Tonca and Terence Watters, an African-American couple, filed a lawsuit against the Homeowners’ Association (HOA) at the Preserve at Bridgewater and its members, Kathryn and Edward Mamaril, alleging race discrimination and failure to accommodate Terence’s post-traumatic stress disorder under the Fair Housing Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all counts. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment regarding the Fair Housing Act and § 1982 claims against the Mamarils but affirmed the decision in other respects.
The Watters, who purchased two lots in June 2013 and moved in December 2015, faced hostility from neighbors, particularly the Mamarils, from the outset. Ed Mamaril, who became HOA president after his wife Kathryn, expressed open disdain, making derogatory comments and suggesting the couple should live elsewhere. Despite the HOA’s pet policy prohibiting free-roaming animals, the Mamarils’ cats frequently trespassed on the Watters' property, and the HOA failed to enforce this rule, allegedly doing so for a white homeowner instead.
Confrontations escalated, including a verbal attack by Kate Mamaril during a Humane Society visit to address the cat issue, where she used racial slurs against Tonca. A significant incident occurred in June 2017 at a restaurant, where the Mamarils verbally assaulted the Watters and referred to their grandchildren using derogatory language. The Mamarils later attempted to obtain a protective order against Tonca, which was subsequently withdrawn. The Watters had also encountered issues with the HOA regarding access to restrictive covenants, which were not properly provided to new homeowners as is customary.
Ed, the HOA president, refused to provide the Watters with copies of the HOA’s restrictive covenants despite requests made through an attorney. When the Watters sought to relocate their mailbox, Ed threatened litigation, while white residents had previously moved their mailboxes without authorization, only to have them restored by the post office later. The Watters faced specific demands regarding the positioning of their porch posts and restrictions on house painting, with evidence suggesting that white homeowners were not similarly constrained.
The primary contention involved a privacy fence, which the HOA does not permit, allowing only pool safety and decorative landscaping fences. The Watters claimed a white resident constructed a garden fence without approval and that another white resident received an exception for a six-foot cedar fence. Although the timeline of the HOA’s establishment is unclear, it appears the latter resident may have built the fence prior to its formation.
Additional grievances included inaction from the HOA regarding violations by neighbors and a lack of communication about serious incidents, contrasting with prompt mass emails about less critical matters. Terence Watters, diagnosed with PTSD and a terminal lung condition, requested a six-foot vinyl privacy fence to alleviate his PTSD triggers, citing the Fair Housing Act. However, he did not mention his disabilities in the request, stating instead that the Act prohibits disability discrimination. The HOA denied the request, arguing that the Act did not apply and suggested alternatives like a wrought iron fence or landscaping.
The Architectural Control Committee (ACC) required the Watters to build a pool to obtain a fence. While the Watters believed their pool plans were approved prior to construction, conflicting testimonies arose, with ACC members asserting that approval had not been granted before construction started. On the day of installation, ACC members halted work but then reviewed and approved the plans on-site, allowing construction to proceed.
Watters filed a lawsuit against the HOA and its members, including the Mamarils, with claims of race discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and 42 U.S.C. § 1982, as well as a claim against the HOA for failure to accommodate Terence's PTSD by not allowing a privacy fence. The parties agreed to have a magistrate judge preside, who granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on all claims. The Watters appealed specifically regarding the HOA and the Mamarils.
In reviewing the summary judgment, the court applies a de novo standard, favoring the non-moving party when drawing factual inferences. Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact, as stipulated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). A mere alleged factual dispute does not automatically defeat a supported motion for summary judgment; however, if evidence suggests a reasonable jury could favor the non-moving party, a genuine dispute exists.
The Watters' first claim cites two relevant sections of the FHA: § 3604(a), which prohibits making housing unavailable based on race, and § 3617, which prohibits coercion or interference concerning the exercise of rights under § 3604. Both sections apply to post-acquisition conduct, meaning that actions taken after the sale or rental of housing can still violate these provisions. The court's interpretation, as established in Bloch v. Frischholz, asserts that § 3617 encompasses a broader range of post-acquisition conduct than § 3604(a) and is not strictly limited to initial housing transactions.
To establish a claim under § 3617, the plaintiffs must demonstrate four elements: 1) they are protected individuals under the FHA; 2) they were exercising their fair housing rights; 3) the defendants interfered with this exercise through coercion or intimidation; and 4) the defendants acted with discriminatory intent.
The Watters meet the initial criteria of being black individuals residing in their owned home in the Preserve. The primary contention lies in the interpretation of intent to discriminate, particularly regarding Ed Mamaril's comment about the Watters' choice to move into the Preserve and multiple derogatory remarks made by Kate Mamaril. While the HOA and the Mamarils acknowledge that Kate's use of racial slurs indicates discriminatory intent, they argue Ed's remark was non-racially motivated. However, given the context of Ed’s statement and Kate’s overt racism, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Ed's comment also exhibited racial animus, satisfying the fourth element of discrimination at this stage.
The crux of the dispute concerns whether the Mamarils’ and HOA's actions interfered with the Watters’ housing rights. The Watters assert a coordinated pattern of harassment, which, when viewed collectively, supports their claim. Under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), a damages action is tort-like, allowing recovery for injuries from wrongful conduct. The HOA and Mamarils contend that the Watters have not identified a specific right under 3604(a) that was violated. However, a claim under 3617 does not necessitate a specific violation under 3604; instead, it addresses coercion and interference with housing rights. The Mamarils’ repeated racist remarks exemplify such interference and can be construed as a pattern of harassment that could amount to constructive eviction, despite the Watters remaining in their home. The text of 3617 is broader than 3604, allowing for claims of harassment that do not require a complete deprivation of housing rights.
