Jose Medina v. David Diguglielmo the District Attorney of the County of Philadelphia the Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania
Docket: 05-3147
Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; August 31, 2006; Federal Appellate Court
David Diguglielmo, the District Attorney of Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Attorney General appeal a District Court order granting habeas corpus relief to state prisoner Jose Medina under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Medina was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The District Court found that Medina's trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging the competency of a twelve-year-old witness, Marcos Toro, and deemed the state court's affirmation of the conviction an unreasonable application of federal law.
The Commonwealth argues that the District Court erred in assuming that all reasonable attorneys would have contested Toro's competency and claims that Medina was not prejudiced by the lack of such a challenge. The Appeals Court intends to reverse the District Court's order, asserting that Medina did not demonstrate any prejudice from his counsel's actions.
During the preliminary hearing, Toro testified about encountering Medina, who displayed a knife and threatened to kill someone. Toro initially stated he witnessed Medina stab the victim, William Bogan, but later clarified that he did not directly see the act and relied on his brother's account. The prosecution's examination revealed that Toro felt intimidated by Medina's family present in the courtroom, leading to concerns about his testimony's reliability.
Marcos Toro, a 12-year-old witness, was questioned about his understanding of truth and lies during a trial presided over by Judge Juanita Kidd Stout. Despite being deemed "precocious" by Judge Margiotti, there was no motion for a competency hearing regarding his age or inconsistent responses. The Commonwealth established a prima facie case, leading to Mr. Medina being held for trial.
Prior to jury selection, Assistant District Attorney Carol Sweeney expressed concerns about the emotional state of Marcos and his brother Hector, noting that they appeared nervous but composed until the presence of the defendant's family caused Marcos to become visibly upset and express fear of testifying. Sweeney requested the defendant's family be excluded from the courtroom during their testimony, a motion supported by Mr. Daly, Mr. Medina's attorney.
During direct examination, Marcos struggled to articulate the difference between truth and lies, failing to provide clear answers when asked about what would happen if he lied. When asked if he wanted to be there, he admitted he did not, and when queried about fear, he responded affirmatively. The court urged him to communicate more comfortably, but he continued to show difficulty in understanding the questions, ultimately stating he did not know what Sweeney was referring to when asked about an incident involving a "white dude."
Mr. Daly did not contest the competency of witness Marcos Toro during his testimony. Toro, who had known Mr. Medina since childhood, stated he saw Medina in a "Chinese store" but initially did not respond when asked what occurred afterward. ADA Sweeney requested a sidebar and proposed that ADA Ponterio, who had handled the preliminary hearing, question Toro, which Judge Stout allowed. After resuming the examination, Toro testified he witnessed Medina show a "Rambo" knife and later stab a white man in the chest, noting no one approached the victim afterward.
During the examination, when asked if he could read a police statement, Toro did not respond, though he indicated he signed each page. Following a recess, ADA Sweeney checked on Toro's well-being, prompting concern for his health, which led Judge Stout to call for medical assistance. After reconvening, Toro mentioned hearing the victim say he would pay the next day and saw Medina searching the victim's pockets after he fell.
Mr. Daly's cross-examination highlighted inconsistencies in Toro's testimony from the preliminary hearing, focusing on Toro's admissions that he did not directly witness the stabbing but assumed it based on seeing the knife. Daly's questioning emphasized that Toro's statements about the stabbing were either based on what his brother told him or speculative assumptions. Throughout, Toro maintained that he did not intend to lie and believed he was assisting the police during his initial statements.
Marcos Toro testified that he believed Harry was responsible for a stabbing, although he admitted he did not actually see the incident. During redirect examination, he affirmed he did not fabricate his account, directly naming Harry as the assailant. Following the trial, Mr. Medina was convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, and possession of criminal instruments, receiving a life sentence after the jury deadlocked on the penalty phase.
On appeal, Medina contended that the trial court wrongfully allowed testimony from two pre-teen boys, claimed ineffective assistance from his counsel for failing to challenge the boys' competency, and asserted that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the conviction, emphasizing that circumstantial evidence, including Medina's presence at the crime scene, possession of a similar knife, and behavior after the stabbing, warranted a guilty verdict. The court acknowledged potential merit in Medina's claim of ineffective counsel regarding the competency of the witness Michael Toro and ordered an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
During the hearing, Mr. Daly, Medina's attorney, explained his decision not to object to Michael Toro's competency, stating he found Toro competent after reviewing prior testimony. He aimed to assess Toro's demeanor during the trial and believed that his previous inconsistencies could benefit their defense strategy. Daly confirmed that he evaluated Toro's ability to perceive, recall, communicate, and understand the oath, concluding that Toro met the competency criteria.
