Docket: A–51 September Term 2016; A–63/64/65 September Term 2016; 077686; 077964
Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey; June 19, 2018; New Jersey; State Supreme Court
Justice Timpone delivered the Court's opinion regarding the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, specifically addressing the tolling provision in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c). This provision delays the statute of limitations when the prosecution relies on DNA evidence that directly identifies the suspect. The consolidated appeals challenge the interpretation of "actor" in this context, focusing on whether the tolling applies when DNA evidence initiates an investigative lead rather than directly identifying the defendant.
The Court concluded that the DNA-tolling exception is only applicable when DNA evidence directly matches the defendant to the crime-related physical evidence. In the cases at hand, the DNA evidence did not directly link the defendants to the offenses, leading to the affirmation of the Appellate Division's decision to dismiss the indictments against Gary Twiggs and relevant portions against James and Likisha Jones.
In State v. Jones, a separate issue concerning a conspiracy indictment was raised. The Court determined that sufficient evidence of a "continuing course of conduct" existed to toll the statute of limitations, thus affirming the Appellate Division's ruling on this count.
The facts from State v. Twiggs indicate that in June 2009, Twiggs and the victim, S.T., reported a robbery involving Dillon Tracy, who was later identified through DNA found on a mask linked to the crime. Although S.T. and Twiggs initially appeared as victims, S.T. later suggested a conspiracy between Twiggs and Tracy. Tracy's DNA matched the mask, and after his confession, police arrested Twiggs in 2014. Twiggs sought to dismiss the indictment based on the statute of limitations, but the trial court found the DNA-tolling provision inapplicable as it did not connect Twiggs directly to the crime, resulting in the indictment's dismissal and the State's subsequent appeal.
A panel of the Appellate Division upheld the decision in State v. Twiggs, determining that the term 'the actor' in the DNA-tolling provision refers specifically to the individual whose DNA is analyzed, not to third parties identified by that individual. The majority held that the statute applies only to those whose DNA directly identifies them as criminal actors, excluding those later named by such actors. As the DNA evidence did not directly implicate Twiggs, the tolling provision was deemed inapplicable for his prosecution. The majority also analyzed the legislative history of the DNA-tolling exception, rejecting the State's argument based on State v. Rumblin, which equated 'actor' with 'principal' and 'accomplice' under the No Early Release Act (NERA). The majority distinguished the specific usage of 'actor' in the DNA-tolling provision from its usage in NERA, asserting that the former's definition is more precise. A dissenting opinion, led by Judge Leone, argued that the majority's interpretation could allow leaders of conspiracies to evade prosecution by using underlings to commit crimes. Following the ruling, the State filed a notice of appeal. Additionally, facts from the grand jury proceedings in State v. Jones indicate a sequence of events surrounding the death of ten-year-old Jon-Niece Jones, detailing her illness, subsequent death, and the actions of family members, including a conversation about disposing of her body.
Godfrey Gibson traveled to Elisha's home, where Elisha packed items into his car before they, along with James, drove to a wooded area in Upper Freehold, New Jersey. Elisha took a plastic bin into the woods and returned smelling of gasoline, with a large fire visible in the area. Days later, family members met and agreed to keep the incident secret regarding Jon-Niece's whereabouts, a meeting that Likisha later denied. Elisha died on December 26, 2002, leaving an apology note expressing her desire to avoid trouble and indicating her distress over Jon-Niece's injury. In March 2005, a hunter found skeletal remains in Upper Freehold, which the Monmouth County Medical Examiner determined to be a homicide with evidence of abuse. Despite efforts to generate leads, including a segment on 'America's Most Wanted,' the case remained cold. In 2006, Iyonna threatened to reveal what happened to Jon-Niece during an argument with Likisha, who responded violently. In 2010, Iyonna learned from James about the concealment of Jon-Niece's body, which had been burned in a mixture of water, gasoline, and cement. In July 2012, during an interview with the Administration of Children's Services, Iyonna disclosed details about Jon-Niece's disappearance, which led to the discovery of her birth and medical documentation. After the interview, Gibson threatened Iyonna if she spoke to the police. DNA testing confirmed Iyonna's relation to the remains and matched Jon-Niece's father, Jamal Kerse. In September 2012, the Medical Examiner issued a death certificate for Jon-Niece, citing homicidal violence. In January 2013, a Grand Jury indicted James, Likisha, and Gibson on multiple charges, including conspiracy to commit tampering with evidence and hindering apprehension.
