Sleeth v. Sedan City Hospital

Citations: 298 Kan. 853; 317 P.3d 782; 2014 WL 517801; 2014 Kan. LEXIS 31Docket: No. 105,876

Court: Supreme Court of Kansas; February 6, 2014; Kansas; State Supreme Court

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In the wrongful death case against Sedan City Hospital and employee David Short, the court addressed conflicting lower court opinions on whether the required written notice of claim was provided before the lawsuit was filed, as mandated by K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 12-105b(d). The district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiffs did not meet statutory notice requirements. Although a divided Court of Appeals reinstated the claim, the majority disagreed on the rationale. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the district court's dismissal, emphasizing that substantial compliance with the notice statute is not achieved without a clear statement of monetary damages. The court held that the 120-day investigation period provided to municipalities is a statutory condition precedent to filing a lawsuit, and premature filing results in lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court noted that even if the plaintiffs substantially complied by May 2, 2010, by providing a damages statement, the district court's dismissal was appropriate due to premature filing. The case stemmed from the death of patient Christopher J. Johnson, allegedly due to negligence when a feeding tube was improperly inserted. The district court determined the hospital was a municipality under the relevant statute, thus subjecting the claim to the notice requirements. The Sleeths initially claimed their case was contractual rather than tortious, but both lower courts rejected this argument, which the Sleeths did not seek to appeal. The court planned to examine the letters sent by the Sleeths to evaluate their compliance with the notice statute and review the relevant court proceedings and case law.

On February 21, 2010, the Sleeths’ attorney notified Michelle Williams, administrator of Sedan City Hospital, of a wrongful death claim against the hospital and others, threatening legal action if a settlement was not reached. The letter requested that the claim and medical records be forwarded to the claims manager and alleged negligence by hospital staff. However, it failed to provide the Sleeths' address or the amount of damages sought, which are required by K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 12-105b(d)(1) and (5). On March 8, 2010, the hospital’s insurance analyst requested an itemization of damages and indicated that future correspondence should be directed to her. The Sleeths’ attorney submitted the requested forms on March 22 and later specified damages totaling $1,183,000 in a May 2 letter. The wrongful death lawsuit was filed on August 2, 2010, which was within the two-year statute of limitations but raised issues regarding compliance with K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 12-105b(d), which requires notice to a municipality before filing suit. The defendants contended that the Sleeths did not serve the required notice, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction and filing a joint motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. They asserted that Sedan City Hospital was a municipality as defined by law and that no board members received notice of the claim, supported by affidavits.

The Sleeths denied the defendants' claims, asserting they had met statutory notice requirements by sending letters on February 21 and May 2, 2012. They argued that the hospital administrator acted as a 'de facto' clerk authorized to receive notice, and that the letters collectively provided a clear indication of their claim. The defendants acknowledged receipt of the letters but contended they did not comply with K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 12-105b(d), as the February 21 letter lacked a damage statement and was not sent to the hospital's actual clerk. They also argued that the May 2 letter to the insurer did not fulfill the notice requirement, and the lawsuit was premature since less than 120 days had passed since that letter. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice, finding that neither the administrator nor the insurer qualified as the hospital's 'clerk' under the statute, and the notice was therefore improper. The court also determined that the statute of limitations for wrongful death had expired due to non-compliance with the notice requirement. The Sleeths appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, with differing opinions among the panel members regarding substantial compliance with the notice requirements. Judge Atcheson concluded that the combination of both letters satisfied the statute, while Chief Judge Greene believed the February 21 letter alone was sufficient.

Judge Greene contended that the absence of damages reference in a February 21 letter was not essential, citing a $250,000 cap on nonpecuniary wrongful death damages in K.S.A. 60-1903, which he believed reduced uncertainty about damages. He asserted that lacking detailed damages information did not hinder the hospital’s ability to assess the claim’s merits. Conversely, Judge Atcheson insisted that mentioning damages was crucial for compliance with K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 12-105b(d).

The panel collectively agreed that delivering notice to the hospital administrator met statutory requirements because the hospital lacked a designated clerk, interpreting Kansas case law to allow service on an officer with equivalent authority. Judges Atcheson and Brazil also concurred that the insurer was an appropriate recipient of notice, with Atcheson applying an agency theory to justify that the insurer could receive the missing damages information.

