Wynona Harris, a bus driver trainee for City of Santa Monica, claimed she was terminated due to her pregnancy, violating the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The City contended her dismissal was due to poor job performance. During the trial, the City requested a jury instruction allowing them to avoid liability if they proved a legitimate reason for firing Harris, even amidst discriminatory motives. The trial court denied this request, leading to a jury verdict favoring Harris. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, asserting the instruction was correct and the trial court's refusal was prejudicial.
The Supreme Court of California affirmed part of the Court of Appeal's ruling, stating that if a jury finds unlawful discrimination was a significant factor in an employee’s termination, and the employer demonstrates it would have made the same decision without discrimination, damages, backpay, or reinstatement cannot be awarded. However, the employer remains liable under FEHA, which aims to prevent discrimination. Therefore, the plaintiff may be entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief and reasonable attorney's fees and costs. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with these findings.
Harris was initially hired in October 2004, but during her training, she had a preventable accident. After completing her training, she was promoted to a probationary driver. During her probation, she had a second preventable accident and received a 'miss-out' for being late, which the job performance guidelines indicated could reflect reliability issues, potentially leading to termination.
On March 1, 2005, Harris received a written performance evaluation from her supervisor indicating that she needed further development during her probationary period as a driver. Despite this, Harris claimed her supervisor previously stated she was performing well but would have rated her higher if not for a November accident. On April 27, 2005, Harris failed to notify her dispatcher about being late for a shift due to stress from her daughter's juvenile court hearing, marking her second miss-out. Transit manager Bob Ayer investigated and recommended keeping the miss-out in Harris's file, noting her failure to meet employment standards based on her record of two miss-outs and two preventable accidents.
On May 12, 2005, Harris informed her supervisor, George Reynoso, of her pregnancy, which he appeared displeased about and subsequently requested a doctor's note for her to continue working. Four days later, she provided a note with limited work restrictions, which were not contested as relevant to her case. On the same day, Reynoso received a list of probationary drivers not meeting employment standards, including Harris, and her last working day was May 18, 2005.
In October 2005, Harris filed a lawsuit against the City, alleging her termination was due to pregnancy discrimination. The City denied these claims, asserting legitimate reasons for her termination as an at-will employee. During the trial, the City sought a jury instruction on mixed motives, stating that if the employer's decision was influenced by both discriminatory and non-discriminatory reasons, it could avoid liability if it proved that the legitimate reason alone would have led to the same outcome. The court denied this request and instructed the jury instead that Harris must demonstrate her pregnancy was a motivating factor in her termination, defined as something that influences the decision even alongside other contributing factors.
The jury found that Harris's pregnancy was a motivating factor in the City's decision to terminate her employment, awarding her $177,905 in damages, primarily for non-economic losses related to mental suffering. The City challenged the verdict, asserting that the trial court's denial of a mixed-motive jury instruction impeded its defense, but the court rejected this claim. Subsequently, Harris sought attorney's fees, which were granted at $401,187, based on the California Government Code, allowing for such awards in favor of the prevailing party. The Court of Appeal supported Harris's position, ruling that the requested jury instruction accurately reflected California law and that the trial court's refusal was a prejudicial error. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal upheld the jury's finding of substantial evidence for pregnancy discrimination and remanded the case for a new trial. The review focused on the validity of the mixed-motive instruction, BAJI No. 12.26, within the context of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), which prohibits employment discrimination based on protected characteristics, including pregnancy. In cases without mixed motives, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies, where the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the employer can then present a legitimate reason for its actions, and the plaintiff must demonstrate that this reason is a pretext for discrimination. The plaintiff maintains the ultimate burden of persuasion throughout the process.
Liability in employment discrimination cases hinges on determining whether an employer's stated reason for an employment action is genuine or merely a pretext. In mixed-motives cases, where both discriminatory and legitimate reasons influence the employer's decision, the challenge is identifying the appropriate standard of causation. Section 12940(a) prohibits adverse employment actions based on protected characteristics, requiring a causal link between the employer's consideration of these characteristics and the action taken. The interpretation of "because of" is contested, with the City arguing it signifies that consideration of a protected characteristic must be a necessary factor in the employer's decision—known as "but for" causation. This interpretation aligns with the Supreme Court's ruling in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, which mandates that age must be the reason for adverse action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. However, California precedent acknowledges that "but for" causation is not the only interpretation. In In re M.S., the court clarified that multiple causes can contribute to an outcome, and discrimination need not be the sole or dominant factor to establish a violation. Instead, a substantial factor test is applied, allowing for concurrent motivations in determining liability under antidiscrimination statutes.
