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Cal Coburn Brown v. John Lambert, Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary
Citations: 451 F.3d 946; 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 14936; 2006 WL 1668233Docket: 04-35998
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; June 19, 2006; Federal Appellate Court
Cal Coburn Brown, the petitioner-appellant, challenged his death sentence following convictions for aggravated first-degree murder in Washington after a series of violent crimes, including carjacking, rape, and murder. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed his case, including his constitutional claims related to the trial and sentencing. The court ordered the withdrawal of a prior opinion and replaced it with an amended opinion, denying a petition for rehearing en banc due to lack of majority support from active judges. Brown's appeal centered on three issues, notably the facial validity of Washington's death penalty statute, which he argued lacks guidance for jurors regarding collateral crimes. The statute requires jurors to deliberate only on whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist to warrant leniency, a process that Brown contended fails to adequately direct jury discretion. The court referenced a prior case, Campbell v. Kincheloe, which upheld the statute against similar challenges. Brown had previously exhausted all direct appeals and state habeas proceedings before seeking federal habeas corpus relief. In Campbell I, the court affirmed the Washington Supreme Court's interpretation of a statute, dismissing the defendant's facial challenge as 'meritless.' Brown's argument is a narrower version of this challenge, claiming the statute inadequately guides jury discretion regarding collateral convictions; however, the prior ruling in Campbell I precludes this claim. The court noted it would not reevaluate the statute as established precedents bind subsequent rulings. Brown also contended that three jurors were improperly dismissed for cause, affecting the legitimacy of the death penalty verdict. Juror X expressed doubt about her ability to impose the death penalty, stating that she would need clarity before making such a decision. The trial judge excused her, citing that her views would impair her juror duties. Juror Y displayed even stronger opposition, calling the death penalty 'barbaric' and showing visible discomfort at the prospect of sentencing someone to death, leading to her dismissal for cause. In contrast, Juror Z expressed support for the death penalty, articulating a nuanced view that it should be reserved for severe cases, indicating he could consider it when instructed. His balanced stance differed significantly from the attitudes of Jurors X and Y, underscoring the trial judge's discretion in excusing jurors based on their ability to fulfill their roles. Z held views on the death penalty that aligned with Washington's statute, believing it should only be imposed for severe crimes while considering mitigating factors such as mental health and emotional development. He expressed willingness to engage with fellow jurors' perspectives and acknowledged the responsibility of jurors, firmly stating he would adhere to the law. Despite these assurances, the prosecutor argued that Z was hesitant to impose the death penalty, asserting he would only do so if convinced the defendant would kill again, leading to the prosecutor's motion to excuse Z for cause, which the trial judge granted without further inquiry. The Supreme Court's precedents establish that prospective jurors can only be excluded for cause based on their views on capital punishment if those views would prevent them from fulfilling their duties as jurors. Jurors who believe the death penalty is unjust can serve, provided they are willing to set aside personal beliefs in favor of the law. The Court emphasized that excluding jurors based solely on their views on the death penalty risks undermining the diversity of the jury pool and violates due process if done without evidence of a juror's inability to follow the law. In the case of Z, the Washington Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's decision to excuse him, citing his potential impairment in performing juror duties. However, the court did not provide sufficient justification specific to Z's exclusion, noting only that Z incorrectly stated he would impose the death penalty under specific conditions and misunderstood the burden of proof in a criminal case. The court concluded that the trial judge acted within discretion in excusing Z for cause. The court did not find that juror Z was incapable of following instructions, as Z expressed he could consider the death penalty in appropriate cases, similar to the juror in Gray. A determination that Z was 'substantially impaired' would have been unreasonable. The court's reasons for excluding Z were inadequate; his statement about imposing the death penalty only under certain conditions did not preclude him from doing so in other scenarios. Misstatements regarding the law by jurors, such as Z's initial misunderstanding of the prosecution's burden of proof, were deemed irrelevant since they could be clarified through jury instructions, which Z indicated