United States of America, Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Peter Gotti, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, Anthony Ciccone, Also Known as Sonny, Richard Bondi, Richard G. Gotti, Primo Cassarino, Jerome Brancato, Peter Piacenti, Anna Eylenkrig, Thomas Lisi, Carmine Malara, Jerome Orsino, Frank Scollo, Vincent Nasso, Anthony Pansini, Jules R. Nasso, Salvatore Cannata

Citations: 459 F.3d 296; 180 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2199; 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 17430Docket: 04-2960-

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; July 12, 2006; Federal Appellate Court

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The case involves an appeal concerning the interpretation of the Hobbs Act following the Supreme Court's decision in *Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc.*, which clarified the requirements for establishing extortion. Defendants Peter Gotti, Richard G. Gotti, Anthony Ciccone, and Richard Bondi contended that this decision invalidated the Hobbs Act counts based on the extortion of intangible property rights. However, the court ruled that *Scheidler II* did not invalidate those counts, emphasizing that liability under the Hobbs Act requires proof that the defendant not only sought to deprive the victim of property rights but also aimed to obtain those rights for himself, which applies to both tangible and intangible property.

The court upheld the defendants' convictions against various challenges and remanded Ciccone's and Bondi's cases for resentencing under precedent cases, while also remanding Peter Gotti's case for reconsideration of sentencing. The government's cross-appeal regarding the district court's decision not to apply a leadership role enhancement to Peter Gotti's sentence was rejected. The underlying indictment included 68 counts related to the Gambino Family's corrupt influence over labor unions and businesses at Brooklyn and Staten Island piers, targeting a total of seventeen members and associates of the Gambino Family.

Four defendants-appellants were tried alongside three 'made members' of the Gambino Family, while ten other defendants pled guilty. The indictment included two primary counts of racketeering and racketeering conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d), with additional allegations specified in Counts 3-68. The defendants-appellants' convictions fell into fourteen categories, including various counts related to the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) and other entities, money laundering, gambling, and witness tampering.

In the ILA Counts, the indictment claimed that Gambino Family members, including defendant-appellant Ciccone, exerted control over the union through coercion to ensure organized crime associates secured key positions. This led to charges of extortion, wherein the defendants allegedly wrongfully acquired ILA positions, wages, benefits, and violated members' rights to free speech and democratic participation as protected by the Labor-Management Reporting Disclosure Act (LMRDA). Additionally, the defendants were accused of fraudulently depriving ILA members of their rights to economic benefits and the honest services of their elected officials.

Substantial evidence was presented at trial supporting the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) charges against George Barone, a member of the Genovese Organized Crime Family. Barone testified to a longstanding agreement between the Gambino and Genovese Families regarding control over ILA activities, with the Gambino Family managing Staten Island and Brooklyn, while the Genovese Family oversaw New York and New Jersey. In the late 1970s, Ciccone became the Gambino representative in charge of the waterfront and served as vice president of the ILA, effectively controlling local union officials. After serving time in prison from 1983 to 1990, Barone resumed his involvement in waterfront activities and found Ciccone still exercising influence over these operations.

Frank Scollo, former president of Local 1814 in Brooklyn, corroborated Barone's testimony, stating that Ciccone often dictated his actions and that he feared job loss if he disobeyed. Scollo concealed his relationship with Ciccone from union members and relayed Ciccone’s directives regarding elections at the July 2000 ILA convention. Scollo expressed frustration over a delegate's poor performance but felt he lacked authority to terminate him without Ciccone's consent. A wiretapped conversation revealed Ciccone advising Scollo on how to handle the situation, leading to the delegate's resignation.

Additionally, the MILA Counts involved a scheme by the Gambino and Genovese Families to manipulate the ILA's national health plan to secure a contract for GPP/VIP, a company partly owned by a Gambino associate, which had paid kickbacks. Ciccone was the sole defendant-appellant related to these counts.

Evidence presented at trial regarding the MILA scheme included testimony from David Tolan, the management co-chairman of MILA since 1997. Tolan explained that MILA was established in early 1997 as a national health plan for ILA members, with a Board of Trustees composed of eighteen management-side and eighteen union-side trustees. In 1997, the trustees sought proposals from twenty-two pharmaceutical benefit providers for a prescription drug benefit, receiving bids from all companies. GPP was ranked fifth, while Express Scripts topped the list. Tolan recommended excluding GPP due to perceived financial inadequacies and favoring Express Scripts; however, the union trustees opposed this and ultimately split the management of the contract between Express Scripts (south of Virginia) and GPP/VIP (north of Virginia), with GPP/VIP being led by Joel Grodman and co-defendant Vincent Nasso. 

After Express Scripts declined a requested audit, MILA exclusively engaged GPP/VIP for services. Tolan expressed concerns over GPP/VIP's cost-effectiveness, noting its greater expense compared to other providers. In 2001, GPP/VIP requested a substantial fee increase, prompting Tolan to initiate a new bidding process, in which Advance PCS submitted a bid significantly lower than GPP/VIP's. Initially, the trustees agreed to award the contract to Advance PCS, but the union trustees later imposed conditions and ultimately opposed it, favoring GPP/VIP instead. The management trustees escalated the issue to binding arbitration, resulting in a ruling in favor of Advance PCS. 

The government also presented evidence indicating certain ILA trustees' support for GPP/VIP was influenced by Ciccone, who was linked to organized crime. Testimony revealed that Vincent Nasso paid kickbacks to Ciccone, and Scollo, a union-side trustee, acknowledged Ciccone's interest in maintaining GPP's contract. Scollo also indicated Ciccone directed him to assist GPP when Advance PCS emerged as a competitor, but he refrained from disclosing Ciccone's ties to Nasso to other trustees. GPP/VIP maintained the lucrative pharmaceutical services contract from approximately 1997 until 2001.

Wiretap evidence presented by the government established a connection between defendants Nasso and Ciccone, highlighting kickbacks from Nasso to Ciccone. Notable conversations from March 26 and April 18, 2001, revealed Ciccone's need for funds to make a payment to Peter Gotti, the acting boss, and indicated Ciccone's control over the financial dealings concerning the MILA contract. Ciccone asserted his dominance in negotiations with Joel Grodman regarding payment terms and indicated that Grodman’s role was contingent on Ciccone's approval.

The indictment against Ciccone and Bondi included charges of conspiracy to extort and defraud Local 1 of the ILA by attempting to exert control over officials Steve Knott and Louis Saccenti. The allegations outlined efforts to deprive Local 1 members of their economic benefits, rights to free speech and democratic participation, and the expectation of honest services from elected officials, as protected under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). Testimony from Scollo, a former president of Local 1814, illustrated conflicts with Saccenti and the influence of Ciccone in local union matters, particularly regarding personnel decisions within Local 1.

