Jarek Molski Disability Rights Enforcement, Education Services: Helping You Help Others ("Drees") v. M.J. Cable, Inc., a California Corporation, D/B/A Cable's Restaurant

Citations: 481 F.3d 724; 19 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 175; 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 6794; 2007 D.A.R. 3911Docket: 05-55347

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; March 23, 2007; Federal Appellate Court

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Jarek Molski, a paraplegic and civil rights activist, appeals the denial of his motion for a new trial after a jury ruled in favor of M.J. Cable, Inc., the owner of Cable's Restaurant, despite Molski's evidence of ADA and Unruh Act violations. Molski claimed the restaurant failed to address various architectural barriers that hindered his access, including a heavy restroom door, inadequate stall space, lack of grab bars, and unreachable fixtures, which posed significant health risks due to his condition. The jury's verdict was influenced by the District Court's speculation that Molski's history of litigation might categorize him as a "business" rather than an individual deserving ADA protections. The Ninth Circuit Court reversed the District Court's decision, emphasizing the validity of Molski's claims and the necessity for compliance with accessibility laws. Molski had previously initiated numerous lawsuits against inaccessible public accommodations, viewed by some as a vexatious litigant exploiting the legal system for financial gain.

At trial, Molski, Sarantschin, and construction expert Beall testified for Molski, while Dalkas, Cable's vice president, served as an adverse witness. Molski discussed his experiences at Cable's, his history with lawsuits, and views on disability discrimination. Sarantschin detailed his investigation into Cable's ADA violations, and Beall estimated that remodeling both bathrooms for ADA compliance would cost approximately $8,600, with cheaper incremental fixes available. Dalkas admitted that Cable's had not identified accessibility barriers, citing a lack of compulsion to make renovations, despite acknowledging the company could afford the repairs. He expressed concerns about the economic implications of remodeling and mentioned a $40,000 estimate for compliance, though no bids had been revealed during discovery.

The defense strategy focused on discrediting Molski by suggesting he aimed to extort settlements through his numerous ADA lawsuits. Molski revealed he had filed 374 similar cases and earned significant income from settlements, while also indicating he had no other employment. The jury ultimately ruled in favor of Cable's, stating they did not find the restaurant failed to address architectural barriers. Molski's subsequent motion for a new trial, claiming the verdict was against the evidence's weight, was denied by the District Court, leading to his appeal. The standard of review for the appellate court is abuse of discretion regarding the denial of new trial motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a).

The district court's denial of a motion for a new trial can only be reversed if there is no evidence supporting the jury's verdict. A mistake of law by the district court also warrants reversal. Under Rule 59(a), a new trial may be granted for reasons historically recognized in U.S. law, such as a verdict being against the weight of the evidence, excessive damages, or unfair trial conditions. Courts emphasize that a new trial is appropriate only when the verdict contradicts the clear weight of the evidence, relies on false evidence, or prevents a miscarriage of justice. The district court is required to evaluate the evidence and may set aside a jury's verdict if it finds, with conscientious conviction, that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence. Appeals courts generally defer to district courts on these determinations unless there is no reasonable basis for the jury's verdict, in which case the denial of a new trial is an error in law. 

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was enacted to combat discrimination against individuals with disabilities, specifically prohibiting such discrimination in public accommodations. Title III of the ADA ensures individuals can fully enjoy the services and facilities of public accommodations without discrimination based on disability. It mandates the removal of architectural barriers in existing facilities when such removal is readily achievable, defined as easily accomplishable without significant difficulty or expense.

Federal regulations delineate readily achievable barrier removals for public accommodations under 28 C.F.R. 36.304, which include installing grab bars, rearranging toilet partitions, and other modifications to enhance accessibility. The Department of Justice regards these measures as modest yet effective for removing barriers. To succeed in a Title III discrimination claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate they are disabled, that the defendant operates a public accommodation, and that they were denied access due to their disability. Enforcement of the ADA can be pursued by aggrieved individuals or the Attorney General, with private parties eligible for injunctive relief but not monetary damages. However, attorney's fees may be awarded to prevailing parties. 

