Charles Blackburn v. the Lonoke County Board of Election Commissioners Matthew Brown, Mickey "stubby" Stumbaugh, and Dan Stowers, in Their Official Capacities as Members of the Election Commission Dawn Porterfield, in Her Official Capacity as Lonoke County Clerk Doug Irwin Norman Walker And John Thurston, in His Official Capacity as Arkansas Secretary of State

Citation: 2022 Ark. 176

Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; October 6, 2022; Arkansas; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

Combined Opinion SummaryCombined Opinion Original

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Charles Blackburn appealed a decision from the Lonoke County Circuit Court, which dismissed his amended complaint against the Lonoke County Board of Election Commissioners, its members, the Lonoke County Clerk, and the Arkansas Secretary of State. Blackburn aimed to run as an independent candidate for Lonoke County Judge in the 2022 election and claimed he was misinformed by a Clerk’s office employee regarding the number of signatures required for his candidacy under Arkansas Code Annotated section 7-7-103. Initially told he needed 367 signatures, he later learned he actually required 618 and was short by 251 signatures by the May 1, 2022 deadline.

In response, Blackburn sought legal remedies, including a writ of mandamus and a preliminary injunction, to extend the signature collection deadline by 14 days. His amended complaint added the presumptive candidates for the major parties and included constitutional challenges to the signature requirement. Blackburn contended that the Clerk's erroneous information infringed on his right to access the ballot.

The circuit court dismissed his complaint with prejudice, leading to Blackburn's appeal, which he sought to expedite. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision, albeit with modifications.

Blackburn seeks to invoke the court's original jurisdiction, arguing that government actions regarding section 7-7-103 rendered the statute unconstitutional as applied to him, and requests that his name be placed on the ballot as an independent candidate for Lonoke County Judge. He references Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-5(a), asserting that his case fits within the scope of original jurisdiction. However, the court clarifies that his claim does not attack the validity of a statewide petition or involve contempt powers, which are the specific examples provided in the rule. It emphasizes that its jurisdiction is primarily appellate unless explicitly granted for original actions. Blackburn's attempt to pursue both original and appellate jurisdiction simultaneously is rejected, as no law or precedent supports his original jurisdiction claim under these circumstances.

In addressing Blackburn's arguments on appeal, he contends that the circuit court improperly dismissed his amended complaint, claiming reliance on incorrect information provided by a government official regarding the signature requirements of section 7-7-103. He argues this reliance hindered his ability to access the ballot and rendered the statute unconstitutional as applied to him. The court applies a standard of review that treats the facts in the complaint as true and favors the plaintiff, while also noting the necessity of stating factual allegations rather than mere conclusions to warrant relief. It references Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal for failure to state facts supporting a claim for relief, and Rule 8(a)(1), requiring concise statements of facts in pleadings.

Rules 8(a)(1) and 12(b)(6) are applied together to evaluate the adequacy of a complaint, focusing on the underlying facts of the alleged cause of action. Complaints lacking factual support and consisting solely of conclusions may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). Statutes are assumed to be constitutional, with the burden of proof on those challenging their constitutionality. Challenges can be either as-applied, considering the specific case facts, or facial, aiming to invalidate the statute entirely.

In this case, the circuit court dismissed claims against the Lonoke County appellees and defendant Thurston. It ruled that the County Clerk had no obligation to provide Mr. Blackburn with the necessary signature count and that he bore the responsibility to determine this information himself. The court determined that Arkansas law does not provide a private right of action for ballot access and found no basis for the relief Blackburn sought. 

Regarding Blackburn's constitutional challenges, the statute was deemed constitutional both facially and as applied, with no significant burden placed on his ballot access. Errors by the Clerk's employee did not alter Blackburn's responsibility to verify signature requirements from the Secretary of State's Office. Additionally, there were no allegations of wrongdoing against County Judge Doug Irwin or Democratic Nominee Norman Walker, warranting their dismissal.

Thurston's dismissal was based on the absence of any factual allegations of wrongdoing. The court noted that Blackburn had not demonstrated that any mistaken information affected his ability to challenge the statute's constitutionality. Thurston's potential sovereign immunity was acknowledged, but the dismissal was fundamentally due to Blackburn's failure to state any claim, as outlined under Rule 12(b)(6).

Blackburn alone bore the responsibility for obtaining the required signatures, as confirmed by the circuit court. In the case Whitfield v. Thurston, the Eastern District of Arkansas upheld the constitutionality of section 7-7-103, analyzing the balance between asserted injuries to First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and the state's compelling interests. The court found that while the pandemic affected signature collection, it did not constitute a substantial burden on ballot access. Blackburn failed to demonstrate severe constitutional violations or sufficient facts to warrant relief. Thus, the circuit court's dismissal of his amended complaint was affirmed, though modified to reflect a dismissal without prejudice, allowing Blackburn the option to replead or appeal. Justice Womack concurred in part but dissented regarding the dismissal of claims against the county defendants, asserting that while those claims should not have been dismissed with prejudice, the dismissal against the Secretary of State was appropriate due to constitutional protections afforded to state actors. The legal representatives for Blackburn and the appellees are noted.