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BUCKNER-WEBB v. State
Citation: Not availableDocket: S21G1281
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia; September 20, 2022; Georgia; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
This legal opinion is subject to modifications due to motions for reconsideration, and the final text will be included in the bound volume of the Georgia Reports. The Supreme Court of Georgia, in its decision on September 20, 2022, addressed whether a trial court's order denying a motion to withdraw as counsel on the basis of alleged conflicts of interest is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The Court concluded that such orders do not qualify for immediate appeal as part of the limited exceptions under this doctrine, affirming the Court of Appeals' decision in Buckner-Webb v. State but for different reasons. In the relevant case, Diane Buckner-Webb and others were indicted in 2013 for conspiracy related to the alteration of standardized test scores as part of a larger investigation involving multiple educators from the Atlanta Public Schools. Following a trial that concluded in 2015, the defendants were found guilty of conspiracy to violate the Georgia RICO Act. They subsequently filed motions for a new trial. Despite each defendant having separate attorneys during the trial, the Circuit Public Defender appointed one attorney, Stephen R. Scarborough, to represent all defendants on appeal in 2017. Scarborough filed a motion to withdraw as counsel in June 2019, citing conflicts of interest from his joint representation just as the defendants were due to file particularized motions for a new trial. During the hearing on his motion to withdraw, the trial court questioned the two-year delay in filing after his appointment. Scarborough attributed the delay to the extensive review needed of the case records. He ultimately recognized the necessity to address the conflict under Rule 1.7, noting that his continued joint representation could lead to professional discipline due to the irreconcilable conflict, as the defendants did not waive this conflict. Scarborough sought to withdraw as counsel, citing an "ethically untenable position" due to conflicting loyalties among the Defendants, which would limit his ability to raise issues robustly in motions for a new trial. He identified an actual conflict under Rule 1.7, stating that his representation of each Defendant would adversely affect his duties to the others. After meeting separately with the Defendants, who declined to waive the conflict, they requested conflict-free appellate counsel. Scarborough acknowledged that the potential for conflict was apparent to others involved in the case but emphasized the necessity of a thorough review of the record for effective representation. Despite the trial court’s frustration over the timing of Scarborough's conflict disclosure, it permitted the motion hearing to continue. The State contended that there was no conflict of interest, arguing that Scarborough failed to specify the conflict and that any concerns were unfounded, particularly in a RICO conspiracy context. During an ex parte conference, Scarborough explained he could not detail specific conflicts due to his duty of loyalty to each client and noted the issues he could not raise would benefit one Defendant over another due to their hierarchical positions within APS. The trial court requested detailed information on the indigency status of each Defendant, which Scarborough confirmed had been established. On August 21, 2019, the trial court denied Scarborough's motion to withdraw, citing reasons from the previous hearing, and issued a certificate for immediate review. Following this, Defendants filed an application for interlocutory review on September 3, 2019, and a direct appeal on September 20, 2019, arguing the order was appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The Court of Appeals denied the Defendants' request for interlocutory review on September 25, 2019, and subsequently dismissed their direct appeal on June 29, 2021, due to lack of jurisdiction, citing that the collateral order doctrine did not apply to the trial court's order denying their motion to withdraw as counsel. Following this, Defendants filed a second petition for a writ of certiorari, which was granted on December 14, 2021, to address a novel legal question. The legal framework for appeals in Georgia is established by the General Assembly, particularly under OCGA § 5-6-34, which outlines which trial court orders can be immediately reviewed. Subsection (a) specifies that all final judgments can be appealed once the case is no longer pending below, along with certain significant interlocutory orders deemed critical enough to warrant immediate appeal, such as those impacting rights irreparably. Orders not falling under these categories can only be appealed if certified by the trial court as important within ten days of entry. For non-final orders, Georgia generally requires adherence to interlocutory appeal procedures unless they qualify under the 'collateral order doctrine,' which permits immediate appeals for orders that resolve issues substantially separate from the main trial issues and are considered effectively final. This doctrine, rooted in federal law, allows for the immediate review of orders that are critical and independent of the overall case, as established in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. Determining whether a matter is subject to effective appellate review involves assessing whether the relief sought would be obstructed by a final judgment from the trial court. This evaluation includes examining the entire class of claims to ascertain their appealability under the collateral order doctrine. For instance, in Roberts v. State, the court found that the denial of a statutory double jeopardy claim was indeed appealable under this doctrine. Review has also been permitted for orders that allowed the involuntary medication of a defendant or compelled a reporter to disclose confidential sources. Conversely, certain interlocutory orders, such as those denying motions based on sovereign immunity or recusal of a trial judge, have been deemed not appealable under the collateral order doctrine. In the current case, the Court of Appeals concluded that an order denying a motion for counsel to withdraw due to a conflict of interest was not immediately appealable, as the defendants would not forfeit a significant right by awaiting a direct appeal. While this assessment is agreed upon, the Court of Appeals did not consider whether the counsel’s interest in avoiding an ethical conflict that could infringe on a client's constitutional rights warranted collateral-order review. Upon certiorari review, it was determined that orders denying a motion to withdraw based on a conflict of interest do not qualify as part of the “very small class” of interlocutory orders eligible for immediate appeal. These orders are not considered "effectively final" regarding counsel’s interests, as there are alternative methods for attorneys to seek review. Specifically, attorneys can pursue immediate appeals through the interlocutory procedures outlined in OCGA § 5-6-34 (b), which, although exhausted in this case, remains viable for future situations. Trial courts are encouraged to issue certificates of immediate review, and the Court of Appeals should consider granting interlocutory reviews for cases with substantial merit