Thomas Wayne Evenstad v. Terry L. Carlson

Citations: 470 F.3d 777; 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 29372; 2006 WL 3436142Docket: 05-1467

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; November 30, 2006; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Thomas Wayne Evenstad was convicted in Minnesota state court of first and third degree criminal sexual conduct for raping eighteen-year-old H.S. After his conviction on March 19, 1999, Evenstad's appeals, including a post-conviction relief petition, were denied by both the Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court. He subsequently sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which was dismissed by the district court. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a certificate of appealability on two issues but ultimately affirmed the district court's dismissal.

During the trial, H.S. testified that after encountering Evenstad on a chat line service, she met him and was sexually assaulted. Following the assault, H.S. sought out other potential victims, leading to the testimony of two witnesses, A.M.-1 and A.M.-2, who provided evidence of Evenstad's prior sexual misconduct. In his post-conviction relief petition, Evenstad claimed A.M.-2 had given false testimony and that the prosecution violated his due process rights by not disclosing exculpatory evidence as mandated by Brady v. Maryland.

At the post-conviction hearing, Evenstad presented testimony from Karen Whalen, who claimed to have heard A.M.-2 say her trial testimony was false. However, Whalen did not report this claim prior to the defense investigation. Another witness, J.A., who had initially reported Evenstad's rape, recanted her accusation during the hearing, admitting to inconsistencies in her statements and acknowledging that she had lied to the police. Despite J.A.'s prior allegations and identification of Evenstad, her testimony was not presented at trial, and Evenstad's defense counsel recognized her credibility issues.

The post-conviction court denied Evenstad relief, determining that Whalen's testimony, which claimed A.M.-2 testified falsely, did not justify a new trial. It applied the newly acquired evidence test from State v. Fedor and found Whalen's testimony to be "impeaching and doubtful," concluding it would not have altered the trial's outcome since A.M.-2 was one of two Spreigl witnesses. The court also ruled there was no Brady violation, asserting that even if evidence of J.A.'s alleged prompting had been suppressed, it would not have affected the trial's result.

Upon appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the post-conviction court's decision but identified an error in the application of the Rainer test, stating the Larrison test should have been used instead. Despite this, the appeals court deemed the error harmless, as both tests yielded similar results. It also upheld the finding of no Brady violation, concluding that there was not a reasonable probability that the jury would have distrusted the Spreigl witnesses if the suppressed evidence had been disclosed. Evenstad's petition for review to the Minnesota Supreme Court was denied.

Subsequently, Evenstad sought federal habeas corpus relief on claims of false trial testimony and a Brady violation, but the district court dismissed the petition. A certificate of appealability was granted only for his claims regarding A.M.-2's alleged false testimony and the withheld exculpatory evidence related to J.A. The review of these claims is limited by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which restricts federal courts to a deferential review of state court decisions unless those decisions contradict established federal law or are based on unreasonable factual determinations.

A state court decision is deemed "contrary to" established precedent if it applies a rule that conflicts with Supreme Court law or reaches a different outcome on materially similar facts. A decision is an "unreasonable application" of federal law if it identifies the correct legal standard but applies it unreasonably to the facts. For federal habeas relief, even an incorrect application must be objectively unreasonable. Under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2), a state court's factual determinations are unreasonable only if not supported by the evidence presented. 

Evenstad contends the state courts mismanaged Ms. Whalen's post-conviction testimony, claiming errors in applying state law resulted in due process violations. Specifically, he asserts that the post-conviction court improperly relied on the Rainer test and that the Minnesota Court of Appeals wrongly deemed this reliance harmless. He seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) and (2). 

However, federal courts lack authority to review state law interpretations, as federal habeas corpus relief does not address state law errors. The review is limited to whether state court decisions were contrary to or unreasonably applied established federal law as interpreted by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court’s precedent must be identified, focusing on its holdings rather than dicta. Evenstad fails to cite any relevant Supreme Court case to substantiate his claims, resulting in the rejection of his petition.

