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David v. Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles
Citations: 219 W. Va. 493; 637 S.E.2d 591; 2006 W. Va. LEXIS 28Docket: No. 32859
Court: West Virginia Supreme Court; May 12, 2006; West Virginia; State Supreme Court
The West Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) is held responsible for paying the expert witness and attorney fees of a licensee, Daniel David, who was denied due process during his driver’s license revocation proceedings. David was charged with driving under the influence on February 24, 2004, leading to a DMV order revoking his license for six months, effective April 8, 2004. He appealed the revocation and requested a hearing, which was scheduled for October 4, 2004. David’s attorney issued a subpoena for Trooper C.L. Adkins to attend the hearing, as authorized by W.Va. Code, 17A-2-18. On the hearing date, although David and his expert appeared, Trooper Adkins did not show up, claiming to be in another court. David’s counsel waited until 3:00 p.m. for the trooper's arrival before leaving. The relevant statute permits continuances for good cause, but does not appear to have been properly applied in this case. The decision underscores the DMV's obligation to ensure due process, particularly regarding witness attendance in administrative hearings. On October 7, 2004, the appellant's counsel received a 'continuance request' from a Fayette County assistant prosecuting attorney, indicating that Trooper Adkins was unable to attend the October 4, 2004 DMV hearing due to obligations in Magistrate Court. This request, sent on October 5, was accompanied by a certificate of service. Records show Trooper Adkins had been notified multiple times on July 29, 2004, to appear in court for several scheduled cases on October 4, with no notices for hearings after 11:30 a.m., and no subpoenas were issued for his attendance. There is no evidence that Trooper Adkins attempted to have the magistrate cases continued or that he informed the prosecutor or magistrate about being subpoenaed for the DMV hearing. His only actions appeared to be phone calls on the hearing date and subsequent letters. The DMV granted a continuance, rescheduling the hearing to March 9, 2005, due to Trooper Adkins' absence. On February 4, 2005, the appellant sought a writ of prohibition and mandamus in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, arguing that the DMV's continuance was erroneous and requested dismissal of the suspension proceedings. The circuit court denied this petition without explanation or findings on February 10, 2005, prompting the appellant to appeal. The appellant claimed he would suffer significant prejudice due to the inability to use an expert witness at the hearing. The standard for granting a writ of prohibition is established, allowing it when a lower court lacks jurisdiction or exceeds its powers. The circuit court's summary dismissal lacked detailed justification, leading to a de novo review of the case. The procedural standards for DMV hearing continuances are outlined in West Virginia Code and relevant regulations, allowing the Commissioner to grant continuances. A request for continuance must be submitted in writing to the Commissioner at least five days before the scheduled hearing. The Commissioner will grant the request if good cause is demonstrated, which can include serious illness, medical appointments, court appearances, or religious holidays. Each party is limited to one continuance unless specified in Subdivisions 3.8.3 and 3.8.4. In DUI cases, continuances may also be granted to the arresting officer under Subdivision 3.8.4. Rule 3.8.1 allows continuances for court appearances, which Trooper Adkins could have invoked given his prior notice of magistrate court hearings. Despite having two months' notice of these hearings, he did not apply for a continuance under Rule 3.8.1, and no explanation for this failure was provided by the appellee. Rule 3.8.4 allows for emergency continuances on less than five days' notice for unexpected personal emergencies affecting the person requesting the hearing or the arresting officer. However, Trooper Adkins' situation did not qualify as an unexpected emergency since the magistrate court hearings were anticipated, and he had ample notice. The DMV's decision to grant a continuance based on an alleged emergency was therefore improper. Additionally, the excerpt references case law affirming the due process rights of individuals regarding their driver's licenses and discusses previous rulings on delays in DMV proceedings, emphasizing that claims of prejudice must be shown to warrant dismissal of proceedings due to delays. A molded writ of prohibition was granted in Cline, requiring the DMV to temporarily reinstate regular driver’s licenses if hearings were unreasonably delayed, thereby shifting the burden of delay back to the DMV. In the current case, the DMV contends that dismissing the driver's license suspension proceedings against the appellant is excessive, suggesting the appellant can simply attend another hearing with his expert witnesses. However, the appellant asserts he cannot afford to pay for his expert's attendance at a subsequent hearing and argues that the DMV's improper granting of a continuance violated his due process rights. The court previously established that a party's failure to appear at a deposition could result in that party being responsible for the costs incurred by the other party for expert witnesses and legal fees. The principle emphasized is that legal disputes should be resolved based on their merits, avoiding unfair advantages or trial by ambush. Given that the appellant's driver's license represents a significant property interest, the DMV is obligated to conduct hearings that uphold the due process rights of all parties involved. The current conclusion is that the DMV’s improper delay in the suspension proceedings denied the appellant due process. As a remedy, the appellant should recover expenses incurred due to this delay, returning him to the position he would have been in had the continuance not been granted. Consequently, the circuit court's denial of the writ of prohibition is reversed, as the DMV would be exceeding its jurisdiction by conducting a hearing that violates the appellant's right to a fair and comprehensive hearing on the merits of his case. The ruling of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to issue a writ of prohibition requiring the DMV to pay the appellant’s expert witness fees, attorney fees, and travel costs associated with the continuance of the October 4, 2004, administrative hearing. This includes fees incurred during the current prohibition and appeal proceedings. A letter from a Fayette County magistrate indicated that Trooper Adkins could not attend the DMV hearing due to multiple scheduled hearings, but it clarified that a notice to appear is not a subpoena. Trooper Adkins had a specific subpoena for the DMV hearing, which took precedence over his obligations to the magistrate court. The appellant's brief noted that Trooper Adkins knew the appellant retained an expert for the hearing. Cited precedent indicates that strict application of procedural rules by the DMV that deny continuances can constitute a due process violation. Further, to warrant dismissal of administrative proceedings due to delay, a party must demonstrate both unreasonable government delay and substantial prejudice to their defense. Additionally, the DMV's failure to comply with DUI arrest reporting time requirements does not obstruct administrative action unless actual prejudice to the driver is shown. Any disputes regarding the fees and expenses should be initially addressed by the Circuit Court, with the DMV having the option to dismiss the license revocation proceedings instead of paying the appellant’s fees.