Court: Missouri Court of Appeals; April 18, 2019; Missouri; State Appellate Court
Rhiannon Scronce appeals the Court of Appeals' decision that reversed the McCracken Circuit Court's finding of her as CJS's de facto custodian under KRS 403.270. The appeal raises three key issues: 1) whether the time to qualify as a de facto custodian can be aggregated or must be continuous; 2) what initiates a legal proceeding to pause the de facto custodian time requirement; and 3) whether a putative father who has only obtained a DNA test qualifies as a "parent" under KRS 403.270. The court affirms in part and reverses in part.
The case involves CJS, born in December 2014, whose mother, Jasmine Shoales, initially misled Rhiannon and Dixie Meinders about CJS's paternity, claiming Caleb Scronce was the father. In September 2015, Dixie filed a petition for emergency custody due to Jasmine's neglectful home environment. The court awarded temporary custody to Rhiannon and Dixie after finding Jasmine's home unsafe for CJS. Following this, Jasmine sought to reset the adjudication hearing and requested a paternity test for Keith Middleton, identified later as CJS's biological father.
The court acknowledged the DNA results confirming Keith as the father but denied his visitation request, citing a lack of information about him. In subsequent proceedings, Keith sought custody, and Rhiannon and Dixie filed a counter petition, leading to all cases being assigned to the same family court judge.
On January 3, 2017, an Agreed Order was issued to consolidate the "J" and "CI" cases, with a final hearing scheduled for May 2017. At the hearing, testimony was provided by Keith, Dixie, Rhiannon, and Tony Harris, a licensed counselor representing Keith; Jasmine was absent. The court, referencing Spreacker v. Vaughn, determined that since the child was never placed by the Cabinet and was under three years old, a six-month period was necessary to establish de facto custodianship. The court found that Rhiannon had cared for the child for more than six months before Mr. Middleton's custody petition, which he did not file until September 6, 2016, thus not tolling the six-month requirement under KRS 403.270(1)(a). As a result, Rhiannon was awarded custody, while Keith was granted limited visitation rights.
Keith appealed the custody decision, and the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling, citing Heltsley v. Frogge. The appellate court held that Keith's motion on April 29, 2016, was enough to toll the time required for Rhiannon to achieve de facto custodian status, concluding she did not meet the criteria for such status. The analysis then focused on whether Rhiannon qualified as a de facto custodian, clarifying two key legal questions: (1) whether the required time period for de facto status must be continuous, and (2) what constitutes the initiation of a legal proceeding sufficient to toll the required time.
The statute in question, KRS 403.270(1)(a), defines a "de facto custodian" as a person who has been the primary caregiver and financial supporter of a child residing with them for a continuous six-month period if the child is under three years old. Rhiannon and Dixie contended that the required period could be aggregated, citing a two-week period in spring 2015 during Jasmine's incarceration. However, it was concluded that the legislative intent, as reflected in the wording of "a period of six months," indicates that the time requirement must be one uninterrupted period, not a combination of separate intervals.
The legislature did not intend for the aggregation of different time periods under the de facto custodian statute, as allowing such aggregation would contradict the statute's purpose. Granting de facto custodian status equates a third party's standing in custody matters to that of a parent, which is a significant legal consideration protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To qualify as a de facto custodian, the required time period must be continuous. Consequently, neither Rhiannon nor Dixie meets the criteria for de facto custodian status.
Regarding the tolling of the time period for de facto custodian status, there is inconsistency in case law about what constitutes the commencement of a legal proceeding. KRS 403.270(1)(a) states that any time after a legal proceeding initiated by a parent seeking custody does not count toward the required residency period. The trial court ruled based on *Spreacker v. Vaughn* that the time had not been tolled before Rhiannon attained de facto status, whereas the Court of Appeals referenced *Heltsley v. Frogge* and found that it had been tolled.
In *Spreacker*, the child's Great-Aunt obtained emergency custody after the parents' arrest. Although the Great-Aunt later sought custody in another county, the Court of Appeals determined that the mother had not initiated a separate action to regain custody, which indirectly indicated that a separate proceeding is necessary to toll the de facto custodian time requirement. A dissent in the case argued that "commence" should refer to any participation in custody litigation, criticizing the requirement for a separate action as unnecessarily burdensome and not aligned with legislative intent.
Heltsley aligns with the dissenting opinion in *Spreacker*, highlighting a scenario involving a married but separated couple and their child. Prior to separation, the child's maternal grandparents provided substantial financial support and the mother and child lived with them during the father's military service. Following the separation, the mother and child permanently moved in with the grandparents on January 14, 2007, after which the grandparents filed a dependency petition and were granted temporary custody shortly thereafter. The mother filed for divorce and sought custody on February 23, 2007, while the father requested joint custody in an April 16, 2007, pro se response. The grandparents intervened, claiming de facto custodianship, but the family court dismissed their petition, ruling they were not de facto custodians. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, stating that the father's actions prior to the grandparents' claim were sufficient to toll the de facto custodianship period under KRS 403.270(1).
In the current case, the trial court's application of *Spreacker* is questioned because unlike the mother in that case, Keith filed a separate custody action and actively participated in the dependency proceedings. He asserted his paternity and requested custody at the first available opportunity. The text argues that the trial court improperly ordered a home study under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC), which does not apply when the state has never had custody of the child, as confirmed by Missouri authorities. The conclusion emphasizes the fundamental constitutional right of parents to raise their children and advocates for a straightforward process for tolling the de facto custodianship period, arguing against the necessity of filing a separate custody action when an active case is already present.
