Jorge Garcia Olguin v. the State of Texas

Citation: Not availableDocket: 05-20-00811-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; September 9, 2022; Texas; State Appellate Court

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Jorge Garcia Olguin was convicted after a bench trial for continuous sexual abuse of a child and indecency with a child by sexual contact, receiving sentences of thirty years and ten years in prison, respectively, to run concurrently. Olguin appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the amended indictment lacked specificity regarding the number of offenses charged. The appellate court modified the trial court's judgment to reflect Olguin's not guilty pleas but affirmed the convictions. The case background revealed that Olguin had a close relationship with his step-grandchildren, who later reported sexual abuse by him. The allegations surfaced after D.V. disclosed the abuse to a friend, leading to an investigation by authorities. Witness testimonies, including those from the victims and Olguin, were presented during the trial.

Appellant contests the sufficiency of evidence supporting his convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a child (Count I) and indecency with a child by sexual contact (Count II). He asserts that the trial court incorrectly determined the State met its burden of proving all elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. The legal standard for evaluating evidence sufficiency involves viewing the evidence favorably towards the verdict and assessing whether a rational factfinder could find each element of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Conflicting evidence is resolved in favor of the verdict, and determinations regarding witness credibility are also upheld.

For Count I, the offense of continuous sexual abuse requires proof of two or more acts of sexual abuse occurring within a 30-day period, with the perpetrator being at least 17 years old and the victim being under 14. While specific dates of abuse are not necessary, the State must demonstrate that the acts occurred within the specified timeframe. Testimony from the child victim alone can suffice for a conviction. Appellant argues the State did not adequately prove he committed the required acts over the 30-day duration, citing testimonies that described numerous incidents over a five-year period without clear evidence that any two acts occurred within 30 days. He claims the State’s reasoning was insufficient, relying on the family's living situation rather than concrete evidence. Additionally, he notes that victims expressed affection towards him and that allegations lacked corroborative evidence, such as photos or witnesses, particularly regarding incidents alleged to have occurred in vehicles.

Appellant argued that witnesses testified positively about his character, attributing their negative statements to loyalty to Lety, fueled by his infidelity and her anger. He claimed that if he were guilty, he would have fled to Mexico rather than appearing at the police station, asserting that the State failed to meet its burden of proof due to the delayed and uncorroborated testimony regarding the sexual abuse allegations, which he noted are challenging to defend against.

Count I of the indictment accused appellant of committing multiple acts of aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child involving C.F., who was under fourteen at the time of the incidents. C.F., now nineteen, described her close relationship with appellant, who became a father and grandfather figure after moving in with him and Lety when she was nine. She recounted instances of sexual abuse starting around that age, detailing a specific incident in an SUV where appellant sexually assaulted her and instructed her to keep it secret. C.F. testified that the abuse continued regularly in various locations, including appellant and Lety's bedroom, where he would engage in sexual acts while she was positioned in a vulnerable manner. She described the nature of the abuse, including the physical contact and appellant's behavior, emphasizing her confusion and reluctance to disclose the abuse due to her affection for him.

The account details a pattern of sexual abuse that C.F. experienced from appellant, beginning when she was around ten years old and continuing until she was fourteen. C.F. described initial inappropriate contact with her vagina over her clothes, which escalated to full sexual intercourse. Despite recognizing the wrongdoing and attempting to refuse, appellant would manipulate her by pleading or offering gifts, including an iPod. C.F. identified "fifth grade camp" as a significant time frame for the abuse, noting that incidents occurred both before and after this event. The abuse ceased when appellant separated from Lety and moved out.

C.F. did not disclose the abuse during the time it occurred due to fear of getting appellant in trouble, only revealing it to D.V. two years before the trial after D.V. mentioned similar experiences. C.F. began self-harming in seventh grade as a coping mechanism for her depression, initially attributing the self-harm to bullying rather than the sexual assault.

Police and forensic interviewers testified about their interviews with C.F., noting her detailed, consistent, and chronological accounts of the abuse. They confirmed that appellant had ongoing access to C.F., both in their shared home and after school, and observed behavioral changes in C.F. consistent with trauma, such as self-harm. Appellant denied the abuse during his interview, attributing C.F.'s claims to a potential false report stemming from his breakup with Lety, a claim deemed odd given the time elapsed since he last saw C.F. The forensic interviewer noted that C.F. showed no signs of being coached and presented a clear narrative of the chronic abuse she endured, indicating a "script memory" of repetitive traumatic events.

