Spleas v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp.

Citations: 21 Wis. 2d 635; 1963 Wisc. LEXIS 381; 124 N.W.2d 593

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court; November 26, 1963; Wisconsin; State Supreme Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The trial court was correct in determining that there was no basis for the jury to assess contributory negligence between the bus company driver and the plaintiff, Spleas. The testimonies presented were fundamentally conflicting; if the jury accepted the bus driver's account, Spleas could not be found negligent, and vice versa. The appellant argued that testimony from bus passengers suggested Spleas was not visible to the driver when approaching the bus door, potentially indicating negligence on the driver's part, but not contributory negligence on Spleas' part. Furthermore, Spleas' action of trying to board the bus after his leg was caught in the door was deemed a normal reaction, thus not supporting a finding of contributory negligence.

Regarding alleged errors in jury instructions, the appellant claimed that the phrase "a cause of the plaintiff's injuries" improperly suggested multiple causes of injury, when a singular cause should have been indicated due to the absence of contributory negligence. However, the court concluded that this error was harmless as the jury was tasked with choosing between the plaintiff's and bus driver's narratives. The appellant also contended that the court emphasized the plaintiff's perspective unduly, particularly regarding the driver's duty to prevent closing the door on a boarding passenger, without equally addressing the passenger's responsibility in the situation. The court found any such errors minor and not prejudicial. Additionally, the court clarified that the bus driver owed the highest degree of care to passengers, consistent with the standards set for common carriers.

The trial judge required the bus driver to exercise the highest degree of care, reflecting expected human vigilance related to their operational duties. The court deemed this instruction appropriate. The appellant claimed that the damage instructions could lead to double recovery for a single item of damage. The court’s instructions allowed the jury to determine a fair monetary compensation for various damages suffered by Paul Spleas due to the accident, including pain, suffering, health impairment, medical expenses, and loss of earnings. Previous case law indicates concern over double recovery, but in this instance, the use of a general verdict makes it unlikely that the jury awarded double compensation for any single factor.

The court also noted that a lack of itemization in damage assessments complicates review but maintains that in the absence of proof of error, jury determinations will not be disturbed. The appellant argued against including 'loss of earning capacity' in damages, citing insufficient evidence. Spleas indicated he faced challenges in his work post-accident, receiving fewer raises than colleagues. The court referenced past rulings affirming that earning capacity can be affected even if salary remains unchanged. It concluded that there was enough evidence to justify including future earning capacity impairment in the instructions, distinguishing this case from precedents lacking such evidence.

However, the court found error in permitting an award for future medical and hospital expenses, as there was no expert testimony to support claims of future needs, aligning with established legal principles that require expert evidence for such awards.

The court maintains that the same principles apply to future medical expense awards as established in prior cases. Evidence suggested a permanent injury, but there was no proof of future medical costs. In Behringer v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., the court ruled that juries cannot speculate on future medical expenses without evidence, and instructing juries to include such speculative items in damages is a reversible error. Conversely, in Springen v. Ager Plumbing, the court found any error not prejudicial under the specific circumstances. 

Regarding a second accident on September 12, 1962, where the plaintiff fell from a broken ladder, the defendant argued the plaintiff did not meet the burden of proof as outlined in Smee v. Checker Cab Co., which requires the plaintiff to demonstrate the specific cause of damages when multiple causes exist. However, the plaintiff presented competent medical evidence linking his injuries to the first accident, and the defendant failed to provide opposing medical testimony regarding the second accident, allowing the jury to reasonably attribute damages to the 1955 incident.

The jury awarded the plaintiff $15,000 in damages, which the defendant claimed was excessive. The plaintiff, previously in good health, experienced significant deterioration post-accident. After the fall, he received treatment from Dr. Dunst, had X-rays taken, and did not return to work for several days. Over the next two years, he suffered from backaches, headaches, and sleeplessness, leading to hospitalization and medical procedures, including a myelogram and traction treatment. While opinions on his condition varied among doctors regarding a protruded intervertebral disc, no surgery was performed, and his recovery was prolonged.

Dr. David Ansfield opined that Spleas had a normal spinal canal and that his back complaints were subjective and expected to resolve. In contrast, Dr. Louis Kagen diagnosed Spleas with a chronic low back strain, indicating that his symptoms were permanent. The conflicting medical testimonies led to a conclusion that the jury's damages award was excessive based on the severity of Spleas' injuries. A reasonable award was determined to be $10,000, which accounts for potential errors in jury instructions regarding future medical expenses. The court emphasized that while jury assessments of damages should generally be upheld, it is responsible for intervening if the award is excessive, even in favor of the plaintiff. The case will be remanded for a new trial on damages unless Spleas consents to accept the reduced amount of $10,000 within twenty days. Additionally, the Powers rule, which allows for a plaintiff to remit excessive damages in the absence of trial errors, has been modified to permit this option even when a prejudicial error has occurred, specifically relating to damages. The judgment was reversed and remanded with directions, and the appellant is entitled to costs on appeal.