Filing expenses for new cases are acknowledged, but cases will likely be consolidated for convenience. The court overrules the precedent set in Spreacker, establishing that a parent's direct involvement in child custody proceedings indicates a desire to regain custody, which tolls the de facto time requirement under KRS 403.270. Applying this ruling, Rhiannon does not qualify as a de facto custodian because CJS was under three years old and not placed in her care by DCBS. To achieve de facto status, Rhiannon needed to be CJS's primary caregiver and financial supporter for a minimum of six months. Although granted custody on November 5, 2015, Keith asserted his paternity and sought custody shortly thereafter, with the trial court ordering an ICPC study on Keith's home, which would extend beyond the six-month period necessary for de facto status. Despite Rhiannon's custody, Keith's first court appearance to assert his rights just 14 days later was sufficient to toll the de facto time period. The trial court incorrectly ruled Rhiannon as CJS's de facto custodian, given that CJS was only eleven months old at the time Keith's paternity was established, resulting in significant bonding time lost. The trial court's comments during proceedings reflected a bias against Keith’s claims, and it is emphasized that due process protects a parent's right to make decisions regarding child-rearing without state interference, as long as the parent is deemed fit.
Rhiannon's commendable actions regarding CJS do not negate Keith's status as a fit parent. His parental rights remain intact, with no legal proceedings for dependency, neglect, or abuse against him. The court has ordered custody of CJS to be granted to Keith, emphasizing his fundamental right to raise his child, which is paramount over any claims from third parties. Although Rhiannon contends that Keith's lack of a filed motion to establish paternity undermines his legal status as CJS's father, this argument is dismissed. The court recognized Keith as CJS's father upon receipt of the DNA test results, fulfilling the definition of "parent" under KRS 600.020(46).
The court concludes that: 1) the time required for de facto custodian status under KRS 403.270 must be continuous; 2) active participation by a parent in custody proceedings can toll the required time for de facto custodian status; and 3) Rhiannon and Dixie do not qualify as de facto custodians and lack standing for custodial claims. Consequently, custody is to be awarded to Keith, with Jasmine agreeing to sole custody for him.
Chief Justice Minton concurs with the decision but disagrees with the majority's interpretation of KRS 403.270(1)(a), advocating for a reading that allows for a cumulative residency period over a child's first three years rather than a continuous six-month period. He argues that the term "period" can refer to a series of events, suggesting that the statute's ambiguity warrants a broader interpretation. Additionally, he references KRS 405.021(1)(a) regarding grandparent visitation rights, further illustrating statutory context.
KRS 405.021(b) establishes a rebuttable presumption in favor of grandparent visitation when a child's parent, who is the child’s son or daughter, is deceased, provided the grandparent demonstrates a significant and viable pre-existing relationship with the child. KRS 405.021(c) outlines specific criteria to establish this relationship: 1) the child has lived with the grandparent for at least six consecutive months, with or without the custodian; 2) the grandparent has been the child's regular caregiver for at least six consecutive months; and 3) the grandparent has had regular contact with the child for at least twelve consecutive months.
The General Assembly's legislative history indicates intent to allow for combined time periods to meet the six-month requirement, as evidenced by the absence of the terms “consecutive” or “continuous” in KRS 403.270(1)(a). This interpretation is supported by cases from other states, such as Indiana, where courts have allowed for aggregation of non-consecutive time periods to satisfy residency requirements for "de facto custodian" status. The Indiana Court of Appeals case A.J.L. v. D.A.L. affirmed that non-continuous time spent residing with caregivers could meet statutory requirements. Concerns regarding the potential for undermining statutory purposes or infringing on parental rights by allowing such aggregation are countered by the assertion that a total of six months’ residence, regardless of continuity, reflects a similar degree of attachment and caregiving.
The majority's interpretation of the statute is criticized for leading to an absurd outcome, allowing a negligent parent to fulfill minimal parental duties while a loving caregiver is effectively denied de facto custodian status despite caring for the child for most of their life. The author argues that it is illogical for the law to favor a parent who has had the child for a shorter period over a caregiver who has provided consistent care. Despite this critique, the author agrees with the majority's ruling that Middleton's attendance at a hearing effectively paused the six-month residency requirement, meaning the caregiver did not meet the criteria for de facto custodian status. The author confirms agreement with the resolution of the case and the handling of other related issues, noting that Dixie Meinders, while a named party, lacks standing to appeal since custody was awarded solely to Rhiannon and she did not contest the order. The excerpt highlights concerns about the lack of support from the Cabinet for parents seeking to regain custody, which complicates family reunification efforts. It also mentions issues regarding missing records from a pivotal hearing, which prevented clarity about the court's decisions and the potential errors made in prior orders related to custody transition.
The trial court granted temporary custody of a child to both Dixie and Rhiannon, but Rhiannon was undisputedly the child's primary caregiver in Lexington. Jasmine, initially considered indigent, was ordered to pay for a paternity test. Although counsel was appointed for her, it was dismissed when Jasmine indicated she would hire her own attorney. Jasmine filed a notice consenting to sole custody being awarded to Keith. The excerpt also references legal principles related to statutory interpretation, emphasizing that similar language in different statutes is presumed to have the same meaning, as supported by relevant case law and legal literature.
