Court: District Court, Virgin Islands; January 25, 1981; Federal District Court
This action involves three plaintiffs, formerly Juvenile Corrections Officers, seeking a declaratory judgment, writ of review, civil rights violation claims, and damages following their dismissal. The defendants include Eleanor Thraen and Leslie Millin, sued in both individual and official capacities, along with the Government of the Virgin Islands. The amended complaint consists of three counts:
1. **Count I** contests the grounds for dismissal cited by Thraen, alleging ulterior motives and seeking a writ of review, back pay, attorney’s fees, and punitive damages.
2. **Count II** claims Millin failed to follow procedural requirements and did not allow the plaintiffs a chance to contest their dismissals, seeking a declaratory judgment on Millin's actions, compensatory damages, and punitive damages.
3. **Count III** alleges violations of due process and equal protection under the U.S. Constitution by Thraen and Millin, with significant compensatory and punitive damages sought.
The court denies some motions to dismiss due to the need to explore the complaint's potential for relief, even with its lack of clarity. It finds that while the plaintiffs do not present a valid tort claim, they may have viable statutory and constitutional claims regarding their employment status and rights. However, the court dismisses the declaratory judgment action and clarifies that damages cannot be sought against Thraen and Millin in their individual capacities. The court concludes that the only possible tort is wrongful discharge, which is narrowly defined and recognized.
The court determines that, under 1 V.I.C. 4, wrongful discharge claims cannot be recognized in the Virgin Islands without a cognizable tort. Consequently, the complaint asserting a tort claim against Thraen, Millin (in both official and individual capacities), and the government will be dismissed.
Regarding statutory claims, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants did not follow proper statutory procedures during their dismissal, which can be remedied under 5 V.I.C. 1421 et seq. The plaintiffs claim to be 'regular' employees, as defined by 3 V.I.C. 451, asserting that their dismissal did not comply with 3 V.I.C. 530. Alternatively, they argue they were 'probational' employees under 3 V.I.C. 527, and that dismissal procedures for probational employees were violated.
The classification of employees is significant as regular employees have more extensive protections against dismissal. The distinction hinges on the completion of a probationary period, which is at least two to three months, depending on the appointment type. The plaintiffs contend that the Director did not set their probationary period, and argue that their ten months of employment should grant them regular employee status, despite not providing legal authority for this claim. The court opts not to rule on this "regular status by default" argument at this stage, as it could impact many employees.
The court will evaluate the complaint first under the assumption that the plaintiffs were probational employees, then under the assumption they were regular employees. As probational employees, the plaintiffs failed to allege a statutory claim for relief. Probational employees have limited protections; if deemed unsatisfactory by the department head, the Director can recommend their removal to the Governor, with required documentation in the personnel records.
Probational employees are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard only if their dismissal is due to fraud or error in appointment or if they claim nonmerit factors influenced their dismissal. The only alleged statutory violation is that the Director did not make a recommendation to the Governor regarding the department head's report on unsatisfactory performance. However, the plaintiffs do not claim that their dismissal was not approved by the Governor or solely enacted by the Director. Although a procedural error occurred due to the lack of a recommendation, such errors do not automatically require reinstatement, as established in Innis v. Monsanto. The court finds that the complaint does not present a valid claim concerning the statutory rights of probational employees.
In contrast, regular employees, which the plaintiffs assert they were at the time of dismissal, have stronger protections against arbitrary dismissal. The dismissal process mandates a written statement of charges, which must be provided to the employee. If the employee appeals within ten days, no dismissal can happen until the GESC holds a hearing. The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs were denied a hearing, which constitutes a violation of their rights as regular employees under 3 V.I.C. 530, warranting relief.
The complaint also raises constitutional claims against defendants Thraen and Millin for improper dismissal based on false reasons and retaliation for exercising free speech regarding inefficiencies in a government facility. The claims include deprivation of property and liberty interests without due process under the 14th Amendment and punishment for free speech under the 1st Amendment. To establish a property interest, plaintiffs must show that such an interest existed and that due process was violated. The due process required varies based on whether the plaintiffs are considered regular or probational employees at the time of dismissal.
Plaintiffs, as regular employees at the time of their dismissals, have a recognized property interest in their jobs, supported by local statutes that create a legitimate expectation of continued employment absent cause for discharge. The court acknowledges that regular employees possess a claim of entitlement to their positions, as supported by precedent. Plaintiffs argue that they only received notice of the reasons for their dismissals, and the court finds that failing to provide any pre-termination hearing constitutes a violation of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment.
Conversely, the issue of whether probational employees have a property interest in continued employment remains unresolved, as the court determines that due process requirements were met in this case. Referencing the Third Circuit's decision in Grausam v. Murphy, the court concludes that due process for probational employees requires only notice of dismissal and the opportunity for a post-termination hearing regarding discrimination based on nonmerit factors. Since plaintiffs received notice and an explanation for their dismissals, and they have the right to a hearing if they believe their dismissals were based on nonmerit factors, their complaint does not establish a property interest or due process claim as probational employees.
