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Timothy Ader v. Delta College Board of Trustees
Citation: Not availableDocket: 143621
Court: Michigan Supreme Court; November 8, 2012; Michigan; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
The Michigan Supreme Court vacated its previous order from February 1, 2012, and denied the application for leave to appeal the July 14, 2011, judgment of the Court of Appeals, concluding it is no longer persuaded that the questions presented warrant review. Justice Markman dissented, arguing that the standing doctrine established in Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, which overruled the prior standing rules from Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm'rs and Nat’l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, violates the constitutional separation of powers. He noted that the determination of the plaintiff's standing under LSEA versus the previous rules is crucial for the case's resolution. Initially, both lower courts found the plaintiff lacked standing under the older standards, but the Court of Appeals later reversed this decision after reconsideration under LSEA. Markman highlighted that the standing test from Lee, based on the U.S. Supreme Court's Lujan decision, requires proof of an 'injury in fact,' a causal connection to the defendant's conduct, and a likelihood of redress from a favorable ruling. He criticized the LSEA doctrine for being vague and overly broad, suggesting it fails to provide a clear standard for determining standing, particularly noting that it allows standing based on inferred legislative intent, which could lead to inconsistencies in legal application. Legislative authority to confer standing is limited by constitutional principles outlined in the Michigan Constitution, which establishes a separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. This separation is articulated in Const 1963, art 3.2, which prohibits one branch from exercising the powers of another unless explicitly stated in the Constitution. The judicial branch's power requires a genuine "case or controversy" with a real dispute and a specific personal injury to the plaintiff, as emphasized in Cleveland Cliffs. Without such injury, the judiciary risks becoming entangled in public debates, infringing on the executive branch's responsibilities in law administration. The judiciary does not serve as a super-administrator of the law; it is the responsibility of the people, through voting and petitioning the Governor, to oversee executive actions. The definition of "judicial power" cannot be dictated by the Legislature, as this would disrupt the established separation of powers. Therefore, the doctrine of standing is critical in maintaining judicial authority within its rightful limits. The author advocates overruling past decisions that improperly broaden judicial power, reversing the Court of Appeals' decision on remand and reinstating its initial ruling. The document is certified as a true copy by Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, dated November 9, 2012.