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Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kimmel
Citations: 405 Md. 647; 955 A.2d 269; 2008 Md. LEXIS 499Docket: Misc. Docket AG Nos. 20, 21
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland; September 2, 2008; Maryland; State Supreme Court
Attorney disciplinary actions were initiated against partners Robert Silverman and Craig Kimmel of Kimmel, Silverman, P.C. (K.S.) due to alleged failures in supervising a less experienced associate and communicating with clients after the firm established a Maryland office. K.S., based in Pennsylvania, aimed to expand its automobile warranty and 'lemon law' practices into Maryland by hiring attorney Robin Katz to open a branch in Owings Mills. Following issues with Katz's management of cases, including her neglect leading to 47 cases being dismissed, she resigned and consented to disbarment in Maryland. The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland charged the partners with inadequate supervision (violating MRPC 5.1) and poor client communication (violating MRPC 1.4). The case was assigned to Judge Kathleen Gallogly Cox for an evidentiary hearing, which occurred in February 2008, with findings delivered in March 2008. Judge Cox noted that K.S. had expanded operations to multiple states and that the firm's structure relied heavily on paralegals and senior attorneys for case management, emphasizing the high volume and settlement rates of their lemon law practice. In 2004, K.S. sought to establish a practice in Maryland but could not find an experienced Lemon Law attorney, leading them to hire Robin Katz, who responded to a job posting. Katz, admitted to practice in Maryland since December 1996, had previous experience handling social security disability cases but no civil trial experience. During her June 2004 interview with Robert Rapkin, who manages a team at K.S., she was described as well-organized and capable despite lacking jury trial experience. After receiving a job offer, Katz trained in K.S.'s Pennsylvania office for a month, learning to manage Lemon Law cases and using the 'Time Matters' system for case management. Upon returning to Maryland, Katz set up her office in Owings Mills, sharing resources with unrelated entities and handling her clerical work independently. She anticipated future paralegal assistance once the caseload increased, with around fifty Maryland cases already in the pipeline by the time she opened her office. Katz began drafting Maryland complaints using adapted Pennsylvania forms, reflecting her adherence to firm expectations. K.S. operates a high-volume practice focused on performance metrics, emphasizing the importance of filing and revenue goals. Initially, Katz was tasked with filing ten cases weekly, increasing to fifteen in January 2005. A revenue target of $10,000 in weekly attorneys' fees from settlements was also set, confirmed by an email from supervisor Rapkin. Katz was repeatedly reminded of the necessity to meet these benchmarks, with Rapkin stressing their critical role in salary evaluations and operational support. Despite not consistently achieving her targets, no disciplinary actions were taken against Katz. In January 2005, Kimmel took over supervision, maintaining the focus on performance. Subsequent communications from Silverman and Kimmel expressed concerns over Katz’s case settlements and mandated she send detailed letters to opposing counsel to improve her output. Kimmel emphasized that adherence to this strategy would enhance her performance and ultimately benefit the firm. Katz was tasked with leading the Maryland office and was directed to enhance its efficiency while managing a significant caseload. From June 1, 2005, until her employment ended, she consistently sent out thirty letters weekly, with updates provided to Kimmel. Kimmel expressed concerns over the low fees from Katz's settlements, typically $2,500 per case, and expected more substantial fees from pre-suit settlements. He highlighted the need for thorough file reviews and noted that discrepancies in settlement fees across cases were not acceptable. Katz managed between 200 and 300 cases requiring monthly reviews, and discussions about the need for a full-time paralegal for her office had been ongoing since September 2004. Although Katz had access to paralegal support from the Pennsylvania office, the coordination was often problematic, leading to delays in handling discovery and filings. By late 2004, Katz's caseload had risen significantly, from 127 cases in September to 239 by December. During her tenure, she filed 461 suits in Maryland, with a total assignment of over 500 matters. Her caseload was comparable to that of other attorneys at the firm, who often managed even more cases, and it was common for attorneys at K.S. to utilize paralegals from different offices for discovery management. The firm typically aims for early settlement in most cases, but Katz was managing numerous active cases with ongoing discovery, leading to a heavy workload. Unlike some jurisdictions, Maryland did not mandate early arbitration, which contributed to delays in settlement. During a busy period in late April 2005, Katz noted she had six motions hearings and multiple mediations scheduled within one week, alongside cases across the state. However, she failed to input deadlines into Time Matters for forty-seven Nissan and Toyota cases, which were aggressively litigated by Piper Rudnick. Despite having access to a designated paralegal for assistance, Katz did not seek help, resulting in no logging of discovery or motions, leading