Court: Supreme Court of Vermont; January 21, 1988; Vermont; State Supreme Court
An appeal was made from a Vermont District Court judgment that revoked a defendant's probation and reinstated a previously suspended prison sentence of four to seven years. The defendant contended that the probation department's one-year delay in executing an arrest warrant for a probation violation violated his due process rights and right to prompt justice. The court disagreed and affirmed the judgment.
The defendant was convicted of aggravated assault in September 1982 and initially sentenced to a term of four to seven years, with three years to serve. At the time of his conviction, he was on probation for an earlier offense in Florida, which he violated by being in Vermont. Upon his release on May 18, 1984, it was expected that his Vermont probation would be transferred to Florida, but this transfer was never finalized.
A condition of his Vermont probation required him to report to his Vermont probation officer within 24 hours of release, which he failed to do. Consequently, a warrant was issued on June 18, 1984. The defendant was arrested in Florida on June 26, 1984, for grand theft and violating his Florida probation, leading to his incarceration until May 1985. He returned to Vermont in June 1985 and was arrested based on the earlier warrant.
The court found him in violation of his Vermont probation for failing to report, leaving the state without permission, and being convicted of another crime. His original sentence was reimposed, with credit for time served. The defendant’s motion to dismiss the probation violation was denied. He appealed, arguing that the state's delay in executing the arrest warrant breached his constitutional rights. Vermont statute allows for a warrant to be issued at any time before the termination of probation but does not specify a timeframe for bringing a probationer before the court. The court noted that other jurisdictions have ruled against unreasonable delays in executing such warrants, but ultimately upheld the trial court's decision.
Defendant's argument regarding the one-year delay in executing a probation violation warrant is countered by a comparison to cases interpreting different federal and state statutes that require prompt action, often using language like "as speedily as possible." Notable cases cited include Greene v. Michigan Department of Corrections, where a delay of over nine years was significant, and United States v. Hill, which emphasized the need for timely court appearances. The absence of similar language in the relevant statute allows for a one-year delay without statutory violation.
Additionally, although the defendant claims this delay infringes on his constitutional rights to due process and a speedy trial, relevant precedent indicates that the right to a speedy trial does not activate until an arrest occurs or charges are formally made. The Supreme Court has clarified that the protections of the Sixth Amendment kick in with either an indictment or actual restraint. Therefore, no violation of the defendant’s right to a speedy trial is found since an arrest warrant alone does not trigger these protections.
For a successful constitutional claim related to due process, the defendant must demonstrate that the delay was both unreasonable and prejudicial, as established in Bearden v. Georgia. The burden remains on the defendant to prove that the one-year delay was unreasonable and adversely affected his rights, which has not been established according to the cited legal standards.
To establish a due process violation due to preindictment delay, a defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice to their defense and that the delay was intentional, aimed at gaining tactical advantage. In this case, the defendant failed to show any prejudice, as he did not attempt to address an outstanding probation violation while in Florida and received credit for all time served. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the state intentionally delayed to gain an advantage. Consequently, the one-year delay in executing the arrest warrant for the probation violation did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights to due process or speedy justice. The trial court's judgment revoking the defendant’s probation and imposing a suspended sentence is affirmed. The only statutory requirement regarding probation is a prompt probable cause hearing when a probationer is held for a violation. The defendant's claims of constitutional violations under both federal and Vermont constitutions were not adequately differentiated, leading to the decision not to invoke Vermont constitutional analysis for the first time on appeal without extraordinary circumstances.
