Rodney Anton Williamson was convicted in 2007 for conspiracy to distribute cocaine, leading to a life sentence. His trial featured a tape-recording from a government informant made after his indictment, which was admitted without objection. The appellate court initially upheld the conviction, stating that the recording did not breach Williamson's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. However, after Williamson sought certiorari, the government reversed its stance, acknowledging that the admission of the recording violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate decision and remanded the case for further review.
On remand, the appellate court instructed the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding the voluntariness of Williamson's statements made to the informant following indictment. The district court found the statements voluntary and ruled out any Fifth Amendment violations. Williamson appealed this decision alongside various other issues, including a motion for a new trial under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which the district court denied. The appellate court is now addressing the Fifth and Sixth Amendment issues raised during these proceedings and has affirmed the district court's rulings. The initial indictment against Williamson was returned on December 18, 2006, charging him with conspiracy to distribute over five kilograms of cocaine.
Edison Alberty, an associate of Williamson, suspected he was under investigation and contacted federal authorities to offer his cooperation. Federal agents equipped Alberty with an audio recording device for a lunch meeting with Williamson on January 29, 2007, where they discussed Williamson's drug organization, planned a drug transaction, and expressed concern over an associate’s arrest. Following the meeting, law enforcement attempted to arrest Williamson, who fled the scene. He was ultimately arrested on June 5, 2007. During his trial, eight witnesses testified against him, and a recording of his conversation with Alberty was played in court. The district judge allowed for redactions due to concerns over audio quality, but ultimately the entire recording was played at the request of Williamson's counsel. The jury convicted Williamson on August 17, 2007, and he was sentenced to life in prison on December 7, 2007. On appeal, Williamson contended that he had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the time the recording was made, arguing its admission constituted plain error. The appellate court initially ruled that it was not plain error, distinguishing relevant case law. However, in a subsequent brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, the government acknowledged that the admission of the recording violated Williamson's Sixth Amendment rights but argued he could not demonstrate that this error prejudiced him. The Supreme Court vacated the lower court's decision, prompting further consideration of the case. On remand, both parties agreed that the recording's admission breached the Sixth Amendment, but they contested whether it met the criteria for plain error. The court deferred resolution of the Sixth Amendment issue and directed the district court to assess whether Williamson's recorded statements were the result of compulsion or coercion, taking into account several specific factors regarding police involvement and Alberty's relationship with Williamson.
Williamson was appointed counsel by the district court, which held a hearing regarding a Fifth Amendment issue involving a recorded conversation. The government presented two witnesses to contextualize the recording, after which the district court issued a memorandum opinion concluding that Williamson's incriminating statements were voluntary, finding no Fifth Amendment violations. Williamson subsequently appealed this decision. While his direct appeal was in progress, he filed a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, requesting additional counsel for this motion. The district court denied both the new-trial motion and the request for additional counsel, as well as a motion for reconsideration, prompting Williamson to appeal these denials.
The appellate court combined all of Williamson's appeals and addressed the key issue regarding the admission of the recorded statement made after a sealed indictment was returned. Although the government agreed that admitting the recording violated his right to counsel, Williamson did not object at trial, resulting in a plain error review. The court affirmed the decision, explaining that Williamson did not meet the stringent criteria for reversal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) and United States v. Olano, which requires demonstrating that the error affected substantial rights and the fairness of judicial proceedings. The burden of proof lies with the defendant to show that the error impacted the outcome of the trial, and in this instance, the overwhelming evidence indicated that a perfect trial would have led to the same conviction. The court noted that, generally, errors that do not influence the jury's verdict do not significantly undermine the integrity of the judicial process.
