Court: Supreme Court of Kansas; April 4, 1980; Kansas; State Supreme Court
The court opinion, delivered by Judge Herd, addresses an appeal regarding the obscenity of the film "French Blue" and the cartoon "Sine," as determined by a jury. The jury found the defendant guilty of promoting obscenity concerning the cartoon but could not reach a verdict on the film, leading to the State dismissing those charges. The appeal centers on trial instructions related to the definition of "prurient interest" under K.S.A. 1978 Supp. 21-4301(2)(o). The court provided a specific instruction defining prurient interest as an unhealthy and degrading interest in sex, distinct from a healthy interest, and noted the importance of determining whether the material appeals to sexual desire. The State contested the trial court's refusal to adopt its proposed instruction equating prurient interest strictly with an appeal to sexual desire, arguing that recent legal developments have altered the definition. The appeal is limited to this aspect, with no challenge to other obscenity elements such as patent offensiveness or the absence of serious value. A historical context of obscenity regulation is provided, referencing key Supreme Court decisions, including Roth v. United States and Miller v. California, which have shaped the legal landscape and definitions of obscenity, ultimately leading to the current statute in question.
The term 'prurient' has been defined through various legal cases, particularly in Roth v. United States, which established a test for obscenity based on whether the dominant theme of material appeals to prurient interest, defined as having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts. The term 'prurient' is further characterized by definitions from Webster’s Dictionary, emphasizing morbid or lascivious longings. Additionally, Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission noted that motion pictures can evoke prurient interest, despite engaging wholesome themes.
The A.L.I. Model Penal Code defines obscenity similarly, stating that a work is obscene if its predominant appeal is to prurient interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it exceeds customary limits of candor. The appellant argues that the definitions imply a direct link between prurient interest and sexual desire, but the Model Penal Code authors reject this broad interpretation, citing the complexities of regulating thoughts or desires unconnected to behavior.
The Supreme Court found no discrepancies between the established case law definitions of obscenity and those in the Model Penal Code. Footnote 26 in Roth references prior cases that consistently interpret obscenity in alignment with prurient interest, including Walker v. Popenoe, which emphasized the potential for a work to arouse salacity, and United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, which clarified that works of science and literature that do not predominantly promote lustful thoughts are not considered obscene. The critical inquiry in each case is whether, when viewed as a whole, a publication has a libidinous effect.
In United States v. Dennett, the court addressed the definition of obscenity, concluding that a work is considered obscene if it has a significant tendency to deprave or corrupt its audience by inciting lewd thoughts or sexual desires. The assessment of obscenity revolves around whether the overall effect of a publication is to arouse sexual impulses, and if this effect outweighs any artistic value. Various terms linked to obscenity, such as "indecent," "immoral," and "scandalous," are defined in common terms, denoting content that is offensive, morally impure, or shocking to decency. The court emphasized that the dominant feature of a work should not merely serve to excite lust without any artistic intent. Additionally, it noted that while normal sexual desires are not inherently dangerous, obscenity could be suppressed if it leads to socially harmful sexual conduct. Ultimately, the court asserted that the determination of obscenity hinges on its potential to incite lewdness and the societal implications of such effects.
In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Melko, the court examined various legal precedents regarding the definition of "prurient interest" in the context of obscenity laws. It noted that the definitions encompass more than just sexual arousal, incorporating terms like salacious, lewd, and morally depraving. The court acknowledged a range of interpretations from prior cases, some focusing on arousal of sexual desire while others emphasized a more negative connotation, such as a morbid or unhealthy interest in sex. The court criticized materials that sensationalize sexuality for commercial gain, labeling them as appealing to prurient interests.
In analyzing the term "prurient interest," the court referenced Roth v. United States, concluding that representations of sexuality should not be deemed obscene unless they convey a shameful or debasing quality. It argued against the notion that the human body is inherently dirty or offensive, suggesting that doing so would implicate a wide array of everyday products. The court determined that the film in question did not exhibit the "leer of the sensualist" and therefore could not be classified as appealing to prurient interest.
The appellant claimed that later Supreme Court rulings indicated a shift in the definition of prurient interest, particularly with the introduction of "patent offensiveness" as a criterion for obscenity in Manual Enterprises v. Day. However, the court maintained that the core definition of prurient interest had not been fundamentally altered, despite the close relationship between the two tests. The appellant further argued that cases like Ginzburg v. United States and Mishkin v. New York reflected an evolving definition leaning towards mere sexual arousal, a position the court did not fully endorse.
The court found no definitive evidence that the element of prurient interest is limited to an appeal to sexual desire, despite cases lacking clear guidelines for future rulings. The court rejected the appellant's reliance on Cohen v. California and Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, noting that these cases do not directly address prurient interest. The State argued that the importance of prurient interest has diminished, now being defined as an appeal to sexual desire, a definition the appellant claims is integral to the modern obscenity test. However, the court clarified that the obscenity test has evolved since Roth v. United States but retains prurient interest as a critical element. The current test involves: (a) whether an average person, using contemporary community standards, finds the work appeals to prurient interest; (b) whether it depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner as defined by state law; and (c) whether it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The court emphasized that prurient interest encompasses more than mere sexual appeal. It argued that the appellant's definition could lead to excessive prosecutions for obscenity, adversely affecting First Amendment rights. The Kansas Legislature's choice to define obscenity using the term "prurient interest" rather than "sexual desire" was acknowledged, and the court upheld the trial court's instruction, denying the appeal.