he would adhere to. The prosecutor showed no concern over Z's confusion on this matter. Additionally, the trial judge dismissed another juror's similar misunderstanding, suggesting such confusion was common. Brown's failure to object to Z's removal during the trial did not affect the analysis of the Witherspoon error, as the claim was raised on direct appeal and not considered waived or barred by the Washington Supreme Court. Consequently, excluding juror Z was against Supreme Court precedent, making Brown's death sentence untenable, as prejudice is presumed in cases of erroneous exclusion of jurors with conscientious scruples against the death penalty. The court declined to adopt a harmless-error analysis, affirming that Brown's sentence cannot be upheld. Lastly, while Brown claimed ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase, this issue would not be addressed further since habeas relief was granted based on the juror exclusion. Brown would have an opportunity for effective counsel if the state seeks the death penalty again. The district court's decision denying Brown's writ of habeas corpus is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings regarding Brown's death sentence. The court mandates that the state must either conduct a new penalty phase trial or vacate the death sentence and impose a lesser sentence within a reasonable time frame. The issue of whether the district court erred in excluding certain reports during the habeas evidentiary hearing is not addressed, as the reversal stands regardless of this point. The discussion notes that Brown's habeas petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 due to its filing date. Additionally, while Brown raised a due process claim related to his conviction, his arguments focus solely on the death sentence, which limits the scope of the court's review. The excerpt also references a juror's responses during voir dire, emphasizing that the juror demonstrated a clear willingness to impose the death penalty, contrasting with previous cases. Juror Z's alleged indecisiveness is emphasized by the dissent, which interprets it as a failure to adhere to the court's instructions and apply the law. However, this interpretation is not supported by the state and is deemed unpersuasive. The comparison is made to another juror, Gray, who was deemed fit to serve despite personal objections to the death penalty. The text argues that a juror maintaining an open mind about the appropriateness of the death penalty prior to the presentation of evidence should be viewed as a positive quality rather than grounds for disqualification. Juror Z confirmed his ability to consider and impose the death penalty, even after learning that life without parole was an alternative. The dissent's claim that Juror Z was confused about his willingness to follow Washington law is challenged. Juror Z explicitly stated multiple times that he could impose the death penalty, clarifying that his prior uncertainty stemmed from not knowing about the life without parole option. During voir dire, he acknowledged that he could consider both sentencing options and expressed that the death penalty would be appropriate in cases involving incorrigible individuals. When questioned further, Juror Z maintained that he could impose the death penalty if convinced it was warranted, regardless of the defendant's potential for future harm. He also indicated that his views regarding the death penalty were initially influenced by the assumption of parole availability, which changed upon learning about the state's life without parole statute. Deference to the trial judge is acknowledged, particularly regarding the observation of witness demeanor; however, demeanor cannot contradict a witness's explicit statements. Juror Z clearly affirmed his ability to impose the death penalty and follow court instructions, with no contradictory statements made. If appellate courts were to rely solely on the trial judge's potential interpretation of non-verbal cues over the clear verbal testimony, it would undermine the principles established in Witherspoon and negate meaningful review of factual findings. The dissent critiques defense counsel's failure to object to Juror Z's dismissal, suggesting that the defense attorney recognized the juror's proper dismissal for cause. However, it is argued that the defense counsel did not object because he was pleased to see Juror Z, who was pro-death penalty, dismissed. In contrast, defense counsel vigorously objected to the dismissal of Juror Y, who opposed the death penalty, highlighting a strategic preference for Y over Z. The dissent's assumption that defense counsel would feel morally obligated to accept Y's dismissal is challenged, as the attorney's relief at Juror Z's removal suggests the trial judge's error in this case may be harmless. Nonetheless, it is emphasized that Witherspoon errors are structural, which has significant implications for the case. The dissent references Rice v. Collins but overlooks that in that case, the state trial court found the juror was dismissed for race-neutral reasons, which was upheld by the California Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court reversed a previous decision due to improper evaluation of the record. In