Cassarino instructed Scollo to inform Knott to refrain from any actions until Ciccone had spoken to Saccenti. Scollo struggled to reach Knott and expressed ongoing tension with Saccenti, stemming from Saccenti's proposed changes at the Howland Hook Container Terminal, which Scollo believed would hinder operations for Local 1814. In a wiretapped conversation on February 26, 2001, Scollo reported to Cassarino that he instructed Decrescenzo to postpone changes until further notice from Ciccone. On March 8, Scollo conveyed that Saccenti misled Augie about resolving issues, labeling Saccenti a "liar." Tensions escalated in a June 27, 2001 conversation where Scollo relayed Saccenti's disruptive behavior, prompting Cassarino to express disbelief at Saccenti's authority. That same day, Ciccone ordered Cassarino to visit Saccenti's home to deliver a warning regarding his actions. An investigator testified to observing Cassarino and Bondi near Saccenti's residence that evening. Scollo acknowledged his lack of authority over Local 1 officials but admitted to occasionally influencing Saccenti’s activities through Ciccone and Cassarino.

The indictment included counts against Ciccone and others for conspiring to defraud Local 1814 members of their union positions, wages, benefits, and the right to honest services from their elected officials. Evidence, including wiretaps and testimony, demonstrated that Scollo took directives from Ciccone regarding Local 1814 matters. Additional counts alleged that Ciccone and others extorted cash from Carmine Ragucci, the owner of the Howland Hook Container Terminal, with Scollo recalling a conversation in which Ciccone indicated Ragucci would be sending cash envelopes to him for delivery to Ciccone.

Ragucci began giving Scollo envelopes containing cash for Ciccone approximately eight or nine months after an initial period. Scollo would either deliver these envelopes directly to Ciccone or to an intermediary, as instructed. On one occasion, Scollo helped Ragucci prepare an envelope with about $8,900 for Ciccone. Scollo was expected to collect these envelopes quarterly, but Ragucci was frequently late with payments, prompting Scollo to inform Ciccone, who expressed frustration and instructed Scollo to ensure Ragucci complied. Scollo acknowledged that the nature of these transactions felt illegal, noting the secretive methods employed, including coded language to avoid detection.

In a separate case, the Molfetta Counts alleged extortion by Ciccone against Frank Molfetta, the owner of Bridgeside Drayadge trucking company. Molfetta had paid Ragucci $150,000 for exclusive rights to operate at Howland Hook but refused to pay an additional $100,000 due to Ragucci's breach of contract. In late 1999 or early 2000, Ragucci informed Molfetta that Ciccone wanted to meet. During this meeting, Ciccone instructed Molfetta to stop payments to Ragucci and instead pay him $2,500 per month, which Molfetta negotiated down to $1,500, starting retroactively. Molfetta initially testified that he made these payments out of fear of Ciccone, but later testified that he did so because Ciccone helped him exit his contract with Ragucci. The government used Molfetta's earlier grand jury testimony to highlight this inconsistency.

Molfetta admitted to providing false testimony to the grand jury out of fear of imprisonment, clarifying that the government only threatened jail if he lied. The Money Laundering Counts involved payments by lower-ranking members to high-ranking officials in the Gambino Family as tributes, with Peter Gotti, Ciccone, and Richard G. Gotti as defendants-appellants. The government presented evidence on the Gambino Family's structure, as explained by FBI Agent Gregory Hagarty, who described the hierarchy including the boss, underboss, consigliere, captains, soldiers, and associates, with the primary goal of generating illicit revenue for the administration. The testimony noted that Paul Castellano was the boss until 1985, followed by John J. Gotti, and later, John A. Gotti served as acting boss from 1992 to 1999. After John A. Gotti's imprisonment in 1999, Peter Gotti became acting boss. Wiretaps revealed conversations indicating Peter Gotti's involvement in making new members and receiving tribute payments. Gene Gotti, in a recorded conversation, referenced financial transactions and tribute payments being funneled to Peter Gotti, indicating ongoing illicit financial activities within the organization.

The visitor informed that he would inform Gene's brother, to which Gene responded he did not want his brother to receive anything, asserting he had not been involved in the transactions. Two months later, Gene instructed another visitor to deliver cash amounts to Peter Gotti. Evidence indicates that tributes were consistently paid in cash to Peter Gotti on a monthly basis, typically around the third or fourth Tuesday, sourced from extortion, fraud, and gambling activities. Discussions in April 2000 revealed arrangements for payments to an unnamed individual, with instructions to follow through as directed. Further communication in May 2000 indicated that Ciccone was willing to meet with a specific individual if confusion arose. 

On October 15, 2000, Cassarino directed Bondi to meet with Eddie Alayev to ensure a deadline. Subsequent testimonies revealed that on the actual payment dates, Brancato was observed meeting Peter Gotti in Howard Beach, coordinating the delivery of payments. Similar observations on January 23, 2001, showed Brancato meeting Gotti while carrying a shopping bag. Wiretaps from March and April 2001 indicated that monthly payments also partially derived from MILA kickbacks, with plans discussed regarding the delivery of cash to Gotti. Agent Hagarty confirmed Brancato’s meetings with Gotti at the same location in March 2001.

On April 18, 2001, Ciccone and Nasso discussed the payment related to the MILA contract, with Nasso expressing urgency for the funds from Joel Grodman. On April 24, FBI Special Agent Robert Rogers observed Brancato meeting Peter Gotti in Howard Beach. Following Brancato's arrest on April 25, the payment process shifted from Brancato directly paying Peter Gotti to Cassarino making payments to Richard V. Gotti or Richard G. Gotti in Brooklyn. On June 25, 2001, Cassarino informed Ciccone about a scheduled appointment for payments. Rogers later tracked Cassarino to Maria's Restaurant in Brooklyn, where Richard G. Gotti's vehicle was present.

On September 26, 2001, Cassarino told Ciccone he did not have the full tribute payment but indicated Ciccone would provide funds from another source for a meeting with Frank Molfetta, who was being extorted. This meeting was observed by Captain James McGowan on September 28, during which Molfetta handed Ciccone an envelope with cash.

On November 29, 2001, law enforcement executed search warrants after observing Cassarino and Richard G. Gotti at Maria's Restaurant, recovering $12,000 in cash from Richard G. Gotti. Cassarino later expressed concerns about law enforcement apprehension, leading to discussions with Ciccone about changing their tribute payment method to avoid jail.

Additionally, counts against Ciccone included a conspiracy to extort Tommy Ragucci, an employee at Howland Hook, by pressuring him to resign to benefit Bobby Anastasia, related to a Gambino Family member. Testimony from Scollo indicated that Ciccone, either directly or through Cassarino, ordered him to inform Ragucci to leave his position.

Ciccone sought to remove Tommy Ragucci from his position to appoint Bobby Anastasia instead. Scollo testified that he attempted to convey this directive to Ragucci, who refused to resign. Ragucci recounted that Scollo implied the order came from "Sonny," understood to mean Ciccone, which made him feel intimidated. Ragucci requested to speak directly with Ciccone, but Scollo denied this request and left upset when Ragucci insisted on keeping his position. Wiretap evidence from July 19 and 26, 2001, revealed Ciccone's urgency for Ragucci's removal, stating he didn't want him there and emphasized it should happen within thirty days. Despite this, Ragucci remained in his role as of the trial date, leading Ciccone to express frustration over the situation.

