Luis F. Padilla v. Alberto R. Gonzales and Deborah Achim
Docket: 05-2697
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; December 7, 2006; Federal Appellate Court
Luis F. Padilla, a petitioner-appellant, faced removal from the United States due to two crimes of moral turpitude: criminal sexual abuse and obstruction of justice. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ordered his removal to Mexico, a decision that was upheld by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 2005. Subsequently, Padilla sought to vacate his convictions in an Illinois state court, arguing his guilty pleas were invalid under a new Illinois law requiring defendants to be informed of potential immigration consequences before accepting a guilty plea. The Illinois court granted his motion to vacate on March 11, 2005. Instead of asking the BIA to reopen his case based on the vacated convictions, Padilla filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, seeking to be declared admissible and to terminate removal proceedings. The district court denied his petition, leading to Padilla's appeal to the Seventh Circuit. Under the REAL ID Act of 2005, the court recharacterized the appeal as a petition for review but concluded it lacked jurisdiction due to Padilla's failure to exhaust administrative remedies, resulting in the dismissal of the petition.
Padilla was granted permission to withdraw his guilty pleas and vacate convictions for sexual abuse and obstruction of justice by a handwritten court order. The rationale for vacating convictions from 1989 and 1991 based on a law effective in January 2004 was not explained. Following the vacated convictions, Padilla petitioned the Northern District of Illinois for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking a declaration of admissibility to the U.S. and an order for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to halt his removal. As his removal date approached, the court held hearings regarding the necessity of having the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reconsider Padilla's case due to the vacated convictions. It was established that Padilla would need to file a motion with the BIA to reopen his case, although the ninety-day filing period had expired; however, government consent could allow for a late filing.
On May 9, the day before Padilla's scheduled removal, the government informed the court that it would not join Padilla's motion to reopen. Although the government noted that Padilla could request the BIA to reopen his case on its own initiative, Padilla faced an imminent 12:00 p.m. surrender time, and he ultimately did not file a motion. The district court upheld the BIA's removal order as valid despite the state court vacating Padilla's convictions, leading to the denial of his habeas petition and motion to stay removal. A subsequent motion to reconsider was also denied. On May 11, 2005, President Bush signed the REAL ID Act of 2005, which retroactively applied jurisdictional changes to Padilla’s case. Padilla filed a notice of appeal on June 9, after being removed to Mexico by DHS.
The REAL ID Act mandates that district courts transfer pending habeas petitions challenging final orders of removal to the courts of appeals, treating them as petitions for review. While Congress did not specify the treatment of habeas petitions pending on appeal at the time of the Act's enactment, several circuits have concluded that such claims should also be considered petitions for review, aligning with Congress's intent for the courts of appeals to be the sole forum for these challenges. Consequently, regardless of whether Padilla's habeas petition was pending in the district court or on appeal when the Act took effect, it is construed as a petition for review of the BIA's removal order. The REAL ID Act retroactively removed the district court's jurisdiction over Padilla's claims and nullified its ruling on his habeas petition.
Jurisdiction for reviewing final orders of removal is contingent upon the alien exhausting all available administrative remedies. The government argues that Padilla failed to exhaust these remedies since he did not request the BIA to reopen his case regarding his vacated convictions. Padilla contends that reopening is not available "as of right" because it lies within the BIA's discretion, thus § 1252(d)(1) does not apply. Although the statute does not define "as of right," it generally refers to claims that the BIA can consider and for which it can grant meaningful relief. A claim is deemed available "as of right" if it falls within the BIA's jurisdiction and the agency can provide the requested remedy. Exhaustion is not required for due process claims since the BIA lacks jurisdiction over constitutional issues. The BIA can reopen Padilla's case at any time and could grant relief if his vacated convictions invalidated the removal order. Therefore, § 1252(d)(1) is applicable, and Padilla was required to allow the BIA to address his arguments before seeking judicial review.
Padilla cannot point to any case where a court of appeals exercised jurisdiction over issues not previously presented to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). He relies on Panjwani v. Gonzales, which states that motions to reopen are not guaranteed remedies, as the BIA has wide discretion to grant or deny them. However, in Panjwani, the petitioner submitted a motion to the BIA, while Padilla did not allow the BIA to consider his arguments regarding his vacated convictions. The case of Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft further illustrates this point; the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court’s habeas corpus ruling because the petitioner had not raised his claims before the BIA. Although filing a motion to reopen is not always mandatory, an alien must present their issues to the BIA to exhaust administrative remedies. In Padilla's case, the BIA's earlier removal order was upheld, and since he did not raise the issue of his vacated convictions with the BIA, there is no agency ruling for the court to review. The BIA could have reopened Padilla's case at any time, but he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, leading to a lack of jurisdiction for the court to consider his arguments.
The district court's habeas ruling is deemed a nullity under the REAL ID Act, and Padilla's habeas appeal is reclassified as a petition for review. The court lacks jurisdiction to address Padilla's argument regarding the state court's vacatur order because it was not presented to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Consequently, the petition for review is dismissed. Relevant regulations include: 1) aliens must file a motion to reopen within ninety days of the final administrative decision, a limitation that can be waived with party consent; 2) the BIA can reopen or reconsider decisions at any time; and 3) the REAL ID Act restricts district court jurisdiction over removal order reviews, including habeas challenges under 28 U.S.C. 2241. Padilla's reference to Sewak v. INS is found inapplicable, as Sewak raised his issues before the BIA prior to seeking judicial review, unlike Padilla.
