Douglas Coley, an Ohio state prisoner, was convicted of multiple serious offenses, including aggravated murder and attempted murder, and sentenced to death. Following his conviction in Lucas County, Coley pursued state postconviction relief, which was denied at all levels. He then sought federal habeas corpus relief, but the district court also denied his petition. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment.
The factual background includes two main incidents:
1. **Incident Involving David Moore**: On December 23, 1996, Coley and an accomplice, Joseph Green, kidnapped Moore at gunpoint while he was unloading his car. They demanded money and, after releasing him, Coley shot Moore multiple times, including in the stomach and head. Evidence linked Coley to the crime through shell casings and eyewitness accounts, including those from Tyrone Armstrong, who identified the firearms used.
2. **Murder of Samar El-Okdi**: El-Okdi was found dead on January 7, 1997, with gunshot wounds from a .25 caliber firearm. At the crime scene, police recovered a live bullet and a shell casing, further implicating Coley in violent criminal activities.
The court proceedings involved multiple legal arguments and evaluations of the evidence presented during the trial.
El-Okdi was last seen on January 3, 1997, around 8 p.m. Shortly after, at 8:45 p.m., Rosie Frusher heard gunshots and observed a car, resembling El-Okdi's Pontiac 6000, in an alley. She noted a man outside the car and another in the driver's seat. That weekend, Armstrong identified Coley driving a gray Pontiac 6000, later confirmed to be El-Okdi’s vehicle. Armstrong had purchased items for Green and Coley, later found in the Pontiac, and acknowledged they had keys to the car. On January 6, while distributing missing-person flyers, El-Okdi’s friend spotted her car, identified by its damaged rear fender and a unique bumper sticker, and followed it to an apartment complex. After consulting with police, they discovered the car bore a stolen license plate. Police staked out the vehicle until Green, Coley, and a woman with a baby entered and drove off. Police arrested them, noticing Coley had a metallic object, later identified as a loaded .25 caliber pistol found in the car. Additional evidence included El-Okdi’s purse and her license plates discovered in the vehicle. A firearms expert linked Coley's pistol to the bullets found in El-Okdi and Moore. Coley confessed to Armstrong while in jail, indicating he shot El-Okdi and asked Armstrong to fabricate a story regarding the weapon's origin. Moore also recognized Green and Coley as his assailants.
In 1997, Coley was indicted on multiple charges including kidnapping and murder. In 1998, he was convicted and sentenced to 58 years for noncapital offenses and death for El-Okdi’s aggravated murder. Coley’s attempts at direct appeal and post-conviction relief were unsuccessful, and no timely post-conviction petition was filed on his behalf despite having appointed counsel.
In 2003, Coley filed for habeas relief in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which was denied by the district court, though a certificate of appealability (COA) was granted on several issues. These issues included claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not objecting to the indictment, failing to seek the recusal of the trial judge, prosecutorial misconduct for inconsistent theories of conviction, inadequate assistance during mitigation, and issues related to the trial court's handling of mitigating evidence and grand jury transcripts.
The standard of review for habeas corpus appeals involves de novo evaluation of legal conclusions, while factual findings are only overturned if clearly erroneous. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a writ should be denied unless the state court's decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law or based on an unreasonable factual determination. The petitioner bears the burden of proving that these standards are met. A state court's decision is "contrary" if it reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme Court on a legal question or addresses materially indistinguishable facts differently than the Court. An "unreasonable application" occurs if the court identifies the correct legal rule but misapplies it to the case facts or improperly extends or refuses to extend legal principles to new contexts.
Coley alleges that both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective by failing to investigate and present evidence of his character and background, not seeking the judge's recusal during both the guilt and penalty phases, and not raising these ineffectiveness claims on appeal.
Coley's initial claim is dismissed due to his failure to raise it during state appellate proceedings. Even if it were not procedurally defaulted, the claim lacks merit as Coley has not demonstrated any prejudice or specified evidence that was not presented to the jury. The judicial bias allegations stem from a letter discovered by the defense investigator, allegedly written by Coley, which instructed his brother to obtain a rifle for a violent purpose. This letter was brought to the attention of the trial judge by Coley’s defense attorney, who had consulted with the Ohio Board of Commissioners. The judge, having only heard about the letter without seeing it, alerted law enforcement, prompting an investigation. After a motion to quash was overruled, the letter was provided to law enforcement, leading to the defense attorney's withdrawal and the appointment of new counsel.
Coley contends that his trial judge exhibited unconstitutional bias, arguing that both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for not seeking the judge's removal. The legal standard for judicial bias includes a requirement for an impartial decision-maker, as established in precedents like Mayberry v. Pennsylvania and Withrow v. Larkin. The bias inquiry is objective, focusing on whether a reasonable judge in that position would be neutral. Recusal is mandated if actual bias is likely to an unconstitutional extent. Coley argues that the trial judge’s exposure to prejudicial information before the guilt phase, which she conveyed to law enforcement, created a high probability of bias during sentencing. He asserts that the judge's prior knowledge of the case and her role in appointing a grand jury investigation compromised her impartiality, particularly after the jury recommended a death sentence.
