Sleigh v. Sleigh

Citations: 191 W. Va. 326; 445 S.E.2d 509; 1994 W. Va. LEXIS 70Docket: No. 21832

Court: West Virginia Supreme Court; May 27, 1994; West Virginia; State Supreme Court

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Andrew F. Sleigh, Jr., executor of Margaret Malloy Sleigh's estate, appealed a Lewis County Circuit Court ruling that classified two checks issued by his father, Andrew F. Sleigh, Sr., to his grandson, Sean Sleigh, as loans rather than gifts. The checks, dated January 31, 1988, for $2,000, and February 5, 1989, for $15,000, were drawn from accounts held by Andrew F. Sleigh, Sr. and were not included as assets in his estate appraisal. Following Andrew F. Sleigh, Sr.'s death on January 31, 1990, and the subsequent passing of his widow, Margaret M. Sleigh, in June 1991, questions arose regarding the nature of the checks.

Andrew F. Sleigh, Jr. claimed the checks were gifts, supported by a statement from his father before his death that he had given Sean a sum of money which was "forgiven." However, the court affirmed the original ruling, concluding that the checks constituted loans and were assets of both estates. The status of Margaret M. Sleigh’s codicil, which outlined specific bequests, remains legally contested. The case underscores a dispute over the classification of the financial transfers between family members and their implications for estate distributions.

During cross-examination, a witness discussed the interpretation of a financial transaction, stating he did not interpret his father's actions regarding a potential loan. The testimony revealed past legal custody arrangements involving Andrew F. Sleigh, Jr., who acted as attorney-in-fact for both his parents. He reviewed check registers, noting that a $2,000 check was payable to Sean R. Sleigh from an account solely in his father's name. Mary Bergin Sleigh Skidmore testified about a $15,000 check issued after Sean requested financial assistance without disclosing the purpose. She recounted her mother's reluctance to provide the funds due to an unpaid $2,000 loan from the previous year, contrasting her father's insistence on issuing the check. The check was drawn in her mother's handwriting but signed with her father's stamp. Skidmore also noted her mother's impartiality toward her grandchildren, while acknowledging her father's favoritism towards the girls. The check registers were presented as evidence, showing entries for both the $2,000 and $15,000 amounts. Richard Sleigh, another sibling, confirmed he borrowed $44,000 from their parents, kept detailed records of his repayments, and stated that neither parent offered to forgive his debt, indicating a lack of knowledge about the estate's size during their lifetimes.

The individual expressed surprise upon discovering his parents' financial situation, noting his mother’s strict business approach. The court ultimately ruled that the checks in question were loans rather than gifts. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court incorrectly classified the checks and failed to recognize a legal presumption of gift in West Virginia law for transfers between family members. The appellant references the case of Dickeschied v. Exchange Bank, which outlines that the burden of proof lies on the claimant to establish a gift, emphasizing the importance of delivery of possession. For an inter vivos gift to be valid, three criteria must be met: the donor's intent to gift, delivery of the gift, and acceptance by the donee. In this case, the delivery and acceptance of the checks were undisputed; thus, the burden rested on the proponents of the gift theory to prove the donor's intent. The court noted an absence of a general legal presumption of gift for transfers between a grandfather and grandson, contrasting with specific provisions for spouses or joint tenants. While the close relationship of the parties can influence the evidence regarding intent, it does not eliminate the need to establish that intent. Overall, the court highlighted that less evidence may be needed to support a gift to a close relative, but the necessity for proof remains.

Substantial evidence indicates that Sean Sleigh had a close relationship with his grandparents, Andrew F. Sleigh, Sr. and Margaret Malloy Sleigh, including having lived with them and being under Margaret's legal custody as a child. A codicil to Margaret's will, although its validity is disputed, bequeathed Sean significant items from her estate. Despite this relationship, evidence suggests that two checks issued to Sean were intended as loans rather than gifts. A check register noted the $15,000 check as a "loan," and Margaret expressed concern about the checks, mentioning an unpaid $2,000 loan from Sean. Testimony from Andrew F. Sleigh, Jr. indicated that his father referred to the money given to Sean as forgiven, but this did not establish that the funds were gifts. The court emphasized that the burden of proof lies with the appellant to demonstrate any errors in the trial court's ruling. After reviewing the evidence, the court upheld the trial court's conclusion that the transactions were loans, not gifts. Additionally, the appellant argued that the checks could not be enforced under W.Va. Code § 44-1-14 due to their lack of appraisal in Andrew F. Sleigh, Sr.'s estate.

W.Va. Code § 44-1-14 previously mandated the appraisal of evidences of debt before a judgment could be rendered. In the current case, the proceedings were strictly declaratory and not related to the collection of debts. The trial court determined that the checks in question were loans, not gifts, and the collection issue was not addressed. Consequently, the circuit court's decision is upheld. There were no objections to the testimony regarding the checks, and one attorney explicitly noted that he did not challenge the competency of the testimony under the Dead Man’s Statute. Evidence showed that Andrew F. Sleigh, Sr. regularly issued checks in a specific manner, and Margaret M. Sleigh managed the account related to a $15,000.00 check, with entries in the account register predominantly in her handwriting. According to W.Va. Code § 48-3-10, property purchased by one spouse but titled in the other’s name is presumed a gift unless proven otherwise, although this presumption does not apply in marital property actions. The court chose not to discuss recent amendments to W.Va. Code § 44-1-14, deeming them irrelevant to the case at hand.