Until officially published in the Ohio Official Reports, the opinion can be cited as *State ex rel. Trumbull Cty. Republican Cent. Commt. v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections*, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3268. The Supreme Court of Ohio denied a writ of mandamus sought by the Trumbull County Republican Central Committee and candidate Sarah Thomas Kovoor, aiming to place her name on the ballot for a judgeship in the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas. Kovoor was nominated by her party's central committee following the resignation of Judge Peter Kontos, which created a vacancy 100 days before the general election. However, R.C. 3513.04 barred her candidacy due to her prior unsuccessful attempt to secure the Republican nomination for another judicial office in the May 2022 primary. The court emphasized that under R.C. 3513.04, individuals who seek party nominations at a primary election cannot subsequently run for a different office at the general election, with specific exceptions not applicable to this case.
On August 17, the prosecutor's office informed Penrose that R.C. 3513.04 disqualified Kovoor from candidacy for a vacated judicial position. The following day, a Trumbull County voter filed a protest against Kovoor, also referencing R.C. 3513.04. On August 19, the board held a special meeting to certify candidates for the November ballot, resulting in a tie vote regarding Kovoor's candidacy. The matter was referred to Secretary LaRose for a tiebreaking decision. Relators initiated an expedited election matter on August 24, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel LaRose to decide the tie and to certify Kovoor. An accelerated schedule for evidence and briefs was established. On August 31, LaRose voted against certifying Kovoor, explaining that R.C. 3513.04, deemed straightforward and constitutional by courts, barred her from candidacy due to her previous unsuccessful attempt for a judgeship in the primary election.
To obtain a writ of mandamus, relators must prove (1) a clear legal right to relief, (2) a legal duty on the part of respondents, and (3) lack of an adequate remedy at law. The impending election timeline means relators lack such a remedy. The court must assess if the board or LaRose acted with fraud, corruption, abuse of discretion, or disregard for law. One request for relief is moot, as LaRose has already rendered a decision on the tie vote. The remaining issue is whether Kovoor's name should be placed on the ballot. Relators concede that R.C. 3513.04 bars Kovoor's candidacy, as it prohibits candidates from running in the general election if they unsuccessfully ran in the preceding primary, confirming the statute's clear and unambiguous language. Thus, Kovoor is prohibited from being a candidate for the November election.
R.C. 3513.31(I) does not override R.C. 3513.04, as asserted by relators regarding Kovoor’s candidacy. Relators claim Kovoor’s candidacy is permissible under R.C. 3513.31(I), which allows political parties to select candidates for unexpired terms if an officeholder dies or resigns close to a primary election. They argue that the statute's language mandates the board and Secretary LaRose to include Kovoor on the ballot without discretion, and that it permits candidates who lost primary elections to be nominated for different offices despite R.C. 3513.04.
However, these interpretations misread the statutes. The board retains the authority to examine candidates’ qualifications for the ballot, and R.C. 3513.31(I) must be read in conjunction with R.C. 3513.04, which prohibits individuals who sought party nominations in primary elections from being candidates for vacancies in the following general election. The General Assembly’s inclusion of R.C. 3513.31 in R.C. 3513.04 indicates that the latter applies to candidates selected by party central committees to fill vacancies, and any exemption from this rule must be explicitly stated by the General Assembly, which it has not done. Thus, R.C. 3513.31(I) and R.C. 3513.04 are not in conflict when interpreted together.
Relators argue that R.C. 3513.31(I) prohibits a political party central committee from selecting a primary-election winner for an unexpired term but allows selection of a primary-election loser. They interpret the statute to mean that since it specifies who cannot be selected (a primary nominee), it permits the selection of any other candidate, even those restricted under R.C. 3513.04. However, the court finds this interpretation flawed, asserting that R.C. 3513.04 and R.C. 3513.31(I) work in harmony, with R.C. 3513.04 stipulating that candidates who lost a primary election cannot be nominated for another judicial office, while R.C. 3513.31(I) prevents a central committee from selecting a primary election winner for a vacancy. The court rejects relators' conflicting interpretation and concludes that R.C. 3513.04 applies to Kovoor, rendering her ineligible for the unexpired term.
Additionally, relators claim that R.C. 3513.04 is unconstitutional as it applies to Kovoor, though they fail to specify which constitutional provisions are violated. They reference cases involving the First and Fourteenth Amendments and argue for strict scrutiny due to the statute's alleged severe restriction on voting rights. The court maintains that all statutes are presumed constitutional and emphasizes that relators bear the burden to prove unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. They argue that the statute does not serve a legitimate public interest since the vacancy occurred after the primary election, but the court finds this argument unconvincing.
Evaluating the constitutionality of a state election law involves assessing the severity of the alleged injury, as established in Anderson v. Celebrezze. Strict scrutiny is applied if the law severely restricts voting rights, necessitating that it be narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. A law is deemed to severely burden voting rights if it discriminates based on political content or offers few alternatives for ballot access. Conversely, "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions" on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights are typically justified by the state's regulatory interests.
The constitutionality of R.C. 3513.04 has been upheld using the Anderson/Burdick balancing test in two instances. In Purdy, the court found that R.C. 3513.04 did not discriminate based on party affiliation and imposed only a limited burden by preventing candidates who lost a primary from running for another office in the same election cycle. This restriction served legitimate state interests, including preventing conflicts among party members and reducing voter confusion.
In Brown, the court reaffirmed this position, noting that an amended version of R.C. 3513.04 remained nondiscriminatory, with only a slight burden on voting rights. The court upheld the law's constitutionality again, determining that the state interests justifying the law were minimal.
Relators in the current case have not provided compelling reasons to deviate from the conclusions reached in Purdy and Brown, nor have they meaningfully distinguished their arguments from those cases. They contend that barring a specific candidacy does not advance a legitimate public interest, but this claim lacks substantive support.
The secretary argues that the governmental interests supporting R.C. 3513.04, previously upheld in Purdy and Brown, are applicable here. The statute aims to minimize voter confusion, particularly when candidates are running for the same office they previously sought unsuccessfully, as seen in Kovoor's situation. Additionally, the secretary claims the statute helps avoid intraparty conflict, citing that Republican voters preferred another candidate over Kovoor, and that the Trumbull County Republican Central Committee's nomination of Kovoor could undermine voter intent and create intra-party discord. Relators have not provided reasons against these state interests' applicability to Kovoor’s candidacy, and it is not the court's role to develop their arguments.
On the issue of an alleged violation of the Open Meetings Act (OMA), relators claim the board's action to seek the prosecutor’s opinion on R.C. 3513.04 was invalid due to a lack of a public meeting. However, this claim was not properly before the court, as relators sought only a writ of mandamus for Kovoor’s ballot placement, not relief for the OMA violation. The court concludes that relators have not demonstrated a clear legal right for Kovoor to be placed on the general-election ballot, resulting in the denial of the writ of mandamus. The judgment is concurred by several justices, with some concurring only in judgment.
