Larry E. Carozza and Kenna Carozza filed a negligence complaint against Officer James Lusk and the city of Middletown following a collision between Lusk's cruiser and Carozza's terminal-tractor. The incident occurred on January 11, 2017, after dispatchers received a call about a child struck by a vehicle. Officer Lusk, responding with lights and siren, proceeded through several intersections at high speeds and ultimately collided with Carozza, who had entered the intersection after a traffic light turned green.
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment: the Carozzas sought partial summary judgment regarding Carozza's comparative negligence, while Lusk and the city claimed immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744. The Butler County Court of Common Pleas denied both motions on November 8, 2021. Lusk and the city appealed, asserting that the trial court improperly denied their immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act. The appellate court found sufficient grounds to reverse the trial court's decision and grant summary judgment in favor of Lusk and the city.
Entitlement to immunity is a legal question determined by the court prior to trial via summary judgment. The standard for reviewing a denial of political-subdivision immunity is de novo, adhering to Civ. R. 56. This means the court assesses the evidence as though the trial court had applied the correct legal standard, ensuring no genuine issues of material fact exist for trial. Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no material facts in dispute, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and reasonable minds can only conclude against the nonmoving party. The moving party must initially demonstrate the lack of genuine issues of material fact, after which the nonmoving party must present specific facts indicating such issues remain. If the nonmoving party fails to do so, summary judgment is granted.
Political subdivision liability is governed by R.C. Chapter 2744, which outlines a three-tiered analysis for determining immunity. The first tier establishes general immunity for political subdivisions concerning acts tied to governmental or proprietary functions, though this immunity has exceptions. The second tier examines five exceptions to immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B), particularly in cases of alleged negligent vehicle operation by a political subdivision's employee. The analysis also considers specific defenses that may negate these exceptions. The third tier assesses whether any defenses in R.C. 2744.03 can restore immunity if exceptions apply. R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a) provides a complete defense if a police officer is responding to an emergency call without engaging in willful or wanton misconduct.
Ohio law grants immunity to employees of political subdivisions under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6), establishing that they are liable for civil claims arising from official actions unless specific exceptions apply: (a) actions outside the scope of employment; (b) actions taken with malicious intent, bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner; or (c) liability imposed by another Revised Code section. Wanton and reckless conduct are distinct from negligence, which is covered by immunity. The terms 'willful' and 'wanton' indicate varying degrees of care, important for determining liability for both the political subdivision and its employees.
In the context of the case, if Lusk's behavior were found to be willful or wanton misconduct, the City could be liable under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a). Conversely, if Lusk's behavior was deemed wanton or reckless, he could be held personally liable under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b). However, proving such conduct requires meeting a high standard, typically determined by a jury, but summary judgment is appropriate if the conduct does not indicate a disposition toward perversity.
The City’s motion for summary judgment was initially denied, but it is undisputed that Lusk was acting within his employment scope while responding to an emergency call, which is a governmental function. The analysis then centers on whether the criteria of R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a)—that Lusk was a police officer responding to an emergency call and that his actions did not constitute willful or wanton misconduct—are satisfied. The definition of 'emergency call' includes various urgent situations necessitating immediate police response. Testimony indicates Lusk was indeed responding to such a call, supporting the argument for immunity under the specified legal framework.
Willful misconduct is defined as an intentional failure to adhere to a clear duty or rule of conduct, resulting in potential harm, while 'wanton' behavior indicates a complete disregard for the duty of care owed to others in high-risk situations. The trial court acknowledged these definitions but found insufficient evidence to support claims that Lusk acted willfully or wantonly. The cruiser video showed Lusk driving with emergency lights on at speeds up to 60 mph before reducing speed to approximately 35 mph in a 35 mph zone, under dark and potentially icy conditions. The appellees' argument that Lusk should have sounded his siren or slowed further was deemed inadequate to prove a total lack of care necessary to classify his actions as willful or wanton. Lusk had no statutory obligation to sound the siren. Consequently, the court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding Lusk's alleged misconduct, granting the City entitlement to summary judgment under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(b).
Regarding Lusk's motion for summary judgment based on R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) immunity, the court examined whether Lusk acted with malicious intent or recklessness that would preclude such immunity. Given the earlier findings that Lusk's driving did not amount to willful or wanton misconduct, the court noted that 'malicious purpose' indicates a higher level of intent. The remaining issue was whether Lusk acted recklessly, defined as a conscious disregard of a known risk. To establish recklessness, it must be shown that Lusk was aware his actions could likely cause injury, indicating a significant indifference to the risk of harm to others.
Lusk's conduct, while potentially negligent, did not meet the standard for recklessness as defined by law. He activated his vehicle's lights and slowed to the speed limit while approaching an intersection, demonstrating a lack of perverse disregard for known risks. Under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b), civil liability for political subdivision employees requires evidence of malice, bad faith, or wanton or reckless misconduct, which the appellees failed to provide. Therefore, the trial court's denial of Lusk's motion for summary judgment was erroneous. Although jury determination is typically required for wantonness or recklessness, summary judgment is appropriate when conduct does not indicate a disposition to perversity. Appellants are entitled to immunity from tort liability under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b). The trial court's judgment is reversed, and summary judgment is granted in favor of the City and Lusk.