Furthermore, the 14th Amendment protects individuals' liberty interests, which can be implicated by a governmentally imposed stigma affecting employment opportunities. The criteria for a deprivation of liberty interest include the termination process, publication of false and stigmatizing reports, and a failure to provide notice and a hearing on those reports. Plaintiffs assert a valid liberty interest due to allegedly false and stigmatizing reasons cited for their dismissals, particularly impactful in the field of Juvenile Corrections. They claim no hearing was provided regarding their dismissals. Thus, regardless of their employment status, plaintiffs have presented a cognizable constitutional claim.
An individual can seek relief if terminated from government employment as a result of exercising their 1st Amendment right to free speech, as established in Perry v. Sindermann. This protection applies regardless of the employee's job status at the time of dismissal, per Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle. However, not all speech qualifies for constitutional protection; the evaluation involves balancing the employee's interest in discussing public concerns against the state's interest in maintaining efficient public services, as articulated in Pickering v. Board of Education.
Plaintiffs must demonstrate that their speech was protected and influenced their dismissal, after which the burden shifts to the defendants to prove that the dismissal would have occurred regardless of the protected speech. The plaintiffs claim their terminations were motivated by a desire to mask inefficiencies at the Juvenile Corrections Facility, which constitutes a viable 1st Amendment claim. Although plaintiffs may face challenges in proving their case, the difficulty of proof alone does not justify dismissal.
The complaint seeks various remedies, including reinstatement, back pay, punitive and compensatory damages against individual defendants, and a declaratory judgment on the legality of actions taken. The remedies appear disorganized concerning the counts of the complaint, necessitating a structured approach as the case progresses.
A writ of review can be issued if a substantial right is claimed to have been violated by a governmental decision. As plaintiffs allege violations of statutory and constitutional rights related to their dismissals, issuance of the writ is warranted. Upon review, if the allegations hold true, the court has extensive powers to modify or reverse the decision, award restitution, and mandate further actions as necessary. Historical cases illustrate the court's broad application of these powers, including reinstatement and back pay determinations in government employee discipline matters.
Back pay was awarded against the government in Turnbull v. Holder, 11 V.I. 93 (D.V.I. 1974). Plaintiffs in the current case seek more than just back pay, including reinstatement, attorney's fees, costs, and significant compensatory and punitive damages from Thraen and Millin personally. However, the court determined that allowing such relief through a writ of review exceeds its statutory authority and does not align with the statute's ambiguous references to 'restitution.' Therefore, any claims for personal liability against Millin and Thraen must be pursued through a different legal mechanism. The court will dismiss the complaint regarding money damages from these individuals while permitting claims for restitution against the government.
Regarding declaratory judgments, these serve to adjudicate rights and obligations in ongoing controversies and do not provide an alternative means for injunctive or compensatory relief. The court deemed the request for declaratory relief unnecessary since the issues could be resolved through statutory and constitutional claims already at the coercive remedy stage, leading to a dismissal of the declaratory relief claims.
For the constitutional claims, the court noted a lack of jurisdictional basis but will treat them as § 1983 actions, which allow for remedies for constitutional rights violations. Plaintiffs can seek nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages from Thraen and Millin in their personal capacities, not from the government. In summary, the court will grant the motion to dismiss claims related to torts, personal damages under the writ of review, and requests for declaratory judgment.
The court found the complaint sufficient to establish both statutory and constitutional claims, allowing for relief against the government through a writ of review and for damages from Thraen and Millin in a civil rights action. Consequently, the defendants' motion to dismiss these claims was denied. However, the court granted the motion to dismiss regarding tort claims, declaratory judgments, and personal capacity damages against Thraen and Millin under the writ of review powers, as these claims were deemed untimely. The complaint was filed over 90 days after the alleged misconduct by Thraen, violating the statute of limitations set forth in 33 V.I.C. 3409(c). Although Millin's alleged misconduct might have occurred within the 90-day period, the plaintiffs failed to provide dates or respond to the untimeliness argument, leading the court to rule the complaint untimely for Millin as well. The court noted that no motion for a late filing was made, and the statute of limitations was upheld. Additionally, the case references Simmonds v. GESC, indicating that while temporary employment provides little job security, regular employees have a recognized property interest in their jobs. A trial has been rescheduled to February 16, 1981.
In Abraham v. Hendricks, the court acknowledged a constitutional issue regarding the necessity of a pre-termination hearing for the dismissal of regular employees. It addressed due process requirements but sidestepped the constitutional question by identifying violations of statutory procedures. The ruling implies that regular employees possess a property interest in their jobs, supported by the case of Romney v. Rimple. The Grausam decision arose during a period when the distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges' in governmental employment was thought to be obsolete, but this distinction has since been redefined as 'entitlements' versus 'benefits.' The Supreme Court clarified that not all governmental employment is entitled to due process protections, as seen in Bishop v. Woods. While the Grausam presumption that due process applies to probationary employment may no longer hold, the Third Circuit's framework for determining necessary procedures when due process is applicable remains unaffected by later rulings, as demonstrated in Richards v. Christian, which distinguishes between the issuance of a Writ of Review and the substantive review process itself.
