Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey; March 27, 2018; New Jersey; State Supreme Court
Police officers responded to a serious motor vehicle accident involving defendant Shayna Zalcberg, whose vehicle struck another, resulting in severe injuries and the death of one passenger. Emergency services transported the occupants to a hospital, where police suspected alcohol involvement due to the circumstances and observations made at the scene. Officers found a miniature alcohol bottle in Zalcberg's vehicle and noted that she smelled of alcohol. Unable to conduct sobriety tests due to her injuries, the officers decided to obtain a blood sample without a warrant, believing it unnecessary. Zalcberg was subsequently charged with second-degree vehicular homicide and assault by auto. She moved to suppress the blood draw results, arguing it violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court agreed, ruling that exigent circumstances did not apply, a decision the Appellate Division affirmed. However, the court concluded that the totality of the circumstances did present an objective exigency, justifying the warrantless blood draw, and reversed the Appellate Division's judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings.
No discussion occurred regarding the need for a search warrant prior to obtaining the defendant's blood sample. An officer arrived at Jersey Shore Medical Center to collect the sample, but had to wait approximately one hour before being allowed to access the defendant. After the blood was drawn by a nurse, the defendant was charged with second-degree vehicular homicide and multiple counts of assault by auto. The defendant moved to suppress the warrantless blood test results, and the judge granted this motion, citing the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Missouri v. McNeely, which established that the natural dissipation of alcohol does not justify a per se exigency for a warrantless blood draw.
The State appealed this decision, and during the appeal process, another Appellate Division case ruled that McNeely applied prospectively rather than retroactively. Based on this ruling, the Appellate Division reversed the suppression order. The defendant sought leave to appeal this reversal, which was granted. Subsequently, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided in State v. Adkins that McNeely should be applied retroactively, leading to a summary reversal of the Appellate Division's decision and remand for a new suppression hearing.
On remand, the trial court again granted the defendant's motion to suppress, finding that while probable cause existed, the State did not demonstrate an exigency that would allow for a warrantless search. The judge emphasized the significant delay between establishing probable cause and drawing the blood sample, noting that a telephonic warrant could have been obtained. Ultimately, the only exigency recognized was the natural metabolization of alcohol, which was insufficient to justify the warrantless blood draw under the standards established in McNeely and Adkins.
An Appellate Division panel upheld the trial judge's decision, leading to the State's motion for leave to appeal regarding the suppression of results from a warrantless blood draw. The State contends that both lower courts failed to assess the totality of circumstances indicating exigency. The State emphasizes the necessity for officers to conduct a thorough investigation of a serious car crash, which involved significant emergency response efforts, including the use of the "Jaws of Life" and multiple medevac helicopters. It argues that the courts should have given considerable weight to the potential dissipation of alcohol evidence, referencing Adkins, and that an analysis based on hindsight regarding police resource allocation cannot replace an exigency evaluation.
The State criticizes the lower courts for suggesting that exigency was undermined by the officers not securing a blood sample immediately upon establishing probable cause. It asserts that such a conclusion improperly imposes a requirement for immediate warrant application. Furthermore, the State points out that telephonic warrants were effectively unavailable on the night of the incident, despite existing court rules, due to a lack of practical procedures in Monmouth County. The Attorney General, as amicus curiae, supports the State's argument, advocating for an assessment of the officers' actions based on objective reasonableness and comparing this case to State v. Jones, which justified a warrantless blood draw under similar exigent circumstances. The Attorney General distinguishes the current case from McNeely, stating that the present situation involved unique factors, including multiple injuries, an unconscious defendant, and significant emergency response efforts, creating a legitimate objective exigency.
The defendant argues that the warrantless blood draw cannot be justified under the exigency exception to the warrant requirement. They assert that the State's narrative is a "revisionist" portrayal aimed at fitting the situation within the exigency doctrine. The defendant contends that law enforcement was mistaken in believing no warrant was needed, pointing out that over an hour passed after probable cause was established without action being taken to secure a warrant. The defendant critiques the State's suggestion of a new "accident exception," which would eliminate the need for a warrant for drivers suspected of DWI following an accident, arguing this contradicts established legal precedents.