Harris argues that the term "because of" in section 12940(a) does not require that a protected characteristic be the "but for" cause of an employment action. The statute uses the phrase "because of" without stipulating that the action must be "solely," "exclusively," or "predominantly" due to discrimination. Instead, Harris asserts that it suffices for discrimination to be "a motivating factor" in the employer's decision, even if other factors are present. This interpretation aligns with the Fair Employment and Housing Commission's (FEHC) longstanding view and Congress's understanding in the 1991 amendments to Title VII.
Three interpretations of "because of" in section 12940(a) are identified: 1) discrimination as a "but for" cause, 2) discrimination as a "substantial factor," and 3) discrimination as "a motivating factor," each supported by some authority. Legislative history does not clarify the required degree of causation for section 12940(a). Amici curiae argue that the inclusion of a "motivating factor" standard in housing discrimination under section 12955.8 suggests an intention to exclude this standard from employment discrimination provisions in the FEHA.
Negative implications from disparate provisions are strongest when considered simultaneously. Historical court rulings demonstrate that negative inferences can arise from the simultaneous amendment of related statutes. The 1993 amendment introducing the "motivating factor" language for housing law was not intended to affect employment discrimination provisions, as there is no evidence that the legislature considered the latter while amending housing law. Consequently, the absence of a similar clause in section 12940(a) implies that the legislature did not intend to adopt the "motivating factor" standard for employment discrimination.
Ambiguity exists in the interpretation of "because of" in section 12940(a), prompting a review of federal law, particularly Title VII. California courts align with federal precedents due to similarities in employment discrimination laws. Title VII prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the U.S. Supreme Court highlighted inconsistencies in federal circuit courts regarding causation and burden of proof in mixed-motive discrimination cases. Some circuits required "but for" causation, while others allowed a showing that discrimination was a substantial factor, with varying implications for employer liability. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that if a plaintiff demonstrates that gender was a motivating factor, the burden shifts to the employer to prove it would have made the same decision irrespective of discrimination. In this case, the City does not assert that Harris bore the burden of proving "but for" causation, but contends that the jury should have been instructed that if both discriminatory and non-discriminatory reasons motivated the employer's action, liability is avoided if the employer proves by a preponderance of the evidence that its legitimate reason alone would have led to the same decision.
The City advocates for the adoption of the Price Waterhouse standard not only for burden shifting but also for the legal implications of an employer's same-decision showing, which under Price Waterhouse serves as a complete defense against liability. However, this interpretation was altered by the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1991, which established that while an employer can limit remedies available to a Title VII plaintiff through a same-decision showing, it does not constitute a complete defense to liability. The amended Title VII allows for a finding of unlawful employment practices if a motivating factor is established, even if other factors also played a role. In instances where an employer demonstrates it would have made the same decision absent the impermissible factor, courts may grant specific forms of relief but cannot award damages or mandate actions like hiring or reinstatement. The Court of Appeal asserted that these 1991 amendments are irrelevant to interpreting California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), as the California legislature has not mirrored the federal "motivating factor" language. The Court suggests that the original interpretation of "because of" by Price Waterhouse and not the subsequent amendments should guide the understanding under section 12940(a). It argues against the notion that the California legislature intended to adopt Price Waterhouse's definition of "because of," emphasizing that the legislative history indicates the 1991 amendments aimed to restore previous interpretations of the term prior to the Price Waterhouse decision, which understood "because of" as encompassing any significant influence in employment decisions.
The House Judiciary Committee report clarifies that 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(m) reaffirms the illegality of relying on prejudice in employment decisions, responding to the Price Waterhouse decision. Legislative history indicates Congress aimed to restore, not revise, the understanding of "because of" in Title VII's discrimination ban. It emphasizes that post-enactment legislative history should not influence statutory interpretation since it could not affect congressional votes. The 1991 amendment, including the "motivating factor" language, was intended to clarify Congress's interpretation of "because of," aligning with its original intent rather than introducing a new standard. Title VII prohibits discrimination when sex is a motivating factor for any employment practice, which contradicts the City’s assertion that only Price Waterhouse's interpretation is relevant. The history of Title VII reveals various interpretations of "because of" over time. The Supreme Court's decision in Gross, concerning the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), illustrates that "because of" in the ADEA requires "but for" causation and does not include the "motivating factor" standard, as Congress did not add such language to the ADEA when amending Title VII. This highlights that the 1991 addition was meant to elucidate, not change, the meaning of "because of" in Title VII.