to delinquent responses and subsequent Motions for Sanctions. Katz did not respond to these motions and instead focused on preparing discovery responses. Of the forty-seven cases, eighteen saw no discovery filed, while responses in ten were submitted late, prompting renewed Motions for Sanctions, most of which went unanswered. The first case dismissal occurred in May 2005, and eventually, all forty-seven cases were dismissed with prejudice. By January 2005, Katz felt overwhelmed but continued to prioritize new cases over overdue responses, neglecting the risks involved. She feared disclosing her mistakes to senior partners, believing her job was at stake, which influenced her decision-making. Additionally, Katz attempted to conceal her shortcomings by forwarding letters to opposing counsel for cases that had been dismissed. The Iweala case exemplified her issues; despite an extension to file discovery, her responses were unexecuted, and after failing to respond to a renewed motion, it was dismissed with prejudice on May 24, 2005. The dismissal of the Iweala case was the first to be noticed by the firm, prompting inquiries from the Office Manager. Katz deemed her case dismissal inappropriate, asserting she had filed discovery on time and had submitted a Motion to Reopen, which was not docketed until July 6, 2005. Silverman, upon discovering issues, initially trusted Katz's assurance that the matter could be reinstated. However, after Katz admitted her mistake regarding reinstatement, Silverman took no further action, believing the error was isolated. In mid-July 2005, new discovery issues arose, prompting the Office Manager to email Katz about Orders related to Motions to Compel. Katz minimized her difficulties, attributing delays to limited time and claiming some discovery had been sent. Katz, overwhelmed and experiencing personal distress, took a week-long vacation in late July, returning to significant backlogs. Although a paralegal was hired during this period, Katz was responsible for training. She resigned via email on August 10, 2005, citing health issues and refused to assist in the transition. Upon visiting the Maryland office, Silverman found Katz in a distressed state and noted disorganized documentation. In response, K.S. assigned attorneys and paralegals to address the issues stemming from Katz's inaction, including reassigning her cases within weeks. Charles Carter, a client affected by Katz's failure to timely designate experts, struggled to obtain updates on his case and was unaware of Katz's resignation until later. He sought status updates through multiple letters and emails, receiving a response only on February 7, 2006, which informed him of his case's dismissal. Eventually, Carter's case was resolved satisfactorily, with Silverman negotiating a fair settlement after Carter engaged new counsel. During Katz's employment, she was the sole attorney licensed in Maryland and communicated with firm members primarily through email and phone, with minimal in-person oversight. Graham and Rapkin observed no unusual circumstances during their visits, and Kimmel and Silverman did not visit the Maryland office before Katz's resignation, remaining unaware of any issues with Katz's representation. Kimmel reported no client complaints, typically indicative of workload issues, and stated that resources were available for Katz if she had requested assistance. Despite Katz's request for staff support, Kimmel and Silverman believed she was performing adequately and did not address her staffing needs. When a crisis arose in August, the firm quickly hired three lawyers. Currently, the Maryland office is staffed with two lawyers and one paralegal, managing significantly lower caseloads than other K.S. offices. The hearing judge concluded that Respondents violated MRPC 5.1, referencing Maryland cases and relevant cases from other jurisdictions regarding lawyer supervision. Judge Cox determined that the supervision provided by K.S.'s founding partners was insufficient, especially given Katz's lack of experience in automotive warranty and 'lemon law' claims and in handling contested cases in Maryland's circuit courts. The Pennsylvania attorneys did not adjust the firm's policies to accommodate Maryland's legal distinctions. Furthermore, the use of a computerized case management system replaced necessary hands-on supervision, and there were inadequate safeguards against neglecting the system. The supervising attorneys failed to mentor Katz in fulfilling her ethical duties within a high-volume, fee-driven practice. Additionally, Respondents violated MRPC Rule 1.4 by not responding promptly to Carter's inquiries regarding his Maryland case status. The hearing judge noted that the firm's effective response upon discovering these issues served as a mitigating factor. The Petitioner did not challenge the findings, while Respondents contested four specific findings of fact, including Katz's sole responsibility for her clerical work and the directive from Kimmel regarding the sending of demand letters. Evidence presented indicates uncertainty regarding Katz's awareness of a K.S. paralegal's assignment to assist with Nissan and Toyota matters. Respondents dispute the assertion that K.S.'s Maryland office has two lawyers and one paralegal managing significantly lower caseloads than other K.S. offices, conceding its accuracy but opposing the implication that Katz's caseload was excessively high. They argue that under MRPC 5.1, the standard of supervision requires only reasonable efforts and does not hold attorneys as guarantors of their employees' ethical