Gibson was indicted for second-degree hindering the apprehension of another and himself. Defendants James and Likisha sought to dismiss the indictment based on the statute of limitations, which the trial court denied, citing the DNA-tolling provision that applied due to DNA evidence linking the defendants to the case. The court determined that the statute of limitations only began to run in 2012 when law enforcement obtained relevant DNA samples. Subsequently, both defendants accepted conditional plea agreements for lesser charges and received concurrent two-year probation sentences.
Upon appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the dismissal denial for tampering, obstruction, and hindering charges, affirming the denial for the conspiracy charge. The appellate panel emphasized that the DNA-tolling provision is only applicable when DNA evidence directly identifies the perpetrator, which was not the case here, as the DNA only identified Jon-Niece and not the actual perpetrators of the crime. The panel argued that applying the DNA-tolling provision to unidentified individuals would undermine the statute of limitations' protection. Consequently, the panel ruled that the tampering, obstruction, and hindering charges should have been dismissed, while affirming the conspiracy charge as a 'continuing offense' based on conduct that spanned an extended period, thus upholding the trial court's ruling on that charge.
Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to conceal their criminal actions from 2002 to 2012, with specific overt acts identified, including threats made by Likisha in 2006, discussions by James in 2010, and threats by Gibson in 2012. The panel concluded that the ongoing nature of the defendants' conspiracy constituted a 'continuing offense,' thereby allowing the conspiracy charge to circumvent the five-year statute of limitations. The State's petition for certification and the defendants' cross-petitions were granted. The State advocates for a broad interpretation of 'actor' under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c), positing that DNA evidence linking one individual could implicate multiple defendants whose identities were unknown until the evidence emerged. The State argues that the definition of 'actor' under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(g) should apply universally within the Code, emphasizing that N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) lacks a specific definition, thus referring to 'any natural person.' The State contends that the statute of limitations should be tolled due to DNA evidence identifying a victim and co-conspirator. It maintains that the legislative intent supports this interpretation, as the term 'actor' was broadened from 'the person who commits a crime,' avoiding the term 'the defendant' to enable prosecution of all involved parties. The State asserts that the conspiracy in Jones aimed to conceal crimes against a victim rather than solely protect one individual from prosecution. It distinguishes this case from Grunewald v. United States, arguing that the concealment acts were integral to the conspiracy, not a separate effort post-crime. The State claims the indictment sufficiently alleged a conspiracy necessitating concealment, despite not detailing all overt acts, arguing that allowing the statute of limitations to bar the charge would unjustly reward the defendants for their actions. Defendants assert that 'actor' refers exclusively to those directly identified by DNA evidence.
Likisha and James differentiate between the terms 'actor' and 'victim', with 'actor' defined as one who acts and 'victim' as one who has been acted upon. Twiggs contends that the statute lacks language to extend exceptions to those connected to the crime. Defendants argue that the definition of 'actor' in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(g) allows for a broad interpretation and is not the sole definition within the Code. They assert that the Legislature intended 'actor' to be synonymous with 'suspect' for the purpose of the DNA exception, supported by a Sponsors' Statement using these terms interchangeably. Defendants highlight DNA evidence's reliability in identifying perpetrators, emphasizing the statute of limitations' role in preventing stale charges. They claim the DNA exception should only apply to actors whose DNA is implicated in a crime, arguing that third-party statements—not the State's DNA evidence—identified them as suspects. They oppose a broader interpretation that could enable individuals connected to a crime to come forward after the statute of limitations has expired.
Regarding the conspiracy charge, Likisha and James assert that their aim was to protect Elisha from prosecution and claim the indictment does not establish an express agreement to conceal the crime to avoid their prosecution. They argue that the conspiracy's objective was achieved upon Elisha's death in December 2002, marking the commencement of the statute of limitations, and that any actions taken afterward could not extend a conspiracy that had already ended. Alternatively, they contend the conspiracy was abandoned due to a lack of overt acts within the five-year limit. They claim these factors bar prosecution for conspiracy.
The text emphasizes that an indictment should only be dismissed on clear grounds and when it is manifestly deficient. The standard for reviewing dismissal decisions is generally deferential, but legal questions are subject to de novo review. Thus, the legal questions in this case will be examined without deference to lower court interpretations.