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, establishing that such discrimination is actionable when any of these factors is a motivating factor in employment practices. The City argues that the absence of "motivating factor" language in the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) suggests that the ADEA should inform the interpretation of "because of" in the FEHA. This position also relies on the pre-1991 interpretation of the phrase in Title VII by Price Waterhouse. However, the Supreme Court's decision in Gross indicates that the phrase "because of" does not have a uniform meaning across different anti-discrimination laws, emphasizing legislative intent as critical. Since Congress did not include "motivating factor" language in the ADEA, it suggests a different meaning for "because of" compared to Title VII. The FEHA’s lack of explicit definition for "because of" creates ambiguity, but does not default to Price Waterhouse's interpretation. The court stresses the importance of aligning interpretations with the legislative intent behind the FEHA, which declares the necessity to protect all individuals from discrimination in employment based on various characteristics, including race, gender, and disability.
Denying employment opportunities and discriminatory practices hinder societal development, harm the interests of employees and employers, and create public unrest. The Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) aims to provide remedies to eliminate such discrimination, ensuring civil rights in employment regardless of race, gender, and other characteristics. The courts uphold the fundamental policy of a discrimination-free workplace, emphasizing the public benefit of this principle.
The FEHA's provisions require a liberal interpretation to fulfill its objectives. The court has stated that the public interest in combating sexism in the workplace is paramount. The discussion also addresses the "same-decision" defense, where an employer must prove that the same employment decision would have occurred without any discrimination, clarifying that justifying the decision post-factum does not suffice. The court is tasked with determining whether this defense fully exempts an employer from liability in cases where discrimination played a part in an adverse employment action, a question not directly resolved by the Court of Appeal but alluded to in previous cases.
The Fair Employment and Housing Commission (FEHC), previously tasked with establishing a system of published opinions as precedent for interpreting the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), has interpreted the phrase "because of" in a way akin to Congress's 1991 understanding of Title VII's causation requirement. In the case of Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc. (1990), the FEHC determined that section 12940(a) considers any conduct discriminatory if it is motivated, even in part, by a victim's race or other protected characteristics, establishing liability when a preponderance of evidence shows that discrimination influenced the adverse employment action. This interpretation aligns with Title VII, where a same-decision showing limits certain remedies but does not fully absolve liability.
The FEHA serves two primary purposes: providing remedies to redress the effects of discrimination, ensuring individuals can seek and maintain employment free from discrimination, and preventing and deterring unlawful employment practices, reflecting a legislative intent to combat the broader societal impacts of discrimination. The FEHA recognizes that discrimination adversely affects employees, employers, and the public, aiming to uphold a workplace free from discrimination's detrimental effects.
Consequently, a same-decision showing by an employer does not completely absolve them of liability if a plaintiff has proven that discrimination was a substantial motivating factor for the adverse employment action. While isolated discriminatory thoughts or remarks alone do not establish liability under the FEHA, it would undermine the act's preventive goals to allow an employer to escape liability when discrimination is a significant factor in their employment decision. The example of Ann Hopkins at Price Waterhouse illustrates cases where discrimination, while not the sole cause, can still be a substantial motivating factor for adverse actions.
At the time of the partnership review, only seven out of 662 partners were women, and Hopkins was the sole female candidate among 88 nominees for partnership. The review process involved comments from all partners, interviews by the admissions committee, and recommendations to the policy board, which decided on the final outcome based on no fixed guidelines. Price Waterhouse had no cap on the number of partnerships granted in a year. Hopkins’s colleagues highlighted her exceptional performance in securing a significant $25 million contract with the U.S. Department of State, noting that no other candidates had a comparable track record. She was recognized as an outstanding professional with strong character and competence by various officials.
