United States v. Veronica Jimenez

Citations: 478 F.3d 929; 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 4140; 2007 WL 569893Docket: 06-3365

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; February 26, 2007; Federal Appellate Court

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Veronica Jimenez appeals her conviction for possessing with intent to distribute over 500 grams of methamphetamine, arguing that the district court improperly denied her motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. On July 23, 2005, Officer Travis Oetter stopped Jimenez and her son for a traffic violation on Interstate 80 in Omaha, Nebraska, at approximately 11 p.m. Jimenez provided conflicting information about their travel plans, claiming they were going to a wedding in Minneapolis, despite having missed it and lacking airline tickets for their return. The officer noted her nervous behavior and the vehicle’s altered interior as suspicious.

After requesting permission to search the vehicle, which Jimenez granted, Officer Oetter discovered a package he believed contained narcotics in the wheelwell. Jimenez was arrested, and a more thorough search at the impound lot revealed four bundles of methamphetamine. Following her indictment and conviction by a jury, Jimenez received a 120-month prison sentence.

In her appeal, Jimenez contends that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress, which argued the lack of probable cause for the stop, detention, and search, as well as a claim that her consent to the search was not voluntary. She also sought to suppress statements made during the encounter, citing violations of her Miranda and Fifth Amendment rights.

The district court accepted the magistrate judge's recommendation to deny the motion to suppress evidence, with the exception of statements made by Ms. Jimenez during the period between her being handcuffed and receiving her Miranda rights. The court determined there was probable cause for stopping the vehicle and that the officer had reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, justifying Ms. Jimenez's detention and the request for a search. It concluded that the officer could reasonably believe Ms. Jimenez consented to the search and that her statements made after receiving Miranda rights were voluntary. Ms. Jimenez contended that the denial of the motion to suppress was erroneous due to a lack of reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop, absence of consent for the search, and that her waiver of Miranda rights was not knowing and voluntary. The review of the district court's decision follows a standard of clear error for factual findings and de novo for legal conclusions. The court found no error, affirming that Officer Oetter had reasonable suspicion to detain Ms. Jimenez and broaden the traffic stop's scope based on inconsistencies in her travel plans, her nervous demeanor, and the state of the vehicle. While individual factors may not constitute reasonable suspicion, collectively they justified further investigation.

The district court found no error in Officer Oetter's belief that Ms. Jimenez had consented to a vehicle search. Ms. Jimenez argued that her license and registration were not returned before the search request, implying that any consent was coerced. However, the voluntariness of consent is assessed based on the totality of circumstances, as established in precedent cases. Factors considered included Ms. Jimenez's age, intelligence, education, intoxication, and understanding of her rights. The court found no evidence that she was confused or under the influence, and a videotape of the encounter showed no coercion, with Ms. Jimenez actively consenting to the search.

Even if Ms. Jimenez was effectively arrested, this does not automatically invalidate her consent, as individuals in custody can still voluntarily consent to searches. The court also addressed Ms. Jimenez's claim that her statements made after waiving her Miranda rights should be suppressed due to involuntariness. The court determined that she was properly informed of her rights and understood them, as indicated by her affirmative responses. Her emotional state did not negate her voluntary waiver, and there was no evidence of coercion or intimidation from the officers.

The court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress evidence and found no error regarding the sufficiency of the evidence for her conviction. The review for sufficiency of evidence is strict, and a verdict will only be reversed if no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Ms. Jimenez argued that the evidence was inadequate to demonstrate her knowledge of the substantial amount of methamphetamine concealed in the vehicle, referencing United States v. Mendoza-Larios, 416 F.3d 872 (8th Cir. 2005) for support. However, her case diverges from Mendoza-Larios as she admitted awareness of something being in the vehicle. She claimed her son was uninvolved and unaware of the narcotics, which did not exonerate her. Upon arrest, she acknowledged having drugs in her purse, which contained cocaine, although there was conflicting testimony regarding whether she identified it as cocaine or crystal meth. Testimony indicated that she intended to drive the vehicle one way to leave it in Minneapolis without a return ticket or funds for one, actions typical of drug couriers. Additionally, she had control of the vehicle during the trip. Citing United States v. Cortez, 935 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1991), the court noted that possession can be inferred from several factors, including exclusive control over the vehicle and responses to investigators. The overall record provided sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably conclude that Ms. Jimenez was aware of the large drug quantity in the vehicle, leading to the affirmation of her conviction. The judgment of the district court is upheld.