State v. Angela D. Brewer

Citation: Not availableDocket: 28120

Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina; October 12, 2022; South Carolina; State Supreme Court

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Angela D. Brewer was convicted of homicide by child abuse following the death of her thirteen-month-old grandson, who ingested lemonade mixed with oxycodone. Brewer challenged the court of appeals' decision to uphold the trial court's admission of an interrogation video recorded while she was under medication. Additionally, the case involved the admissibility of a toxicology report from an out-of-state laboratory, presented by a pathologist who did not conduct the testing. The trial court deemed the toxicology report non-testimonial, which was affirmed by the court of appeals. The Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld the admission of the interrogation video but reversed Brewer's conviction and sentence due to a violation of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause.

On October 17, 2014, paramedics responded to a 911 call from Brewer’s home, where the child was found unresponsive and later pronounced dead at the hospital. At the time of the incident, Brewer was the only adult present, having cared for the child and his one-month-old sister throughout the day. Brewer claimed to have given the child lemonade around 1:15 p.m., and when she attempted to wake him later, he was unresponsive. Following the emergency call, law enforcement conducted a search of the residence, finding a pill container and two sippy cups with suspicious liquids.

Dr. James Fulcher, a pathologist, conducted an autopsy and submitted samples to the National Medical Services (NMS) laboratory for testing, unable to initially determine the cause of death. On November 6, 2014, Brewer met with a Pickens County detective and rejected the possibility that her child could have ingested her prescription OxyContin, becoming argumentative during the discussion. On November 17, Fulcher concluded the cause of death as 'acute oxycodone toxicity' after receiving toxicology results. Investigators tested items from Brewer's home, finding positive results for methamphetamine and caffeine in one sippy cup and oxycodone in another; however, no positive test for methamphetamine was found in the child.

On December 18, 2014, Brewer was interviewed by Rita Burgess and Christine Cauthen after being read her Miranda rights. During the interview, Brewer admitted to taking OxyContin and Valium on the day of the interview. Her condition appeared to deteriorate, leading investigators to take a break due to her slurred speech and apparent drowsiness. The interview ended when Brewer requested a lawyer, after which she was charged with homicide by child abuse.

During a pretrial Jackson v. Denno hearing, defense counsel sought to exclude the interrogation video, claiming Brewer was too intoxicated to waive her rights. Testimony indicated Brewer was coherent at the beginning but deteriorated later. The court found the initial portion of the video admissible but deemed the latter portion inadmissible due to Brewer's impairment.

Regarding the NMS report used to support Fulcher's testimony about the cause of death, defense counsel argued that Fulcher could not testify about the specific amount of oxycodone because the State did not call the lab personnel who conducted the tests, infringing on Brewer's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. The trial court ruled that the NMS report was not testimonial, thus the Confrontation Clause did not apply, and noted that defense counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine Fulcher.

Fulcher testified that the child’s death resulted from a lethal concentration of oxycodone, emphasizing that the detected amount could be fatal to any individual, including adults. He highlighted his reliance on the NMS lab for toxicology reports, performing about 650 autopsies annually, and asserted the lab’s reliability, stating he would not endorse a report if he suspected any testing issues. Fulcher explained that the oxycodone found was likely dissolved in liquid, as Brewer's medication was a long-acting formulation, contrasting it with short-acting oxycodone products. He noted the potential for abuse of the longer-lasting medication by manipulating its form to increase the drug's concentration, which was critical in countering the defense's claim of accidental ingestion. The jury ultimately convicted Brewer, sentencing her to the mandatory minimum of twenty years for homicide by child abuse, a decision affirmed by the court of appeals, which is now under certiorari review. 

Key legal issues include whether the court of appeals erred in finding Brewer’s statement to law enforcement was voluntary despite evidence of her intoxication, and whether the admission of the NMS report violated the Confrontation Clause, given that the test results were deemed non-testimonial. The standard of review for the voluntariness of confessions involves assessing the trial judge's factual conclusions for clear error, while the legal determination regarding testimonial statements is reviewed de novo. The appeal considers the established jurisprudence on these standards, noting variations in how different jurisdictions approach the voluntariness of statements.

Brewer challenges the admission of a December 2014 interrogation video, arguing that the trial court incorrectly determined she could waive her constitutional rights due to intoxication. The State defends the trial court’s decision, asserting that it did not abuse its discretion by admitting the initial portion of the video while excluding the later segments, where Brewer's demeanor indicated significant impairment from prescription medication. Under Miranda v. Arizona, a confession is inadmissible unless the suspect voluntarily waives their rights, with the State bearing the burden of proof. The court assesses voluntariness based on the totality of circumstances, stating that intoxication alone does not invalidate a confession unless the suspect is unconscious of their statements. Previous rulings emphasize that evidence of intoxication may affect the credibility of a confession but does not necessitate its exclusion unless the individual was entirely unaware of what they were saying. The trial court found that, despite Brewer's initial signs of impairment, she understood the questions and answered them appropriately at the start of the interrogation. As the interview progressed, her clarity diminished, indicating a clear distinction in her state of mind over time.

