Dukowitz v. Hannon Security Services

Citations: 815 N.W.2d 848; 2012 Minn. App. LEXIS 63; 2012 WL 2685044Docket: No. A11-1481

Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota; July 9, 2012; Minnesota; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Appellant Jane Kay Dukowitz contests the district court’s dismissal of her wrongful termination claim against Hannon Security Services, asserting that the court erred in two respects: first, by concluding that her claim of termination in retaliation for applying for unemployment benefits does not constitute wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and second, by ruling that the unemployment compensation statutes do not imply a private right of action. Dukowitz was employed from November 2005 until her termination on March 18, 2009. After accepting a seasonal position in July 2008, she was informed in December 2008 that her role would end, prompting her to apply for unemployment benefits. Dukowitz alleges that her supervisors discussed terminating her after she mentioned applying for benefits. Hannon contends her termination was due to a lack of available work and performance issues, while Dukowitz disputes these claims. Her lawsuit, initiated in June 2010, was met with a summary judgment in favor of Hannon, leading to an award of costs to Hannon, which the district court denied Dukowitz’s request to waive based on her financial hardship. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision.

Minnesota common law may recognize a claim for retaliatory discharge based on an employee's intention to apply for unemployment benefits, but this is not explicitly established. The Minnesota Unemployment Insurance Law provides temporary wage replacement for those unemployed without fault, defining unemployment based on hours worked and earnings. Retaliation by an employer for seeking unemployment benefits is possible, but the law does not expressly prohibit it, raising the question of whether such retaliation could support a civil cause of action. 

Dukowitz argues her claim falls under the public policy exception to at-will employment recognized in Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., where wrongful discharge was acknowledged for employees terminated for refusing to violate the law. However, her claim does not fit this narrow exception, and the court has historically refrained from creating new causes of action. Dukowitz cites Nelson v. Productive Alternatives, Inc. to suggest her claim is viable, but the court clarifies that Nelson did not establish a clear public policy exception beyond cases of termination for refusing to violate the law. The court emphasizes that any extension of current legal principles should be undertaken by the supreme court or legislature, not lower courts.

Nelson's claim was dismissed because he failed to establish a clear public policy supporting his right to vote as a member of a nonprofit. The court affirmed this decision, explicitly stating it did not address the potential for a broader wrongful-discharge claim under Minnesota law, but indicated reluctance to recognize such claims, traditionally reserved for legislative determination. The court also rejected Dukowitz's argument that Nelson supported her claim, noting reliance on case law from other jurisdictions was ineffective as those decisions either came from supreme courts or were based on established precedents of broader wrongful discharge claims.

Dukowitz further contended that the unemployment law implicitly allows for a private right of action for retaliatory discharge. The court outlined the criteria for determining if a civil cause of action could be implied from a statute, which include assessing the plaintiff's relation to the statute's intended beneficiaries, legislative intent regarding remedies, and alignment with the statute's purpose. She cited the purpose of the unemployment law aimed at addressing economic insecurity due to involuntary unemployment, and specific provisions that void agreements waiving unemployment benefits and prohibit employer obstruction of benefit access. However, the court ultimately found no indication of an implied civil cause of action in the unemployment law.

Any employee agreement to pay an employer's taxes is void, and employers cannot deduct wages for their taxes or obstruct unemployment benefits applications. Employers violating this provision face misdemeanor charges for each offense. While Dukowitz, an unemployed individual, is protected under the unemployment law, the court determined that the legislature did not intend to create a private right of action within this framework. The unemployment statutes do not explicitly include retaliation against employees applying for benefits, and the existence of a criminal remedy for violations suggests no intention for private claims. Additionally, the purpose of the unemployment law is to provide benefits to the unemployed rather than to prevent unemployment or protect against retaliation. Therefore, the court concluded that there is no implied private right of action for retaliatory discharge under the unemployment law, affirming the district court's dismissal of Dukowitz's claim.

Dukowitz contests the district court's award of $1,361.35 in costs to Hannon, asserting that the court failed to account for her in forma pauperis status and the financial strain the order would impose. Under Minnesota law, the prevailing party in district court is entitled to reasonable disbursements (Minn. Stat. 549.04, subd. 1). Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(a) similarly mandates that costs and disbursements be awarded as prescribed by law, without allowing discretion based on the non-prevailing party's financial situation.

Dukowitz argues that the permissive language in Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(d) suggests the court has discretion to deny costs; however, the court interprets this as merely granting authority to tax costs appropriately. Additionally, Dukowitz contends that the district court misapplied the in forma pauperis statute, which mentions that costs can be rendered against an in forma pauperis party only if they prevail, thus not applicable in this case.

Dukowitz's reference to a prior case (State ex rel. Vill. of Orono v. Vill. of Long Lake) is deemed irrelevant as it did not involve the statutes at hand. Furthermore, case law from other jurisdictions does not hold persuasive weight due to differing statutory language. Ultimately, the court concludes that it lacked discretion to deny Hannon's cost application based on Dukowitz’s financial hardship, affirming the award of costs. The decision is upheld as Dukowitz did not establish a valid claim for wrongful discharge, and the district court's actions were deemed appropriate.