Williamson failed to demonstrate that the alleged trial error affected his substantial rights or the outcome of his trial, as there was overwhelming evidence of his guilt independent of the disputed taped recording. Key testimonies included Christopher Swaney discussing extensive drug dealings with Williamson, Glenson Isaac detailing sales of cocaine to him, and Michael Sealy corroborating these accounts with his own experiences. Additionally, DEA agent James Cryan provided surveillance evidence linking Williamson to drug transactions, including the recovery of significant amounts of cocaine and cash. The court concluded that even if the error impacted Williamson's rights, it did not undermine the fairness or integrity of the judicial process. The overwhelming evidence against Williamson suggested that the absence of the recording would not change the trial's outcome. The court emphasized that reversing the conviction could harm public perception of the judicial system more than maintaining it. Williamson's assertion that the recorded statements were compelled or coerced was also dismissed, as the court found no violation of the Fifth Amendment, confirming that the statements were voluntary and thus admissible.
Voluntariness of a defendant's statements hinges on whether they were made as a result of free will or if coercion impaired their decision-making capacity. Courts evaluate this based on the totality of circumstances. In this instance, the district court examined testimony from witnesses regarding a January 29, 2007, meeting between Mr. Alberty and Mr. Williamson at a Greensboro restaurant, intended to arrange a drug deal and discuss concerns about a co-conspirator's legal issues. Mr. Alberty was instructed to wear a recording device on the day of the meeting without prior knowledge of an indictment against Mr. Williamson or plans for his arrest. The government agents did not guide the conversation or pressure Mr. Alberty on how to engage with Mr. Williamson. The interaction, characterized by Mr. Alberty as "normal," involved casual dialogue about various topics, including past drug activities, without intimidation or coercive tactics. Mr. Williamson, who arrived and left voluntarily, had no visible police presence during the meeting, as law enforcement was surveilling from unmarked vehicles outside. The district court concluded that the circumstances did not indicate coercion, affirming that Mr. Williamson spoke freely and could have ended the conversation at any time.
Voluntariness of Williamson’s statements hinges on whether they stemmed from a free choice or if his will was compromised. The context of a casual lunch with a friendly acquaintance, without any signs of intimidation, suggests a lack of coercion. The district court's conclusion is supported by the evidence, indicating no violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant can seek a new trial based on newly discovered evidence within three years post-verdict. Williamson filed such a motion nearly three years after his conviction, during his direct appeal, but was denied court-appointed counsel for this motion. He contends that Rule 33 motions made during a pending appeal constitute "critical stages" warranting Sixth Amendment counsel. However, it is determined that once an appeal is filed and the conviction record is closed, Rule 33 proceedings are collateral and do not require Sixth Amendment counsel.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies after judicial proceedings commence and persists through the first appeal. However, this right concludes after the direct appeal is resolved, and there is no constitutional right to counsel for collateral challenges. Circuit courts agree that a new-trial motion filed post-trial but pre-appeal is a critical stage, while one filed after the appeal is collateral and does not invoke the right to counsel. Williamson's new trial motion was considered collateral as his direct appeal had already concluded with an affirmed conviction and sentence.
Williamson filed a Rule 33 motion shortly after the Supreme Court remanded his direct appeal to the Fourth Circuit, distinguishing his case from precedent that states there is no right to counsel for Rule 33 motions after the direct appeal is resolved. The critical question addressed is whether there exists a Sixth Amendment right to counsel for a Rule 33 motion based on newly discovered evidence filed more than fourteen days post-judgment. The finding is that such motions are collateral to the judgment and the appeal, thus no Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists. This conclusion aligns with various case law, including Johnson v. United States and Trenkler v. United States, which determine that Rule 33 motions filed outside the ten-day window for direct appeals are distinct collateral challenges. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, specifically Rule 4(b), indicate that Rule 33 motions filed within ten days can affect the appeal process, but motions filed after that period do not have the same status. Consequently, since Williamson's motion was filed nearly three years after his appeal notice, he had no right to counsel. Although he cited Kitchen v. United States to argue for a right to counsel during pending appeals, the court maintained its stance that Rule 33 motions remain collateral. Therefore, the judgment of conviction and denial of the new trial motion are affirmed.
