Christopher Skinner v. A. Peter Govorchin

Citations: 463 F.3d 518; 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 23678; 2006 WL 2661092Docket: 05-2458

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; September 18, 2006; Federal Appellate Court

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Christopher Skinner, while incarcerated at Macomb Correctional Facility, filed a complaint against four state employees—Peter Govorchin, Hugh Wolfenbarger, Linda Wittman, and Doug Ford—claiming wrongful garnishment of appellate costs from his prison account. The district court dismissed the complaint, prompting Skinner to appeal pro se. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case and issued a mixed ruling: affirming some parts, reversing others, and remanding for further proceedings.

Skinner's previous litigation included a 2001 Section 1983 complaint concerning the wrongful seizure of his electronic publications, which resulted in a summary judgment for the defendants, upheld by the appellate court in 2003. Following that case, Govorchin submitted a bill for appellate costs totaling $1,619.25, which Skinner did not contest. The appellate court mandated this amount be awarded to the State, leading to actions by Wittman and Ford to collect the costs from Skinner's prison account, ultimately withdrawing nearly all his funds monthly.

Skinner's complaint alleged violations of various federal constitutional rights, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and state law. The defendants moved to dismiss or seek summary judgment, which the district court granted based on a magistrate judge's recommendations. The appellate court found that the garnishment complied with Rule 39 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which allows the taxation of costs against the appellant unless otherwise ordered. The court outlined the process for assessing costs, emphasizing the procedural requirements for filing and objecting to cost requests.

The State, as the prevailing appellee, was entitled to request costs, and the court's award aligned with Rule 39(d). On November 4, 2003, the appellate panel dismissed Skinner's arguments, after which the State filed an itemized and verified bill of costs on November 12, 2003. Skinner failed to object to this bill within the required ten-day period and did not raise the issue until eleven months later; the court did not extend the objection period. Skinner alleges that the costs awarded violated the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which states that a judgment against a prisoner must explicitly include the payment of costs. Skinner argues that since the costs were awarded after the judgment, they do not meet this requirement. He references the case Feliciano v. Selsky, where the court held that unless a judgment explicitly includes costs, a prisoner in forma pauperis cannot be charged costs, as the appellate rules allow for costs only if the law does not provide otherwise.

The document critiques the interpretation of cost-awarding procedures under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) as proposed by Skinner and Feliciano. It argues that the PLRA does not supersede the traditional cost-awarding processes outlined in Rule 39(d), as indicated by its language stating that costs may be rendered "as in other proceedings." This suggests that the PLRA is meant to create specific rules for indigent prisoners regarding the payment of costs rather than altering the established procedures. 

The excerpt further contends that Skinner's reliance on specific wording in the PLRA lacks a solid basis for changing the established norms, since the term "judgment" does not exclude other forms of court orders from which costs may arise. It argues that the PLRA does not indicate an intention by Congress to restrict cost awards to only those included in formal judgments. 

Additionally, the critique highlights the impracticality of Skinner's interpretation, which would require courts to determine cost imposition at the time of rejecting a claim rather than allowing the prevailing party to decide later whether to seek costs. This could disproportionately disadvantage indigent prisoners, who may face costs even when the prevailing party (often the State) chooses not to seek them. 

The document concludes that there is little benefit to indigent prisoners from this interpretation, as it does not necessarily favor them in the long term, and suggests that states typically do not pursue cost awards against inmates, possibly due to the minimal amounts involved compared to the costs of collection.

States have the ability to seek costs when desired, and Skinner's proposed rule does not provide benefits to the courts, which are better equipped to handle contested motions rather than abstract cost awards. The document emphasizes that provisions should be interpreted consistently with Rule 39(d) to avoid complications. Skinner's challenge to the cost award is dismissed because he did not object within the required 10-day period, allowing the State's request to be granted in line with Rule 39. However, his challenge regarding the State's collection of those costs is upheld. The PLRA established specific procedures for collecting costs from prisoners appealing in forma pauperis, which allows the State to collect costs in monthly increments of 20% of the prisoner's income, as stated in 28 U.S.C. 1915(b)(2). The State's action of withdrawing 100 monthly from Skinner's account is deemed illegal. Furthermore, Skinner's request for an injunction against this practice does not violate the Tenth or Eleventh Amendments. The case is remanded to the district court to order the State to comply with the 20% collection rate for the costs award.

Skinner seeks monetary relief against Assistant Attorney General Govorchin for the improper garnishment of funds from his prison trust account under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, targeting both his official and individual capacities. The official-capacity claim is barred by the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, as it seeks recovery from the state, which is the real party in interest. The precedent set in Edelman v. Jordan and Ford Motor Company v. Indiana Department of Treasury establishes that federal courts cannot entertain suits for reimbursement from state officials unless the state consents. Additionally, Skinner’s claim for individual-capacity relief is not obstructed by sovereign immunity; however, it is subject to prosecutorial immunity, which protects state attorneys from § 1983 liability for actions taken within their official duties. The doctrine of prosecutorial immunity, reaffirmed in Imbler v. Pachtman, extends to decisions made in prosecution and other related duties, covering both criminal and civil proceedings where the attorney acts in an enforcement role.

Prosecutorial immunity hinges on whether a prosecutor's actions are advocacy-related. If actions do not stem from their role as an advocate, only qualified immunity applies. In this case, the district court correctly determined that Govorchin's actions were closely linked to the judicial phase and therefore entitled to absolute immunity, as his pursuit of costs in Skinner v. Jones was a fundamental advocacy act typical of an attorney's role in litigation.

Skinner's claims against Wolfenbarger were dismissed appropriately. He alleged Wolfenbarger inadequately responded to his grievance appeal and failed to supervise other prison employees. However, the district court found these claims legally insufficient. Specifically, the grievance appeal denial does not constitute a valid claim under the law, as established in Shehee v. Luttrell and Martin v. Harvey. Additionally, Skinner could not hold Wolfenbarger liable based solely on supervisory status due to the absence of respondeat superior liability under Section 1983.

The decision affirms in part, reverses in part, and remands for further proceedings as detailed in the opinion.