United States v. Ricardo Epps

Citations: 404 U.S. App. D.C. 39; 707 F.3d 337; 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2866; 2013 WL 500241Docket: 11-3002

Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; February 12, 2013; Federal Appellate Court

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The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed the appeal of Ricardo Eugene Epps, who sought a reduction of his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) following the Supreme Court's decision in Freeman v. United States. Epps was originally sentenced to 188 months in prison for drug offenses in 1999 after entering a plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). The district court had previously denied his motion for a sentence reduction, stating that Epps' sentence was not based on the crack-cocaine Guidelines range.

Epps argued that the lack of a controlling opinion in Freeman allowed for reconsideration of his sentence since his original sentence was based on the crack-cocaine Guidelines. The court found that the district court did indeed calculate Epps’ Guidelines range and expressed concerns over the disparity in sentencing between crack and powder cocaine offenses. Ultimately, the appellate court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further consideration, emphasizing that Epps' sentence could be eligible for reduction in light of the Sentencing Commission's amendments to the crack cocaine Guidelines that were made retroactive.

The amendments would lower Epps' offense level to 33, adjusting the Guidelines sentencing range to 168 to 210 months. The government opposed reducing his sentence, asserting that it was based on a stipulated 188-month sentence from his Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement rather than the applicable Guidelines range. Epps contended that his sentence was connected to a reduced Guidelines range, justifying a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The district court denied his motion, and Epps appealed in January 2011, with the appeal held in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision in Freeman regarding eligibility for sentence reductions under § 3582(c)(2) in the context of such plea agreements. 

The government argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because Epps had completed his imprisonment and was serving a five-year mandatory supervised release term. Epps countered that the appeal was not moot, as its outcome could influence his supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), which allows for termination of supervised release based on the defendant's conduct. Despite Epps' release, the court found it had jurisdiction over the appeal. 

The government maintained that, due to the mandatory supervised release term dictated by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), the court could not grant any relief even if it agreed with Epps' motion, since the district court lacked authority to reduce his supervised release term. Following Epps' release on May 11, 2012, the court directed supplemental briefs on the appeal's mootness. Historically, there had been a conflict between 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2), which allowed for up to three years of supervised release for certain felonies, and 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), which mandated a minimum of five years of supervised release. The 2002 amendment clarified that the term of supervised release under § 841 prevailed, establishing a minimum of five years regardless of the other provision. The government's argument assumes, without discussion, that this 2002 amendment was retroactive.

The presumption against retroactive legislation is a well-established principle in U.S. law, rooted in doctrines predating the Republic. An act is considered retroactive if it imposes new disabilities on past transactions. This principle stems from constitutional provisions like the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Due Process Clause, leading courts to interpret ambiguous statutes as not intended for retroactive application. The 2002 amendment to 21 U.S.C. § 841 created a conflict with 18 U.S.C. § 3583, which was unresolved in the circuit at that time. The Supreme Court's decision in Vartelas supports a prospective-only interpretation of statutes that impose automatic consequences. The 2002 amendment is viewed as imposing new disabilities regarding past transactions, necessitating a prospective interpretation.

The court has not previously addressed the circuit split concerning the interpretation of § 841 and its relationship with § 3583. The government's argument based on United States v. Lafayette, which predates the 2002 amendment, is misplaced as that case did not resolve retroactivity issues. Epps’ pending motion under § 3583 allows the district court to clarify these interpretations. The prospective application of the 2002 amendment implies that a reduction in Epps' imprisonment term may enhance his chance for a similar reduction in supervised release, as the district court retains discretion over supervised release terms unaffected by the amendment.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), a district court can terminate supervised release after one year, but the statute does not prohibit early motions for termination. The ambiguity in § 3583(e) regarding the timing of such motions allows for flexibility. Epps has also the option to seek a modification of conditions under § 3583(e)(2) at any time before the expiration of his supervised release term, which he is currently within.

In United States v. Bundy, the court indicated that the possibility of reducing a defendant's supervised release term was too speculative to warrant a decision on the merits, as it would not align with Article III's case or controversy requirement. This ruling is not binding, and unpublished dispositions do not restrict courts from reaching different conclusions in published opinions. The assumption that Epps over-served his sentence is critical in determining whether he should remain under supervised release for five years. In Bundy, the court referenced Burkey, which stated that challenges similar to Epps' become moot upon a defendant's release. However, the cases cited in Burkey are not directly comparable to Epps’ situation. In Sibron v. New York, the Supreme Court determined that a challenge to a conviction is not moot upon release due to potential collateral consequences. Conversely, in Lane v. Williams and Spencer v. Kemna, the Court found cases moot where the relevant legal consequences had expired. Epps' case differs from these precedents as he is not contesting his conviction but seeking a retroactive sentence reduction. His unserved five-year supervised release term creates a substantial likelihood that a determination of a shorter incarceration term could influence the district court's decision on his supervised release. Additionally, at least two appellate courts have recognized that the possibility of a reduced supervised release term can render a released prisoner's claim non-moot, as illustrated in Levine v. Apker.