The Zinna Count involved a conspiracy to extort $5,000 from Leonardo Zinna after discovering he had charged individuals for waterfront jobs. Wiretap evidence showed Ciccone instructing associates to demand money from Zinna, asserting that he owed them.

The Marinelli Counts alleged conspiracy and extortion against Nicola Marinelli. Evidence indicated that after Marinelli sought help for workmen's compensation payments, Ciccone and Cassarino extorted him for a portion of those benefits. Wiretap conversations revealed Cassarino instructing Marinelli's son to deliver money, confirming arrangements had been made with Marinelli.

Vito expressed anxiety regarding the appropriate amount of money to bring for a meeting, seeking guidance from Cassarino, who suggested a figure based on what Ciccone indicated. Vito was apprehensive about making a mistake, prompting Cassarino to assure him that he would be informed if something was wrong. Vito initially paid Cassarino $5,000, but later learned that this amount was inadequate, necessitating an additional payment of $5,000 after discussing the situation with his father.

The Alayev counts charged defendants Ciccone and Bondi with conspiring to extort property interests from Eduard Alayev, the owner of Café Roma. Alayev testified that after purchasing the café, Cassarino and Bondi insisted on installing illegal gambling machines. Despite Alayev's refusal, Cassarino threatened that the machines would be installed regardless and demanded $1,000 monthly if Alayev did not comply, asserting control over the neighborhood. Fearing for his family's safety, Alayev did not report the threats.

Subsequently, three gambling machines were installed without Alayev’s consent while he was away. After police intervention, which resulted in the destruction of the machines and Alayev's arrest, he attempted to prevent further installations but faced continued pressure from Cassarino. Alayev characterized himself as powerless against the defendants due to their intimidation and influence, ultimately closing the kitchen to avoid further police scrutiny related to the illegal gambling activities.

In December 2000, Alayev decided to sell Café Roma, with Cassarino insisting that the buyer should be Lenny Kogan, who would pay $40,000. Cassarino later took a portion of this payment for himself. Wiretapped conversations revealed Bondi discussing Alayev's management of Café Roma, expressing frustration over Alayev's insistence that no one enter the kitchen where gambling machines were located. Cassarino urged Bondi to confront Alayev about his demands. Additionally, the indictment included counts alleging that Ciccone and others conspired to extort Steven Seagal by attempting to secure financial dealings with him. Seagal recounted a friendship with Jules Nasso, which ended in the late 1990s due to Nasso's changed demeanor. Nasso claimed Seagal owed him a million dollars, a statement Seagal's advisors disputed. In October 2000, during filming in Toronto, Seagal met with Ciccone and Vincent Nasso, where Ciccone expressed a desire for Seagal to work with Jules again, making Seagal uncomfortable. Later, a meeting in New York led to Ciccone confronting Seagal about his supposed debts to Jules, stating that cooperation with Jules was important and that profits would be shared.

Seagal indicated his intention to collaborate with Jules during a meeting, after which Jules implied that Seagal narrowly avoided serious consequences by his choice of words. On the morning of the "Exit Wounds" premiere in March 2001, Ciccone, accompanied by Jules and others, confronted Seagal at his home, demanding $3 million. Seagal eventually paid between $500,000 and $700,000 to Jules, attributing the payment to a previous investment in stocks. Seagal sought assistance from a former acquaintance in prison to mediate the situation. Subsequently, Jules and Vincent Nasso advised Seagal to sever ties with them, and Jules later initiated a $60 million civil lawsuit against him. Recordings presented by the government revealed Ciccone and Jules discussing their intentions to demand $150,000 from Seagal for each movie he produced.

The document also outlines charges against Ciccone and Bondi related to an illegal bookmaking and joker-poker gambling operation. The bookmaking allegations involve their management of a New York branch of a Costa Rica-based gambling business from September 2000 to December 2001. Evidence presented at trial, including wiretapped conversations, demonstrated the involvement of several defendants, including Bondi and Ciccone, in this operation. Specific wiretaps highlighted Bondi's role in managing payouts to bettors and freezing accounts of those who owed money, with an exchange indicating the strategic consideration before freezing a bettor's account based on their financial status.

Bondi communicated with Cassarino about a bettor's status, indicating the bettor was "minus twenty-two," to which Cassarino instructed to "freeze it." In another conversation, Cassarino and Lisi discussed the urgency of contacting Bondi about a bettor wanting to settle up to play the same night. Wiretap evidence revealed Ciccone as the overall supervisor of the bookmaking operation, with Cassarino updating him on business activities. On October 1, 2001, Cassarino reported a profitable week, detailing a bettor on a commission structure that reduced their payout from fifty percent to thirty percent, indicating operational adjustments to manage payouts. 

Further wiretap evidence included discussions between co-defendants Brancato and Malara regarding a bettor named "Soldier," highlighting financial issues and collection efforts. Detective Martin testified about documents seized from Cassarino and Lisi's residences that detailed betting figures for their clients, including daily winnings and losses. Specifically, documents from Lisi indicated a bettor was up by $5800 for the week, while another was up by $3380. Additionally, records were found at Bondi's residence.

Regarding the joker-poker charges, the government presented evidence that Ciccone, Bondi, and others operated gambling machines at locations such as Café Roma. Testimony from law enforcement, including Detective Grzegorski, described observing Bondi removing currency from a gambling device, which functioned by allowing players to bet credits.

Winning in the gambling context results in additional credits that can be cashed out. After observing suspicious activity, Detective Grzegorski arrested Bondi and discovered a list of gambling locations on him. Detective Martin explained the mechanics of the gambling devices, which involve inserting currency to receive credits for gameplay, culminating in potential winnings.

The Witness Tampering Count alleged that defendants, including Ciccone, attempted to influence Bondi's stepson, Anthony Frazetta, who had been subpoenaed. During a wiretap conversation, Ciccone expressed concerns about Frazetta's testimony and the implications of his responses. Frazetta's attorney later notified the government that Frazetta would invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Following discussions among Ciccone, Cassarino, and others regarding Frazetta’s grand jury appearance, Ciccone criticized the advice given to Frazetta to assert his privilege without legal representation.

In the verdicts, Peter Gotti was found guilty of multiple counts, including Racketeering and Money Laundering, while being acquitted of specific charges. Richard G. Gotti also faced similar convictions. Anthony Ciccone was convicted on charges of Racketeering, Racketeering Conspiracy, and Extortion.

The legal document outlines numerous criminal charges and convictions related to various schemes of extortion, fraud, and illegal gambling operations involving multiple individuals and entities. Key charges include conspiracy and extortion targeting the Maritime Industry Labor Association (MILA) and local unions, as well as various individuals (referred to as John Doe). Specific counts detail attempts and successful extortions concerning financial gains, rights to refuse gambling machines, and business sales.

Peter Gotti received a sentence of 115 months in prison and a forfeiture order of $3,749,250. Richard G. Gotti was sentenced to 33 months without a resentencing upon review. Anthony Ciccone faced a 180-month sentence with restitution of $1,601,499 and forfeiture of $1,636,499. Richard Bondi was sentenced to 57 months and ordered to pay $311,894 in restitution. 

