Prince George's County Health Department v. Briscoe

Citations: 79 Md. App. 325; 556 A.2d 742; 1989 Md. App. LEXIS 97Docket: No. 1139

Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland; April 28, 1989; Maryland; State Appellate Court

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The appeal involves the Prince George’s County Health Department and the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene contesting a Circuit Court decision favoring C. Elaine Briscoe and 18 other social workers. The social workers claimed entitlement to higher pay, arguing they performed the same work as psychiatric nurses at HMH facilities, thus should be classified at the same salary grade. Key issues include whether the trial judge wrongly reversed a prior personnel classification decision, allowed certain social workers to intervene, and awarded attorney’s fees. 

The grievance was initiated on July 30, 1985, by Briscoe and 11 others, alleging a violation of Art. 64A. 27(a) regarding comparable pay for comparable duties. They sought a salary upgrade and retroactive pay, presenting evidence that their roles and the nurses' roles overlapped significantly, with assignments based solely on scheduling. A witness noted a hiring intention to allow nurses to focus on psychotherapy rather than routine tasks. The state's evidence from the Department of Personnel’s study indicated that while roles were distinct in some facilities, at the PG Health Department and the Regional Institute for Children and Adolescents, the functions of social workers and nurses overlapped, especially in a case management capacity that did not adhere strictly to traditional roles.

Psychological testing and assessment services are primarily provided by schools or hospitals, resulting in psychologists not frequently offering these services. Instead, psychologists and nurses often engage in roles typically associated with social workers, such as coordinating community services and assessing social and family histories. The DSAPC determined that there is significant overlap in the functions of these professionals in outpatient clinics, leading to the recommendation against creating a unified classification that spans all three professions. However, the DSAPC did suggest establishing a new classification for clinical social workers to attract qualified candidates. The State presented evidence that the grievance filed by social workers was moot due to salary adjustments made by the Legislature, which only left a minor disparity. Following a hearing, the examiner concluded that social workers were neither over-utilized nor under-compensated; rather, it was the psychologists and nurses who were found to be under-utilized and over-compensated. Consequently, the examiner dismissed the grievance, stating the social workers did not prove that the State acted arbitrarily or violated regulations regarding salary adjustments. The social workers subsequently appealed to the circuit court, seeking to overturn the Department of Personnel's decision and requesting salary increases to match those of psychiatric nurses. They also sought retroactive pay and reclassification. The circuit court allowed RICA social workers to intervene, and during hearings, the trial judge expressed concern about due process and equal protection issues regarding salary parity among professionals working in the same facility.

Two choices were presented regarding a ruling favoring the appellant. The State expressed a vested interest in avoiding precedential exceptions. The judge encouraged discussions between parties to potentially reach an agreement, while also indicating the intention to rule. Ultimately, on July 15, 1988, following a second hearing, the trial judge reversed the Department of Personnel's (DOP) decision, instructing the DOP to reclassify all social workers, including RICA intervenors, and to either revise an existing classification or create a new one. The judge ordered back pay retroactive to July 30, 1984, and mandated the State to cover reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses for the social workers. No explicit opinion or grounds for the decision were provided by the trial judge. 

The standard of review for the DOP decision is outlined in the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, allowing a reviewing court to reverse or modify an agency decision if it infringes on the petitioner's substantial rights due to constitutional issues, jurisdictional overreach, procedural unlawfulness, legal errors, lack of substantial evidence, or if deemed arbitrary or capricious. The court's role is limited to preventing unreasonable administrative action. Two standards of review are established: the "substantial evidence test" for factual findings, which requires deference to agency expertise, and an alternate standard for decisions based on legal errors, permitting the court to substitute its judgment. The application of these standards is complicated in this case due to the trial judge's lack of explicit reasoning for reversing the DOP's decision.

Reversal of the Department of Personnel's (DOP) decision based on its factual findings was deemed unreasonable due to the uncontroverted nature of the facts. The State acknowledged that the social workers and psychiatric nurses involved in the grievance hearing performed similar duties, supporting the agency's conclusions. The trial judge expressed concerns regarding fairness, referencing due process and equal protection, suggesting a potential constitutional reversal of the DOP's decision under 10-215(g)(3)(i). However, no violation of the social workers' constitutional rights to due process or equal protection was found. Procedural due process was not an issue since the appellees had an opportunity to present their grievances. Regarding substantive due process under the 14th Amendment, it was determined that state actions must have a rational basis, protecting against arbitrary treatment. The analysis of equal protection involves determining if similarly situated individuals are treated differently and whether such treatment disadvantages a suspect class or fundamental right, which would necessitate strict scrutiny. In this case, it was concluded that the social workers and nurses, while performing similar duties, were not identically situated due to differing qualifications and capabilities, particularly concerning tasks that nurses could perform but social workers could not, such as administering medication. Thus, no differential treatment that violated equal protection was established.