the current case, the Washington Supreme Court applied the incorrect standard regarding juror Z, failing to find any evidence that he could not fulfill his juror oath. The dissent erroneously assumes that the trial court must have accepted the prosecutor's objection regarding juror Z’s ability to follow the law. The prosecutor's objection did not address juror Z's oath but instead focused on his perceived confusion about the death penalty. Juror Z had identified as pro-death penalty in his questionnaire and expressed a willingness to consider imposing it, stating he would do so only if convinced it was appropriate. There is no support in juror Z's testimony for the claim that he would not follow the law, and any inference of such a failure is unfounded. The dissent does not provide evidence to substantiate its claims about juror Z's inability to adhere to legal instructions. Dissenting judges express confusion regarding jury instructions related to the death penalty in Washington, particularly focusing on the case's aggravated circumstances—kidnapping, torture, and murder. They assert that these circumstances justify the death penalty under Washington law, despite the law's requirement for juries to consider only mitigating factors in such decisions. The dissent highlights a potential error in the trial judge's dismissal of Juror Z, suggesting that the judge improperly considered the crime's heinousness, which contradicts established legal precedents regarding juror dismissal criteria. The dissenters argue there is no constitutional flaw in Brown's conviction, referencing relevant case law that distinguishes between errors requiring sentence reversal versus those affecting convictions. They critique the majority’s decision to overturn a suitable punishment, stating it disregards the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) by failing to defer to the Washington Supreme Court's endorsement of the trial judge's jury selection process. They emphasize the necessity for deference to trial court decisions, particularly in light of the limitations of written records during voir dire, and note that defense counsel did not object to the dismissal of the juror in question. The dissent concludes that overturning the death sentence in this case lacks legal justification and is irrational. Brown kidnapped a hotel desk clerk near Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, subjected her to severe physical and sexual abuse over two days, and ultimately killed her. He was later apprehended in Palm Springs, California, where he had abducted another victim, who escaped and reported him to the police. During jury selection in King County Superior Court, a juror (Juror Z) was dismissed for expressing doubts about imposing the death penalty, suggesting it should be reserved for defendants likely to re-offend. The trial judge, after questioning Juror Z and considering input from both the prosecution and defense, excused him for cause. The Washington Supreme Court upheld this dismissal on appeal. However, the opinion of the reviewing court criticized the Washington Supreme Court's rationale as "misplaced and insufficient," asserting that Juror Z could follow the law regarding the death penalty. The court's conclusion that the Washington Supreme Court made an unreasonable determination of the facts conflicted with the established federal law under AEDPA (28 U.S.C. 2254(d)). It was determined that the dismissal of Juror Z was contrary to Supreme Court precedent, and prejudice from this exclusion is presumed, as established in previous rulings. The case did not warrant a harmless-error analysis, and the court declined to adopt one. Brown's death sentence is overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase. Although this claim would normally require extensive consideration, the court has decided to grant habeas relief for other reasons, thereby not addressing the ineffective assistance claim directly. Should the state pursue the death penalty again, Brown will have the opportunity to receive competent legal representation. The court also refrains from evaluating a related issue regarding the district court's refusal to consider certain reports during the habeas hearing, as the reversal of the lower court's judgment is warranted regardless. The district court's denial of the writ of habeas corpus is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions for the state to either conduct a new penalty phase trial within a reasonable time or to vacate Brown's death sentence in favor of a lesser sentence. The decision is reversed in part and remanded. The dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc contends that juror Z was improperly excluded, asserting that his commitment to impose the death penalty was stronger than that of the juror struck in Gray. Juror Z responded unequivocally "Yes, sir" when asked about his ability to impose the death penalty, contrasting with the juror in Gray, who expressed uncertainty with "I think I could." The dissent criticized juror Z for perceived indecisiveness, suggesting it indicated an inability to follow court instructions. However, it argues that if the juror in Gray was deemed fit despite her moral objections, juror Z should similarly be considered qualified. Juror