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Blom v. Kumbier
Citations: 275 Wis. 227; 81 N.W.2d 528; 1957 Wisc. LEXIS 271
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court; March 5, 1957; Wisconsin; State Supreme Court
Appellant argues that there was prejudicial error in jury instructions regarding right of way and in denying a requested question. The court affirms the judgment, stating that the jury was instructed correctly about the right of way: if Blom made a full stop at the arterial stop sign, he had the right of way, subject to whether he lost that right through his actions post-stop. The appellant contends that the instruction should have included a requirement for Blom to make an efficient observation of traffic before proceeding. It is established under Wis. Stat. § 85.18 that a driver must stop and then observe traffic conditions, as supported by Kraskey v. Johnson, which emphasized the need for efficient observation at intersections. However, there is no evidence that Blom failed to observe traffic adequately after stopping. Photographic evidence suggests he had a clear view of oncoming traffic. Blom testified he stopped fully, looked for oncoming vehicles, and waited for two cars to pass before proceeding, contradicting claims he recklessly entered the intersection. While Blom was found to be negligent in maintaining a proper lookout as he approached the intersection, this alone did not support a finding that he failed to observe safely after stopping. Kumbier was driving at a significant speed, indicating he was far from the intersection when Blom began to move. Additionally, the jury instructions are criticized for implying both vehicles entered the intersection simultaneously. The court clarified that if one driver was in the intersection significantly ahead of the other, then the statutory right of way did not apply, thus finding no error in the instructions provided. Evidence did not support a finding that Kumbier entered the intersection before Blom; both vehicles likely entered simultaneously, as Kumbier was traveling at least 50 mph, limiting the time difference to an instant. The collision occurred under 100 feet from the intersection's north end. The court's reference to statutory provisions regarding right-of-way was deemed irrelevant to Kumbier, as there was no evidence he signaled a left turn. The court refused to submit a question about Blom’s position on the highway, which the defendant argued was an error. However, no evidence indicated that Blom was negligent regarding his position, as he remained in the correct lane. The court acted within its discretion by not submitting the question. Regarding jury instructions, the court read relevant statutes on roadway operation but did not elaborate on how each driver should navigate the intersection. Although more detailed instructions could have been beneficial, it was not prejudicial to Kumbier given the evidence, and no request for more comprehensive instructions was documented, which typically precludes reversal for incomplete instructions. In Madison Trust Co. v. Helleckson and Grinley v. Eau Galle, the court addressed the complexities of applying traffic statutes at an acute-angle 'Y' intersection, emphasizing the necessity for legal counsel to assist the trial court. The defendant requested an instruction asserting that undisputed physical evidence, specifically skid marks measuring 82 feet, contradicted the testimony of Blom, who claimed he stopped at a stop sign. The trial court did not rule on this request nor provide the instruction, though jurors were advised to consider physical evidence carefully. The request was deemed waived since it was made orally at the end of the testimony, and no further requests were made. The court maintained discretion in denying the instruction, as the physical evidence did not irreparably undermine witness testimony; the jury could still reasonably doubt Blom’s account. The appellants argued for a new trial based on claims that the verdict was against the weight of evidence and influenced by bias, particularly regarding the skid marks’ implications. However, the trial judge affirmed the verdict, stating that justice was served, a perspective the appellate court respected after thorough review. The judgment was ultimately affirmed.