Regarding the 120-day period for filing suit post-notice, Judge Atcheson argued this was a personal jurisdiction matter that could be waived, differing from another panel's view that it pertained to subject matter jurisdiction. He concluded that the defendants waived this defense by not mentioning it in their answers and implied they acted in bad faith by not raising the 120-day bar, which could have allowed the Sleeths to correct their filing without prejudice. Senior Judge Brazil dissented, asserting the 120-day requirement related to subject matter jurisdiction and criticizing Atcheson’s reasoning as infringing on legislative authority. The hospital and Short sought review of the panel's differing interpretations, while the Sleeths did not cross-petition, leading to a granted review under K.S.A. 20-3018(b) and jurisdiction under K.S.A. 60-2101(b).

The court analyzed whether the Sleeths complied with K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 12-105b(d) regarding notice requirements. The Sleeths argued that their February 21 letter to the hospital administrator met the statute's compliance; however, the defendants countered that the letter failed to file with the municipality's clerk and lacked a statement of damages. Alternatively, the Sleeths contended that the combination of the February 21 letter and a subsequent May 2 letter to the hospital’s insurance carrier constituted sufficient compliance. The defendants acknowledged the May 2 letter included a detailed damages statement but maintained that neither letter was sent to the appropriate municipal authorities and that the lawsuit was prematurely filed before the 120-day review period had lapsed, which they argued deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction.

The court concluded that the February 21 letter did not meet the statutory requirements due to the absence of a damages statement. Furthermore, even assuming the two letters could collectively satisfy the statute, the premature filing violated the requirement of the 120-day review period, which is a condition precedent to filing suit and essential to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. The analysis refrained from addressing additional issues such as the authority of the hospital administrator or potential waivers of the notice requirements, asserting that the case could be resolved based solely on the premature filing. This decision also clarified conflicting interpretations among appellate panels regarding the jurisdictional implications of K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 12-105b(d).

When evaluating compliance with K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 12-105b(d), the determination of whether a plaintiff has substantially complied is a legal question reviewed de novo if the notice's contents are unchallenged. Compliance with this statute is mandatory for claims against municipalities under the Kansas Tort Claims Act, and written notice must detail specific facts leading to the claim. This notice, which must be submitted to the municipality's clerk or governing body, requires the claimant's and attorney's names and addresses, a concise statement of the claim's factual basis including date, time, place, and circumstances, details of involved public officers or employees (if known), an account of the nature and extent of injuries, and the amount of monetary damages sought. Substantial compliance with these requirements is necessary for a valid claim filing, and such notice is not admissible in subsequent legal actions. No lawsuit may proceed until the municipality has formally denied the claim or 120 days have elapsed since the claim was filed. A claim is considered denied if not fully approved by the municipality within 120 days, unless a settlement is reached. Legal action must commence within the timeframe set by the civil procedure code, or it will be barred, granting claimants at least 90 days from denial to initiate proceedings.

K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 12-105b(d) mandates that notice of claims against municipalities include the name and address of any involved public officer or employee. In this case, the district court dismissed claims against Sedan City Hospital and employee Short for noncompliance with this statute. The Court of Appeals affirmed that notice to the municipality is necessary even when suing an employee, as established in previous cases. Although the applicability of the statute to municipal employees acting within their employment was not addressed, it remains unchallenged in this instance. 

The statute requires substantial compliance with five specific notice content criteria: (1) names and addresses of the claimant and attorney; (2) a concise factual basis for the claim; (3) the name and address of any public officer or employee involved; (4) a statement of the nature and extent of injuries claimed; and (5) the amount of monetary damages sought. Compliance is assessed based on whether the notice allows the municipality to fully investigate and understand the claims, rather than merely counting the presence of each required item.

In this case, the notice dated February 21 lacked both the claimants' address and the amount of damages requested. However, the defendants acknowledged that omitting the address was inconsequential, a position with which the court concurred.

