Katherine Renee McQueen appeals her conviction for Assault in the Second Degree, as determined by a jury on March 10, 2020, and the subsequent sentencing by the Circuit Court on May 29, 2020. McQueen argues that the Circuit Court made several errors, including:
1. Failing to conduct a proper "back-and-forth" Tachibana colloquy to ensure she understood her rights.
2. Making incorrect evidentiary rulings, such as:
a. Allowing testimony that mischaracterized the complaining witness, Gabriela Lyle, as the "victim."
b. Admitting post-arrest evidence of McQueen “slipping handcuffs” as probative.
c. Striking her testimony regarding a pre-existing shoulder injury.
d. Allowing the State to refer to her as "a drunk person" during closing arguments.
Additionally, McQueen claims ineffective assistance of counsel due to her attorney's failure to:
a. Move for a judgment of acquittal after the State's opening statement.
b. Investigate Lyle's knee injury.
c. Challenge testimony related to any choking injuries to Lyle.
d. Avoid compelling her to testify.
Lyle accused McQueen of attacking her with a knife, causing a five-inch laceration on her arm, while the State contended that McQueen was intoxicated during the incident. The court concluded that the Circuit Court appropriately conducted the Tachibana colloquy, maintaining it was a formal discussion that adequately ensured McQueen's understanding of her rights.
The Hawai#i Supreme Court ruled in Han that a "true colloquy" requires meaningful engagement between the trial court and the defendant to ensure the defendant's understanding of their rights. In State v. Pomroy, the court found a colloquy lacking because the district court's advisement was unclear. The State argued that McQueen waived the issue of her right to testify by not objecting to the Circuit Court's advisement. However, Hawai#i appellate courts have addressed similar issues as plain errors, emphasizing the need for the court to confirm that a defendant's choice not to testify is made knowingly and voluntarily. If a violation of the right to testify is found, the conviction must be vacated unless the State proves the violation was harmless.
During a pretrial exchange, the Circuit Court informed McQueen of her constitutional right to testify and to remain silent, confirming her understanding of both options. The court reiterated her right to consult her lawyer and instructed that the jury could not hold her decision to remain silent against her. After confirming her understanding and discussing her decision with her attorney, McQueen ultimately chose to testify.
The Circuit Court conducted a thorough colloquy with McQueen regarding her right to testify or abstain from testifying, ensuring she understood each question and had opportunities to ask for clarification. The court's inquiries were clear, and there was no indication of confusion on McQueen's part. McQueen's reference to State v. Eduwensuyi was deemed inapplicable, as that case involved a lack of necessary advisements from the trial court, which was not the situation here. The court concluded it had properly advised McQueen of her rights.
Regarding evidentiary matters, McQueen contended that the Circuit Court erred by not striking testimony that referred to Lyle as a "victim." Although the court sustained the defense's objection to the term, it allowed Lee, a lay witness, to refer to Lyle as a "victim" once, which was considered harmless error. The court had instructed the jury to presume McQueen's innocence and to avoid using the term "victim," emphasizing that such use does not automatically result in prejudicial error. Ultimately, the court maintained that the single reference to Lyle as a "victim" did not undermine McQueen's right to a fair trial, given the overall instructions provided to the jury.
Evidence was admitted regarding McQueen slipping handcuffs while in a Honolulu Police Department patrol car, which McQueen argued was error. The State contended this evidence was relevant to counter a potential defense of physical impossibility due to voluntary intoxication, demonstrating her ability to control her movements post-stabbing. Officer Reid Nakamura testified about observing McQueen slipping her handcuffs, despite defense objections claiming irrelevance and prejudice. The Circuit Court allowed the evidence, indicating its relevance to McQueen's ability to control her conduct, both while in custody and during the incident in question. The court emphasized that the ability to slip out of handcuffs suggested a level of physical control inconsistent with a defense based on intoxication. Under HRS 702-230(2), evidence of self-induced intoxication is admissible to prove or negate conduct but cannot negate the required state of mind for an offense. The court found that the evidence had probative value regarding McQueen's conduct and state of mind at the time of the offense.
Relevant evidence is generally admissible under HRE Rule 402 but may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, as stated in HRE Rule 403. A trial court's determination of evidence relevance is reviewed under a right/wrong standard, while the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In this case, evidence that McQueen slipped her handcuffs was deemed relevant to her physical capabilities shortly after the incident, despite her alcohol consumption. Officer Nakamura testified he observed McQueen's hands moving from behind her back to the front, indicating physical ability that could counter her defense of physical impossibility due to intoxication.
The court found the evidence more probative than prejudicial, considering factors like the necessity of the evidence, the availability of alternative proof, and the potential to incite jury hostility. The evidence was crucial for the State to demonstrate the physical possibility of McQueen's actions against her defense claim. McQueen's assertion that the evidence painted her as a seasoned criminal was unconvincing, as Officer Nakamura did not imply she attempted to escape. Consequently, the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.
