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State v. Groves
Citations: 232 Kan. 66; 653 P.2d 457Docket: No. 53,412
Court: Supreme Court of Kansas; October 22, 1982; Kansas; State Supreme Court
The court opinion by Prager, J., addresses a direct appeal from the Coffey County District Court, which had found four defendants guilty of violating Kansas motor vehicle registration statutes. The Court of Appeals reversed these convictions in State v. Groves, prompting the Supreme Court to grant the State’s review petition. The defendants—William R. Groves, William A. Cummings, and Michael D. Booth—were cited for operating unregistered Schwing concrete pump/boom trucks owned by Concrete Placement, Inc. on U.S. Highway 75 on three occasions between October 1979 and July 1980. The primary legal question is whether these trucks qualify as 'self-propelled cranes' or 'road machinery,' thus exempting them from registration under K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-128. Relevant statutes define various vehicle categories, including 'motor vehicle,' 'truck,' and 'self-propelled farm implement,' while outlining registration requirements and exemptions. Specifically, K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-128 lists exemptions for certain vehicles, including farm tractors and road machinery, indicating that the classification of the concrete pump/boom trucks is critical to determining their registration requirements. Self-propelled cranes and earth-moving equipment with pneumatic tires can be transported on highways within the state for job-related purposes without needing to register or display license plates, provided they adhere to other motor vehicle regulations. However, such vehicles cannot operate on state-maintained roads or highways on Sundays or legal holidays, except for Lincoln’s Day, Washington’s Day, and Columbus Day. According to K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-142, it is illegal to operate an unregistered vehicle on highways. The defendants argue that a Schwing concrete pump/boom truck qualifies as a "self-propelled crane," thus exempt from registration requirements under K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-128. The vehicle in question is acknowledged as a motor vehicle per statutory definitions. Testimony from Edward Lothamer, manager of Concrete Placement, Inc., highlighted the vehicle's characteristics and its operational use, primarily for lifting and placing concrete in hard-to-access areas. This vehicle performs significant roadwork, including highway improvements and bridge construction, with a lifting capacity exceeding 1500 pounds. The Schwing concrete pump/boom truck is constructed by integrating a concrete pump with an International diesel truck chassis, enabling it to travel at legal speeds. The vehicle's design allows it to transport concrete effectively, with capabilities to lift substantial weights through a boom arm. While primarily used for concrete, it can occasionally lift other heavy items, showcasing its versatility as a specialty machine. Lothamer reported that the vehicle logs considerable mileage annually, with a total weight of 54,000 pounds. The equipment involved in the arrests was used for constructing the Wolf Creek power plant in Coffey County. A truck was regularly driven from Kansas City to the construction site and back, totaling about six hours on public highways each day. There has been legal inconsistency in Kansas regarding whether a concrete pump/boom truck qualifies as a road machine or self-propelled crane. Notably, in 1975, an assistant attorney general opined it was exempt as a road machine, but this was not legally binding. In 1978, a district judge ruled it was exempt as a self-propelled crane, while later that year the attorney general declared it was not exempt under either category. In 1980, the Kansas Department of Revenue concluded it must be registered. A district magistrate upheld this, and the decision was affirmed on appeal, although the Court of Appeals later reversed it. The court found no specific definition of 'self-propelled crane' in Kansas law and evaluated whether the concrete pump/boom truck fits the exemption criteria in K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-128. The term 'crane' is defined as a machine for lifting heavy weights, prompting the court to assess if the vehicle is a crane or a truck with a concrete delivery system. Ultimately, the court determined the Schwing concrete pump/boom truck is a motor vehicle that must be registered and does not qualify as a self-propelled crane under the exemption. The legislature aims to regulate all motor vehicles on highways, with specific exemptions for self-propelled cranes and earth-moving equipment, which must adhere to other vehicle requirements and have restrictions on their operation on Sundays and holidays. K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-128 classifies exempt vehicles into two categories, with category (a) covering special purpose vehicles, and category (b) covering self-propelled cranes and earth-moving equipment, limited to specific movements. The section addresses the limited operation of certain vehicles on state roads and highways, emphasizing that exemptions in K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-128 should be interpreted according to legislative intent. Ordinary dump trucks are not exempt simply for hauling dirt, and self-propelled cranes are not exempt if they merely have lifting capabilities. Specifically exempted is a self-propelled farm implement designed for fertilizer application, while a concrete pump/boom truck does not qualify as a 'self-propelled crane' under this exemption. The legislature likely aimed to exempt vehicles that operate on highways only briefly for specific purposes, such as moving large equipment to job sites. The court distinguishes the case from Moravek’s Concrete v. Department of Revenue due to differences in the Oregon statute's language, which allowed for broader exemptions. The defendants also argued that concrete pump/boom trucks should be categorized as 'road machinery' under section (a) of K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-128; however, the court agrees with the lower courts that these vehicles do not qualify for this exemption, as a significant portion of their use is not related to road construction. On the dates of the traffic citations, the vehicles were employed for concrete work at a power project, not as road machinery. Lastly, the defendants claimed the statute is unconstitutional for vagueness, referencing the criteria established in State v. Kirby regarding the clarity required for criminal statutes. A criminal statute is deemed unconstitutionally vague if its language does not provide a clear warning about the prescribed conduct, leading to uncertainty for individuals of common intelligence. A statute that necessitates guessing at its meaning violates due process. The vagueness test is based on fundamental fairness. K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-128 was determined not to be unconstitutionally vague, as it clearly reflects the legislature's intent to require vehicle registration for all vehicles capable of road travel. The defendants claimed a defense of mistake of law under K.S.A. 21-3203 based on reliance on an official interpretation of the statute. However, this defense is only valid if based on interpretations from the Kansas Supreme Court or U.S. appellate courts, not from lower courts. An opinion from the attorney general concluded truck-mounted concrete pump units are not exempt from registration requirements. Consequently, the district court's judgment is affirmed, while the Court of Appeals' judgment is reversed, with Justice Fromme not participating.