California's Unruh Civil Rights Act parallels the ADA, ensuring equal access regardless of various statuses, including disability. Violations of the ADA automatically constitute violations of the Unruh Act, which permits recovery of actual damages and statutory damages of $4,000, without needing to prove actual damages. The Unruh Act also allows for attorney's fees. Consequently, litigants often combine claims under both the Unruh Act and the ADA in federal court.

The case at hand examines whether the District Court improperly denied Molski’s motion for a new trial, specifically questioning the sufficiency of evidence supporting the jury's finding that the defendants did not fail to remove architectural barriers, and whether the court's interpretation of Molski as a business rather than an individual justified the jury's decision.

The jury's verdict that Cable's did not fail to identify and remove architectural barriers lacks evidentiary support. The District Court's Special Verdict Form followed the elements of a Title III ADA claim, initially asking if Cable's failed in this regard. The jury answered "no," thus not addressing subsequent questions about specific barriers. However, the record presents substantial evidence from Molski and Sarantschin detailing numerous architectural violations, which Dalkas, Cable's vice president, acknowledged had not been addressed by the restaurant. The primary dispute related to whether removing these barriers was "readily achievable," but the jury did not adequately distinguish between the failure to identify/remove barriers and the feasibility of removal. The jury's conclusion contradicted the evidence presented, leading to the determination that the District Court erred in denying Molski's motion for a new trial.

Furthermore, the District Court's rationale for the verdict, attributing it to a belief that Molski was not an "individual" under the ADA due to prior litigation, is legally flawed. The ADA protects disabled individuals, and Molski, as a paraplegic, clearly qualifies as such. The interpretation of statutory language must adhere to its plain meaning, which supports Molski's standing under Title III of the ADA.

The defendant argues that the ADA defines "individuals" as only "clients and customers" of public accommodations under 42 U.S.C. 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv). This interpretation is incorrect for two reasons: it misreads the ADA's provisions and does not factually exclude Molski. The clause cited applies only to specific prohibitions against denying participation or providing unequal benefits to disabled individuals, and the general prohibition against discrimination based on disability is found in 12182(a), which does not limit the definition of "individuals" to clients or customers. The Supreme Court has clarified that the broad rule in Title III encompasses all "individuals," not just patrons. This interpretation aligns with the Third Circuit's ruling in Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem'l Med. Ctr., which established that the phrase "clients or customers" does not restrict Title III's application.

Moreover, Molski qualifies as a "customer" of Cable's Restaurant, having ordered and paid for food, which aligns with the Supreme Court's ruling that even a one-time payment establishes customer status. Even if Molski were considered a business, there was no evidence presented to support this claim, as he was identified as an individual with disabilities. The Joint Pre-Trial Conference Order confirms Molski's status, leaving no basis for the jury to conclude otherwise.

The jury instructions failed to support the District Court's explanation of the verdict, as they did not address the "Molski-as-business" theory or clarify whether Molski qualified as an "individual" under the ADA. The instructions only required proof of three elements for an ADA violation: Molski's disability, the public accommodation status of Cable's, and Molski's denial of access due to architectural barriers. The first two elements were stipulated, and Molski clearly proved the third. Consequently, the jury instructions did not substantiate the District Court's speculation regarding Molski's status. The record lacks any evidence supporting the jury's verdict, leading to the conclusion that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Molski's motion for a new trial. The appellate court reversed the District Court's decision, vacated the judgment against Molski, and remanded the case for a new trial, awarding costs on appeal to Molski. Additional notes referenced Molski's prior designation as a vexatious litigant and questioned the relevance of certain evidence admitted at trial. The appellate court did not address these evidential issues, focusing instead on the procedural errors impacting the trial's outcome.