The State's decision to utilize nurses primarily for psychotherapy does not negate the distinct qualifications and backgrounds of nurses compared to other groups, which means they are not similarly situated for equal protection claims. Even assuming similarity, the State has a legitimate interest in differentiating pay scales due to varying qualifications and in attracting and retaining nurses for State positions. The State also needs the flexibility to manage outpatient facilities differently from psychiatric hospitals. Imposing a uniform standard contrary to legislative recommendations would undermine prior decisions regarding clinical mental health therapists. The Department of Personnel's (DOP) decision was not unconstitutional. 

Regarding the pay plan, the trial judge could only overturn the DOP's decision based on the interpretation of Md. State Gov. Code Ann. 1988, which details the process for establishing pay plans for classes of positions, not individual roles. The DOP hearing examiner correctly concluded that the statute pertains to classes, such as Social Workers and Community Health Nurses, rather than specific positions. The Merit System aims to standardize employment practices and prevent issues like nepotism. Article 64A defines a 'class' as positions with similar duties and qualifications, requiring uniform pay rates. Changes to the pay plan must be recommended by the Secretary of Personnel, approved by the Governor, and presented to the General Assembly; thus, the hearing examiner lacked authority to modify the pay scale or classification for the appellees.

Evidence from the hearing indicated that the secretary had already made recommendations for class-wide salary increases for social workers in fiscal years 1987 and 1988 prior to the grievance being filed. Testimony at the grievance hearing was specific to the PG Health Department and did not establish entitlement for the entire social worker series. A study requested by the Legislature indicated that, although there were similarities in functions at PG Health Department and RICA, social workers and psychiatric nurses were not interchangeable across all facilities. The hearing examiner correctly concluded that Art. 64A. 27(a) did not grant the relief sought by social workers, and the trial judge's reversal of the agency's decision was in error.

The appellees cited Frosburg v. State Department of Personnel, but this case differed significantly. In Frosburg, a grievance was filed regarding a five-grade discrepancy between Drivers License Reviewers and newly created Hearing Officer positions, leading to an upgrade recommendation. However, the issue of entitlement to upgrade was not part of the appeal, and no back pay was awarded. Unlike Frosburg, the appellees could not be classified into a higher-paid category because they lacked qualifications as psychiatric nurses, and Art. 64A. 27(a) only addressed 'comparable' salaries, not identical ones.

Regarding reclassification claims under Art. 64A. 16, the trial judge considered this issue for the first time at the circuit court level and ordered reclassification, which was erroneous. A party cannot change their legal theory after presenting it to an administrative agency, as established in prior cases. The court is limited to the record made before the agency, and classification matters require specialized expertise, which the trial judge acknowledged by deferring to the DOP for reclassification determination.

Evidence regarding the qualifications, job specifications, and performance of social workers and psychiatric nurses was absent, which was critical for assessing the need for reclassification. The hearing officer's decision not to grant relief that was not requested was legally sound. Article 64A. 16 and relevant grievance procedures allow State employees to seek reclassification by demonstrating misclassification or that their duties align more closely with an existing class. The process of establishing job classifications requires gubernatorial approval, and any substantial change in a job's duties results in the abolition of the old position and the creation of a new one.

To qualify for reclassification, an employee's duties must closely match those of an established class. In this case, no evidence showed that the appellees’ duties were sufficiently similar to those of psychiatric nurses to warrant reclassification. Instead, the evidence indicated that nurses were performing functions typical of social workers, implying that the nurses may have been overclassified. Additionally, the appellees did not possess the necessary qualifications for the psychiatric nurse positions.

The trial judge's order for the Department of Personnel (DOP) to revise or create a classification was unsupported by the Merit System. Regarding intervention, the RICA social workers, who did not file a grievance at the agency level, should not have been permitted to intervene in the circuit court appeal, as exhaustion of statutorily prescribed administrative remedies is required before pursuing judicial review.