However, the federal district court noted that Hopkins's aggressive approach sometimes led to abrasiveness, affecting her relationships with staff. Partners had previously advised her to improve in this area, and despite some improvements, her interpersonal skills were a significant factor in the failure of her partnership bid. Both supporters and detractors pointed out her perceived harshness and difficulty in working with others. There were indications of gender bias in the critiques; some partners labeled her as 'macho' and suggested she overcompensated for her gender. Comments also indicated that objections to her behavior may have been influenced by her being a woman, with suggestions to moderate her language and demeanor. One supporter acknowledged her evolution into a more appealing candidate over time.
The district court found that Thomas Beyer was responsible for the decision to put Hopkins's candidacy for partnership on hold, advising her to adopt a more traditionally feminine demeanor to improve her chances. Despite the legitimate emphasis on interpersonal skills in partnership decisions, the court determined that Price Waterhouse discriminated against Hopkins based on sex by giving undue weight to comments rooted in sex stereotyping. In a related case, Rowland v. American General Finance, it was noted that while Rowland had a track record of favorable performance reviews and was considered for promotion to district manager, her candidacy was repeatedly overlooked. Although her supervisors acknowledged her qualifications, they highlighted concerns regarding her "people skills." Following a customer complaint about her handling of a loan cancellation, it was revealed that her ambition and difficulty in delegation may have alienated colleagues, contributing to the decision not to promote her.
In 1996, Rowland met with her supervisor Roach to discuss her lack of promotion, during which Roach indicated that Rowland needed to improve her people skills. Rowland pressed Roach for more clarity, and he explicitly stated he did not want another woman in the position, particularly referencing Shelby Bennett's influence. Bennett, a female district manager, echoed a sentiment that men dominate the company, implying women must conform to their directives. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that while Rowland's shortcomings could be a sole reason for denying her promotion, her alleged deficiencies in people skills might be intertwined with gender bias that influenced the decision. Although the court noted that Rowland had minimal chance of winning if she had to prove that sex discrimination was the direct cause of her non-promotion, it recognized sufficient evidence indicating that gender was a motivating factor in the decision. Specifically, Roach's comments and Bennett's remarks suggested that gender bias played a significant role. The court emphasized that discrimination does not need to be the sole cause to be deemed a substantial factor in employment decisions. It warned that permitting employers to avoid liability by demonstrating legitimate factors could undermine the objectives of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), which aims to provide effective remedies against unlawful employment practices and prevent workplace discrimination that fosters strife and resentment.
Section 12920.5 clarifies that the prohibition on discrimination under section 12940(a) extends beyond situations where discrimination is the sole cause of an employment decision. An adverse employment action influenced by racial, gender, or other forms of discrimination may signal a broader, problematic policy or practice. For example, a supervisor's refusal to promote a qualified female candidate may not directly harm her chances but could negatively affect future applicants if such behavior is not addressed. The Legislature's intent, as expressed in the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), is to prevent and deter unlawful practices before they affect employment opportunities. If discrimination is a significant motivating factor in an employment decision, declaring it illegal helps prevent its future repetition, thereby encouraging fair competition in the workforce.
The document emphasizes that discrimination's adverse effects extend beyond individual cases, impacting the public's interest in an equitable workplace. The FEHA aims to safeguard against discrimination's harmful influence. However, it does not criminalize discriminatory thoughts or isolated remarks that don't directly influence employment decisions. Such comments may lead to harassment claims under a different FEHA provision but are insufficient to support a claim under section 12940(a).
Causation under section 12940(a) requires that discrimination must directly influence an employer's decision to refuse hiring, employment, training selection, or discharge, as well as compensation and employment conditions. Justice O'Connor in Price Waterhouse emphasized that isolated remarks or comments from non-decisionmakers do not suffice to establish bias as a motivating factor in employment decisions. She noted that while race and gender awareness is inherent in decision-making, mere references to these characteristics do not infer that they were the basis for a decision. To prove discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must present direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the employment decision, a standard some federal courts adopted but which was ultimately dismissed in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, where the Supreme Court ruled that both circumstantial and direct evidence are valid in discrimination cases. Nonetheless, the requirement for substantial evidence of discrimination, rather than merely showing it was a motivating factor, is essential to prevent liability based on trivial remarks. Proving that discrimination was a substantial factor does engage the deterrent purpose of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and holds the employer accountable, even if other legitimate reasons influenced the decision. The document refrains from elaborating on what constitutes sufficient evidence in mixed-motive cases, acknowledging the complexity and variability of such situations.