In Mujahid v. Daniels, the Ninth Circuit determined that a prisoner’s challenge to the Bureau's "good time" regulations could be rendered non-moot, a view echoed by the Fourth Circuit in Townes v. Jarvis regarding a prisoner’s challenge to parole ineligibility. These cases suggest that a favorable ruling could lead to a tangible benefit, contradicting Burkey’s assertion that collateral consequences must be proven rather than presumed. The current court has not definitively ruled on whether a motion for sentence reduction under 3582(c)(2) becomes moot after a prison term is served, but aligns more closely with the rationale in Levine and Mujahid than with Burkey's broader stance. The court posits that Epps is eligible for a sentence reduction under 3582(c)(2), which could influence the district court's decision on his supervised release. The Supreme Court in Johnson recognized 3583(e)(1) and (e)(2) as avenues to rectify unjust prolonged incarceration. A dissenting opinion claims a confusion between Epps' eligibility for relief and the question of whether he served excessive time, which the majority rejects, asserting that Epps is entitled to a determination regarding his potential eligibility for a sentence reduction based on recent Sentencing Commission changes. Furthermore, in Freeman v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that defendants sentenced via a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement could still seek sentence reductions under 3582(c)(2), as the sentencing must consider the Guidelines, regardless of the plea arrangement. The plurality opinion emphasized that the judge's discretion is guided by the Guidelines and that concerns about disrupting plea agreements do not negate the applicability of 3582(c)(2).

Concerns regarding retroactive reductions to sentencing ranges under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) were deemed overstated, as such reductions are infrequent and subject to constraints enforceable through appellate review. The plurality opinion diverged from Justice Sotomayor's concurring view by emphasizing that the statute focuses on the reasons behind a judge’s sentence rather than the motivations of the parties involved in a plea agreement. The plurality clarified that a district court's acceptance of a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement must align with the Sentencing Guidelines, as outlined in U.S.S.G. 6B1.2, which allows acceptance only if the sentence is appropriate within the guideline range or justified for deviation.

The plurality concluded that under 3582(c)(2), a district court can revisit a sentence if the sentencing range was a relevant factor in the original decision. This interpretation aligns with the policy statement under U.S.S.G. 1B1.10, which restricts district court discretion and permits modifications solely based on retroactive amendments. Below-guidelines modifications in 3582(c)(2) proceedings are generally prohibited unless the original sentence involved a downward departure. 

The plurality criticized the concurrence's proposed rule for allowing modifications only when explicitly included in the plea agreement, arguing it would perpetuate disparities that the Sentencing Reform Act aims to eliminate. The plurality maintained that 3582(c)(2) should assist in mitigating sentencing disparities, citing the example of crack-cocaine sentencing inequalities as a target for reform. Ultimately, the plurality held that defendants entering Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreements should be eligible for 3582(c)(2) relief, as the judge's acceptance of the plea is likely based on the Guidelines. The dissenting justices concurred that the parties' intent is largely irrelevant to whether a sentence was "based on" the Guidelines, finding the concurrence's approach arbitrary and impractical, with some circuit courts agreeing that the plurality’s logic supports granting relief under 3582(c)(2) for such plea agreements.

A concurring opinion establishes that if a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement specifies a Guidelines sentencing range for a charged offense and that range is later reduced, the defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The term of imprisonment stems from the agreement rather than the judge's Sentencing Guidelines calculations. The district court can consider a reduction only if the plea agreement explicitly calls for sentencing within a specific Guidelines range or clearly indicates that the specified term is based on a relevant Guidelines range evident in the agreement. 

The Supreme Court's fragmented decision in Freeman complicates whether it set a definitive standard for lower courts regarding the eligibility of Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentences for reductions. The Marks v. United States standard indicates that in cases with no single rationale supported by five Justices, the ruling is the position taken by the concurring opinions on the narrowest grounds. This principle has led to confusion among lower courts. 

The court's interpretation of Marks implies that the narrowest opinion must represent a common denominator that at least five Justices implicitly endorse. In a splintered ruling in Delaware Valley II, the plurality and concurring opinions differed on contingency enhancements for fees, leading to an en banc court in King overruling previous interpretations of Delaware Valley II. The en banc court clarified that when opinions supporting a judgment are mutually exclusive, applying Marks could erroneously elevate a non-majority opinion to national law.

All necessary components of a Supreme Court opinion must share a common rationale for a controlling opinion to be identified under Marks; otherwise, Supreme Court precedents are considered persuasive but not binding. The en banc court determined there is no viable middle ground regarding enhancement availability, agreeing with the plurality in Delaware Valley II that contingency enhancements are not available in this circuit, emphasizing that attorney's fee disputes should not lead to extensive litigation. The court has not previously applied the Marks standard to the fragmented decision in Freeman. In United States v. Duvall, the court affirmed the district court's finding that a defendant was not eligible for 3582(c)(2) relief, accepting that Justice Sotomayor's concurring opinion in Freeman was authoritative due to the parties' agreement. The concurring opinion referenced the en banc opinion in King but ultimately found relief was not available based on United States v. Berry. Consequently, because the parties accepted Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence as controlling, the court did not need to address alternative arguments or establish the concurring opinion as binding precedent. Under Marks, there is no controlling opinion in Freeman, as the plurality and concurring opinions do not share a common rationale. The plurality rejected the approach of the concurring opinion, emphasizing that 3582(c)(2) requires an inquiry into the judge's sentencing rationale, not the parties' motivations. The dissent agreed with the plurality, criticizing the concurring opinion for its inconsistent focus and arbitrariness. While other circuits have treated the concurring opinion as the Court's holding, they may not have recognized scenarios where 3582(c)(2) relief would be granted under the concurring opinion but not the plurality's view.