conduct. Regarding MRPC 1.4, Respondents maintain that communication duties are personal to the attorney handling a matter, and thus, breaches cannot be attributed vicariously. The standard of review indicates that the hearing court's factual findings are generally upheld unless they are clearly erroneous, with deference given to the hearing judge's credibility assessments. Bar Counsel must prove allegations by clear and convincing evidence, while defense evidence only needs to meet a preponderance standard. Proposed legal conclusions are reviewed de novo by the court. In addressing the claim that Katz performed all her clerical work, Respondents argue insufficient evidence supports this assertion, citing paralegal support from Pennsylvania. The court overruled this exception, clarifying that clear and convincing evidence does not require absolute proof. Despite the availability of remote paralegal assistance, evidence showed Katz operated largely independently for most of her tenure, responsible for all clerical duties, including managing mail and phone messages, and tracking her paper usage. Katz was responsible for performing all clerical work in the Maryland office, which included essential daily tasks not covered by the paralegals in Pennsylvania. The hearing judge reasonably concluded that Katz handled her own clerical duties as the sole employee in Maryland. Furthermore, Kimmel directed Katz to send a minimum of ten substantive demand letters to opposing counsel three times a week, emphasizing that these letters should reflect individual case details rather than being mere form letters. The definition of "substantive" in this context indicates that the letters were meant to create a permanent record and advocate for the clients' rights and duties. Kimmel criticized Katz for not adequately personalizing her correspondence and expected each letter to be distinct and reflective of the specifics of each case, which was contrary to Katz's reliance on generic templates. Kimmel's guidance suggested that Katz should spend 30 to 60 minutes on each case file, implying a significant commitment of time totaling 15 to 30 hours weekly for the required letters. This expectation underscores the substantial nature of the task, as the demand for detailed, case-specific letters necessitated considerable effort beyond mere formality. Kimmel anticipated receiving substantive letters in numerous cases. Respondents challenge the hearing judge's conclusion that Katz appeared unaware of the availability of Pennsylvania-based paralegals for claims against Nissan and Toyota. It was agreed that Katz acknowledged having paralegal assistance for responding to interrogatories and document requests, with specific paralegals assigned to particular manufacturers. Respondents referenced testimony indicating Katz's lack of distinct recollection regarding the Nissan paralegal, as she could not clearly remember if she was assigned one, recalling instead distinct paralegals for other manufacturers like General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler. When asked about Tracey Christy, Katz acknowledged her could have been the Nissan paralegal, but this uncertainty contributed to the judge's finding that Katz "seemed" unaware of a specific paralegal for Nissan claims. The judge's credibility assessment allows for selective reliance on conflicting evidence, leading to the conclusion that Katz's vague recollection contrasted with her clear memory of other paralegals. The hearing judge also found that K. S's Maryland office operates with two lawyers and one paralegal, maintaining a significantly lower caseload than other K. S offices, which respondents argue could imply Katz's workload was excessive. They attribute the current lower caseload to a high volume of appeals, suggesting Katz's workload management may not have been adequate. The judge acknowledged this reduced workload and its implications for supervision. Ultimately, the findings regarding workload and staffing in Maryland are accepted as accurate, leading to the overruling of the exception raised by respondents. Respondents' objections to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law are rejected, affirming that they violated MRPC 5.1 and 1.4. MRPC 5.1 mandates that partners must implement policies ensuring compliance with the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically overseeing inexperienced lawyers and identifying critical timelines for pending matters. Informal supervision may suffice for small firms with experienced attorneys, but larger or more complex situations require detailed supervisory measures. Partners are accountable for the ethical climate of their firm and cannot assume compliance by all attorneys. Effective supervision must adapt to the experience of individual attorneys and the firm's culture. In the case of K. S, multiple indicators highlighted the need for increased supervision, particularly as the firm established a new office in Maryland without prior local litigation experience. The founding partners and the Maryland office manager lacked familiarity with Maryland legal practices, leading to improper case filing locations. This oversight compounded challenges associated with handling a high-volume caseload across different jurisdictions. Distinctions between Maryland and Pennsylvania practices significantly impact the management of automotive warranty claims. Key differences include fee-shifting, early settlement provisions, venue selection, and challenges related to expert witnesses, which necessitate a comprehensive understanding of Maryland law to protect clients from