The defendants also raised challenges to their convictions based on the precedent set in *Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc.*, highlighting ongoing legal disputes regarding their charges and sentences.

Defendants-appellants contend that several extortion counts in the indictment became invalid following the Supreme Court's decision in Scheidler II on February 26, 2003, coinciding with the trial's conclusion. Ciccone and Bondi, who faced multiple Hobbs Act extortion charges, argue this affects their convictions. In contrast, Peter Gotti and Richard G. Gotti, not charged with extortion, assert these counts influenced their sentencing as relevant conduct under the Sentencing Guidelines. It is agreed that the legal validity of the indictment and jury instructions regarding Hobbs Act extortion will be reviewed under a de novo standard.

The discussion begins with Scheidler I and evaluates its implications, followed by an interpretation of Scheidler II concerning the extortion counts. Ultimately, the conclusion is that all challenged extortion counts remain valid. Scheidler II imposed stricter criteria for determining extortion under the Hobbs Act, necessitating a review of the Hobbs Act's language, which states that extortion involves obtaining property from another through wrongful force or fear. Prior to Scheidler II, the definition of "property" under this Act was interpreted broadly to include intangible rights, and "obtaining" was understood to cover situations where defendants caused losses or interference with property rights without seeking to exercise those rights for personal gain, as illustrated by the precedent set in United States v. Tropiano.

The Court upheld the Hobbs Act extortion convictions of the Tropiano defendants, dismissing their claim that Caron merely surrendered a right to conduct business in Milford, which they argued was not "property obtained" by the defendants. The Court clarified that property, as defined under the Hobbs Act, extends beyond tangible assets to include any valuable rights contributing to wealth, regardless of direct benefits to the taker. Caron had the right to solicit customers without territorial constraints, and the value of this right was evidenced by a $15,000 agreement not to solicit those customers, highlighting its significance as property under the Hobbs Act.

Furthermore, the Court referenced a previous ruling that recognized a union member's right to democratic participation in elections as property, affirming that intangible rights are protected under the Hobbs Act. The Court also cited a case involving anti-abortion protestors, where the extortion was established through the use of violence to compel the abandonment of business-related rights, thus fulfilling the "obtaining" requirement of the Hobbs Act. The Supreme Court later evaluated similar circumstances in Scheidler II, where it was argued that the defendants' actions constituted extortion due to the coercive impact on individuals' rights to seek medical services. The Seventh Circuit upheld this interpretation, countering the defendants' claims that they merely forced plaintiffs to relinquish their rights without "obtaining" them. However, the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision.

The Court noted that on appeal, respondents altered their argument regarding the property rights allegedly extorted from them. Initially, they claimed that the rights of women and clinics to receive and perform medical services were extorted; however, they later asserted that petitioners violated the Hobbs Act by interfering with their control over the use and disposition of their property. The respondents argued that this right constitutes property and that petitioners disrupted the clinics' operations, thus obtaining or attempting to obtain respondents' property.

The United States supported the respondents' view, contending that a defendant obtains property when they gain control over the use of a business's intangible assets. However, the Court found this interpretation inconsistent with the Hobbs Act's definition of extortion, which requires the "obtaining of property from another." It stated that even if the boundaries of extortion liability were to include intangible rights, the characterization of petitioners' actions as obtaining property from respondents fell well outside those boundaries. 

The Court emphasized that the anti-abortion protesters neither pursued nor received anything of value from respondents that they could control, transfer, or sell. To label their actions as extortion would undermine the statutory requirement for obtaining property and would blur the distinction between extortion and coercion. Coercion, which involves using force or threats to limit another's actions, was identified as a more accurate description of the petitioners' conduct. The Court noted that Congress specifically included extortion as a violation under the Hobbs Act but did not include coercion. Ultimately, the Court concluded that since the anti-abortion protesters did not obtain or attempt to obtain property from the respondents, there was no basis for finding them guilty of extortion under the Hobbs Act.

Justice Stevens, in dissent, criticized the majority's opinion for its narrow interpretation of the phrase "obtaining of property from another," arguing that it limits the statute to tangible property and that no other federal court has interpreted it so restrictively.

Justice Stevens contended that the ruling in Scheidler II invalidated both the broad definitions of "obtaining" and "property" under the Hobbs Act. However, the majority opinion clarified that it did not intend to make such sweeping changes and specifically noted that it would not determine the full extent of extortion liability, including whether intangible rights could be considered property. The majority explicitly stated that its decision did not negate prior rulings, such as Tropiano, which recognized the intangible right to solicit refuse collection accounts as property under the Hobbs Act. 

Consequently, it is concluded that Scheidler II did not overturn Tropiano's interpretation of property under the Hobbs Act and did not imply that only tangible property rights can be extorted. Instead, the majority emphasized the need for defendants to have genuinely obtained or sought to obtain the property right in question. 

In Scheidler II, the Court established that to "obtain" a property right involves both deprivation and acquisition. Although the anti-abortion protesters may have sought to deprive others of their property rights, they did not succeed in acquiring any property. The Court highlighted that the protesters did not pursue or receive anything of value that could be exercised, transferred, or sold, indicating that their intent was solely to shut down abortion clinics rather than to acquire property. This distinction is crucial in understanding the requirements for liability under the Hobbs Act as interpreted in Scheidler II.

The Scheidler II Court did not recognize the actions of the protestors as constituting acquisition because there was no intent to engage further with the clinics after interfering with their operations. The protestors' actions amounted to coercion rather than extortion, as they did not seek to benefit from the clinics' rights. In contrast, if the protestors had attempted to force clinics to change their services or transfer operations, they would have met the Scheidler II definition of "obtaining." This distinction clarifies why the Supreme Court maintained that the principles from Tropiano remain valid. 

In Tropiano, the defendants actively sought to take over solicitation rights from Caron, effectively obtaining a non-competition agreement valued at $15,000 to eliminate competition and enrich themselves. Their actions constituted extortion under the Hobbs Act, unlike the protestors in Scheidler II, who simply deprived others of rights without any intent to utilize those rights. 

To evaluate whether an extortion count aligns with Scheidler II, it is essential to determine if the defendant (1) deprived another of a property right and (2) intended to exercise or transfer that right for profit. A profit motive indicates an effort to obtain rights rather than merely depriving someone of them.

On appeal, the defendants contest several counts in the indictment, claiming they only support coercion charges and not extortion, arguing that the district court's instructions were inconsistent with Scheidler II. Each count will be assessed for its compliance with this interpretation, starting from the indictment’s framing to the jury's instruction.

The indictment alleges that the defendants engaged in extortion related to both ILA and Local 1, seeking to acquire union members' rights under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), specifically their rights to free speech, democratic participation, and loyal representation. The defendants purportedly attempted to control union activities by directing delegate votes and influencing elected officials' actions, aiming to exercise these rights for their own financial benefit. 

Defendants argue that the charges should fail since they could not legally exercise the union members' LMRDA rights, a point that is under debate in various district courts following the Scheidler II ruling. Three out of four district courts have determined that LMRDA rights can be considered extortable property under the Hobbs Act, despite the inability of third parties to legally exercise these rights. In contrast, one district court posits that intangible rights can only qualify as extortable property if they can be lawfully exercised or transferred.

