United States v. Jorge Mejia

Citations: 461 F.3d 158; 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 21428; 2006 WL 2411384Docket: 05-3903-

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; August 22, 2006; Federal Appellate Court

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Jorge Mejia appeals a 37-month sentence for illegal reentry after deportation due to an aggravated felony, asserting that the sentencing court erred by not considering a potential lesser sentence available in districts with 'fast-track' programs. Mejia argues that this discrepancy creates an unjust sentencing disparity under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(6). The background reveals that Mejia legally immigrated to the U.S. in 1980, faced murder charges in 1997 but was convicted on lesser charges, and was deported to Mexico in 2002 after serving time. He illegally reentered the U.S. in August 2004, claiming he intended to visit briefly to check on his daughter. He was arrested shortly thereafter for attempted theft and remained in state custody until federal charges for illegal reentry were filed on September 29, 2004, leading to his subsequent federal indictment. The court ultimately affirmed Mejia's sentence.

On February 8, 2005, Mejia pled guilty to illegal reentry. At his sentencing hearing on July 14, 2005, he acknowledged a Guidelines sentence of 46 to 57 months but presented five arguments for a non-Guidelines sentence: 1) his sympathetic motivation to reunite with a lost child; 2) the claim that the Guidelines improperly double-counted his criminal history; 3) that fast-track programs in other districts created unwarranted sentencing disparities under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6); 4) that the Guidelines did not account for time served in state custody; and 5) that he would face additional immigration custody post-sentence. The district court rejected all arguments except the fourth, ultimately imposing a 37-month non-Guidelines sentence to reflect Mejia's time in state custody.

The district court determined that there was no unwarranted sentencing disparity in Mejia's case, asserting that fast-track programs are exercises of prosecutorial discretion, as supported by United States v. Stanley. The court emphasized that the principle of prosecutorial discretion remains valid post-Booker. 

Fast-track programs began in the Southern District of California to manage overwhelming illegal reentry cases, where defendants could receive a 24-month sentence in exchange for waiving rights such as indictment and appellate review. Other districts adopted similar programs offering plea agreements for reduced sentences. In 2003, Congress endorsed these programs in the PROTECT Act, which directed the Sentencing Commission to authorize downward departures for early disposition programs. Consequently, U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1 was established, allowing downward departures upon the government's motion in accordance with authorized early disposition programs.

On September 24, 2003, Attorney General Ashcroft outlined criteria for obtaining authorization for 'fast-track' programs, which include: (A) a district facing a high volume of specific offenses that would strain resources if not expedited, or other exceptional local circumstances justifying expedited case handling; (B) the unavailability or unwarranted nature of state prosecution for those cases; (C) a specific class of cases characterized by highly repetitive and similar fact patterns; and (D) exclusion of cases involving offenses designated as 'crimes of violence.' Upon receiving authorization, the district can implement the program as directed by the United States Attorney, incorporating features such as expedited disposition, waivers of pre-trial motions, appeals, and the right to habeas corpus. These programs are based on the premise that defendants agreeing to participate save government resources and demonstrate a higher acceptance of responsibility. Thirteen federal districts currently have 'early disposition' or 'fast-track' programs for illegal reentry cases, while the Southern District of New York has significantly more illegal reentry cases than some of those with existing programs, although it is unclear why it has not sought such a program. The court reviews sentences under United States v. Booker for 'reasonableness,' interprets Federal Sentencing Guidelines de novo, and evaluates factual findings for clear error.

Prior to the Booker decision, courts were restricted from granting downward departures in sentencing to account for the absence of fast-track programs. In *United States v. Bonnet-Grullon*, the Second Circuit affirmed that the Guidelines did not permit such departures, specifically referencing disparities resulting from prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions between different districts. The opinion noted that disparities created by prosecutorial discretion were not "unwarranted" if they served the administration of justice. Similarly, in *United States v. Stanley*, the court upheld a sentencing disparity arising from plea-bargaining practices, reinforcing that prosecutorial discretion in charge selection is constitutionally valid.

Mejia's appeal argues that pre-Booker cases do not govern his situation, as both *Stanley* and *Bonnet-Grullon* focused on the Guidelines' limitations on downward departures, rendering their comments on plea-bargaining disparities as non-binding. Post-Booker, courts are required to evaluate disparities not only through the lens of the Guidelines but also based on factors outlined in Section 3553(a), which emphasizes avoiding unwarranted disparities among similarly situated defendants.

The court found Mejia's argument flawed, as he equated the benefits of fast-track jurisdictions with his own situation without acknowledging the lack of a corresponding detriment. Congress has endorsed fast-track programs without mandating them, indicating that these programs do not lead to the unwarranted disparities prohibited by Section 3553(a)(6). The PROTECT Act allows for downward adjustments only under specific early disposition programs authorized by the Attorney General, emphasizing a legislative intent to limit courts' discretion in granting unauthorized downward departures.

Departures under fast-track programs are strictly limited to authorized programs, as confirmed by legislative history. Prior to the PROTECT Act, an amendment to the Child Abduction Prevention Act acknowledged that judicial authority could permit 'limited departures' in structured early disposition programs, specifically for offenses that place extraordinary strain on local resources. This amendment recognized potential sentencing disparities between fast-track jurisdictions and others but clarified that it did not authorize ad hoc downward departures in individual cases. The 2003 Sentencing Commission report indicated that the exclusive adoption of fast-track programs in certain jurisdictions could lead to unwarranted sentencing disparities, contradicting the Sentencing Reform Act’s aim to reduce such differences. The report noted that the Attorney General's approval of early disposition programs should enhance uniformity but warned that courts in districts without these programs might resort to downward departures to align sentences with those in fast-track jurisdictions, thereby undermining the PROTECT Act's goals. Consequently, Congress acknowledged that while fast-track programs may create discrepancies, these are a result of legislative choices aimed at specific policy goals, and thus a sentence cannot be deemed unreasonable solely due to the absence of an early disposition program in the district.

It is argued that, following the Booker decision, it remains unreasonable to impose a downward departure based on disparities between fast-track and non-fast-track jurisdictions, as Congress impliedly accepted such disparities in the PROTECT Act. The district court's sentence was deemed reasonable, even though Mejia may have received more lenient treatment in jurisdictions with high volumes of similar offenses. Various circuit courts support the position that a district court's decision not to adjust a sentence for a lack of a fast-track program does not render the sentence unreasonable. The judgment of the district court is affirmed, with the court also imposing three years of supervised release and a $100 special assessment.