The jury was instructed to consider whether discrimination was merely a motivating factor in Harris's termination, but it should have been asked to determine if discrimination was a substantial motivating factor. The trial court must first evaluate if the evidence supports this substantial factor instruction. Regarding remedies, if a plaintiff demonstrates that discrimination was a substantial factor in a termination, yet the employer proves it would have made the same decision regardless, the plaintiff is not entitled to reinstatement or backpay. Such remedies would not adequately address the adverse effects of discrimination if legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons existed for the termination. Granting these remedies would unfairly benefit the plaintiff and restrict the employer's ability to make legitimate employment decisions, leading to inefficiencies contrary to the purposes of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). This conclusion also applies to claims for economic loss, such as future income (front pay), and to noneconomic damages like emotional distress. Although discrimination can cause dignitary harm, if the employer would have acted as they did regardless of discrimination, compensating for emotional distress from the termination itself is unjustified. It is impractical to separate emotional distress caused by discrimination from that caused by the termination, as the emotional distress primarily stems from the firing. Thus, compensation for such distress would constitute a windfall for the employee if the employer proves lawful reasons for the termination.
Harris argues against limiting noneconomic damage remedies under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), noting that unlike Title VII, FEHA has not historically imposed such limitations. Although the FEHA allows for all relief generally available in noncontractual actions, it does not authorize damages that could lead to a windfall. Furthermore, the absence of noneconomic damages for discriminatory termination does not eliminate potential liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress or for emotional distress claims arising from unlawful harassment under FEHA.
However, it is concluded that a termination motivated by discrimination is not compensable under section 12940(a) if the employer successfully demonstrates a same-decision defense. Still, a finding of unlawful discrimination is significant and has important implications. Such a finding may lead to judicial declarations of wrongdoing, which can reaffirm the plaintiff's rights and condemn discriminatory practices, as well as injunctive relief to prevent future discrimination. Additionally, plaintiffs who prove unlawful discrimination may qualify for reasonable attorney's fees and costs, which serves to support the objectives of the statute by ensuring that employees can pursue claims without the burden of legal costs, particularly when the employer's actions have contributed to the situation. This fee structure mitigates the risk of overcompensation that might arise with damage awards.
Requiring employers to bear litigation costs related to their own wrongdoing aligns with the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) goal of deterring unlawful employment practices. Discrimination may not always cause compensable injury to a plaintiff, but it can have broader adverse effects on society. Allowing plaintiffs to recover reasonable attorney's fees encourages employers to recognize the social costs of discrimination, thus furthering deterrence. Under section 12965, subdivision (b), the award of attorney's fees is discretionary and should consider the plaintiff's level of success, ensuring it does not incentivize unnecessary litigation for claims lacking public significance. Legislative intent parallels that of Title VII, emphasizing that benefits should not primarily favor attorneys through substantial fees for trivial relief. A plaintiff facing adverse employment actions due to discrimination may qualify for reasonable attorney's fees aimed at addressing such discrimination. The City argues for a complete defense based on a same-decision showing, referencing cases like Bekiaris v. Board of Education, where a teacher's termination for performance reasons was upheld despite claims of First Amendment violations. The principle established in Bekiaris was echoed in the U.S. Supreme Court case Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, which shifted the burden to the employer to prove that the same decision would have been made regardless of the protected conduct once a plaintiff demonstrates that such conduct was a substantial factor in the adverse decision.
A lawful dismissal occurs if the employer demonstrates that they would have made the same decision regardless of the employee's protected conduct. This principle is supported by case law, including Williams v. City of Los Angeles, where the court ruled that reinstatement isn't required if the employer can prove they would have acted similarly without the protected conduct. In Martori Brothers Distributors v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., the court adopted a burden-shifting framework from the Wright Line decision, which states that if an employee shows their union activities influenced their discharge, the employer must then prove the discharge would have happened regardless. Discharges due to misconduct won't be deemed unfair labor practices unless it’s proven that the employee would have been retained but for their protected activities. The City argues for a similar application of these principles under section 12940(a) of the FEHA, emphasizing that reinstatement and backpay shouldn't be granted if it results in a windfall for the employee. However, a same-decision showing does not eliminate the possibility of finding an unlawful motive that could justify declaratory or injunctive relief. The summary concludes with a mention of Harris's argument for a higher standard of proof regarding same-decision showings.