The majority view aligns with the position that intangible property, including LMRDA rights, can be extorted regardless of the legality of its exercise. It is emphasized that the Supreme Court did not impose a legality requirement in Scheidler II. The dissenting perspective from the Bellomo court is criticized for suggesting that illegal property, like narcotics, cannot be extorted under the Hobbs Act, which creates inconsistencies in the application of extortion laws regarding tangible versus intangible property. No compelling rationale supports the notion that tangible property can be extorted irrespective of legality, while intangible property cannot.

Imposing a "legality" requirement on the extortion of tangible and intangible property is deemed unnecessary. The Hobbs Act extortion counts related to the ILA and Local 1 are upheld post-Scheidler II. For the MILA-related counts, the indictment claims defendants obtained rights from MILA participants to influence service provider contracts, ultimately benefiting a Gambino-associated enterprise through kickbacks. The allegations fulfill the criteria set by Scheidler II. 

Regarding the Tommy Ragucci Counts, the indictment states the defendants attempted to extort Ragucci’s employment rights and salary by coercing him to resign, intending to replace him with a preferred candidate. This aligns with the principle that defendants aimed to transfer property rights for personal gain, thus these counts also survive.

The Alayev Counts assert that the defendants acquired Alayev's intangible rights to make business decisions without external pressure, effectively becoming silent partners to exploit those rights for their benefit. Consequently, these counts meet the Scheidler II standards.

Lastly, the Seagal Counts are upheld as they allege the defendants threatened Seagal with violence to coerce him into collaboration, thereby infringing upon his right to make independent business decisions.

Defendants attempted to appropriate Seagal's intangible right to choose collaborators for their own profit, amounting to extortion under the Hobbs Act as established in Scheidler II. The jury was correctly instructed on the elements of Hobbs Act extortion, with the March 5, 2003 jury charge clarifying that the term "crime" includes not just tangible assets but also intangible rights that contribute to income or wealth. Extortion requires the defendant to obtain money or something of value that can be exercised, transferred, or sold, rather than merely depriving someone of property.

The district court detailed the property implicated in the extortion counts related to the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) and the Multiemployer Individual Life Insurance Arrangement (MILA). For ILA-related counts, relevant property included union positions, wages, employee benefits, and certain intangible rights protected by the Labor Management Reporting Disclosure Act (LMRDA), which ensures union members' rights to participate in governance, run for office, express opinions, and vote without retaliation. 

For MILA-related counts, the identified property encompassed potential economic benefits lost due to defendants' corruption, the right to choose service providers for pharmaceuticals, and the fiduciaries' duty to act solely in the interests of MILA participants, as mandated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).

The district court noted that the extortion counts related to Local 1 and ILA involved similar property interests. For the Tommy Ragucci counts, the relevant property was identified as Ragucci's right to employment at Howland Hook Terminal. In the Alayev-related extortion counts, the court emphasized that the property at issue included money and the right to conduct business without external pressure, specifically the rights to refuse illegal gambling machines and to sell the business freely. The court clarified that mere interference with these rights does not suffice for extortion; it requires proof that the defendant wrongfully induced the victim to relinquish these rights in exchange for money or something of value. For the Seagal-related counts, the property involved was money and the right to make independent business decisions. The court's jury instructions were found to align with the Scheidler II precedent, despite the defendants' claims of inconsistency, particularly regarding the use of coercion. The court's instructions reaffirmed that for a guilty verdict on extortion, the government must establish that the defendant gained something of value due to their wrongful actions. The defendants mischaracterized the jury instructions, suggesting they leaned towards coercion rather than extortion.

The district court instructed jurors that to determine whether the defendants wrongfully obtained the intangible rights of MILA participants, they needed to find that the defendants not only caused the relinquishment of these rights but also exercised them for personal gain, specifically through the selection of Vincent Nasso's company, GPP/VIP, as a service provider. This instruction aligned with the Scheidler II standard. Additionally, the court clarified that merely interfering with or depriving someone of property does not constitute extortion; the defendants must also have obtained something of value that they could use or sell.

The court consistently emphasized the "obtaining" requirement in its instructions to the jury regarding extortion counts, negating any claims of prejudicial error by the defendants-appellants. The defendants also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their various convictions, including counts related to Local 1 and others. The standard of review for these challenges requires defendants to prove that no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, based on evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the government.

Specifically, for the Local 1 counts involving Ciccone and Bondi, the defendants asserted insufficient evidence for their fraud convictions and, in Bondi's case, for extortion as well. The Local 1 fraud counts were based on an "honest services wire fraud" theory, which requires proof of a scheme to defraud, the objective of which is money or property, and the use of interstate wires to advance the scheme.

A scheme or artifice utilizing the mails or wires is defined that enables an employee or officer of a private entity to secretly act in their own interests rather than those of their employer, accompanied by material misrepresentation or omission to the employer. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1346, a conviction for "honest services wire fraud" requires proof of: (1) a scheme to defraud; (2) intent to deprive another of the right to honest services; (3) material misrepresentations or omissions capable of influencing the employer's behavior; and (4) use of mails or wires to further the scheme. In the case involving Local 1, the government asserted that defendants defrauded union members of the honest services of their elected officials, Saccenti and Knott, who were allegedly acting under the influence of the Gambino Family. Ciccone, on appeal, acknowledged his attempts to control these officials but argued that since they did not actually comply, union members suffered no fraud. However, the court emphasized that the scheme itself is sufficient for conviction, independent of its success, referencing precedents that distinguish between bribery and self-dealing cases. Unlike self-dealing, where actual detriment must be shown, the court found Ciccone's actions analogous to bribery, where no such showing is necessary, particularly given the heightened duties of loyalty imposed on union officials. 

Defendants' actions were capable of causing economic and other detriment to Local 1 members, thus satisfying the evidence requirements for Ciccone's conviction on fraud counts. Bondi's claim of mere coincidence during an encounter with Local 1 official Louis Saccenti was rejected, as evidence indicated his participation in a criminal scheme orchestrated by Ciccone, which included instructing Cassarino to deliver a threatening message to Saccenti. The distinction between mere presence and participation under specific circumstances was emphasized, supporting the sufficiency of evidence for Bondi's conviction on both fraud and extortion counts.

Regarding the Local 1814 counts, Ciccone acknowledged exercising control over President Scollo but argued that Scollo's actions aligned with Local 1814's interests. The government countered that Scollo's dependence on Ciccone for permission hindered his ability to act in the best interests of Local 1814 members, depriving them of Scollo's honest services. Testimony revealed Scollo felt he lacked the authority to make independent decisions, illustrating the detrimental impact of Ciccone's control on the local's governance.

