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State v. Frase

Citations: 138 Wis. 2d 473; 406 N.W.2d 411; 1987 Wisc. LEXIS 667Docket: No. 86-0916

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court; June 1, 1987; Wisconsin; State Supreme Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

In this case, the defendant was prosecuted as an habitual traffic offender under Wisconsin Statute Section 351.04, following a 14-month delay between receiving documentation from the Department of Transportation and the initiation of formal proceedings. The circuit court found that the delay, while prejudicial, was not intentional, and classified the defendant as an habitual traffic offender, resulting in a five-year revocation of driving privileges. The defendant's driving record included multiple convictions for offenses such as reckless driving and operating under the influence. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision, ruling that the delay did not violate due process as it was neither intentional nor used as a tactical advantage by the state. The defendant did not dispute the validity of his traffic convictions or his identity, thus undermining claims of prejudice. The court also addressed procedural aspects, clarifying that the revocation period commenced from the trial court's determination date. The appellate court upheld the lower court's decision, modifying the effective date of revocation to be consistent with statutory requirements, and dismissed the defendant's due process claims in light of the absence of intentional delay or substantial prejudice.

Legal Issues Addressed

Due Process and Pre-Indictment Delay

Application: The delay in prosecuting the defendant as an habitual traffic offender did not violate due process as it was not intentional and did not create a tactical advantage for the state.

Reasoning: The court of appeals affirmed this decision, concluding that the delay did not demonstrate intentionality by the state nor did it constitute a denial of due process.

Habitual Traffic Offender Classification under Wisconsin Statute

Application: The defendant was classified as a habitual traffic offender based on multiple convictions within a five-year period, which included reckless driving and operating under the influence.

Reasoning: The defendant was classified as an habitual offender and had his driving privileges revoked for five years, starting July 13, 1984, due to multiple convictions within a five-year period, as outlined in Wisconsin statutes.

Revocation of Driving Privileges

Application: The defendant's driving privileges were revoked for five years starting from the date of the trial court's finding, consistent with the statutory mandate.

Reasoning: The law mandates a five-year revocation starting from the trial court's finding of habitual traffic offender status, which took effect on May 1, 1986.

Two-Prong Test for Due Process Violations

Application: Neither prong of the Supreme Court's two-prong test for due process violations due to delay was satisfied in this case, as there was no evidence of intentional delay or prejudice affecting the defense.

Reasoning: Given that neither prong of the tests from Marion and Strassburg was satisfied, the court did not need to determine which standard applied.