Ruth Torres v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee for the Supreme Court of Texas

Citation: Not availableDocket: 05-21-00651-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; September 9, 2022; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Ruth Torres, representing herself pro se, appealed a judgment from the 68th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, which permanently enjoined her from engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. The appeal was against the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee for the Supreme Court of Texas, which had initiated the suit in May 2020, alleging that Torres, a non-lawyer, was attempting to represent two legal entities in litigation. Torres was served with process after filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, during which she engaged in various legal motions despite the automatic stay. The UPLC later filed for summary judgment, presenting evidence that Torres had filed legal documents on behalf of the HR Entities, which constituted unauthorized practice as non-lawyers cannot represent entities in court. The trial court denied Torres's motions and, during the summary judgment hearing, rejected her late response due to page limit violations and lack of permission to file late. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that Torres's actions constituted unauthorized practice of law and that the trial court's rulings were proper.

The judge granted the motion for summary judgment after hearing arguments from both parties and subsequently issued a final judgment that permanently enjoined Torres from unauthorized legal practice. Torres filed a motion to recuse the judge on the same day of the judgment and, eleven days later, submitted a “Verified Request for Rehearing and Motion for New Trial” along with additional motions. In her motion for a new trial, she claimed she did not receive timely notice of the hearing. The presiding judge heard this motion, during which Torres orally requested her recusal, leading to the judge voluntarily recusing herself and transferring the case to a different court. No further hearings took place, and Torres's motion for a new trial was overruled by operation of law, prompting her appeal.

In her appeal, Torres first raised concerns about bias in the judicial system due to campaign contributions, although she did not challenge the specific judgment. Her second issue, divided into eighteen sub-issues, included a claim (sub-issue 2A) of inadequate notice regarding the summary judgment hearing. Torres argued she was unaware of the hearing until shortly before it occurred and attributed the lack of notice to a potentially full email account. However, the record indicated she was notified twenty-one days prior via email and was aware of the hearing at least a week ahead of time. As she did not seek a continuance or file a late response, the court concluded she failed to preserve this issue for review.

In sub-issue 2B, Torres argued that the judgment was void because the presiding judge should have recused himself in light of her earlier motion to recuse. However, she did not object to the judge's assignment during the summary judgment hearing, only raising the issue post-ruling.

An objection to an assigned judge is deemed untimely if filed after the judge has made any ruling in the case, as established in In re S.N.Z. The court resolves Torres’s sub-issue 2B against her. Regarding sub-issue 2C, Torres argues that the injunction against her is void under Rule 683 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, claiming it does not cite the violated regulation or provide reasons for its issuance. The court clarifies that Rule 683 applies only to temporary restraining orders and temporary injunctions, not to final judgments, and resolves this issue against Torres, referencing Qaddura v. Indo-European Foods.

In sub-issue 2D, Torres contends the trial court erred by not considering her late response to the UPLC's motion for summary judgment. However, the court notes that a late response can only be filed with leave of court, which Torres did not seek, nor did she request a continuance, resulting in the trial court’s decision to not consider her response being upheld, as supported by SP Terrace, L.P. v. Meritage Homes.

For sub-issue 2E, Torres argues that the trial court improperly relied on the UPLC's determination of her unauthorized practice of law as the sole basis for summary judgment. The court finds sufficient evidence, including Torres’s lack of a Texas law license and her intentions to represent entities in litigation, to support the trial court's ruling. The court clarifies that non-lawyers cannot represent parties in litigation and that the trial court's judgment did not imply consideration of Torres's untimely response, which was never filed properly. This is supported by Crain v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm.

In sub-issue 2F, Torres claims no court has established jurisdiction over the entities involved. The court emphasizes that pro se litigants must adhere to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys, reinforcing the necessity of compliance with procedural rules as noted in Garrett v. Lee.

HR Entities are not involved in this case, and Torres's arguments regarding sub-issue 2F lack clarity, coherence, and relevant legal authority, rendering it unreviewable. In sub-issues 2G, 2I, 2J, 2K, 2O, and 2P, Torres challenges the UPLC’s summary judgment motion, questioning its sufficiency and clarity regarding whether it seeks traditional or no-evidence summary judgment. The motion explicitly cites rule 166a(c), which pertains to traditional summary judgment, and asserts that Torres was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 

Torres claims the UPLC's motion is unsupported because it only references prior documents rather than attaching them; however, Texas law allows for previously filed evidence to be incorporated. Torres criticizes a declaration from UPLC attorney Charles Gameros as conclusory, but the court finds it provides sufficient factual basis, as it details Gameros's review of the State Bar of Texas's records regarding Torres's licensure and her intent to represent HR Entities. 

