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Feit v. Feit

Citations: 183 W. Va. 206; 394 S.E.2d 901; 1990 W. Va. LEXIS 97Docket: No. 19264

Court: West Virginia Supreme Court; June 26, 1990; West Virginia; State Supreme Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

This case involves an appeal by Janie Marie Feit against a Circuit Court of Harrison County decision that modified her divorce decree by canceling her right to purchase her ex-husband Alvin Feit’s share in their marital property and requiring its sale to a third party. The original decree allotted Janie a 25% interest and Alvin a 75% interest in the property, with provisions for either party to buy out the other's interest. Janie initially expressed intent to purchase Alvin's share but did not act within a time frame considered reasonable by the court. The circuit court ruled that Janie’s financing arrangement, involving her son's co-signature, introduced an unauthorized third party, thus modifying the decree to mandate the sale to a third party. Upon appeal, the higher court found that the circuit court exceeded its statutory jurisdiction under W.Va. Code, 48-2-15, by altering property rights unrelated to alimony, support, or custody issues, as established by precedents like McKinney v. Kingdon. The appellate court reversed the circuit court's judgment, reinstating Janie's right to purchase Alvin's interest at the specified price, emphasizing that her son's involvement did not invalidate her purchase option.

Legal Issues Addressed

Involvement of Third Parties

Application: The co-signing of a loan by the appellant's son did not constitute a third-party transaction affecting the appellant's purchase option.

Reasoning: The trial court incorrectly concluded that the appellant's son co-signing a note transformed the purchase into a third-party transaction; however, there was no evidence to suggest the son was willing or able to buy the property independently.

Jurisdiction to Modify Divorce Decree

Application: The circuit court lacked the authority to modify the divorce decree concerning property distribution as it was not related to alimony, child support, or custody.

Reasoning: Jurisdiction in divorce cases is strictly statutory, and courts lack authority to alter property matters beyond what is specifically allowed by law, as established in previous cases, including McKinney v. Kingdon and State ex rel. Hammond v. Worrell.

Property Rights Post-Divorce

Application: The appellant retained a valid property claim to purchase her ex-husband's interest, and the circuit court's alteration was not permissible.

Reasoning: The trial judge granted the appellant the right to purchase her husband's interest in the Twin Oaks property for 25% of $124,000, contingent upon mutual agreement on a different price until the property was sold to a third party.