Mr. Daly articulated his trial strategy aimed at undermining the credibility of witness Michael Toro through cross-examination, specifically by utilizing preliminary hearing notes to highlight inconsistencies in Toro's testimony. This approach appeared effective during the trial, as Toro's statements shifted between supporting the prosecution and the defense, which Daly believed helped create reasonable doubt. Subsequently, Judge Stout expressed intent to deny Mr. Medina's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, evidenced by a handwritten court entry, yet no formal order was issued. Following Judge Stout's death, Judge Legrome D. Davis formally denied the motion in 1997. In Medina's second appeal, the Court of Common Pleas and later the Superior Court upheld the decision, asserting that trial counsel's tactical choices, though perhaps erroneous in hindsight, were not devoid of a reasonable basis. Medina pursued relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act in 2001, which was dismissed and affirmed by the Superior Court in 2003. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court later denied his appeal. Medina then filed for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, raising six claims related to ineffective assistance of counsel, including failures to challenge witness competency, introduce medical evidence, and address judicial admonishments, as well as prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments.
Mr. Medina's pro se petition was identified by his appointed counsel as presenting five claims: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not challenging the competency of the Toro brothers; (2) violation of federal due process rights due to the trial court's failure to conduct a sua sponte inquiry into the Toro brothers' competency; (3) ineffective assistance for failing to introduce medical records; (4) ineffective assistance for not objecting to improper prosecutorial comments; and (5) ineffective assistance related to the trial court's admonishments of counsel in front of the jury. The District Court noted that the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation overlooked Medina's claim regarding the due process violation from the lack of a competency inquiry. Since neither party objected to this characterization nor did Medina contest it in his objections, the District Court did not assess the due process implications. According to Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the court is not obligated to review a magistrate judge’s oversight de novo if no objections are raised. Medina did not argue that his federal due process rights were breached by the absence of a competency hearing, nor did he file a protective cross-appeal regarding this issue, leading to the conclusion that this claim was abandoned. The District Court granted Medina's habeas corpus petition on June 2, 2005, determining that the state court's dismissal of the ineffectiveness claim regarding counsel's failure to object to competency was an unreasonable application of federal law. The court found this failure prejudicial, suggesting that without Marcos Toro's testimony, the jury might have had reasonable doubt about Medina's guilt. The Commonwealth appealed, asserting that the District Court erred in finding Mr. Daly's representation ineffective for not challenging Marcos Toro's competency. The appeal is governed by 28 U.S.C. 1291 and 2253(c)(1)(A), which limit granting habeas corpus relief to claims that have been adjudicated on their merits in state court unless they meet specific criteria regarding federal law or factual determinations.
A federal habeas court can grant a writ if a state court's legal conclusion contradicts that of the Supreme Court or if it resolves a case differently on materially similar facts. Additionally, a writ may be granted if the state court correctly identifies the legal principle but applies it unreasonably to the facts of the prisoner's case. For a writ to issue, the state court's application of federal law must be objectively unreasonable. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are assessed under a two-pronged test from Strickland v. Washington: a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced the defense. The defendant must show a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for the errors made by counsel.
The competency of a witness under fourteen years of age in Pennsylvania law was established in Rosche v. McCoy, which set a presumption of competency for those over fourteen and required a judicial inquiry for those younger, focusing on their ability to communicate, observe, remember, and understand the duty to tell the truth. Although the burden of proving incompetency lies with the party asserting it, trial counsel failed to request a judicial inquiry into the competency of a child witness, constituting ineffective assistance.
Mr. Daly's justification for not objecting to Marcos Toro's competency was based on his belief, after reviewing Toro's preliminary hearing transcript, that the child was competent. However, Mr. Daly failed to pursue a competency hearing despite Toro's statement indicating a lack of understanding regarding truth and lies, which should have raised concerns about Toro's maturity and credibility. Mr. Daly claimed his strategy was to create reasonable doubt by highlighting inconsistencies in Toro's testimony, but this approach was deemed objectively unreasonable under Pennsylvania's professional standards for attorneys. The precedent set in *Commonwealth v. Mangini* established that counsel's failure to object to a witness’s competency in similar circumstances was ineffective, emphasizing that two valid strategies were available—challenging the witness's competency or cross-examining them. The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s ruling that Mr. Daly's strategy was reasonable, despite hindsight analysis, was determined to be an unreasonable application of the standards established in *Strickland*. Additionally, the Commonwealth’s argument that the trial judge’s ruling of competence justified Mr. Daly’s inaction was rejected.
