State v. Tanner

Citations: 181 W. Va. 210; 382 S.E.2d 47; 1989 W. Va. LEXIS 92Docket: No. 18487

Court: West Virginia Supreme Court; June 8, 1989; West Virginia; State Supreme Court

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John Tanner was convicted on January 20, 1988, by a Raleigh County Circuit Court jury for transferring stolen property and subsequently filed an appeal against the denial of his motion to overturn the verdict and the sentencing order from April 27, 1988, which sentenced him to one to ten years in prison, later suspended in favor of probation. Tanner was indicted on September 22, 1987, for receiving stolen property and two counts of transferring stolen property related to a stolen 1982 Dodge van.

Tanner became involved with the stolen van during a trade arrangement with an unidentified man who proposed swapping his stolen 1982 Dodge van for Tanner's 1975 Dodge van, along with an additional cash payment of $300 to $650 for the condition difference. The trade was executed without proper title transfers, leading Tanner to use the title of a van no longer in his possession. Financial difficulties prompted Tanner to transfer the title of his van to his father-in-law, C.H. McGuire.

In December 1984, Tanner transferred the 1982 van to his son-in-law, Ronald Chapman, who sold it in March 1987 to Clarence Chapman for $350. Clarence did not title the van, later selling it to Joseph Ames. Ames became suspicious of the van due to missing identification numbers and contacted police, leading to the discovery that the van was stolen from Carol Hager Motors in 1981. Evidence revealed inconsistencies in the vehicle's identification, including removed identification numbers and mismatched emission control stickers.

A serial number matching that of a stolen 1982 Dodge van was found under Ames’ van. At trial, the judge dismissed a second count against Tanner regarding the transfer of stolen property to C.H. McGuire due to lack of evidence for an actual transfer. Tanner was acquitted of receiving stolen property from late 1981 or early 1982 but was convicted of transferring stolen property to Ronald Chapman on December 5, 1984. Tanner argued that the trial court erred by not directing a verdict of acquittal and not overturning the guilty finding for the third count, claiming no evidence of a 'dishonest purpose' in the transfer. The court agreed, stating that the State did not prove Tanner had a 'dishonest purpose' when transferring the van to his son-in-law, leading to the reversal of his conviction. Citing State v. Taylor, the court explained that the elements for transferring stolen property include that the property must be stolen, the accused must know or suspect it is stolen, the transfer must be to someone other than the owner, and it must be done with a 'dishonest purpose.' It noted that while W.Va. Code 61-3-18 does not explicitly require criminal intent, a mens rea element has been inferred, necessitating proof of 'dishonest purpose' for a guilty verdict. During the trial, the jury was instructed on the need to find Tanner acted with a 'dishonest purpose,' defined as deceitful or fraudulent. However, the record showed only limited evidence regarding Tanner’s transfer of the van, primarily from his statements to the police, where he expressed uncertainty about the transfer's details.

Tanner's grand jury testimony revealed that he gave a van to his son-in-law, Ronnie, without any money exchanged, as Ronnie needed it for his construction business. Tanner was uncertain about the exact ownership transfer process, suggesting it could have been transferred to his father-in-law first. During the trial, Ron Chapman recounted receiving the van from Tanner for use as a work vehicle. The prosecution argued that Tanner knew the van was stolen at the time of the transfer and acted with dishonest intent, depriving the rightful owner of the vehicle. Tanner's attorney objected to this argument, noting that Tanner was not charged with concealing stolen property, which involves different legal elements. The prosecution clarified that it was not claiming Tanner was guilty of concealment but wanted the jury to infer that this could indicate a dishonest purpose in the transfer. Despite the objection, the trial judge allowed the jury to consider all facts. The court emphasized that dishonest purpose is distinct from knowledge and that the prosecution must prove all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Ultimately, the prosecution failed to establish Tanner's dishonest purpose in the transfer, and the case relied heavily on Tanner's own statements, suggesting that without them, there may not have been sufficient evidence for prosecution.

Tanner's conviction is reversed because the State failed to prove he transferred the van to his son-in-law with dishonest intent. Since intent is a critical element of the charged offense, retrial is prohibited under the Double Jeopardy Clause, preventing the prosecution from retrying the case to present evidence it previously lacked. Consequently, the court orders Tanner's conviction to be set aside and remanded to the circuit court for entry of a judgment of acquittal. Tanner was not charged with any related crime, and the jury was instructed that transferring a motor vehicle title for a vehicle not owned by the transferor was not a charge against him. Additionally, a written but unsigned statement by Tanner was admitted as evidence during the trial.