Sonny instructed that he should be consulted on significant decisions, and by directing Scollo to "confer with him," Ciccone engaged in fraudulent conduct against the Local 1814 members, depriving them of Scollo's honest services. Ciccone's argument against his conviction for the Local 1814 counts is dismissed. Regarding the Howland Hook counts, the core issue was Ciccone’s extortion of quarterly cash payments from Carmine Ragucci over several years. Ciccone acknowledges the payments were made but argues there was insufficient evidence regarding their purpose, noting Ragucci did not testify. Extortion, per the Hobbs Act, involves obtaining property through the wrongful use of force or fear. The court indicates that the definition of extortion is broad, requiring proof that the defendant intentionally instilled fear to compel property transfer. Evidence suggests a reasonable jury could conclude Ciccone exploited Ragucci's fear, particularly as Scollo testified that Ciccone would express anger when payments were delayed, which he communicated to Ragucci. Although Ragucci did not testify, he consistently made substantial cash payments to Ciccone without any legitimate justification, supported by his brother's testimony. Scollo’s acknowledgment of the secretive nature of the payments further indicates extortion. Ciccone's alternative explanations for the payments lacked evidential support, leading the court to reject his challenge regarding the Howland Hook counts. The Molfetta counts similarly allege that Ciccone extorted cash from Frank Molfetta, owner of Bridgeside Drayadge.

Ciccone admits to receiving cash payments from Molfetta but claims he relieved Molfetta of his obligation to pay Carmine Ragucci, arguing this negates extortion. However, the court finds this argument unconvincing for two reasons: 

1. Evidence shows Molfetta had determined three years prior that he was not obligated to pay Ragucci, undermining Ciccone's assertion of having liberated him from this obligation.
2. Molfetta's grand jury testimony indicated that Ciccone ordered him to make payments retroactively and that Molfetta complied out of fear, which Ciccone fails to adequately contest.

Consequently, the court rejects Ciccone's challenge regarding the sufficiency of evidence supporting his conviction related to Molfetta.

Additionally, Peter Gotti, Richard G. Gotti, and Ciccone were convicted of money laundering conspiracy and various money laundering acts under 18 U.S.C. § 1956. The charges relate to cash "tributes" from illegal activities sent up the Gambino Family hierarchy to Peter Gotti. The court outlines the relevant statutory provisions, emphasizing that it is a crime to conduct transactions involving proceeds of unlawful activity with intent to promote or conceal such activities, with severe penalties for violations. The money laundering conspiracy provision further stipulates that conspiring to commit these offenses incurs the same penalties as the underlying crime. The government must prove the defendants knew the transactions involved proceeds from unlawful activities.

The document outlines the elements required to establish that defendants engaged in a financial transaction involving proceeds from unlawful activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1956. It specifies that a defendant must know the property was derived from illegal activity and must conduct or attempt a financial transaction with that property. The defendants-appellants contended that three critical prongs were not met: conducting a financial transaction, the nature of the transaction, and its impact on interstate or foreign commerce. 

Prong 2, concerning the conduct of a financial transaction, is evaluated by examining statutory definitions. "Conducts" includes initiating, concluding, or participating in a transaction, while "transaction" encompasses various forms of financial exchanges. A "financial transaction" is defined broadly, affecting interstate commerce or involving financial institutions.

The defendants-appellants argue that the evidence was insufficient to prove they conducted any transactions, relying on the claim that merely receiving funds does not constitute conducting a transaction. However, the statutory interpretation indicates that receiving funds does indeed qualify as conducting a transaction, as it involves participating in a transfer or delivery of funds. Thus, the receipt of money satisfies the requirement of having conducted a financial transaction as defined by law.

The legislative history indicates that Congress intended the term "transaction" to have a broad interpretation. The Second Circuit noted in United States v. Leslie that "transaction" encompasses various financial activities, while the Sixth Circuit has determined that cash transfers qualify as financial transactions, as they involve the disposition of funds. The court rejected the defendants-appellants' claim that receiving funds does not constitute a transaction and their assertion that the transactions lacked a financial character due to no impact on interstate or foreign commerce. The relevant legal standard for money laundering prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 requires only a minimal effect on interstate commerce to establish federal jurisdiction. The statute’s language reflects Congress's intent to utilize its full Commerce Clause authority, establishing that even a de minimis impact suffices for jurisdiction. The court affirmed that it is appropriate to consider the conduct leading to the laundered funds, as seen in precedents like United States v. Goodwin and United States v. Hatcher, where activities linked to money laundering were shown to affect interstate commerce. In this case, the charged money laundering offenses stemmed from illegal activities, including Hobbs Act extortions, which involved businesses in interstate commerce and international gambling operations, thus confirming their impact on both interstate and foreign commerce.

The government asserts that the alleged money laundering activities, which included payments to Gambino Family leaders like Gotti and Ciccone, had a significant impact on interstate commerce by supporting the Gambino Family's operations. This satisfies the jurisdictional requirement under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, countering the defendants-appellants' claim of insufficient evidence for conducting financial transactions. 

Regarding the proceeds of unlawful activity, the defendants-appellants argue that the government failed to sufficiently link the contested funds to specific unlawful activities, merely suggesting various potential sources. However, precedent allows for circumstantial evidence to establish this link. The government provided sufficient evidence indicating that the funds were derived from Hobbs Act extortions and illegal gambling, specifically citing instances like the Molfetta extortion and the placement of joker-poker machines.

Lastly, the defendants-appellants contend that the evidence only shows cash payments to Peter Gotti and does not demonstrate that these payments promoted or concealed unlawful activities. However, ample evidence supports that the defendants engaged in concealment money laundering, as the transactions were conducted in a complex and secretive manner, involving coded communication and intermediary transfers of cash.

A reasonable jury could conclude that Peter Gotti knowingly accepted cash payments that were intentionally concealed to obscure their source, as supported by case precedents emphasizing the importance of concealment in money laundering convictions. The excerpt also addresses Ciccone's challenge to his conviction regarding Tommy Ragucci, arguing insufficient evidence of threats or intimidation. However, wiretapped conversations and Ragucci's testimony contradict this claim, indicating Ciccone's attempts to force Ragucci's resignation, which could be seen as extortion of Ragucci's job rights. Furthermore, Ciccone contests the sufficiency of evidence for the Zinna Count, which alleges a conspiracy to extort $5,000. His argument fails because the charge is for conspiracy, not actual extortion, and the evidence supports an agreement among Ciccone, Scollo, and Cassarino to extort Zinna, fulfilling the requirements under the Hobbs Act. Thus, Ciccone's challenges to both convictions are dismissed.

The Marinelli Counts allege that Ciccone and Cassarino extorted funds from Marinelli after he sought their help with workers' compensation payments. Ciccone argues that there was no evidence Marinelli paid them out of fear, as Marinelli initiated contact with them. However, evidence presented at trial shows that after receiving payment, Ciccone and Cassarino demanded more money, leading to Marinelli's son, Vito, expressing fear about insufficient payment. This supports a reasonable conclusion that Marinelli felt compelled to pay due to fear, thus upholding the conviction against Ciccone.

The Alayev Counts involve Bondi, who contends he was not personally involved in the extortion of Eduard Alayev. However, testimony indicated that both Cassarino and Bondi ordered Alayev to install gambling machines at Café Roma. Additionally, wiretap evidence revealed Bondi provided information about Alayev's activities and collected money from the gambling machines. This evidence establishes sufficient grounds for the jury to link Bondi to the extortion.