inadequate representation. K. S should have proactively addressed these differences when establishing supervisory procedures for their new office, rather than during ongoing litigation. Potential strategies to mitigate their lack of Maryland experience included processing test cases or hiring experienced attorneys. During oral arguments, respondents claimed that K. S's successful branch openings in other states indicated a sound approach for Maryland, but no evidence was presented to support this assertion, nor were the qualifications of attorneys in other jurisdictions documented. The case emphasizes that a less experienced attorney requires heightened supervision, contrary to the informal oversight typically sufficient in small, experienced firms. The situation involved a large firm with a high client load, where an inexperienced attorney was isolated and tasked with quickly filing numerous cases, despite lacking knowledge in automotive warranty law and critical litigation practices. Supervising attorneys in Maryland are responsible for ensuring that an employee's skills align with their assigned duties. The precedent set in Ficker mandates that supervisors verify the competence of newly hired attorneys before assigning them to specific fields, particularly if they are novices, as was the case with Katz in automotive warranty law. Respondents failed to assess Katz's qualifications adequately, thus neglecting their supervisory obligations. Respondents intended for Katz to quickly begin handling "lemon law" cases, and during her orientation, K. S was already accepting Maryland cases. Upon completing her one-month orientation in Pennsylvania, Katz was assigned over 50 cases to file in Maryland and authorized to manage a branch office with minimal supervision. However, the orientation period did not conclusively establish her competence to adequately represent clients. Respondents recognized the necessity of assessing an attorney's competency for supervision but failed to ensure Katz possessed the required skills, including experience in contested litigation and understanding of potential sanctions for discovery failures. In contrast, a precedent from Zuckerman highlighted that proper supervision is critical for newly hired employees, particularly when their reliability is unproven. Zuckerman's case involved a paralegal who misappropriated funds due to insufficient oversight after only a short tenure. The court determined that entrusting her with significant responsibilities without adequate supervision constituted a failure to meet professional obligations. Similarly, Respondents did not implement supervisory strategies for Katz, neglecting to account for their unfamiliarity with her reliability, work habits, and character. Although K. S contacted one of Katz's references, hiring her on the same day as the interview was deemed an insufficient measure of her suitability for the role. Katz's performance evaluation at K. S. revealed significant supervisory deficiencies. Her supervisor neither visited the Maryland office nor engaged in direct oversight; instead, Katz selected case files for review in Pennsylvania. Supervisory attorneys are required to ensure their subordinates meet ethical and professional standards, as outlined in MRPC 5.1(b). The practice of allowing attorneys to present only their best work for review undermines effective supervision. With Katz working in isolation, there was a pressing need for tailored supervisory strategies to ensure compliance with ethical rules. Katz was essentially tasked with self-supervision, which is problematic; the relevant case law supports the necessity for supervisors to actively monitor their employees' progress and follow up on delegated tasks. Katz's supervisors failed to conduct periodic audits or on-site visits, relying heavily on her self-reports regarding task completion. Her repeated requests for additional support in the Maryland office were ignored, and instead of addressing her concerns, supervisors merely reminded her of workload quotas. While some colleagues managed larger caseloads effectively, this did not excuse the lack of individualized supervision, which is crucial considering the specific demands of the work and Katz's relative inexperience. During her 13 months at K. S., Katz opened 461 new cases and managed over 500 matters, indicating an overwhelming workload that warranted more robust oversight and support from her supervisors. Weekly performance expectations for Katz included generating $10,000 in settlements and filing at least fifteen complaints, alongside managing court appearances and settlement negotiations. When Katz requested assistance, her supervisor responded with motivational communications rather than practical support. No one from the Maryland office provided help until significant issues arose, necessitating major damage control. To address the backlog, her supervisor mandated the creation of 30 demand letters weekly for his review, promising that this would enhance her performance and lead to additional staffing if successful. Despite her claims of needing immediate help, supervisors did not adequately address her concerns. The culture at K. S prioritized filing numbers, case turnover, and revenue, which overshadowed ethical obligations. MRPC 5.1 comments highlight that firm partners should recognize how corporate culture affects employee decisions, especially for new hires needing guidance to maintain ethics amidst profit pressures. Supervisors failed to balance these ethical considerations with the intense focus on revenue targets. An email from Katz's supervisor