The defendant maintains that the trial court correctly assessed the totality of the circumstances and determined that the officers lacked the objective exigency necessary to justify a warrantless search. Furthermore, the defendant claims that the absence of a formal telephonic warrant procedure at the time is irrelevant, asserting that the officers could have sought assistance from an assistant prosecutor to obtain a telephonic warrant. Thus, the defendant concludes that there was no valid justification for not pursuing a warrant before proceeding with the blood draw.
Regarding judicial review, an appellate court must defer to the trial court's factual findings if supported by sufficient evidence. However, legal interpretations are reviewed de novo. The Fourth Amendment and New Jersey's Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures, requiring a warrant unless a specific exception applies, such as exigent circumstances. The definition of exigency varies case by case, requiring a fact-sensitive analysis, considering factors like the urgency of the situation, the time needed to secure a warrant, the seriousness of the crime, and the risk of evidence destruction or harm to individuals. The exigency doctrine is often cited in cases involving warrantless blood draws.
In Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court ruled that a compelled blood sample for alcohol analysis is a search under the Fourth Amendment. The case involved a defendant who, after a single-car accident, exhibited signs of intoxication when police arrived. The officer arrested the defendant at the hospital and directed a blood draw without a warrant. The Court recognized the blood test as an "intrusion into the human body" and typically requiring a warrant, but upheld the officer's actions due to an emergency situation where evidence risked being lost through alcohol metabolization.
In Missouri v. McNeely, the Court addressed the confusion following Schmerber regarding whether the natural breakdown of alcohol constitutes a blanket exigency for warrantless blood tests in DUI cases. The defendant in McNeely, who showed signs of intoxication after being stopped for erratic driving, refused a breathalyzer. The officer took him to a hospital and ordered a blood test without consent or a warrant. The Supreme Court clarified that while the dissipation of alcohol can indicate exigency, it does not apply categorically; warrantless blood tests must be assessed based on the specific circumstances of each case. The Court emphasized that if delays in obtaining a warrant do not significantly hinder the efficacy of the search, officers are required to secure a warrant before conducting a blood test.
The Missouri Supreme Court determined that the absence of an emergency situation negated the justification for a warrantless blood test, affirming that the metabolization of alcohol does not inherently create exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. The case of Adkins involved a defendant subjected to a warrantless blood draw following a car accident, where the trial court initially suppressed the blood test results based on pre-McNeely case law, which incorrectly supported warrantless searches due to alcohol dissipation. Upon appeal, the court established that McNeely mandated a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis for assessing exigency, leading to the reversal of the Appellate Division's decision and a remand for a new suppression hearing. The court emphasized that the potential dissipation of blood-alcohol evidence should be a significant factor in this assessment. In State v. Jones, the Appellate Division found a warrantless blood draw constitutional after a defendant, who caused a multi-vehicle accident, was unconscious and later exhibited signs of intoxication at the hospital. The blood sample was taken approximately one hour and fifteen minutes post-accident, following the officer's request.
The officer did not obtain a warrant for the blood test due to standard procedure and lack of training on telephonic warrants. Four months post-McNeely, the defendant sought to suppress the warrantless blood test results. The trial court granted this motion, stating the State failed to prove it was impossible for officers to call for a warrant. However, the Appellate Division reversed this decision, citing "special facts" justifying a warrantless blood sample, including the presence of an accident, injuries requiring hospitalization, and a lengthy police investigation. The appellate panel clarified that the State did not need to demonstrate that blood-alcohol evidence would be destroyed, only that any delay could threaten its preservation.
In State v. Jones (Jones II), the panel applied the principles from Adkins, affirming the earlier reversal of the suppression order based on an objective exigency analysis. The circumstances included a serious accident necessitating multiple emergency services, the use of the "Jaws of Life" for extrication, and helicopter transport of victims, all on a busy highway during a high-traffic event. The officers’ responsibilities included managing traffic, examining wreckage, and interviewing witnesses, which justified any delay in obtaining the blood sample. The panel concluded that the hour-long wait at the hospital did not negate exigency and dismissed the defendant's arguments regarding the technical nature of telephonic warrants, emphasizing the impracticality of the system at that time and the officers' belief that a warrant was unnecessary.
No established procedure existed for obtaining telephonic warrants in Monmouth County at the time of the incident, nor were Freehold Township officers trained in such a process. The defendant argued that the officers could have learned about telephonic warrants through legal consultation, but the officers believed no warrant was needed for blood draws. Their lack of knowledge about any formal warrant procedure, combined with their belief that warrants were unnecessary, indicated that a warrant was not reasonably available.