3617 applies to post-acquisition discrimination that does not lead to eviction, aligning with Congress's intent in the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and HUD regulations against interference based on race. A reasonable factfinder could determine that the Mamarils’ harassment significantly interfered with the Watters’ enjoyment of their property, despite the absence of direct eviction threats. The Mamarils' harassment included racially charged comments about the Watters' presence in the subdivision and their attempts to investigate the Watters' background. The harassment escalated when the Watters reported violations of neighborhood covenants, and it persisted during family activities.
The HOA and the Mamarils reference Walton v. Claybridge Homeowners Association, Inc., to argue that their actions were merely personal and unrelated to housing; however, Walton is distinguishable as it involved a single overheard remark, unlike the Mamarils’ direct racial hostility. They claim that certain comments were made outside HOA contexts, but this view neglects the broader pattern of racial slurs and the power dynamics inherent in the Mamarils’ roles as HOA leaders. Their titles amplify the impact of their behavior on the Watters’ housing rights, similar to how a supervisor's actions are viewed with greater severity in Title VII cases.
Courts recognize a hostile housing environment under the FHA, applying standards similar to Title VII. Therefore, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that ongoing racial hostility from the HOA's leadership undermined the Watters’ ability to enjoy their home, affecting their sense of safety and overall living conditions.
Interference under 3617 is defined as a "pattern of harassment, invidiously motivated," rather than mere neighbor disputes or isolated acts of discrimination. The Watters present a case against the Mamarils, who have reportedly used racial slurs against them since their arrival in the neighborhood. Although the evidence allows the Watters to bring their race discrimination claim under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) against the Mamarils, it fails against the Homeowners Association (HOA) due to a lack of evidence showing the Mamarils acted on behalf of the HOA during their discriminatory actions. The Watters also attempt to establish a prima facie case of housing discrimination against the HOA, referencing various issues like pet covenants and mailbox placements, but the record does not support their claims.
The Watters also assert a race discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which requires proof of discriminatory intent similar to the FHA. They have sufficient evidence against the Mamarils but none against the HOA, allowing them to pursue this claim only against the Mamarils. Additionally, the Watters claim that the HOA violated the FHA by not accommodating Terence's PTSD when denying their request for a privacy fence. To succeed, they must prove that the HOA was aware of Terence's disability. However, the evidence indicates that while Terence informed an HOA member of his lung condition, there is no evidence that the HOA was aware of his PTSD, which undermines their failure to accommodate claim.
The Watters have enough evidence to pursue their claims against the Mamarils under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and 42 U.S.C. 1982 before a jury, but lack evidence linking the Mamarils’ actions to the Homeowners Association (HOA) or supporting their failure to accommodate claim. The district court's judgment is affirmed regarding the HOA and most individual defendants, but the decision concerning the Mamarils on the FHA and 1982 claims is vacated and remanded for further proceedings.
Dissenting, Circuit Judge St. Eve argues that the Watters' claims lack a necessary connection between the alleged discriminatory treatment and adverse housing actions, thereby justifying the affirmation of the district court's summary judgment in favor of the Mamarils. The case involves the Preserve at Bridgewater, a housing development where the Mamarils, HOA leaders, allegedly made racist comments towards the Watters, who are black. Specific incidents are detailed, including Edward Mamaril's hostile remarks upon the Watters' arrival and Kathryn Mamaril's use of racial slurs during altercations. The Watters filed suit claiming race discrimination and interference with property rights, but the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, which the majority opinion affirms for the HOA and other residents, while allowing the claims against the Mamarils to proceed. The dissent emphasizes that the record lacks evidence necessary for the Watters to sustain their claims.
To establish a claim under Section 3617 of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), plaintiffs must prove four elements: (1) they are protected individuals under the FHA; (2) they engaged in fair housing rights; (3) the defendants coerced, threatened, or interfered with them due to their FHA-protected activity; and (4) the defendants intended to discriminate. While the Watters meet the first two criteria, their claims fail on the third. Coercion or intimidation must have a clear nexus to an adverse housing action; mere neighbor disputes or offensive comments without this connection are not actionable under the FHA. The Watters presented instances where Kathryn Mamaril directed racial slurs at Tonca Watters, but they failed to demonstrate how these remarks linked to any protected housing rights or actions. Additionally, Kathryn's past leadership role in the homeowners association (HOA) does not perpetuate her authority after her resignation, and the significant time gap between the two instances of harassment dilutes any claim. Edward Mamaril's inquiry about the Watters' choice to move to the area, although odd, lacks a connection to housing consequences and is not actionable as a racial slur without proof of adverse effects. The Watters’ attempt to connect the actions of Kathryn and Edward through a spouse-imputation theory is unsupported by law. Furthermore, the Watters' new argument regarding harassment as constructive eviction has not been sufficiently substantiated, leading to the conclusion that their claims do not meet the required legal standards.
The document addresses the criteria for establishing a claim of attempted constructive eviction based on discriminatory actions. It references case law, noting that the phrase “you people” is typically linked to racial implications only when accompanied by other racially charged language or actions, as seen in cases like Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Il and Paz v. Wauconda Healthcare. The text highlights that the Watters did not provide sufficient context to support their claim against Edward Mamaril. Citing Bloch v. McGowan, it emphasizes that evidence must demonstrate a connection between discrimination and housing actions, such as the removal of mezuzot by a condominium association. In contrast, the isolated offensive remarks made by Kathryn Mamaril over fourteen months do not constitute attempted constructive eviction, particularly since one remark was made off the property. The author critiques the majority for disregarding the need for a nexus between the alleged discriminatory remarks and adverse housing actions, concluding that the Watters’ claims lack merit and affirming the district court's summary judgment in favor of the Mamarils. The author expresses dissent regarding the majority's findings.