The notice elements outlined in K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 12-105b(d) vary in significance regarding a municipality's ability to assess a claim, depending on specific circumstances. In this case, the claimants' address was deemed irrelevant since their counsel's contact information was provided; however, the absence of a monetary damages statement was critical. The court rejected Chief Judge Greene’s assertion that lacking this statement did not impede the municipality's investigation, particularly given that the claimants initially sought a substantial amount exceeding nonpecuniary damages, primarily due to pecuniary losses like lost disability income. K.S.A. 60-1903 allows for unlimited pecuniary damages in personal injury and wrongful death cases, making the absence of a damages statement significant for the municipality's evaluation process. The statutory cap on nonpecuniary damages does not inform the municipality about the pecuniary damages claimed.

The court emphasized that a notice lacking a monetary damages statement does not fulfill the objectives of K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 12-105b. Citing Garcia v. Anderson, the court noted that without understanding the extent of the alleged damages, the legislative intent for early resolution of claims is undermined. It was agreed that some indication of damages is essential for compliance with the statute, as municipalities cannot assess the stakes without this information.

In prior rulings, substantial compliance was found when a claimant's notice and petition demanded the same damages, allowing for later amendments without disturbing statutory purposes. However, in the Sleeths’ situation, the February 21 letter's failure to mention monetary damages did not meet compliance standards. The court considered whether compliance could be achieved through a combination of the February 21 and May 2 letters, while acknowledging that the notice must be filed with the municipality’s clerk or governing body, raising questions about the adequacy of filing with a hospital administrator and the hospital's insurance representative.

The petition was filed on August 2, 2010, 92 days after a May 2 letter detailing damages. The February 21 letter did not meet statutory requirements, thus not initiating the 120-day review period mandated by K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 12-105b(d). Since the Sleeths did not claim their petition was denied, the statutory period had not lapsed, making the lawsuit premature. The court must determine if the 120-day review period can be waived if the municipality does not assert it as a defense. It was concluded that this period cannot be waived, and substantial compliance with K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 12-105b(d) is essential for the court to gain subject matter jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction is critical and cannot be granted through consent or waiver; if absent, appellate courts also lack jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction is classified into specific and general categories, but the appeal primarily concerns subject matter jurisdiction. The court has previously classified the notice requirements under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 12-105b(d) as jurisdictional. In Kau Kau Take Home No. 1 v. City of Wichita, it was established that a proper notice of claim is required before a lawsuit against a municipality can proceed. Legislative history indicates that these notice requirements are jurisdictional prerequisites for lawsuits under the Kansas Tort Claims Act, as highlighted in Gessner v. Phillips County Comm’rs.

K.S.A. 12-105b(d) is characterized by the Court of Appeals as affecting subject matter jurisdiction. However, Judge Atcheson argues it should be interpreted as implicating personal jurisdiction, as it relates to the obligation of giving notice before commencing an action, similar to service of process. In the case of Gessner, the court addressed whether the Kansas saving statute, K.S.A. 60-518, allows a claimant to file a notice and initiate a lawsuit after the statute of limitations has expired if a prior lawsuit was dismissed due to failure to comply with the notice requirement. The court ruled that K.S.A. 12-105b(d) requires written notice to be filed before any action can commence, reflecting a legislative intent to prevent actions from being initiated prior to the expiration of a 120-day review period or a municipal denial of the claim. The statute explicitly states that no lawsuit may be filed until the claim is denied or the 120 days have elapsed. Judge Atcheson’s interpretation, which could allow claimants to circumvent this requirement, is seen as inconsistent with the clear statutory language. The statute's purpose is to enable municipalities to investigate claims before litigation begins, and its role as a condition precedent to filing suit is more akin to the exhaustion of administrative remedies than to statutes of limitations, a comparison that Judge Atcheson downplayed.

A district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider a petition if the petitioner does not exhaust all available administrative remedies under the Kansas Judicial Review Act (KJRA). The exhaustion requirements of the KJRA are closely aligned with K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 12-105b(d), which sets procedural prerequisites prior to seeking judicial review. The 120-day review period established by K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 12-105b(d) is a statutory condition precedent for a court to assert jurisdiction over claims against municipalities under the Kansas Tort Claims Act. This review period can only be shortened if the municipality denies the claim in whole or in part before the petition is filed. Waiving the 120-day review period is not permissible to confer jurisdiction over a prematurely filed lawsuit. Consequently, the Court of Appeals' decision reversing the district court is overturned, and the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is upheld. Judges Luckert and Moritz did not participate in the decision, and District Judge Daniel D. Creitz was assigned to this case.