Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; January 4, 2007; Federal Appellate Court
Candidates for public office and voters, supported by organizations like the Democratic Party, are contesting a new Indiana law requiring individuals to present a government-issued photo ID to vote in person, asserting that it imposes an undue burden on the constitutional right to vote. The law includes specific exceptions for absentee voters and nursing home residents. Prior to this law, voters merely signed a poll book to vote in person. The new requirement is manageable for most, as many possess photo IDs, and individuals eligible for absentee ballots or residing in nursing homes are unaffected. However, concerns arise for those without photo IDs who are ineligible for absentee voting. To obtain a photo ID, individuals must present a birth certificate or naturalization certificate and proof of residency. Additionally, those without a photo ID can cast a provisional ballot and have 10 days to either file an affidavit of indigency or obtain an ID. The district court previously ruled in favor of the defendants regarding the law's validity.
Maneuvering in modern America often requires a photo ID, impacting voter participation due to Indiana's law, which may discourage some eligible individuals from voting. Many potential voters either do not register or fail to vote, with the perceived benefits of voting being minimal. Consequently, individuals without photo IDs may not make the effort to obtain one, and those who forget their IDs at polling places may choose not to return.
The demographic most affected by the lack of photo IDs tends to be economically disadvantaged, who generally lean Democratic based on exit polls indicating a correlation between income and political preference. The new law disproportionately burdens the Democratic Party, which must allocate resources to mobilize supporters who would otherwise be deterred from voting.
Legal standing for the Democratic Party is established to challenge the law, asserting injury due to these voting barriers, as minimal harm suffices for standing purposes. While the standing of other plaintiffs in the consolidated suits is less clear, only one plaintiff with standing is necessary for the sought injunctive relief, which is adequately provided by the Democratic Party's claim.
No plaintiff in the case intends to abstain from voting solely due to the new law, indicating that the law does not deter any voters. Some plaintiffs possess photo IDs and are thus unaffected, while others lack IDs but have not committed to voting if they had them. This suggests the motivation for the lawsuit stems from the law's requirement for organizations, like the Democratic Party, to exert more effort to mobilize supporters. The fewer individuals affected by the law, the less justification the state requires to uphold it.
The plaintiffs' argument that any burden on voting must meet strict scrutiny is countered by precedent, specifically Burdick v. Takushi, which states that all election laws impose some burden on voters; excessive scrutiny could hinder states' ability to conduct fair and efficient elections. This situation is distinct from cases involving discriminatory practices like poll taxes, as the Indiana law aims to combat voting fraud, which can dilute legitimate votes. The evidence presented by the plaintiffs regarding potential disenfranchisement was deemed unreliable by the district judge due to methodological flaws, supporting the conclusion that the law's impact is minimal.
Voting fraud through impersonation involves individuals presenting themselves at polling places as someone else—such as a deceased person or someone who has not yet voted. Without the requirement of a photo ID, the likelihood of preventing such fraud diminishes, as poll workers may not thoroughly check signatures or challenge individuals. Although voting fraud is criminalized in Indiana, with penalties including imprisonment and fines, there have been few prosecutions for impersonation, attributed to the underenforcement of minor crimes and the challenges in identifying impersonators. The process is complicated by the potential for impersonators to vote before their counterpart arrives or to be colluding with them.
Preventive measures, such as Indiana's photo ID law, are suggested as a solution to deter impersonation. While plaintiffs argue that voter impersonation is not a significant issue in Indiana due to a lack of reported cases, this absence may stem from selective investigation rather than an actual lack of fraud. The defendants' expert noted a substantial discrepancy of 1.3 million between registered voters and those eligible to vote in Indiana, indicating potential fraud. Despite uncertainty about the actual number of impersonations, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the new law disproportionately affects eligible voters compared to the potential for impersonation.
The plaintiffs argue that the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 mandates states to purge ineligible voters from registration rolls, but Indiana has not completed this process. The delay is due to requirements that necessitate notifying voters with changed addresses and allowing removal only if they do not respond and fail to vote in two consecutive federal elections. The plaintiffs contend that the Indiana law is underinclusive by not requiring photo IDs from absentee voters, complicating verification processes. The document emphasizes that election regulations are primarily the responsibility of states under the Constitution, cautioning against subjecting all electoral regulations to strict scrutiny, which could impede states' ability to manage elections. The judgment for the defendants is affirmed, with Circuit Judge Evans dissenting. Evans critiques the Indiana photo ID law as a tactic to reduce turnout among certain demographics and calls for stricter scrutiny, arguing that states should focus on enhancing voter participation rather than imposing restrictions.
The law in question is purportedly aimed at preventing voter fraud by requiring specific forms of photo identification at polling places. However, no historical evidence of such fraud exists in Indiana, and nationwide reports indicate minimal polling-place fraud. The law mandates that voters presenting insufficient identification must vote provisionally. Acceptable identification must include the voter's name matching their registration, a photo, an expiration date (not expired or expired since the last general election), and must be issued by the U.S. or Indiana.
Concerns arise regarding the law's implementation, particularly in identifying whether names on IDs conform to those on voter registration lists, especially in cases of name changes or misspellings. The law disproportionately impacts vulnerable populations, including the poor, elderly, minorities, and disabled individuals, many of whom may lack the required forms of ID. The difficulty of obtaining necessary documents, such as certified birth certificates, is highlighted, particularly for individuals with limited mobility or financial resources.
An anecdote illustrates the law's potential to disrupt even seasoned politicians, as Rep. Julia Carson was initially unable to vote due to the law despite having congressional identification. This suggests that many eligible voters may face barriers to participation, questioning the law's practicality and fairness.
Most issues with the voting system, such as inaccurate registration rolls and malfunctioning machines, indicate mismanagement rather than electoral fraud. There exists a tension between the fear of voter fraud and the risk of disenfranchisement. Indiana's law, which restricts acceptable identification to only a passport or Indiana ID, is excessively restrictive. The case of Burdick established that not all voting regulations are subject to strict scrutiny; instead, courts must balance the injury to voters' rights against the state's justifications for imposing such burdens. Burdick promotes a flexible standard, suggesting that strict scrutiny may be warranted when the burden on voting rights is significant and the state's justification weak. Applying a modified version of strict scrutiny, the author concludes that Indiana's law imposes an undue burden on eligible voters, violating their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Additionally, it is noted that Carson won her election and that a Republican governor was unable to vote due to ID issues.