Z maintained an open mind regarding the death penalty, which the dissent mischaracterized as confusion. Testimony from voir dire showed that juror Z acknowledged the option of life without parole and affirmed his ability to consider both sentencing alternatives. He articulated that he would consider the death penalty appropriate in cases involving individuals deemed incorrigible. The dissent's claims of juror Z’s confusion were countered with specific excerpts from the voir dire, illustrating his clear understanding and willingness to impose the death penalty if warranted. The juror initially believed there was no life without parole option in Washington but acknowledged this possibility upon clarification during questioning. When asked if he could consider imposing the death penalty for a defendant who would never be released, the juror expressed that he could consider it and potentially impose it if convinced it was appropriate. He stated that while he believes in the death penalty, he does not support excessive waiting for its imposition. The juror's ability to follow court instructions and impose the death penalty was affirmed, despite dissenting opinions suggesting his demeanor may have contradicted his statements. The dissent also criticized the defense counsel's lack of objection to the juror's dismissal, arguing it indicated recognition of the juror's proper removal. The majority opinion challenges this view, asserting that the defense counsel likely welcomed the juror's dismissal. Z expressed strong support for the death penalty and affirmed his readiness to impose it under oath, which benefited the defense when he was dismissed by the prosecutor. The dissent's claim that defense counsel conducted a "scrupulous" defense lacks factual support. Defense counsel opposed the dismissal of juror Y, who viewed the death penalty as "barbaric" and demonstrated an inability to impose it, thus disqualifying herself under the Witherspoon standard. The dissent incorrectly suggests that Brown's attorney should have felt obligated to accept Y's dismissal despite her being a more favorable juror for the defense. The dismissal of juror Z is considered harmless by the trial judge, but Witherspoon errors are deemed structural. The dissent misapplies the standard from Rice v. Collins, as the Washington Supreme Court failed to establish that juror Z could not fulfill his oath. The prosecutor's objections to juror Z were based on perceived confusion about the death penalty rather than a direct challenge to his ability to uphold his oath. The prosecutor did not assert that juror Z would disregard his duty, which supports the argument for the invalidity of the dismissal. The prosecutor's argument regarding juror Z's willingness to impose the death penalty is flawed and mischaracterizes juror Z's statements. Juror Z indicated he supports the death penalty but would consider it carefully, which does not suggest he would fail to follow the law. The trial judge's acceptance of the prosecutor's reasoning is criticized, as there is no evidence from juror Z's voir dire that he would not adhere to his oath. The dissenting opinion misinterprets Washington's death penalty jury instructions, mistakenly asserting that the heinousness of the crime justifies dismissing juror Z. This misinterpretation could lead to a Witherspoon error, which prohibits judges from considering the severity of a crime when evaluating juror dismissal. The court finds no constitutional issues with the conviction, referencing relevant case law that distinguishes between death sentence errors and conviction validity. The dissenting judges argue against the majority's decision, suggesting it undermines the proper application of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act by overturning a justified sentence for a severe murder conviction. The panel improperly replaces the trial judge's discretionary ruling regarding the dismissal of a prospective juror for cause during jury selection in a capital case, disregarding the limitations of the written transcript and the defense counsel’s lack of objection to the dismissal. The opinion fails to provide the required deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) to the Washington Supreme Court's endorsement of the trial judge's thorough approach in jury selection. A dissent is expressed against the denial of rehearing en banc, referencing the precedent set in *Rice v. Collins* which emphasizes the need for deferential review of trial court decisions in jury selection due to the inadequacies of a written record. Even under the framework established in *Gray v. Mississippi*, deference must be afforded to the trial court's judgment that a juror could not fulfill their duties. The defense did not object to the dismissal of Juror Z, who had expressed views that conflicted with the requirements of imposing the death penalty, and the Washington Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's dismissal. The panel's opinion unjustly critiques the Washington Supreme Court's reasoning as "misplaced and insufficient" based solely on the transcript, contradicting the findings of both state courts. The panel's conclusion that the Washington Supreme Court's decision was contrary to federal law or based