Harris argues that a same-decision defense should require clear and convincing evidence rather than the standard preponderance of the evidence. This argument is rejected, as the requirement for clear and convincing evidence is similar to the employer's burden to disprove "but for" causation following a showing that discrimination was a substantial factor in an employment decision. The precedent set in Day v. Matthews highlights the difficulty for individuals to reconstruct past events due to the employer's unlawful actions, suggesting that uncertainties should be resolved against the party responsible for creating them.
The Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse rejected the clear and convincing evidence standard, stating that such exceptions to the preponderance standard are rare and typically arise in cases involving significant governmental coercion, such as termination of parental rights or deportation. The Court noted that the elevated standard of proof generally protects defendants rather than plaintiffs seeking it as a means to prove their case.
In California, the standard of proof can vary based on the consequences of an erroneous determination, with preponderance of the evidence being the default in civil cases. Instances where clear and convincing evidence has been required include conservatorship cases involving sterilization, termination of parental rights, and involuntary medical treatments, emphasizing the gravity of the decisions involved in those contexts.
A heightened proof standard has not been applied to cases involving ordinary civil remedies, and no mixed-motive case since Price Waterhouse or the 1991 Title VII amendments has required anything beyond a preponderance of the evidence for an employer's same-decision defense. The Labor Code section 1102.6 mandates a clear and convincing evidence standard for employers to prove a same-decision defense when a plaintiff shows that a violation of the whistleblower statute was a contributing factor to an employment decision. However, this does not imply that the same standard is intended for other statutes concerning same-decision defenses. Employment discrimination litigation differs from cases where a clear and convincing standard is used, thus the appropriate standard is preponderance of the evidence.
Harris argues that a same-decision instruction should not have been provided because the City did not plead this affirmative defense in its answer. The court holds that the City's failure to plead this defense does not preclude such an instruction. According to Code of Civil Procedure section 431.30, an answer must include a statement of any new matter constituting a defense, and since the burden of proof lies with the defendant in asserting a same-decision showing, they must plead this defense. If an employer argues that discriminatory and nondiscriminatory reasons both motivated its actions, the employer must claim that the nondiscriminatory reasons alone would have led to the same decision.
Furthermore, a defect in a pleading is not significant unless it affects substantial rights, and the main purpose of pleadings is to notify the opposing party to prepare their case. The City asserted in its answer that any adverse employment actions were based on legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, not on discriminatory practices. Thus, the court reinforces the principle that amendments to pleadings should be allowed unless they cause prejudice or are untimely.
Employment actions taken by the defendant were not based on pretext, indicating that the City intended to defend against claims of discrimination by asserting a legitimate reason for terminating Harris. The City maintained this defense at trial, suggesting that Harris would not be harmed by jury instructions that allowed for a verdict based on partial beliefs in both her claims and the City's defenses. The absence of a same-decision defense did not impact Harris's substantial rights, allowing the trial court to provide a same-decision instruction. Harris argued that an employer must acknowledge mixed motives to make a same-decision claim, but the court found no inconsistency in an employer asserting legitimate motives while also conditionally arguing that mixed motives could lead to the same outcome. Under California law, defendants may present multiple inconsistent defenses without them being deemed admissions against interest.
Section 12940(a) is interpreted to mean that if a plaintiff shows discrimination as a substantial factor in their termination, the employer can prove that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons would have resulted in the same decision. If successful, the employer is shielded from damages, backpay, or reinstatement, though the plaintiff may still seek declaratory or injunctive relief and may be awarded attorney’s fees. The trial court instructed the jury to assess whether discrimination was a motivating factor in Harris's termination, while the City sought instructions that would absolve it if it proved that its legitimate reason alone would have led to the same decision. An employer cannot prevail by merely showing partial motivation by a legitimate reason; the defense relies on proving that a legitimate reason existed and would have independently prompted the decision.
A jury in a mixed-motive unlawful termination case must first find that the employer's actions were substantially motivated by discrimination before the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate a same-decision defense. If the employer successfully shows a same-decision motive, this defense negates the possibility of awards for reinstatement, backpay, or damages. The trial court must assess whether evidence of discrimination in Harris's case justifies providing a mixed-motive instruction upon retrial. The Court of Appeal's judgment overturning the damages verdict is affirmed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. The case is titled Harris v. City of Santa Monica, with several counsel listed for both the appellant and respondent, as well as various amici curiae supporting both sides.