The Seagal Counts challenge Ciccone's conviction for allegedly forcing Seagal to collaborate with Jules Nasso. While Ciccone acknowledges that Seagal experienced fear from other associates, evidence indicates Ciccone himself exploited this fear. Seagal testified to threats from Ciccone regarding his business relationship with Nasso and financial demands. Wiretap evidence further corroborated Ciccone's direct involvement in pressuring Seagal, leading to the rejection of Ciccone's challenge.

Finally, regarding the Gambling Counts, Bondi (possibly joined by Ciccone) argues that evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for illegal gambling activities. The relevant statute prohibits conducting or managing an illegal gambling business, which is the basis for their charges.

A business is defined under 18 U.S.C. 1955(b)(1) as one that (i) violates state law where it operates, (ii) involves five or more individuals managing or owning the business, and (iii) has been in continuous operation for over thirty days or generates over $2,000 in a single day. Bondi contests his convictions for bookmaking and joker-poker, arguing they do not meet these criteria. 

For the bookmaking charge, Bondi presents three main arguments against the sufficiency of the evidence. First, he claims the operation did not violate New York law since Pelican Sports was based offshore in Costa Rica, where such activities were legal, and no bets were accepted in New York. However, evidence at trial indicated that New York-based defendants managed local clients who placed bets from New York, which constitutes illegal gambling under New York law regardless of the legality in Costa Rica. New York law stipulates that if gambling occurs with a participant in the state, it is deemed illegal. 

Second, Bondi argues there was no proof that bets exceeded $5,000 in a single day, which is necessary for promoting gambling in the first degree. Contrary to this claim, betting records presented at trial demonstrated that the defendants' operation did exceed this amount on certain days. 

Lastly, Bondi contends the government failed to prove the involvement of at least five individuals in the operation, as required by 18 U.S.C. 1955(b)(2).

The government presented evidence at trial indicating that Bondi was part of a broader bookmaking operation involving co-defendants Ciccone, Cassarino, Brancato, Thomas Lisi, Jerome Orsino, and Carmine Malara, undermining Bondi’s claims regarding the sufficiency of evidence for the bookmaking charges. With respect to the joker-poker charges under 18 U.S.C. § 1955, Bondi contended that the machines were not illegal gambling devices. The statute prohibits gambling businesses that violate state law, which defines an illegal gambling device in New York as any machine used in gambling activities where value is staked on the outcome of a contest of chance. Bondi argued that there was insufficient evidence showing players received something of value and that the games were based on skill rather than chance. These arguments were dismissed as meritless because evidence showed that players purchased credits to play, which they could redeem for cash, thus risking something of value. Furthermore, Bondi’s assertion that the games were skill-based failed to recognize that a contest of chance can involve skill if the outcome is materially influenced by chance, which is true for poker. Lastly, Bondi claimed there was no proof that the machines were joker-poker machines, misinterpreting the testimony of Detective Martin, who categorized various machines under the term "joker-poker type" without limiting it to "pure" versions.

The statement clarifies that the speaker had not encountered "pure" joker-poker machines, which use actual cards displayed on the screen. Regarding the indictment's gambling count (Count 66), Bondi contends it should have been dismissed for incorrectly citing New York Penal Law § 225.10, relevant to bookmaking rather than the applicable laws for gambling offenses, § 225.30 or § 225.05. The district court rejected this argument, referencing United States v. Eucker, which establishes that an indictment can be valid despite citing an incorrect statute, as long as it properly charges an offense and the defendant is not misled or prejudiced by the citation error. 

Ciccone challenges the sufficiency of evidence on the Witness Tampering Count related to Anthony Frazetta under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), which prohibits corrupt persuasion to prevent testimony in official proceedings. Ciccone argues that his suggestion for Frazetta to invoke the Fifth Amendment was not improper. However, the evidence indicated that Ciccone's intent was to protect himself from being implicated, thereby demonstrating an improper purpose. Consequently, the challenge to his conviction on this count is rejected.

Additionally, Bondi asserts that the admission of co-defendants’ guilty pleas regarding bookmaking counts violated the ruling in Crawford v. Washington, which calls for reversal of his convictions. Although this admission was indeed an error as per Crawford, it is subject to a "harmless error" standard, meaning that the convictions may still stand if the error did not affect the outcome.

The admission of three plea allocutions is subject to a harmless error review, meaning a new trial is unnecessary if the government can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not influence the verdict. In this case, the admissions of Malara's and Lisi's guilty pleas were deemed harmless due to overwhelming evidence against five other defendants—Bondi, Ciccone, Cassarino, Orsino, and Brancato—who were implicated in the bookmaking operation. Additional independent evidence also connected Malara and Lisi to the case, further establishing the harmlessness of the Crawford error, leading to the rejection of this challenge.

Bondi and other defendants contested the district court's denial of a motion to suppress wiretap evidence obtained from co-defendant Cassarino's phone. The warrant, authorized by Justice Nancy Smith on April 5, 2000, was based on an affidavit from Deputy Chief Investigator Joseph Rauchet, which outlined probable cause to believe that Cassarino and others were engaged in illegal gambling activities. The district court upheld the warrant's validity, stating that even if probable cause were lacking, the agents had acted in good faith. The court's review of the denial was conducted de novo, focusing on the legal determinations regarding probable cause and the good faith of law enforcement.

The court agreed with the district court's finding of probable cause, noting that Rauchet's affidavit included four types of supporting information: surveillance evidence, analysis of telephone toll records, Cassarino's use of false subscriber information, and Rauchet's expert opinion based on extensive experience in organized crime investigations. Specifically, surveillance revealed numerous meetings between Cassarino and high-ranking members of the Gambino Family, including discussions about lucrative football gambling operations.

Rauchet analyzed Cassarino's Sprint records, identifying numerous communications between Cassarino’s cell phone and high-ranking Gambino Family members. Notably, Cassarino's phone was registered under "Cassarino Prime," linked to an address associated with Jerry's Caf, an alleged Gambino meeting location, rather than his home. Additionally, a discrepancy in the Social Security number tied to the phone was observed. Rauchet, drawing from his extensive experience, opined that Cassarino was used by Gambino captain Ciccone to facilitate communication within the crime family, supporting the conclusion that there was probable cause for Cassarino's involvement in criminal activity under the federal "totality of the circumstances" standard. Despite an erroneous claim in Rauchet’s affidavit regarding Cassarino’s criminal history, the court found sufficient evidence for probable cause. Bondi's challenges regarding misstatements did not undermine this determination.

In a separate matter, Peter Gotti argued against the empaneling of an anonymous and partially sequestered jury, asserting that the district court erred. The court, however, upheld the decision, identifying strong reasons for jury protection and confirming that reasonable precautions were undertaken to mitigate prejudicial effects on the defendants. Gotti did not contest these precautions but focused solely on the necessity for jury protection, which the court affirmed was justifiable based on relevant case law. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the government's motion for an anonymous jury.