Torres argues the UPLC must demonstrate harm from her actions, but Texas Government Code section 81.104 permits the UPLC to act against unauthorized practice of law without needing to prove imminent harm or irreparable injury. Additionally, Torres asserts the UPLC's motion fails to address material issues concerning her defenses like unclean hands and statute of limitations. However, the court notes that the movant must first establish its claim, after which the non-movant must present evidence to raise any factual issues regarding affirmative defenses.

In Brownlee v. Brownlee, the Texas Supreme Court determined that Torres failed to provide evidence in the summary judgment record, thus the burden did not shift to the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee (UPLC) regarding Torres's affirmative defenses. The court ruled against Torres on several sub-issues, including her argument that the injunction against her was an unconstitutional application of Rule 7 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. While Rule 7 allows parties to appear in court, it prohibits a legal entity from being represented by a non-licensed agent. Historical precedent confirms that corporations must be represented by licensed attorneys. Torres claimed that filing an answer on behalf of a corporation is merely a ministerial act to avoid default judgment, citing cases that do not support her argument that such actions do not constitute unauthorized practice of law. She further argued for exceptions to the pro se representation prohibition based on constitutional grounds but failed to substantiate how these exceptions would relate to her case. The court noted that parties asserting unconstitutionality bear a heavy burden and that inadequately briefed issues may be waived, leading to a ruling against Torres on these points. Lastly, concerning due process and violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, Torres's claims were based on a misunderstanding of the Act’s definition of a “contested case.” The UPLC is not authorized to make determinations on unauthorized practice of law but can only seek court intervention, which it did in this case.

Torres's claims regarding the applicability of provisions and requirements under the Act are overruled, as the case is not deemed a "contested case." The bond requirement under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 684 is not applicable to state agencies and pertains only to temporary injunctions, not the permanent injunction at issue, leading to the resolution of sub-issue 2Q against Torres. 

In sub-issue 2R, Torres's assertion that the injunction represents a public policy injustice lacks supporting legal authority, resulting in the waiver of the issue. The first part of her third issue, which argues that the permanent injunction exceeds the UPLC's requested relief, is rejected; the injunction aligns with the UPLC's petition and includes specific acts that constitute unauthorized practice of law, with no authority cited by Torres to dispute this.

Regarding the bankruptcy stay, Torres's claim that the judgment is void due to a violation of the automatic stay is dismissed. Her participation in the case, including filing an answer, waives objections to service. The only monetary award of $308 in court costs arose post-bankruptcy, thus it was not discharged.

Lastly, Torres challenges the constitutionality of a Dallas County general order limiting the length of motions and briefs to twenty-five pages, which the trial court clerk enforced by rejecting her response for noncompliance.

Courts uphold page limitations on pleadings as constitutional, with no evidence of harm shown by Torres despite her response being improperly rejected by the court clerk. The trial court's refusal to consider Torres’s response was based on its untimeliness rather than its length, which the court previously affirmed. Torres argues that the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) violates several amendments; however, she does not present a clear argument or authority demonstrating its facial unconstitutionality. Most of her claims pertain to perceived inequities in the TCPA's application. Torres filed a motion to dismiss under the TCPA, which the UPLC contested, asserting that the TCPA did not apply and that sufficient evidence existed against her. The trial court denied Torres’s motion on the merits rather than by operation of law, despite her claims of scheduling difficulties due to a judicial change. The evidence also supported the UPLC's case against Torres for unauthorized practice of law. Consequently, her “as applied” challenge to the TCPA fails. Additionally, regarding her request for appointed counsel, the trial court has the discretion to do so under exceptional circumstances, with its decision subject to review for abuse of discretion.

A trial court does not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint counsel unless the case presents exceptional circumstances, which are rare. In this instance, the case addressed unauthorized practice of law, deemed straightforward and common, leading the court to conclude that exceptional circumstances were not present. Consequently, the court did not err in refusing to appoint counsel. Regarding spoliation, Torres argued that the trial court wrongly denied her “Notice to Prevent Spoliation,” claiming the UPLC engaged in tactics to withhold records; however, she provided no legal authority to support her claim. The appellate record showed no failure by the UPLC to preserve or produce relevant records. Thus, the court found no error in the trial court’s denial of her motion. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.