Additionally, McQueen challenged the exclusion of her testimony regarding a preexisting shoulder injury. The State argued there was no error, as it only objected to the medical opinion aspect of her testimony, which her defense counsel acknowledged. Other testimony confirmed that McQueen's shoulder injury predated the incident, and her explanation of needing surgery and the nature of her injury was presented without error by the court.
The State requested the Circuit Court to strike certain testimony from Ms. McQueen regarding her shoulder injury, arguing for a curative instruction to ensure the jury disregarded any references to the injury or previous medical conditions. The Circuit Court sustained the objection, instructing the jury to ignore McQueen's testimony about her shoulder injury, stating it required a medical conclusion and that she was not qualified to give such an opinion. Although the testimony was stricken, McQueen was still allowed to discuss her shoulder injury as a separate matter.
Additionally, McQueen challenged the State’s characterization of her as "a drunk person" during closing arguments, claiming it prejudiced her in the eyes of the jury. The State defended this characterization as a reasonable inference based on evidence, including McQueen's own admission of drinking prior to the incident and testimonies from law enforcement officers describing her behavior as unsteady, slurring her words, and exhibiting confusion. The court concluded that the State's comments were permissible within the broad discretion allowed in closing arguments, affirming that the characterization was justified given the evidence presented.
The individual was distressed due to Lyle's inactivity while she prepared the apartment for a friend's inspection. Testimony indicated she exhibited signs of impairment, such as slurred speech, unsteadiness, and an inability to walk unassisted; officers noted she would have fallen without assistance. Officer Nakamura observed her difficulty following simple instructions, and Officer Yee Hoy detected an odor of alcohol on her. She admitted to consuming two glasses of Mike's Hard Lemonade. Evidence indicated the State could reasonably argue that she was intoxicated during the incident. The Circuit Court correctly denied her objection to the State's characterization of her behavior in closing arguments.
McQueen claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging her attorney failed to: 1) move for judgment of acquittal post-opening statement, 2) inquire about Lyle's septic knee's impact on her behavior, 3) question the absence of choking injuries on Lyle, and 4) allow her to decide on testifying. To prove ineffective assistance, a defendant must show specific errors reflecting a lack of skill or diligence, and that these errors impaired a potentially meritorious defense.
The defense counsel's decision not to seek a judgment of acquittal after the State's opening was justified, as such motions are rarely granted and the opening statement is not evidence. The prosecution must prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt, and the City and County of Honolulu corresponds with the jurisdiction of the first judicial circuit.
The State's opening statement indicated that Katherine Renee McQueen assaulted Lyle in a studio apartment located on the eighth floor of 2509 Ala Wai Boulevard, Waikiki. Lyle was uncertain about her future residence, contemplating a move back to Kauai or remaining in Oahu. Tony brought McQueen to the location, and Lyle worked at a local bar. The State presented evidence during the trial, including testimonies from Lee, the apartment office manager, and responding Honolulu Police Department officers, confirming the incident occurred in Honolulu. McQueen's trial counsel did not err by not seeking acquittal after the State's opening statement, nor was McQueen denied effective assistance of counsel on that matter.
McQueen contended that her trial counsel was ineffective for not exploring Lyle's septic knee as an alternative source for Lyle's knife wound. The court noted that trial strategy is typically not second-guessed, but if the record lacks justification for counsel's decisions, claims of ineffective assistance may be raised in an HRPP Rule 40 proceeding. McQueen argued that her counsel should have suggested that Lyle could have self-inflicted her injuries or that her septic condition might have impaired her memory. While trial counsel questioned Dr. Yost, Lyle’s physician, about Lyle’s septic condition, the record did not clarify why more in-depth questioning was not pursued. Consequently, McQueen's claim of ineffective assistance related to this issue was denied without prejudice, allowing for the possibility of further claims in an HRPP Rule 40 proceeding.
Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to elicit testimony about choking marks on Lyle. McQueen argued that the absence of evidence regarding choking injuries indicated ineffective assistance. However, Lyle's testimony confirmed that McQueen's weight was on her and that McQueen held her neck for three minutes, but Lyle did not claim she was choked. Dr. Yost, who examined Lyle in the emergency room, testified that no other injuries were found, including around the neck. McQueen's argument that trial counsel should have questioned the absence of neck injuries lacked merit, as Lyle never alleged choking, and there were no specific errors by counsel.
Additionally, McQueen contended that she was forced to testify and did not make a knowing, voluntary decision to do so. The record indicated that the Circuit Court properly informed McQueen of her rights and confirmed that the decision to testify was hers alone. McQueen acknowledged understanding this, and her gratitude expressed after the trial further suggested her decision to testify was voluntary. Therefore, her claim of ineffective assistance regarding being compelled to testify was rejected.
The judgment of conviction and sentence from May 29, 2020, was affirmed, though McQueen was allowed to pursue an ineffective assistance claim related to trial counsel's failure to investigate Lyle's septic knee in a subsequent HRPP Rule 40 proceeding.