Epps highlights that, as acknowledged in Freeman, the concurring opinion can differ from the plurality opinion, providing specific examples to illustrate this distinction. In one scenario, parties may agree to a plea deal based on a particular sentencing range, but the district court may reject this range and apply a different one, such as the career offender range, while still accepting the plea for reasons unrelated to the guideline range. Under Justice Sotomayor’s view, if the agreed-upon sentencing range is later reduced, the defendant would qualify for a sentence reduction. Conversely, the plurality opinion would deem the defendant ineligible because the agreed range did not influence the court's decision.

Epps also describes a situation where the court might disregard the guideline range not due to applying a different one, but rather as a policy choice, imposing the agreed sentence regardless. Under the plurality's analysis, the defendant would again be ineligible for a reduction, while Justice Sotomayor would maintain eligibility.

Overall, while five Justices in Freeman concurred that a district court is not categorically prohibited from reducing a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) in Rule 11(c)(1)(C) cases, the circuit is not bound by the concurring opinion. The court must independently analyze when a sentence qualifies as "based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered." The court is only bound by the result in Freeman, which establishes that § 3582(c)(2) relief is not automatically denied when a sentence follows a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement. The legal question regarding Epps' eligibility for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) is reviewed de novo.

The Freeman plurality's interpretation of the Sentencing Reform Act and Rule 11(c)(1)(C) is deemed more persuasive than the concurring opinion. The Sentencing Reform Act mandates that district courts begin by calculating a defendant’s sentence according to the Guidelines, even if the Guidelines are advisory. The plurality interprets § 3582(c)(2) to emphasize the district court's rationale for the imposed sentence rather than the parties' agreement in a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea, arguing that focusing on party intentions would lead to unwarranted sentencing disparities, contrary to the Act's purpose.

In Epps' case, the plea agreement refers specifically to the Sentencing Guidelines for determining his sentence, and evidence supports that the Guidelines were pivotal in the sentencing process. The district court recalculated Epps' Guidelines range and granted a downward departure based on his acceptance of responsibility, demonstrating that the sentence was tied to a specific Guidelines range, unlike in Cook. The district court's assertion that its findings did not conclusively determine whether Epps' sentence was "based on" the Guidelines is effectively countered by the Freeman plurality.

Additionally, while the Sentencing Guidelines state that over-serving a sentence alone does not warrant early termination of supervised release, this factor can still significantly influence decisions on § 3582(c)(2) motions. The court, upon thorough consideration, recognizes that over-serving a sentence is a compelling factor in the analysis.

Epps' appeal remains within the court's jurisdiction despite his release and the start of his supervised release term, as the appeal is not moot. Applying the amended supervisory release provision retroactively would be impermissible, and the outcome of this appeal could significantly impact Epps' supervisory release term. The district court must resolve the pre-amendment conflict regarding which supervisory release provisions apply to Epps. The court has determined that Epps qualifies for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), warranting a reversal and remand to the district court.

In dissent, Judge Brown argues that Epps' release renders the court's conclusion regarding his eligibility for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) moot, as he cannot retroactively benefit from any potential reduction. Brown contends that the decision attempts to bypass the mootness doctrine by citing speculative future effects on Epps's supervised release. The district court retains broad discretion to terminate a defendant’s supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), considering various factors, including a defendant's conduct and the interests of justice. Therefore, any decision regarding Epps' eligibility for relief remains advisory, and outcomes of either ruling would not guarantee or foreclose future relief under § 3583(e).

The court's opinion does not provide any arguments that Epps cannot make himself or compel a district court to shorten his supervised release period. The opinion merely supports Epps’s position without establishing precedential authority. The court's reasoning regarding mootness does not derive from any legal precedent but from its endorsement of Epps’s argument. It confuses two distinct issues: Epps's eligibility for relief under § 3582(c)(2) and whether he served an excessive prison term. While the court addresses the former, the latter is crucial for a district court's decision on modifying Epps’s supervised release. There are significant equitable considerations concerning individuals who have served beyond their appropriate sentences, particularly given that Epps's original harsher sentence stemmed from outdated crack cocaine guidelines. Although a reduction of Epps's sentence would have lessened his injury, the issue of his access to such relief is not relevant to the subsequent inquiry under § 3583(e). The essential factor is the actual duration of imprisonment served, which remains unchanged despite any procedural challenges faced by Epps. Consequently, the mootness of Epps's case arises because he has already completed his prison term, making any potential relief ineffective. Thus, the appeal should be dismissed.