Judge Margiotti assessed Marcos Toro as "precocious" but did not allow the child to answer whether he understood the difference between truth and lies, which is required under Pennsylvania law per Rosche. No thorough inquiry into Toro's mental capacity was documented before this conclusion. At trial, Toro stated he did not know the difference between truth and lies, indicating a competent attorney should have requested a hearing on his ability to testify.
Mr. Medina's appeal examines if there’s a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different without his counsel's errors, referring to the Strickland standard. Despite the absence of Toro's testimony, compelling circumstantial evidence existed to support Medina’s conviction.
Key witness Hector Toro, age seven at the time, testified that he encountered Mr. Medina carrying a large "Rambo" knife and heard him say he would kill someone. Hector had known Medina for years, making mistaken identity unlikely. After their encounter, Hector heard a commotion and later saw a man lying on the ground.
Maria Caraballo, another prosecution witness, observed a white man running while holding his chest and later saw Medina acting erratically near a car. She recognized the deceased man as Mr. Bogan.
Police Officer Robert Fetters testified that he and his partner were searching for a suspect following reports of a person with a knife in a white sweatshirt. They encountered Mr. Medina wearing such a sweatshirt at a nearby intersection but found no weapons or evidence linking him to the reported crime. After a brief stop, they released him, during which he explained he was preparing money for a birthday card. Following this, Officer Fetters witnessed a police response to a man lying in the street.
Officer Fetters and his partner observed Mr. Medina at a bar, noticing he had removed his white sweatshirt, which was unsoiled, suggesting an effort to evade police scrutiny related to reports of a "hospital case" involving a man in a white sweatshirt with a knife. Officer Grieco, responding to a dispatcher call, was assisted by local boys, including Marcos and Hector Toro, in locating Mr. Bogan’s body, which was discovered on the sidewalk, face down, with no pulse and empty pockets, except for a driver's license found on his back. Officer Harris confirmed the lack of personal belongings and that a rescue unit was summoned, but neither Mr. Bogan's wallet nor the murder weapon was recovered.
Assistant Medical Examiner Edwin Lieberman conducted Mr. Bogan's autopsy, determining death resulted from a single stab wound to the chest, penetrating six inches deep, likely caused by a six-inch single-edged knife. A triangular abrasion near the wound suggested the knife was inserted deeply. This finding aligned with Hector Toro's estimate of the blade's length.
Defense witness Ephraim Torres testified to knowing Mr. Medina for two years and described him as a peaceful, law-abiding citizen. It was noted that Medina's mother would corroborate this reputation if called. Medina chose not to testify, affirming that his decision was voluntary, despite being informed of his constitutional right to do so. The District Court determined that without Marcos's testimony—who was the sole witness to the stabbing—there was a reasonable probability the jury would not have convicted Medina.
The District Court's ruling failed to consider the implications of other witness testimonies, particularly Hector Toro's, which, alongside circumstantial evidence, supported the inference that Mr. Medina acted on his threat to kill with a "Rambo" knife. The trial court clarified to the jury that while proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's identity is crucial for conviction, it can be based on circumstantial evidence rather than direct evidence. The jury was instructed that prior inconsistent statements from witnesses could be evaluated for credibility and substantive truth. During cross-examination, defense attorney Mr. Daly cast doubt on Marcos Toro's credibility due to significant inconsistencies in his testimony, particularly regarding his claims of witnessing the stabbing. Marcos admitted he did not see Mr. Medina stab the victim, indicating his brother was the actual witness. Hence, the jury was permitted to disregard Marcos's testimony and consider the circumstantial evidence, including Mr. Medina's prior statement about intending to kill someone shortly before the stabbing. The court concluded that Mr. Daly's failure to request a competency hearing did not prejudice the outcome, affirming the District Court's decision regarding ineffective counsel but reversing its order for habeas corpus relief, determining that Mr. Medina was not harmed by the trial counsel's performance. No issues regarding Hector Toro's competency were raised on appeal.
