Garner v. State

Citations: 342 Ga. App. 824; 805 S.E.2d 464; 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 419Docket: A17A1170

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; September 15, 2017; Georgia; State Appellate Court

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Ronta Garner appeals the denial of his motion for a new trial following his conviction for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during a crime. The evidence presented at trial indicated that on October 30, 2013, Garner and Shamarcus Grimes confronted Quavis Carruth, Trevor Martin, and Darius Wilkins at an apartment complex, both men brandishing firearms. After an initial encounter, they pursued the other men, leading to Garner shooting Carruth after Grimes threatened him. Garner was indicted for aggravated assault alongside Grimes, and separately for firearm possession. He later requested to have his trial severed from Grimes's, which the court granted.

During the trial, Garner was required to wear a shock belt, which he claims violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Although the belt was concealed, Garner argued that its presence affected his ability to assist in his defense. His counsel objected to the belt, citing lack of prior notice and its impact on Garner's demeanor. The trial judge allowed a discussion about the device's use but ultimately overruled the objection, finding no evidence that it impeded Garner's participation in the trial. While a defendant is entitled to a fair trial free from undue influence of security measures, courts have discretion to implement security protocols to maintain order. The use of a concealed shock device is not inherently prejudicial, but if a defendant claims it infringes on their rights to counsel or presence, they must demonstrate how it prejudiced those rights.

The trial court's decision to use a shock belt on Garner was not challenged during the trial, except for a vague initial objection from his counsel, which ultimately waived any appellate review of the matter. Garner failed to provide evidence of prejudice from the shock belt during the motion for a new trial, as he did not testify and no other evidence was presented. The court found no abuse of discretion in applying the shock device, particularly given Garner’s prior threats against the victim and others.

Garner also claimed that the placement of an additional metal detector outside his courtroom violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. His counsel initially objected to the detector’s visibility to the jury, but the trial judge offered a neutral explanation to the jurors that was declined. The jury was later escorted in a manner that minimized their exposure to the detector, which was closed off from view during the trial.

The court concluded that Garner did not demonstrate any prejudice from the detector’s presence, emphasizing that additional security measures are not inherently prejudicial unless they convey a direct implication of danger or guilt. The precedent established by the U.S. Supreme Court indicates that jurors may interpret the presence of security not as a sign of the defendant's dangerousness but as a measure to maintain courtroom order.

No specific Georgia case addresses the use of extra metal detectors in court; however, other jurisdictions have determined that such devices do not imply the defendant poses a danger, as established in Smith v. State and People v. Jenkins. The use of metal detectors outside the courtroom is not inherently prejudicial, similar to additional security measures within the courtroom, as noted in Bruce v. State and State v. Aguilar. Security measures outside the courtroom, including metal detectors, are less likely to prejudice a trial than those in close proximity to the defendant, and the general practice of searching all individuals entering the courtroom helps mitigate juror bias.

In relation to Garner's argument regarding the metal detector, the court found no evidence that its use prejudiced his right to a fair trial and determined there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in permitting it. Garner also contested the admission of hearsay testimony from Carruth, who stated that Grimes told Garner, "If you don’t shoot him, I’ll shoot you." Although Garner had filed a motion in limine to exclude Grimes's statements, Carruth's testimony was relevant to Garner's motive during the crime and not subject to that ruling, thus it was not considered hearsay under OCGA 24-8-801 (c).

Garner further argued that his sentences for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of that crime should merge. However, it is established that unlawful possession of a firearm during a crime is distinct from the underlying felony, as clarified in Scudder v. State and Clark v. State.

The two crimes in question do not merge because the legislature intended to impose additional penalties for using a firearm during specific offenses, such as aggravated assault. Previous cases, including Turner v. State, support this interpretation. As a result, the convictions in this case remain distinct and are not subject to merger. The judgment was affirmed by the court. Additionally, the jury acquitted Garner of several charges, including attempted armed robbery and aggravated assault, related to an incident on October 30, 2013. During the motion hearing, a sheriff's lieutenant testified about enhanced courtroom security measures, including the use of a shock belt and an extra metal detector, which were implemented following a request from the State due to gang-related threats against witnesses. The trial court had considered this evidence before ruling on Garner’s objection during a motion in limine.