The trial court rejected the State's request to admit the second half of a video under Rule 404(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence (SCRE), which was intended to show Brewer's intent and lack of mistake in the handling of her medication. It also excluded certain comments from the part of the video shown to the jury due to their irrelevance or violation of Rule 403, SCRE. The court's decisions, while distinct from the question of the voluntariness of Brewer's statements, demonstrated its understanding of intoxication's relevance and the legal standard requiring a degree of intoxication that incapacitates a person’s comprehension. Brewer's claim that the court of appeals misapplied precedent was addressed; however, the court declined to overrule the established case law, which stipulates that intoxication alone does not inherently render a statement involuntary. It emphasized that voluntariness is assessed based on whether intoxication overwhelmed the individual’s will. The court cited multiple cases illustrating that intoxication must reach a level that prevents understanding the nature and consequences of statements for those statements to be deemed involuntary. The trial court's decision to admit the first portion of the video was affirmed.

Additionally, Brewer challenged the court of appeals' affirmation of the trial court's ruling that the NMS lab report was nontestimonial, arguing that its primary purpose was to provide evidence for a criminal trial. She claimed this ruling allowed the pathologist, Fulcher, to testify about crucial evidence without personal knowledge of the testing process, thereby increasing the necessity for cross-examination of the actual tester.

The State argues that the lab report is non-testimonial, claiming its primary purpose was to aid Fulcher in determining the child's cause of death rather than to prepare evidence for trial. It highlights that law enforcement's initial lack of suspicion towards Brewer supports this assertion. The State maintains that even if the trial court erred in its interpretation, such error was harmless. Under the Sixth Amendment, the Confrontation Clause guarantees the right to confront witnesses against the accused, applicable only to testimonial out-of-court statements. The determination of whether a statement is testimonial relies on the "primary purpose test," assessing the intent of reasonable participants rather than individual subjective intentions. The evolution of the Confrontation Clause, particularly from the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington, established that testimonial statements are inadmissible unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had prior opportunities to cross-examine. This principle was reinforced in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, where the Court ruled that affidavits from forensic analysts could not substitute for live testimony regarding the nature of seized substances.

The majority opinion indicates that affidavits are effectively equivalent to live testimony, suggesting their testimonial nature. The Supreme Court asserted that the substance found with Melendez-Diaz and his co-defendants was cocaine, aligning with the prosecution's assertion, which the analysts would testify to at trial. The Court dismissed the argument that the reliability of forensic testing negates the need for cross-examination, emphasizing that the Constitution guarantees the right to confrontation and cannot be bypassed for alternative trial strategies. Following Melendez-Diaz, the Court ruled that a lab report on blood alcohol concentration is also testimonial, affirming the applicability of the Confrontation Clause. The Court rejected the New Mexico Supreme Court's use of the business records exception to hearsay rules and maintained that there is no 'forensic evidence' exception to the Confrontation Clause. The Court ruled against allowing an expert who did not conduct the test to serve as a 'surrogate witness' under the Confrontation Clause, stating that the Clause does not permit circumvention of direct confrontation based on perceived fairness. In a split decision in Williams v. Illinois, the Court determined that an expert could testify about DNA testing results from an external agency, provided the expert's opinion is based on other evidence. The plurality clarified that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to out-of-court statements not intended to prove the truth of the matter asserted and emphasized that the testifying expert did not endorse the credibility of the lab. However, the differing opinions in Williams have led to confusion regarding the Confrontation Clause's limitations when an expert testifies based on another analyst's results, as noted by various courts.

The lack of a unified standard for determining whether out-of-court statements are considered testimonial is emphasized, particularly following the Supreme Court's decision in Williams, where confusion remains evident as noted by multiple justices. Justice Alito's opinion, referred to as a plurality, is effectively a dissent, as it lacks support from five other justices. The case of Brockmeyer illustrates that certain out-of-court statements, such as those in a computerized chain-of-custody log, are deemed non-testimonial since they do not aim to prove facts necessary for conviction. 

In the current case, law enforcement's early focus on Brewer as a suspect is detailed, including the inventorying of her medication and the seizure of the child's sippy cups for testing. The requirement of calling the forensic analyst who conducted testing to satisfy the Confrontation Clause is highlighted, especially given the legal mandate for autopsies in suspicious child deaths as per section 17-5-520. Other jurisdictions have similarly interpreted statutory requirements for autopsies as indicative of testimonial intent. 

The core issue revolves around whether Dr. Belding's autopsy report was created to establish facts relevant to potential criminal prosecutions, with the conclusion being that it indeed serves that purpose. Supporting cases affirm that autopsy reports are generally considered testimonial, while some rulings have diverged on this interpretation.

The NMS report is deemed critical for the State’s prosecution in a homicide by child abuse case, as it provides essential evidence regarding the cause of death and the quantity of oxycodone found in the child. This case aligns more closely with the precedents set in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming rather than Williams or Brockmeyer. Unlike Brockmeyer, where the notes were classified as nontestimonial, the NMS report is considered testimonial because it directly supports the State's burden of proof and addresses Brewer's defense regarding accidental ingestion. The safeguards present in Williams, which protected against misuse of evidence, are absent here. Fulcher's testimony emphasized the reliability of the NMS lab, which led to the violation of Brewer’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses, as the State relied on a surrogate to present test results without allowing for cross-examination. The court also rejected the State's harmless error argument, noting that the inability to cross-examine the testing individual prevented a thorough challenge of the evidence. The Confrontation Clause requires that reliability be established through cross-examination, a right that Brewer was denied. Consequently, the court affirmed the admission of part of the interrogation video but reversed Brewer's conviction due to the Confrontation Clause violation. The decision is affirmed in part and reversed in part, with concurrence from multiple justices.