Legislative intent is pivotal in interpreting statutes, starting with the statute's plain language. Clearly defined terms must be adhered to, and in the absence of specific definitions, the ordinary meanings of the chosen words are presumed. Statutory language serves as the primary indicator of intent, but courts can also analyze the overall structure and legislative context to avoid rendering any part of a statute meaningless. When ambiguity arises, extrinsic sources such as legislative history may be consulted, particularly if a literal interpretation leads to absurd outcomes. Courts must not alter statutes or add omitted language but resolve ambiguities in favor of defendants, especially in penal statutes.
The excerpt addresses the tolling of the statute of limitations concerning defendants' charges under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c). It emphasizes the public's interest in timely prosecution balanced against a defendant's right to prompt proceedings to prevent prejudice from the passage of time. Statutes of limitations protect defendants from stale charges, providing predictability and an absolute bar to prosecution if the state fails to file within the specified time. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6, modeled after the Model Penal Code, establishes these limits, and courts are bound to uphold them.
The Legislature has established that only a limited number of serious offenses, including murder, manslaughter, and sexual assault, can be charged at any time, as noted in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3, 2C:11-4, and 2C:14-2. An additional exception exists for cases involving DNA evidence, as outlined in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c). This DNA-tolling provision is interpreted narrowly, meaning it only applies under specific circumstances. The statute states that an offense is considered committed when all elements occur or, if the nature of the offense suggests a continuing course of conduct, at the termination of that conduct. The statute of limitations begins the day after the offense, but if the prosecution relies on DNA evidence, it does not commence until the State possesses both the physical evidence and the DNA evidence necessary for identification.
For the tolling to apply, the prosecution must be 'supported by' DNA evidence that matches the actor to the physical evidence. The term 'identifies,' although not defined in the statute, is interpreted to mean establishing the individual’s identity, which is uniquely determined by DNA. DNA evidence is recognized as reliable and has become a standard method for identifying criminal offenders. The statute permits tolling only when the DNA evidence directly identifies the actor, underscoring the Legislature's intent for the provision to apply to those uniquely identified by their DNA.
The legislative history of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) reveals the intent behind the DNA exception added in 2002, which allows for the prosecution of crimes when the perpetrator is unknown but can be identified later through DNA evidence. Initially, the proposed bill referred to "the person who commits a crime," but this was changed to "the actor" in the final version. The Sponsors' Statement indicated that the purpose of the amendment was to remove time limitations on prosecuting crimes when DNA evidence could later establish the identity of the perpetrator. The Legislature acknowledged that statutes of limitations are intended to protect defendants from stale evidence, yet distinguished well-preserved DNA evidence as reliable for identifying defendants long after the crime occurred.
The final Sponsors' Statement clarified that the DNA exception would toll the statute of limitations until the State obtained relevant DNA evidence. Additionally, the legislative fiscal analysis noted that individuals guilty of crimes could evade trial if DNA evidence surfaced after the statute of limitations expired. The consistent terminology used by the Legislature, such as "persons who committed the crime" and "guilty persons," suggests that "actor" was meant to be synonymous with "defendant." The State's argument for a broader interpretation of "actor" based on N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(g) is rejected, as the general definitions section allows for alternative meanings if explicitly defined elsewhere in the Code. For instance, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1 provides a specific definition of "actor" related to sexual offenses, indicating that the general definitions do not universally apply.
A statute does not need to explicitly define a term for its context to necessitate a specific interpretation, as demonstrated in Rumblin, where the term "actor" was interpreted as synonymous with "defendant" in the context of the New Jersey Earned Release Act (NERA), despite NERA lacking a definition for "actor." The court observed that "actor" is used extensively throughout the criminal code and concluded that it encompasses both principals and accomplices. Similarly, the tolling statute uses "actor" to refer to the defendant, aligning with its ordinary definition, which contrasts with the definition of "victim." The State's broad interpretation of "actor" could lead to confusion, potentially allowing "victim" to be included, which undermines the statute's intent regarding the statute of limitations in criminal cases. The statute aims to protect defendants' rights and their ability to mount a defense as time passes, recognizing that evidence can become stale. DNA evidence, however, is considered reliable and does not become stale over time, necessitating that the State must have a direct link between the defendant and the crime via DNA for the tolling provision to be applicable. In the case of Jones, evidence was obtained from skeletal remains that remained unidentified until 2012, raising questions about the tolling provision's application based on the timing and type of evidence.