emphasized results over communication, further illustrating the lack of guidance on ethical practices. Despite multiple warnings signaling the need for better oversight, the firm did not implement adequate policies ensuring compliance with Maryland Rules. They also neglected to supervise the identification of deadlines properly, although they had an adequate system for tracking once deadlines were established, which was compromised by the remote office's staffing situation. Incoming pleadings, motions, and inquiries were directed to the Maryland office, where Katz managed their processing and data entry. Katz had the unilateral ability to bypass the firm’s deadline tracking system, which raised concerns about the adequacy of supervision. While a computerized file tracking system is essential for managing deadlines, merely having such a system does not fulfill the supervisors' obligation to ensure it is properly utilized. Had Katz adhered to the system, it would have highlighted missed deadlines for both her and the out-of-state office. Supervising attorneys cannot assume compliance with procedures by associate attorneys and must implement safeguards to prevent circumvention of accountability measures. In a specific instance, Katz was able to fabricate demand letters for dismissed cases, revealing a lack of oversight in verifying the legitimacy of her work. The firm's procedures did not include checks on the demand letters associated with untracked cases. Supervisors have a responsibility under legal rules to verify that delegated tasks are executed competently. Past cases illustrate that failure to follow up on delegated responsibilities can lead to significant issues, including embezzlement. In this instance, the firm failed to confirm whether Katz properly entered pending deadlines, allowing for potential procrastination or deliberate neglect of her duties. Respondents argued that reasonable supervision could not have prevented Katz's misconduct; however, Kimmel noted that upon his first visit to her office, he recognized disarray and signs of distress. Closer supervision from the beginning could have uncovered these issues earlier. Regardless of whether an employee's ethical lapses stem from incompetence or intentional evasion of procedures, effective supervision must include mechanisms to verify task completion. Respondents also claimed that support was available to Katz if she had been forthcoming about her case management, but ethical guidelines emphasize the importance of supervision in ensuring compliance. Partners in a law firm cannot assume that all lawyers will adhere to established ethical rules, particularly regarding case management and communication. The respondents were not justified in presuming that an associate would disclose her mishandled cases or follow proper procedures. In relation to MRPC 1.4, the respondents were required to communicate with a Maryland client, Carter, who sought updates on his case after the departure of attorney Katz. They argued that they were not vicariously responsible for communication since they were not the attorneys of record for Carter and were not licensed in Maryland, claiming direct contact would constitute an ethical breach. However, the firm had a duty to respond to Carter’s inquiries promptly, especially given the dysfunction of the Maryland office after Katz's resignation. Failing to ensure timely communication would undermine the responsibility of a law firm to its clients, as it would suggest that the firm could ignore client inquiries when cases are unassigned. The respondents, as firm managers, were accountable for the delay in response. Regarding sanctions, Maryland disciplinary proceedings aim to protect the public rather than punish attorneys. Sanctions should be proportional to the violation's severity. The respondents suggested a reprimand for failure to supervise under MRPC 5.1 and dismissal of the communication charge under MRPC 1.4, while Bar Counsel recommended an indefinite suspension. Past cases like Ficker and Mooney, where attorneys faced similar violations, resulted in indefinite suspensions, with specific timelines for potential reinstatement. Supervisory procedures at K. S were not as deficient as those in previous cases resulting in attorney sanctions, yet the harm to clients was significant. A reprimand was deemed appropriate in cases with lesser violations and no client harm, as established in *Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sapero*. Indefinite suspension aligns with sanctions imposed on Maryland attorneys for similar misconduct, as stated in *Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dechowitz*, which emphasizes case-specific circumstances while maintaining consistency in disciplinary actions. Mitigating factors include prior grievance history, likelihood of repeat misconduct, and remorse, highlighted in *Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Seiden*. The hearing judge acknowledged the "unusual circumstances" and pressures faced by Respondents after an abrupt resignation, noting their effective damage control measures, which included re-staffing, client outreach, and settling unresolved cases. Only one client, Carter, reported communication issues but was satisfied with the resolution. Despite the Respondents' efforts, a case cited (*Zuckerman*) resulted in indefinite suspension for an attorney who also acted to mitigate harm. The court considered the impact of its sanctions on potential reciprocal discipline in other jurisdictions. The court determined that indefinite suspension was warranted, but due to Respondents’ prompt recovery efforts, they may apply for reinstatement after 90 days. There are no known prior disciplinary actions against the Respondents, and a longer suspension period is not justified given the aim of protecting Maryland citizens. Attorneys not admitted to practice in Maryland, who do not wish to be admitted, must petition the Court of Appeals for "reinstatement," which is defined by Maryland Rule 16-701(j) as ending a suspension or exclusion from privileges related to practicing law in the state. If an out-of-state attorney is suspended for misconduct under the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC), their name is placed on a list of non-admitted attorneys barred from practicing law in Maryland, as outlined in Maryland Rule 16-760(k). Reinstatement is necessary to remove names from this list and does not require actual admission to the Maryland Bar, impacting future disciplinary actions in other jurisdictions. The court ordered the indefinite suspension of the Respondents, allowing them to apply for reinstatement after 90 days post-suspension, which takes effect 30 days after the court's mandate. The Respondents must also cover all costs associated with the proceedings, including the costs of transcripts, as mandated by Maryland Rule 16-515. The dissenting opinion noted that neither Respondent is admitted to practice in Maryland. Under MRPC Rule 8.5(a)(2), non-admitted lawyers are subject to Maryland’s disciplinary authority if they provide legal services or supervise lawyers practicing law in the state. Rules regarding supervisory responsibilities and communication with clients are detailed in MRPC 5.1 and MRPC 1.4, emphasizing the necessity for partners in law firms to ensure compliance with professional conduct standards and maintain client communication. MRPC 5.3(b) mandates that lawyers with supervisory authority over non-lawyers must make reasonable efforts to ensure the non-lawyer's conduct aligns with the lawyer's professional obligations. This obligation is akin to that under MRPC 5.1, which holds both the supervising and supervised attorneys accountable to the same professional conduct standards. The excerpt underscores the importance of the written code of professional conduct, implying that both lawyers and non-lawyers must adhere to these standards. The text references the complexity of determining appropriate suspension durations for attorney misconduct by comparing past cases. It critiques the dissenting opinion's reliance on prior cases, suggesting that it may not be a fair comparison due to differing circumstances and violations. Specifically, it highlights that the respondents in the current case were charged under MRPC 5.1(a) and (b), while the respondent in the Hines case violated MRPC 5.1(c), which addresses a partner's responsibility when aware of a junior attorney's misconduct. The cases of Ficker and Mooney are also examined, with Ficker's repeated disciplinary issues and multiple violations being noted as significant factors in the severity of his sanctions. The text concludes that, when evaluating the current case against prior cases, Mooney serves as a more relevant reference point than Hines or Ficker due to the differing nature and volume of the violations involved. Ultimately, the determination of a suitable suspension period requires careful consideration of the specifics of each case rather than a straightforward application of precedence. The dissent in Ficker v. K. S asserts that the majority inaccurately represents the hearing judge's findings regarding the Respondents' response to Katz’s misconduct. However, the hearing judge determined that K. S promptly organized its legal team, hiring three Maryland attorneys and reassigning Katz’s cases within two to four weeks. K. S actively worked to resolve client issues resulting from Katz's failures, contacting clients to update them on their cases and offering fair settlements, including consultations with counsel for former clients asserting claims. While the dissent criticizes K. S's handling of a complaint from former client Carter, the hearing judge recognized that K. S eventually resolved his case satisfactorily, despite initial delays in communication. The dissent claims a lack of factual support for the majority's conclusions, but the majority counters that K. S’s immediate corrective actions were evident and that they maintained sufficient staff in their Maryland office during the investigation. The Respondents demonstrated cooperation throughout the investigatory process and expressed deep regret for the harm caused, committing to making their clients whole and preventing future issues. The dissent, however, questions the sincerity of the Respondents' remorse based on the content of K. S’s website. The dissent interprets the K. S website from 29 July 2008 as indicating that the firm has only two "managing attorneys" across nine jurisdictions. However, this conclusion lacks a reliable basis, as the website visited on 1 August 2008 only refers to managing attorneys in the context of attorney biographies. Of the sixteen biographies available, only two mention the title of managing attorney; one is specifically for the Maryland office, while the other is described generically without linking to any jurisdiction. The content of the website appears to serve a marketing purpose and is not comprehensive, making it unreasonable to conclude that K. S operates with only two managing attorneys for all jurisdictions. The dissent is criticized for relying on this limited and unreliable source to challenge the Respondents’ representations in the record.