McIntosh described script memory, noting that individuals may recall routines better than specific dates. Count I of the indictment charged the appellant with sexual abuse of B.O., a minor, alleging that he engaged in sexual conduct by having her buttocks touch his genitals with the intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire. B.O. was interviewed twice; she did not disclose any abuse during the first interview but made an outcry in the second when she was approximately 12 years old. She initially hesitated to speak out due to fears of disbelief from her mother, but after encouragement from her sister C.F., she confided in her mother, leading to a second forensic interview. McIntosh noted that B.O. was consistent and detailed in her second interview, providing sensory details without signs of coaching. Nichols stated the abuse occurred in Plano at the homes of the appellant and Lety. During the investigation, Nichols found consistent patterns in the abuse of both B.O. and C.F. B.O., who was 13 at trial, testified that she had known the appellant for most of her life and viewed him as a grandfather until he touched her inappropriately. She recounted an incident at a family gathering where the appellant took her into a living room, removed her pants, and rubbed his genitals against her. She also described two additional instances of inappropriate touching in his truck and a van. D.V. provided testimony about her experience with the appellant when she was about six years old, describing a situation where she was alone with him, and he asked her to get on top of him, leading to uncomfortable contact. The trial concluded that a reasonable jury could have found the appellant guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a young child under Texas Penal Code § 21.02, affirming the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented.

The court addresses the appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of evidence supporting his conviction for indecency with a child by sexual contact, as outlined in Count II of the indictment. To convict for this charge, the State must demonstrate that the appellant engaged in sexual contact with a child under seventeen. The legal definition of "sexual contact" includes any touching of a child's genitals or any part of their body with the intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire.

The indictment alleges that the appellant intentionally caused the victim, identified as C.F., to use her feet to touch his genitals. The appellant does not contest this specific allegation but suggests that the witnesses, including C.F., were not truthful. Testimony from McIntosh, a forensic interviewer, reveals that C.F. described an incident occurring when she was 14, where the appellant manipulated her feet to simulate sexual activity. C.F. confirmed this account during her trial testimony, detailing that the incident took place in her grandmother's bedroom.

The State argues that C.F.'s testimony supports a finding of the appellant's intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desire, referencing prior case law that infers intent from the nature of the conduct and surrounding circumstances. The court recognizes that the child's testimony is sufficient to support the conviction for indecency with a child by sexual contact.

Defendant's specific intent to satisfy sexual desire can be inferred from his actions, statements, and surrounding circumstances, as established in Scott v. State. Although the defendant denied sexual contact with the victim, the trial court had the discretion to assess witness credibility and resolve conflicts in favor of the verdict. The court concluded a rational factfinder could find the essential elements of indecency with a child, thus rejecting the appellant's first issue.

Regarding the second issue, the appellant argued that the indictment and notice of extraneous offenses did not provide adequate notice of the offenses against three victims, hindering his trial preparation. The State countered that the appellant failed to preserve this error and, even if preserved, provided sufficient notice for the defense concerning continuous sexual abuse of a child. The sufficiency of an indictment is a legal question reviewed de novo, requiring that the indictment clearly inform the accused of the charges to prepare a defense, as stated in both the U.S. and Texas Constitutions.

The appellant claimed that the two-count indictment referenced three victims and four violations, but he acknowledged that the amended notice included more details. However, he argued that during the trial, the victims presented potentially over 500 additional allegations, which he could not adequately prepare for, citing precedent cases for support.

Appellant contends that the admission of evidence concerning acts beyond the indictment's date range infringed on his due process rights in a continuous sexual abuse case. However, he failed to object at trial, resulting in a forfeiture of his right to contest the indictment's adequacy or any related defects, as established by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 1.14(b). The court notes that a complaint about insufficient notice in an indictment constitutes a defect in form and must be raised prior to trial. Appellant's arguments regarding inadequate notice were not preserved for appellate review. Moreover, the indictment, which tracked the statutory language, sufficiently notified appellant of the charges by alleging three predicate offenses within the required timeframe. Even if the indictment alone was insufficient, courts can consider other sources to determine whether a defendant had adequate notice. Appellant's assertion that he was entitled to know which statutory method the State intended to prove is countered by the understanding that the acts constituted a single offense under Texas Penal Code Section 21.02. The State's presentation of evidence of underlying acts was to support the charged continuous sexual abuse offense, not to prove additional, uncharged offenses.

The State filed a notice under Article 38.37 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to introduce evidence of extraneous offenses involving additional abuse against C.F., B.O., and D.V. The defense acknowledged timely receipt of this notice. The court found that the defendant was not harmed by the notice since he received sufficient information to prepare a defense against the State's theory of criminal liability, as supported by relevant case law. C.F. testified to being sexually abused multiple times a week from age nine to fourteen, which the defense contested by questioning her credibility and suggesting that the forensic interviewer would have noted such a high number of incidents. The appellant was given detailed pretrial notice of the allegations, and the court concluded there was no due process violation.

Regarding the judgments, the record indicated that the trial court erroneously recorded the appellant's plea as “Guilty” instead of “Not Guilty.” The appellate court has the authority to correct such errors regardless of whether an objection was raised in the trial court. Consequently, the judgments for both Count I and Count II were modified to reflect a “Not Guilty” plea and were affirmed as modified. The judgments were finalized on September 9, 2022.