Sufficient grounds for empaneling anonymous juries have been established in various cases, particularly where defendants face charges related to grand jury tampering, possess histories of jury tampering, or are involved in serious criminal activities that attract significant media attention. In this case, the district court considered multiple factors: the defendants' alleged membership in the Gambino Family crime organization, including Peter Gotti and Ciccone, both deemed dangerous and ordered into pretrial detention; charges against two defendants for witness tampering related to grand jury testimony; and anticipated intense media coverage. These factors justified the district court's decision to empanel an anonymous and partially sequestered jury.

Regarding the defendants' challenges to their sentences, Peter Gotti contests the length of his sentence and a forfeiture order of $3,749,250. The appellate court vacated his sentence for reassessment under United States v. Crosby, allowing the district court to determine a potential resentencing. However, Gotti's challenge to the forfeiture order was rejected. He argued it was excessive because his RICO convictions were linked solely to money laundering, not more profitable racketeering activities. Since he did not raise this argument at trial, the court reviewed it under a plain error standard, which requires showing an obvious error affecting substantial rights and judicial integrity. The court found no such error, affirming Gotti's racketeering and racketeering conspiracy convictions under 18 U.S.C. 1962 and 1963(a)(3).

A defendant convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 must forfeit any property derived from proceeds obtained through racketeering or unlawful debt collection. The district court found that Peter Gotti reasonably foresaw the racketeering activities of the enterprise he was involved in, supporting the forfeiture order based on trial evidence. The government referenced a precedent in *United States v. Fruchter*, which holds that if a defendant's criminal conduct was foreseeable, proceeds from that conduct can be included in the forfeiture judgment.

During Gotti's sentencing, the district court initially identified him as the acting boss of the Gambino Family and recognized multiple counts as relevant conduct, intending to apply a leadership role enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. However, the court later reconsidered and decided against the enhancement, although it maintained that the counts were relevant for sentencing. The government contends this reversal was erroneous and seeks appellate review to ensure the district court starts with an accurate Guidelines calculation upon reconsideration.

To assess the government’s argument regarding the leadership role enhancement, one must refer to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, which stipulates that a four-level enhancement applies if the defendant was an organizer or leader of extensive criminal activity involving five or more participants. A three-level enhancement applies if the defendant was a manager or supervisor. The commentary clarifies that a defendant's role should be evaluated based on all conduct, not just the specifics of the conviction, and that an adjustment requires the defendant to have been an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of other participants.

An upward departure in sentencing may be justified for a defendant who, while not formally leading a criminal organization, nonetheless had management responsibilities over its operations. Relevant factors for the court to evaluate include decision-making authority, involvement in the offense, recruitment of accomplices, claims to greater profits, planning participation, and overall control exercised. The adjustment aims to reflect relative responsibility and acknowledges that those in supervisory roles often benefit more and pose greater public safety risks. 

In the case of Peter Gotti, the district court declined to impose a leadership enhancement despite his title as "acting boss" of a crime family, emphasizing that mere titles do not suffice for such enhancements. The court required evidence of active participation and decision-making, which it found lacking. Evidence suggested Gotti did not demonstrate typical leadership traits and merely filled a power vacuum created by the incarceration of other family members. The court noted no evidence supported claims of his decision-making authority or participation in certain crimes, and the government contested this ruling on appeal, highlighting an inconsistency in the standard of review for such determinations within the Circuit.

In Huerta, the court refrained from addressing the standard of review, concluding that the outcome would be the same regardless of the standard applied. It established an "either/or" approach for reviewing a district court's application of the Guidelines: a de novo standard for primarily legal determinations and a "clear error" standard for primarily factual determinations. Following the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Booker, which made the Guidelines advisory, this approach has been maintained. In the present case, the court found the clear error standard appropriate due to the predominantly factual nature of the district court's application of U.S.S.G. 3B1.1 regarding Peter Gotti's role in the enterprise. Although the government argued for de novo review, citing no dispute over relevant facts, it focused on disputing the district court's findings rather than establishing a clear error. Consequently, the appellate court did not find clear error in the district court's decision.

Regarding Ciccone, the court vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing, noting that he raised multiple arguments concerning the Guidelines calculation and related restitution and forfeiture orders. The court opted to let the district court address these issues upon resentencing. Similarly, Bondi is also entitled to resentencing, as agreed upon by both Bondi and the government. The court has vacated Bondi's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing as well.

All defendants-appellants' arguments have been reviewed, and no grounds were found to reverse their convictions. Peter Gotti's sentence is remanded to the district court for possible resentencing under the precedent established in Crosby, while Ciccone's and Bondi's sentences are similarly remanded for consideration under Fagans. Richard G. Gotti’s appeal, previously severed, has been remanded for resentencing under Crosby, but he has opted to consolidate his appeal with that of the other defendants. Since all challenges to convictions were ultimately rejected, and the district court has already addressed Richard G. Gotti’s resentencing, no further remand is necessary for his case. The excerpt references the case's history, including its multiple visits to the Supreme Court, and includes notes on various defendants involved in the appeals. Additionally, it mentions a perjury charge against a trial witness and provides context regarding illegal gambling operations, specifically referencing the concept of "sheets" in betting arrangements.

Victims of extortion may be coerced in different ways regarding their rights: they may be forced to exercise their rights under the extortionist's control, transfer their rights entirely to the extortionist, or transfer them to a third party selected by the extortionist. An important distinction exists between exercising and transferring rights, but the key issue is the defendant's intent to act concerning the property rights in question. The arguments presented by Peter Gotti and Ciccone are collectively referred to as those of the "defendants-appellants," regardless of the briefs' specifics. The analysis focuses on whether concealment or promotion was sufficiently established, without needing to determine if the defendants also engaged in "promotion money laundering." Ciccone does not contest the evidence supporting his convictions related to the Alayev counts, nor does he specifically challenge the Gambling Counts, but is assumed to support Bondi's general arguments. Gambling is defined under N.Y. Penal Law as risking something of value on uncertain outcomes with the expectation of receiving something of value based on that outcome. The guilty pleas of Malara and Lisi were admitted as evidence, but their admission was deemed improper post-Crawford v. Washington. However, the government presented substantial evidence of multiple defendants' involvement in bookmaking, including independent corroboration of Malara and Lisi's participation. Bondi claims an aggrieved person status under 18 U.S.C. 2518(10)(a), while the government sought an anonymous and partially sequestered jury, supported by an affidavit from an FBI agent.

On January 13, 2003, a district court granted the Government's motion regarding the pretrial detention of Peter Gotti, identified as the alleged "Acting Boss of the Gambino Family." The court referenced Second Circuit precedent, affirming that his detention was warranted despite a lack of evidence demonstrating his direct decision-making authority in the crimes. The Government contended that his position afforded him significant control over the Gambino family's criminal activities, including supervising extortion. The court's decision regarding Ciccone's sentencing was remanded based on the agreement that Ciccone objected to the Guidelines’ compulsory application, unlike Gotti. Furthermore, Ciccone's argument that restitution and forfeiture orders violated his Sixth Amendment rights due to factual findings made by the court under a preponderance of evidence standard was previously addressed and rejected by the Circuit, which concluded that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act.