Baltimore City Lodge No. 3 of Fraternal Order of Police, Inc. v. Mantegna
Docket: No. 677
Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland; February 14, 1985; Maryland; State Appellate Court
Eva Marie Mantegna filed a lawsuit against The Baltimore City Lodge No. 3 of the Fraternal Order of Police, Inc. (FOP) in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, seeking to recover $4,710 in counsel fees incurred during her divorce from Joseph Mantegna, an FOP member. She claimed her status as a third-party beneficiary of a pre-paid legal plan established by FOP for its members. FOP appealed the judgment, arguing that Mantegna’s ad damnum clause was insufficient to establish jurisdiction and that the court erred in recognizing her as a third-party beneficiary.
The court rejected FOP's arguments, affirming the judgment. It clarified that at the time of Mantegna's filing in 1980, the District Court had exclusive jurisdiction over civil contract actions involving less than $2,500, and concurrent jurisdiction existed for amounts exceeding $2,500 but less than $5,000. Mantegna’s declaration stated she suffered damages "in excess of $2,500" and sought damages to be determined at trial, which the court found sufficient to invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction. FOP's contention that this language did not establish jurisdiction was dismissed as unreasonable.
The court noted FOP’s failure to challenge the adequacy of the ad damnum clause through demurrer, as it only presented general issue pleas. It emphasized that reading Mantegna’s declaration in its entirety clearly indicated a claim for damages exceeding $2,500, aligning with Maryland legal standards that do not require an exact upper limit on claims in civil pleadings. Mantegna’s recovery did not exceed her claim, as she sought damages above $2,500 and received $4,710. Overall, the court determined that Mantegna's pleading was adequate and compliant with Maryland practice.
Former Md.Rule 301 mandated that a pleading must include only necessary factual statements to establish a cause of action, disregarding any formal defects that did not impact the substantial rights of the parties. Mrs. Mantegna's declaration adhered to these rules. Her claim against the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) was based on her status as a third-party beneficiary of a contract between the FOP and its members for pre-paid legal services.
In December 1976, Mr. Mantegna, a police officer and FOP member, received a communication outlining benefits including a proposed pre-paid legal plan for members and their eligible dependents, defined as spouses and children under eighteen. The plan covered various domestic legal issues, including divorce, and required an increase in FOP dues to fund it. The resolution to amend the by-laws was adopted at an early 1977 FOP meeting, with Mr. Mantegna voting in favor.
Subsequent brochures sent by FOP reiterated that the plan included services for members and their eligible beneficiaries, explicitly covering divorce without exclusion for adversarial situations. In 1979, as domestic issues arose, Mrs. Mantegna learned that a lawyer from the pre-paid plan was representing Mr. Mantegna, while she was denied representation due to a conflict of interest. After hiring her own attorney and being denied reimbursement for legal fees, Mrs. Mantegna initiated the lawsuit. Following their divorce in 1981, her case against the FOP proceeded to trial, resulting in a recovery for her.
The trial judge determined that the 1976 communication and the subsequent 1977 and 1978 brochures constituted a contract between the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) and its members, with Mrs. Mantegna recognized as a third-party donee beneficiary entitled to reimbursement for her legal fees from divorce proceedings. Citing Weems v. Nanticoke Homes, Inc., the judge referenced the Restatement of Contracts, affirming that a donee beneficiary can recover if the contract's terms indicate a gift to that beneficiary. FOP did not dispute that the documents established a contractual relationship but contended that the trial court overlooked the 'surrounding circumstances' that indicated the parties' true intentions. FOP argued that the plan was not meant to cover spouses in adversarial situations, particularly in divorce cases, citing concerns raised by a lawyer from the servicing firm regarding dual representation and member interests. However, the court found that such concerns did not negate the contract’s explicit terms, which allowed for fee reimbursement to spouses, including in divorce situations. Testimony from Mr. Mantegna suggested he believed the plan excluded benefits for spouses in divorce, but this did not reflect the intentions of the broader membership at the time of the plan's adoption. The resolution adopted by the members clearly outlined the provision of family law services to eligible dependents, which included Mrs. Mantegna's situation. Thus, the court upheld the contract's terms as providing for the reimbursement of legal fees for eligible beneficiaries.
In donee beneficiary cases, the parties' intent is primarily determined by the language of the contract. The court concluded that the contract's language clearly identifies the class of donee beneficiaries, with Mrs. Mantegna being a member of that class based on the contract's explicit terms. The trial court's findings supporting this were not deemed clearly erroneous. The judgment is affirmed, with the appellant responsible for costs. Additionally, the excerpt notes that the concurrent jurisdiction of the District Court is currently set at $10,000 and references procedural forms under both past and current rules. It also mentions the necessity for alternative coverage arrangements under a legal services plan in cases of conflict of interest, without suggesting any non-compliance with present rules.