questions. An attorney may also choose to defy the order, risking contempt of court. An attorney whose motion to withdraw is denied may refuse compliance if they believe it compels a violation of professional conduct rules or endangers a client’s constitutional rights, despite the potential for contempt. This refusal allows for an appeal from the contempt ruling under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a)(2), though it places the attorney in a precarious position. Citing *Cobbledick*, the excerpt notes that a non-party witness facing a similar situation can either wait for a final judgment or risk contempt for immediate appeal. While a trial court typically loses authority to reconsider an interlocutory ruling after the court term ends, exceptions exist for constitutional issues if the evidentiary context changes. Concerns about possible disciplinary actions for conflicts of interest are deemed speculative and not addressed further. The excerpt also distinguishes Georgia's approach from other jurisdictions regarding appeals of motions to withdraw due to conflicts of interest, concluding such orders are not directly appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The judgment is affirmed, with justices concurring, except for one disqualification. Justice Pinson concurs while expressing skepticism about the collateral-order doctrine's validity. The court reaffirms that statutory changes regarding appellate review should be addressed by the General Assembly if necessary. In Scroggins v. Edmondson, the Georgia Supreme Court established that the collateral-order doctrine can apply to both criminal and civil cases, adopting it from federal law. The Court referenced the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Abney v. United States, which permitted immediate appeals of double jeopardy plea denials, and indicated its reliance on the Supreme Court’s rationale. However, the Court expressed concern about uncritically importing federal legal principles into Georgia law without ensuring contextual alignment, as this could result in misinterpretations. Specifically, the federal collateral-order doctrine is grounded in 28 USC § 1291, which allows appeals from final district court decisions and has been interpreted to include certain non-final rulings. Conversely, the legislative intent and context of Georgia's appellate statutes differ significantly from their federal counterparts. Therefore, the Court cautions against broadly applying the collateral-order doctrine in Georgia, highlighting the potential for complications and uncertainties in the appellate process due to these differences, while still agreeing with the Court's judgment in this instance. The author expresses skepticism regarding the legal foundation of the collateral-order doctrine, suggesting it should not be expanded. The doctrine allows for the appeal of specific interlocutory rulings prior to a final judgment, bypassing the statutory procedures for interlocutory appeals as outlined in OCGA 5-6-34 (b). The doctrine was first applied in Georgia in Patterson v. State, which permitted an immediate appeal of a double jeopardy plea denial without following the interlocutory-appeal statute. Subsequent cases, such as Scroggins v. Edmondson, adopted this doctrine for both criminal and civil cases, drawing from federal law. The author criticizes the practice of uncritically adopting U.S. Supreme Court precedent into Georgia law without sufficient justification, referencing previous cases that have raised similar concerns. They emphasize that the interpretation of legal texts in Georgia should be guided by the context, history, and statutory framework specific to Georgia, rather than relying solely on federal judicial interpretations, which may not align with state law. There is a cautionary note about the potential for arbitrary or incorrect interpretations when federal decisions are applied without a thorough contextual examination. The author concludes that the collateral-order doctrine exemplifies this issue, particularly in how it contrasts with the statutory language and context in Georgia compared to federal law. The U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the collateral-order doctrine indicates it is a practical application of "final decisions" that includes certain collateral rulings deemed final despite not terminating the action. This interpretation allows for a broader understanding of finality, permitting appeals in specific circumstances even if claims remain pending. In contrast, Georgia law maintains a stricter interpretation of its appellate jurisdiction statute, which defines a final judgment as one where the case is no longer pending in the lower court. This interpretation has been consistently upheld for over 140 years, asserting that a judgment is not final if any aspect of the case remains unresolved. The historical context shows that Georgia courts equate "cause" and "case," reinforcing the idea that appeals are not permissible under the current statute if any issues are still pending. Furthermore, Georgia's statutory structure, which includes additional categories of appealable judgments, suggests a clear rejection of the federal-style collateral-order doctrine. Georgia law does not allow for the federal collateral-order doctrine to be imported into its appellate jurisdiction statutes. The document references various amendments to Georgia laws concerning judgments and orders related to child custody and other legal matters, highlighting a statutory mechanism for interlocutory review under OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). This statute permits immediate review if a trial court certifies that a ruling is crucial to the case. In contrast, federal law has a more limited and antiquated framework for interlocutory appeals, as established by 28 USC § 1292, which has not been updated for 40 years and does not provide as broad discretion for district courts as Georgia law does. The author argues against expanding the reach of the collateral-order doctrine within Georgia, emphasizing that doing so would overstep the appellate courts' authority and disrupt established legal boundaries. Existing decisions applying the doctrine should be retained, but the case does not warrant an expansion of its applicability. Immediate review is deemed crucial in Duke v. State, emphasizing the core separation of powers principle that prevents courts from permitting appeals outside established statutory frameworks. Courts lack the authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements set by statute, as established in Gable v. State, and this principle was reiterated in Cook v. State, which overruled a previously established out-of-time appeal procedure. The collateral-order doctrine allows litigants to bypass the statutory process for interlocutory reviews, potentially undermining trial court authority in managing litigation. OCGA § 5-6-34(b) requires trial court approval for interlocutory appeals, enabling courts to maintain control over proceedings unless clarification from an appellate court is deemed necessary. This doctrine shifts the responsibility for reviewing nonfinal orders from the legislature, which typically makes policy judgments, to the courts. The court's decision to refrain from recognizing additional non-statutory exceptions to the final-judgment rule is aimed at preventing further complications. The concurrence from Justice Warren and Justice Bethel supports this position.