Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
Phillip v. Taylor
Citations: 18 V.I. 437; 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9355Docket: Civil No. 77/198
Court: District Court, Virgin Islands; April 21, 1981; Federal District Court
The Court denies Federico Dottin, M.D.'s motion for summary judgment in a personal injury case filed by plaintiff Linus Phillip, who claims negligence related to a myelogram performed on September 11, 1975. Phillip alleges that the dye pantopaque was negligently left in his body, causing injury. The defendant argues for dismissal based on a statute of limitations, asserting that the complaint, filed on September 30, 1977, is beyond the two-year limit established under 5 V.I.C. 31(5)(A). Phillip contends that the statute of limitations should start from the time he discovered the foreign object, which he states was on August 19, 1976, when a neurologist informed him. This claim falls within the timeframe allowed by 27 V.I.C. 166d, which applies when a foreign object is left in a patient’s body. Although the defendant notes that 27 V.I.C. 166d does not apply to malpractice acts occurring before its effective date (November 18, 1975), the Court agrees that the subchapter can inform public policy regarding medical malpractice limitations. The Court supports the trend of tolling statutes of limitations until a plaintiff is aware of their injury, referencing the Supreme Court case United States v. Kubrick, which established that the statute begins to run once the plaintiff knows both the existence and cause of their injury. The Court concludes that for actions occurring before November 18, 1975, the statute of limitations does not begin until the plaintiff is aware of the injury, aligning with the provisions of 27 V.I.C. 166d. The defendant argues that responsibility should rest with Dr. Taylor, who injected the dye. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Dottin improperly removed a needle without aspirating the dye, creating a factual dispute that precludes summary judgment. Defendant contends that the pantopaque dye does not qualify as a foreign object under 27 V.I.C. 166d, referencing Rothman v. Silber, where a court declined to label an anesthetic as such. The Court distinguishes that unlike anesthetic, pantopaque must be removed from the body, asserting that its liquid form does not negate its status as a foreign object. Defendant further argues that the dye was intentionally placed, which should exclude it from foreign object status. The Court disagrees, noting that intentional placement does not prevent an item from being considered a foreign object if left inside. Defendant also claims that plaintiff's alleged collapses after the procedure should have alerted him to an injury, suggesting that the cause of action accrued at that time. However, the Court finds that such collapses could stem from anxiety or transient trauma and do not indicate a permanent injury, especially given plaintiff's pre-existing condition. The Court states that the foreign object exception applies, ruling that the cause of action commenced when plaintiff learned of the dye's retention on August 19, 1976. Defendant further asserts that a radiologist's duties do not encompass the injection or removal of pantopaque or informing the patient of risks. Plaintiff disputes this, maintaining that Dr. Dottin did remove the needle, another factual dispute unsuitable for summary judgment. Consequently, the Court denies the motion for summary judgment filed by Dr. Federico Dottin.