The Court in Soley emphasized that administrative agencies possess the discretion and expertise necessary to evaluate information and should be allowed to exercise this discretion initially without judicial interference. Interventions at various stages could disrupt the legislative intention of efficient administrative processes and lead to the courts addressing issues that might not arise if proper administrative remedies were utilized. In the current case, the procedures for a State employee to file a grievance are specified in the Merit System’s grievance procedures. The trial judge’s failure to require RICA social workers to adhere to these procedures deprived the agency of the chance to gather evidence and make factual determinations regarding these employees, who worked in a different facility than those under the PG Health Department. The record contained insufficient evidence about the RICA social workers, primarily referencing a DOP study. 

The appellees argued that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine did not apply because they claimed the absence of adequate administrative remedies. However, the appellants asserted that their case actually depended on the existence of a remedy that should have been provided, making it contradictory to assert that the RICA social workers were exempt from the administrative process due to a lack of a remedy. The appellees also suggested that pursuing administrative remedies would have been futile due to the DOP’s previous stance regarding the PG social workers. Nonetheless, the Court noted that the hearing officer never had the opportunity to hear evidence on the reclassification, meaning there was no substantial basis to conclude that administrative actions would be futile.

Additionally, the Court referenced a precedent indicating that the administrative remedy is not considered inadequate simply due to potential delays or hardships. The imposition of the exhaustion rule was not merely technical; the trial judge lacked sufficient evidence to make informed decisions about the RICA employees due to the incomplete administrative record. 

Regarding attorney's fees, the trial judge indicated a willingness to consider a request for costs and fees from the social workers’ attorney, acknowledging the challenges faced by the individuals against the State.

The court objected to the request for attorneys' fees, emphasizing that litigants incurred significant costs while fighting for what they believed were entitled rights. The judge indicated that reasonable attorney's fees and costs would be awarded due to the financial burden on individuals compared to salaried attorneys. However, the appellate court found this award to be an abuse of discretion, referencing Rule 1-341, which governs attorney's fees in cases of bad faith or unjustified proceedings. The rule allows for such fees only if the court finds bad faith or a lack of substantial justification in a party's actions. The appellate court noted that the trial judge failed to make the necessary findings of bad faith or lack of justification; merely stating that the parties fought hard did not suffice. The trial judge's reasoning appeared to rely on the "deep pockets" theory rather than a legal basis, as he acknowledged the quality of arguments from both sides. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the attorney’s fee award, stating it had no legal foundation, and ruled that both parties should bear their own costs.

Section 10-215(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act mandates that petitions for judicial review be filed in the circuit court where any party resides or has a principal place of business. HMH's facilities in Montgomery County allow for the petition to be filed there. The formal title for psychiatric nurses at these facilities is Community Health Nurse, with salary grades for Social Workers and Community Health Nurses outlined from Grades 10 to 18. Adjustments in salary grades occurred in fiscal years 1987 and 1988, with Clinical Social Workers spanning Grades 12-17 and Community Health Nurses spanning Grades 12-18, requiring a master’s degree for social workers and a bachelor’s for nurses.

During a grievance hearing, the quality of evidence presented was questioned, as some witnesses provided opinions without solid factual backing or qualifications related to the relevance of their testimony, particularly regarding hiring practices in Virginia. RICA, a facility under HMH in Rockville, is mentioned, alongside COMAR regulations which specify that the employee bears the burden of proof in grievance hearings and other specified cases. While the evidence had weak foundations, the State acknowledged that both groups (Social Workers and Community Health Nurses) performed similar tasks, and hearings were conducted informally.

Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized certain unenumerated rights essential to the Bill of Rights, such as the right to privacy. Changes effective July 1, 1988, to the regulations allow the Secretary, with the Governor's approval, to amend pay plans for specific positions to attract and retain qualified personnel. The court case Frosburg established that sovereign immunity restricts awards of back pay unless a specific statutory waiver is identified, leading to the dismissal of claims for unappropriated funds from the State Treasury.

A "class" or "class of position" refers to a set of job positions that share similar duties, responsibilities, and entrance qualifications, allowing for a common descriptive title. Applicants for these positions must meet the same education, experience, knowledge, and ability requirements, undergo the same fitness tests, and receive equitable compensation. The text references a case where an award of attorney’s fees was reversed, emphasizing that legal outcomes depend heavily on statutory language. It highlights the negative impact of paying employees unequal salaries for similar work, which can lead to employee dissatisfaction and decreased performance. Fair compensation is identified as a key motivator for productivity, while issues of wage disparity are ultimately the responsibility of legislative and executive bodies to address.