Evenstad fails to present Supreme Court authority to support his claim and acknowledges that the prosecution was unaware of the false testimony from A.M.-2 during the trial. The Supreme Court has not resolved whether a due process violation occurs from a conviction based on unknowingly perjured testimony. There exists a split among federal circuits regarding the applicable standard in such cases, which means the law is not "clearly established" under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Most circuits, including the one in question, require the petitioner to demonstrate that the false testimony could likely have led to an acquittal, a standard Evenstad does not argue was misapplied by state courts.

Evenstad's appeal centers on Minnesota state law, specifically his claim that the Minnesota Courts of Appeals improperly applied state law by not utilizing the less stringent Larrison test for false testimony. However, the court asserts it lacks the authority under AEDPA to address this matter. 

Additionally, Evenstad alleges that the state suppressed evidence related to J.A.'s identification of him in violation of Brady v. Maryland. Under Brady, the prosecution must disclose evidence favorable to the accused that is material to guilt or punishment, regardless of the prosecution's intent. This includes evidence that undermines the credibility of government witnesses. For Brady violations, materiality is established if there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed had the evidence been disclosed, with "reasonable probability" defined as one that undermines confidence in the trial's outcome.

Materiality of impeachment evidence is assessed by weighing the evidence's strength and the witness's significance to the defendant's guilt. In cases cited, such as Clay v. Bowersox and Lingle v. Iowa, the courts found that the impeachment value was negligible when the witness's credibility was already undermined or when the conviction was not solely reliant on that witness's testimony. 

The state contends that materiality is a factual question deserving of a presumption of correctness, but it has been established that materiality under Brady is a mixed question of law and fact, which does not receive such presumption.

In this case, Evenstad claims that suppressed evidence regarding the J.A. incident was favorable and materially impactful, suggesting it would have significantly impeached Officer Roberts and potentially affected the credibility of all state witnesses. He argues that since J.A. indicated her identification of him was improperly prompted, similar misconduct must have occurred in other lineups conducted by Officer Roberts.

However, the district court found the evidence concerning Officer Roberts' alleged prompting to be non-material, a determination upheld in this review. J.A. had substantial credibility issues, having recanted her allegations prior to trial, which led to the state dropping those charges. Defense counsel acknowledged her credibility problems, and she only testified about the prompting during post-conviction proceedings, admitting to multiple lies throughout the investigation. 

The sole potential value of the "improper prompting" evidence would be to impeach Officer Roberts, who conducted photographic lineups that were corroborated by other witnesses, A.M.-1 and A.M.-2. While Officer Roberts was important, her impeachment would not likely have altered the trial's outcome, as Evenstad's conviction was primarily based on his offense against H.S., independent of Officer Roberts' testimony. Thus, the evidence's weak impeachment value and limited impact on the case led to the conclusion that it is not material under Brady, negating the need to address whether the evidence was suppressed. Consequently, the district court's denial of habeas relief and dismissal of Evenstad's 2254 petition is affirmed.

The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, U.S. District Judge for Minnesota, adopted the recommendations of Magistrate Judge Raymond L. Erickson. In Minnesota, prior bad acts are referred to as Spreigl evidence, governed by Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b), and witnesses testifying about such acts are identified as Spreigl witnesses. A new trial may be warranted under the Rainer test if: 1) the evidence was unknown to the defendant or counsel during the trial; 2) it could not have been discovered through due diligence beforehand; 3) it is not cumulative or doubtful; and 4) it would likely result in an acquittal or better outcome. Conversely, the Larrison test allows for a new trial if: 1) there is reasonable belief that a key witness's testimony was false; 2) the jury might have reached a different conclusion without that testimony; and 3) the party seeking the new trial was surprised by the false testimony. Evenstad's claim for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2) lacks merit, as he does not contest the state courts' factual findings nor specify objections; his argument focuses solely on state law application, leading to a review limited to 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). Most circuits require a petitioner to demonstrate a "probably" different verdict due to perjury, while Minnesota courts apply a "possibility" standard, allowing for relief if newly discovered evidence could "might" have resulted in an acquittal.