Al R. Nacino appeals the Final Judgment favoring Cambridge Management, Inc., entered on November 19, 2019, following his termination in 2012. Nacino's 2016 complaint alleges that his termination violated Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) 378-2(a)(2), which prohibits employer retaliation against employees for filing discrimination complaints. Cambridge moved for summary judgment, arguing Nacino's prior lawsuit did not involve actual discriminatory practices under HRS Chapter 378. The circuit court granted the motion on October 1, 2019, leading to the Final Judgment.
Nacino raises two points of error: (1) the court improperly ruled on the summary judgment motion before he could depose the supervisor who terminated him, and (2) genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the true reason for his termination. Nacino attempted to serve a deposition subpoena to Ma'rin Witt, his supervisor, but faced unsuccessful attempts before the discovery deadline of August 9, 2019. Although he cited efforts to obtain Witt's deposition, he did not explain his inability to do so during the two years prior to the deadline. The court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in not postponing the motion hearing for further discovery. The appellate court vacates the Final Judgment and remands for further proceedings consistent with its order.
A trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court. Summary judgment is warranted if the evidence, including pleadings and affidavits, demonstrates no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A fact is considered material if it could establish or refute an essential element of a claim or defense. Evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
In Nacino's HRS 378–2(a)(2) retaliation claim against Cambridge, a three-part test applies: (1) the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing they opposed practices forbidden by HRS Chapter 378; (2) if successful, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action; (3) if the defendant does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason is a pretext.
Nacino began employment with Cambridge on September 1, 2004, and filed a charge with the HCRC and EEOC on May 3, 2011, alleging discrimination based on color and national origin. The HCRC closed the charge on November 17, 2011, allowing Nacino to file a private lawsuit, which he did on February 16, 2012. He alleged adverse employment actions related to his complaints of discrimination and was terminated one month after filing the lawsuit. The court ruled that Cambridge did not violate HRS Chapter 378 as the employee who received better treatment was also Filipino.
Nacino's subsequent lawsuit filed on October 3, 2016, reiterated claims against Cambridge, including details of his charge and the timeline of events. At trial, Nacino must prove that his termination was in retaliation for opposing discriminatory practices. Cambridge's motion for summary judgment contends that Nacino cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation, citing case law that allows a defendant to satisfy its burden by showing the plaintiff lacks evidence for an essential claim element. Viewing the evidence favorably for Nacino, it shows he was terminated shortly after filing the Discrimination Lawsuit.
Cambridge does not contest the timing of Nacino's termination but argues that he lacked an objectively reasonable belief that his employment was terminated in violation of HRS 378-2(a)(2). Cambridge asserts that Nacino's complaints in his Discrimination Lawsuit did not pertain to any characteristic protected by HRS Chapter 378, undermining his ability to establish the first element of a prima facie retaliation case. Nacino's lawsuit detailed several adverse employment actions, including the denial of a promised pay increase, demotion, reduced work hours, unequal treatment compared to peers, and false performance accusations, all contributing to a hostile work environment. He reported these issues to Cambridge and state agencies, leading to further mistreatment, including threats of termination for refusing to accept his demotion and pay cut. Nacino's inquiries regarding the adverse actions were ignored, with responses including threats and other unlawful actions.
Cambridge, its supervisors Bedell and Bradshaw, were accused of violating HRS 378-2 by singling out Nacino for unfavorable treatment due to discriminatory intent. Nacino was terminated one month after filing the Discrimination Lawsuit, prior to a decision on the case, which ultimately ruled in favor of Cambridge more than three years later. Despite the ruling, the law does not require a successful discrimination claim as a prerequisite for a retaliation claim; rather, a reasonable belief in unlawful activity is sufficient. The assessment of this belief is objective, considering the limited understanding most plaintiffs have regarding the legal and factual bases of their claims.
A reasonable mistake can pertain to either factual or legal misunderstandings. Title VII is interpreted broadly as a remedial statute, impacting the reasonableness of a plaintiff's belief in the occurrence of a violation. The record indicates that, when viewed favorably towards Nacino, there is potential evidence that Cambridge terminated his employment in retaliation for filing a Discrimination Lawsuit alleging a violation of HRS Chapter 378, specifically HRS 378-2(a)(2). The circuit court erred in granting Cambridge's Motion for Summary Judgment (MSJ), as the temporal proximity of one month between the lawsuit and termination suggests the possibility of pretext for discrimination. The outcome of the Discrimination Lawsuit does not legally resolve the factual issue of retaliatory termination. Consequently, the circuit court's Final Judgment from November 19, 2019, is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order.