Exposure to unfavorable information about a defendant, whether alone or collectively, does not inherently indicate actual bias. Case law, including Esparza v. Mitchell and Liteky v. United States, establishes that judges can be exposed to negative facts and still maintain impartiality. The judge’s handling of a threatening letter, which she did not examine closely and referred to a detective, does not demonstrate a significant probability of bias, as she did not act as an investigator or prosecutor. There is a strong presumption of judicial impartiality, supported by a general expectation that judges understand and apply the law correctly. In the context of Coley’s claims of ineffective counsel regarding the judge's recusal, the argument is deemed meritless. Coley cites State v. Gillard, which suggests procedural protections under state law, but the court finds no constitutional basis for bias in this scenario. Thus, even if trial counsel could have pursued a recusal based on Gillard, there is no evidence of prejudice affecting the outcome of the trial. Overall, the claim of ineffective assistance related to the judge's recusal fails, as no actionable bias has been established.
The judge is presumed to have adhered to Ohio law, which prohibits the inclusion of nonstatutory aggravators when balancing aggravation and mitigation in death penalty cases (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2929.03(D)(2)). Relevant case law (State v. Wogenstahl, State v. Johnson) supports this presumption. Under Strickland v. Washington, it is determined that the judge did not exhibit bias, and therefore, the burden of proving Strickland prejudice lies with the defendant. The prejudice standard assesses whether counsel's performance compromised the trial's reliability or fairness; mere substitution of one unbiased judge for another does not satisfy this criterion. Coley did not demonstrate an unconstitutionally high probability of bias, leading to the failure of his Strickland claim.
Coley further contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging trial counsel's failure to seek the judge's recusal. However, even under de novo review, this claim is deemed meritless as appellate counsel's omission of weak arguments cannot be considered ineffective.
Coley argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for grand jury transcripts, asserting a "particularized need" due to his reindictment. The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed this claim, citing a presumption of regularity in prosecutorial decisions and Coley's failure to establish such need. The federal district court upheld the state court's decision, confirming that it was not contrary to established Supreme Court precedent.
Additionally, Coley claims the trial court improperly denied his motion to sever counts related to different victims, contending that the jury may have been prejudiced by considering the unrelated acts in their verdict. However, the specifics of this argument were not further developed in the excerpt.
The district court determined that the issue at hand was one of state law and found no unreasonable application of established Supreme Court precedent in the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling. The Warden argued that Coley's claim was defaulted since it was only raised in state court as a state law issue and was meritless. However, Coley preserved his claim by alleging that the improper joinder of offenses violated his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the merits were reviewed through the "contrary-to" clause since the state court relied solely on state law.
Misjoinder is not inherently unconstitutional unless it causes significant prejudice that compromises the defendant's right to a fair trial. The harmless-error rule applies, requiring an assessment of whether the error had a substantial effect on the jury's verdict. While the risk of undue prejudice exists when joining counts that permit otherwise inadmissible evidence, the evidence of other crimes in Coley's case was deemed admissible to establish his identity as the perpetrator. The Ohio Supreme Court supported the admissibility of this evidence under Ohio Rule of Evidence 404(b).
Coley's argument that this evidence denied him a fair trial was unconvincing, as substantial evidence against him included his presence in the victim's stolen car, incriminating statements, and ballistic evidence linking him to the crime. Any potential error related to the joinder of offenses was determined to be harmless, and his right to a fair trial was not violated. The state court's rejection of Coley's claim did not contradict clearly established Supreme Court law.
Regarding alleged prosecutorial misconduct, Coley asserted that the prosecution's inconsistent theories of culpability compromised his due process rights, claiming that the prosecution labeled Green as the principal offender during Green's trial but blamed Coley in his own trial. The Warden argued that Coley had not exhausted this claim in state court, as he failed to present it to the Ohio Supreme Court, thus barring federal review on its merits.
A procedurally defaulted claim in a habeas petition may be considered if the petitioner demonstrates either cause and prejudice for the default or that a miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the default. The merits of Coley’s prosecutorial misconduct claim are analyzed under pre-AEDPA law since state courts did not address the merits. Legal and mixed questions receive de novo review. Coley's appeal is limited to the guilt-phase argument, as he forfeited any penalty-phase claims by not raising them in the district court. He alleges prosecutorial misconduct due to inconsistent theories presented in his and Green's trials. However, even assuming the inconsistency violated due process, the claim fails since a similar issue in Bradshaw v. Stumpf was deemed harmless. Coley's convictions for aggravated murder required proof of specific intent to cause death, which was established regardless of whether he was the shooter or an aider and abettor. The jury's determination of his principal role does not alter the conclusion of his guilt. Any errors in the guilt phase were considered harmless. Additionally, Coley’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to file a post-conviction petition was not adequately argued and was not certified for appeal, thus it cannot be addressed. The court affirms the district court’s ruling.