In 2013, a grand jury indicted Likisha and James for offenses related to the disappearance of Jon-Niece, based on statements from Iyonna linking them to the case. Police obtained DNA samples from Iyonna and Kerse, which established a familial connection to Jon-Niece's remains, but no DNA from the defendants was found on the remains. The State argued for the application of a DNA-tolling exception to extend the statute of limitations beyond its five-year expiration, citing the discovery of DNA in 2012. However, the court determined that the DNA evidence did not directly identify the defendants; it only established familial links through Iyonna and Kerse. As a result, the DNA-tolling provision was deemed inapplicable, leading to the conclusion that the indictment should be dismissed due to the expired statute of limitations.
In a related case involving Twiggs, the indictment was primarily based on Tracy's confession implicating Twiggs as a co-conspirator. Although DNA from physical evidence identified Tracy, it did not directly link Twiggs to the crime. The State claimed the five-year statute of limitations should be tolled until Tracy's DNA sample was obtained, but Twiggs countered that the DNA-tolling provision was not applicable since the link was indirect and depended on Tracy's statements. The court agreed, stating that the existence of DNA evidence alone is insufficient to toll the statute unless it directly identifies the defendant. Additionally, the State's argument to apply a broader interpretation of "defendant" from another legal context was rejected, affirming that the DNA-tolling statute does not support such an expansive reading.
NERA defines "actor" to include both principals and accomplices, ensuring that all equally culpable defendants face sentencing, as highlighted in State v. Rumblin. The Appellate Division emphasized that allowing an accomplice to evade consequences would contradict legislative intent. Under NERA, an actor is a co-defendant, meaning an accomplice cannot avoid liability. NERA's application begins at the sentencing phase, independent of statutes of limitations, having already initiated criminal proceedings. Conversely, the DNA-tolling provision allows prosecutions beyond the statute of limitations based on reliable DNA evidence, which is essential for implicating specific individuals. This provision is distinct from NERA, as it addresses concerns about stale evidence at the outset of proceedings. In the Twiggs case, the DNA evidence was insufficient to connect Twiggs directly to the crime, leading to the dismissal of the indictment. The discussion then shifts to the conspiracy count in the Jones case, where a defendant is guilty of conspiracy if they agree to promote or facilitate a crime. Conspiracy is ongoing until either the crime is committed or the agreement is abandoned, as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2.
An overt act in furtherance of conspiracy must be proven to have been committed by the defendant or a co-conspirator, according to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(d). The State is not limited to the overt acts listed in the indictment and can present additional evidence of overt acts. The Supreme Court in Grunewald established that prosecutors cannot indefinitely extend a conspiracy's lifespan through mere acts of concealment after the central criminal objectives have been achieved. It emphasized the distinction between concealment acts that further original conspiracy goals and those that merely cover up a completed crime. The Court reversed convictions for conspiracy due to a lack of evidence of an ongoing agreement among conspirators to conceal the crime.
In assessing a motion to dismiss a criminal indictment, courts view evidence favorably towards the State. An indictment is valid if there is at least some evidence supporting each element of a prima facie case. The denial of such a motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In this case, sufficient evidence was presented to support the conspiracy counts against defendants James and Likisha. Evidence included a 2002 family meeting to cover up events leading to Jon-Niece's death, threats made to co-conspirators to maintain secrecy, and discussions regarding the disposal of a body. These actions indicate a continuing conspiracy that likely aimed to protect the conspirators from discovery, extending beyond the death of Elisha. The defendants retain the right to challenge the State's evidence at trial, where they may also request a jury charge on the application of Grunewald.
The State conceded that the "continuing course of conduct" exception to the statute of limitations was not applicable, but this concession is not binding on the court's analysis. It is recognized that while a prosecutor's position favorable to a defendant carries significant weight, it does not obligate the court. The court finds potential for a continuing course of conduct relevant for tolling the statute of limitations, which is to be decided by a jury upon remand. The judgment of the Appellate Division affirming the trial court's dismissal of the indictment in the case of Twiggs is upheld. In the case of Jones, the Appellate Division's reversal of the trial court's denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss the indictment for substantive tampering, obstruction, and hindering charges is confirmed, while the denial of the motion to dismiss the conspiracy charge is also affirmed. Both cases are remanded to their respective trial courts for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Justice Timpone's opinion is joined by Chief Justice Rabner and Justices LaVecchia, Albin, Patterson, Fernandez-Vina, and Solomon. For clarity, members of the Jones family are referred to by their first names.