The court rejected the notion that reversing the trial court's suppression creates a blanket "accident exception" to the warrant requirement for blood draws in suspected DWI cases. It clarified that not all automobile accidents create exigent circumstances; rather, courts must assess the objective exigency of each unique situation. The case's facts—specifically, a fatal accident with multiple serious injuries, the absence of a telephonic warrant system, and the police officers' numerous responsibilities—amounted to objective exigency. The potential rapid dissipation of alcohol in the defendant's blood also lent substantial weight to the decision. Consequently, the court held that the warrantless blood draw did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights, reversing the Appellate Division's judgment and remanding for further proceedings.
In dissent, Justices Albin and Timpone criticized the majority for not adhering to the precedent set by Missouri v. McNeely, which requires a warrant absent exigent circumstances. They argued that the natural dissipation of alcohol alone does not constitute sufficient exigency, and asserted that the trial court's findings, which indicated no exigency existed, should have been upheld. The dissenters maintained that the Appellate Division correctly affirmed the trial court's suppression of the blood results as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, opposing the majority's reversal.
The trial court conducted a suppression hearing where five witnesses provided testimony regarding a serious two-car accident on Route 522 on July 27, 2011. Multiple law enforcement officers and emergency responders arrived at the scene, where the defendant was unconscious and her passengers were injured. An operator of the other vehicle stated that the defendant's car swerved into his lane, causing the accident. Detective Kerecman secured the scene by 9:05 p.m., and by 9:25 p.m., a paramedic reported a strong odor of alcohol emanating from the defendant. Officer Hudak observed a small alcohol bottle in the defendant's vehicle and noted the smell of alcohol on her by approximately 9:20 p.m., establishing probable cause for a blood sample.
Despite this, Officer Braxton was not sent to the hospital to obtain the blood sample until 10:36 p.m., arriving at 10:53 p.m. The blood sample was not drawn until 12:05 a.m., resulting in an unexplained delay of nearly three hours. The officers did not attempt to secure a warrant during this time, despite the availability of telephonic warrants and judges to authorize them. The trial court made key findings: the officers had probable cause at 9:20 p.m., the delay was unjustified and not caused by the accident's aftermath, and the State did not demonstrate that obtaining a warrant would have undermined the efficacy of the search. All findings were supported by credible evidence.
The trial court adhered to the directive from the Supreme Court in McNeely, which established that the natural dissipation of alcohol does not create a blanket exigency for warrantless blood tests in drunk driving cases. The Supreme Court emphasized that if police can obtain a warrant without significantly compromising the investigation, they are constitutionally required to do so. This principle stems from the "totality of the circumstances" approach outlined in Schmerber v. California regarding the warrant requirement in blood draws.
In the present case, the court noted that the warrant process would not have caused a significant delay, as officers could have secured a warrant while transporting the suspect. Despite this, no efforts were made to obtain a warrant during the hour the officers were present after establishing probable cause, during the drive to the hospital, or while waiting for the blood sample to be drawn.
The trial court found that the situation did not present unique complexities justifying a warrantless draw, as the scene was secured and adequate police presence existed to facilitate obtaining a warrant. The elapsed time from establishing probable cause to the blood draw was nearly three hours, underscoring that exigencies created by the police themselves cannot override the warrant requirement.
The majority's assertion of exigent circumstances based on the situation's complexity was inconsistent with the trial court's factual findings. Additionally, the claim that officers were unaware of how to obtain a telephonic warrant was insufficient to excuse the Fourth Amendment violation, as ignorance of the law does not justify noncompliance with constitutional rights.
Ignorance of the law is not an acceptable defense, particularly for officials responsible for enforcing it, who are presumed to be aware of constitutional requirements such as the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause. Supreme Court rulings emphasize that constitutional rights are not contingent on state training of law enforcement regarding these mandates. Specifically, the state bears the burden to demonstrate that exigent circumstances justify warrantless searches, as outlined in McNeely. In this case, the state failed to prove that it was impracticable to secure a warrant for a blood draw within the two hours and forty-five minutes available. The trial court upheld this conclusion, supported by credible evidence. The appellate review criticized the majority for deviating from the trial court’s factual findings and applying an incorrect standard of review, thereby undermining the precedent set by McNeely. The dissent argues that the majority incorrectly assessed the accident scene's characteristics and that the majority's decision could encourage circumvention of the warrant requirement.