on unreasonable factual determinations fails to meet the AEDPA's standard, which requires that the state court's dismissal be objectively unreasonable rather than merely incorrect. The state court must address facts that are materially indistinguishable from a Supreme Court decision and arrive at a different result for a claim to succeed. In Gray, the Supreme Court reversed a Mississippi decision permitting the dismissal of a juror opposed to the death penalty, asserting that a juror may not be dismissed unless their views would prevent them from performing their duties. This ruling is not subject to harmless error review. In Gray, the trial judge found that the juror could impose the death penalty but still dismissed her, which the Supreme Court deemed erroneous. The ruling emphasizes that potential jurors with conscientious objections against the death penalty cannot be excluded if they are otherwise eligible. However, jurors can be removed if they would impede the state's interests in constitutional capital sentencing. In this case, multiple judges found that Juror Z could not correctly apply Washington's capital sentencing law due to confusion about when to consider the death penalty. The appellate court's decision to override lower court judgments regarding Juror Z's dismissal was deemed inappropriate, as the state courts did not misapply Supreme Court precedent. Juror Z's reasoning for imposing the death penalty was inconsistent with Washington law, indicating a reasonable basis for his dismissal. Juror Z exhibited confusion regarding the imposition of the death penalty despite repeated explanations from both the defense and prosecution about the implications of a guilty verdict, specifically that Brown would never be released from prison. The trial judge clarified that life without parole was a sentencing option, yet Juror Z remained uncertain about when he would consider the death penalty, leading the prosecutor to note his confusion. Juror Z expressed a willingness to follow the law but suggested he needed more time to reflect, indicating indecision that the trial judge deemed disqualifying. Washington law does not ask jurors to assess the likelihood of reoffending but rather whether mitigating circumstances warrant leniency. The judge's conclusion that Juror Z could not fulfill his duty was deemed appropriate, contradicting the panel's assertion that the judge’s finding was unreasonable. The defense did not challenge Juror Z's removal during voir dire, although they did contest the dismissal of Juror Y, who had reservations about the death penalty. No claims of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding Juror Z were made by the defense. Observers of Juror Z's testimony, including the trial judge and both counsels, agreed on his proper dismissal. The panel’s determination, based solely on written records of the voir dire, was viewed as an overreach of its authority under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which aims to limit federal interference in state capital cases unless clear errors are demonstrated. The selective quoting of the voir dire transcript was noted to misrepresent the overall context of jury selection. The voir dire process involves complexities beyond what is captured in transcripts, particularly in assessing jurors' eligibility. In this case, despite clear legal standards warranting the death penalty for severe crimes such as kidnapping and murder, Juror Z expressed a misunderstanding of the law, believing that a death sentence required proof of recidivism. His wavering responses indicated a lack of comprehension, which was evident to the trial judge but not fully reflected in the transcript. The trial judge dismissed Juror Z based on nuanced observations, including body language and demeanor, which are critical in evaluating juror impartiality. Similarly, in the case of Juror Y, the trial judge considered non-verbal cues like posture to assess fitness for jury duty. The appellate court is urged to defer to the trial judge's insights gained from live observation, as juror bias assessments cannot rely solely on written records. The excerpt emphasizes the importance of this deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), highlighting the limitations of a purely textual analysis in understanding juror capabilities. In Rice v. Collins, the Supreme Court emphasized the necessity of deference to trial court findings regarding juror bias. The case involved a Batson challenge concerning the peremptory strike of Juror 16, a young African-American woman, based on the prosecutor's belief that her youth indicated a lack of community ties and potential leniency towards the crime. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's acceptance of the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations. The district court dismissed the habeas petition, but the Supreme Court reversed, stating that the appellate court had made an unreasonable factual determination by accepting the prosecutor's reasons without sufficient scrutiny. The Court highlighted that state-court factual findings are presumed correct and that the burden lies with the petitioner to rebut this presumption with clear and convincing evidence. Juror 16 had affirmed her belief in the illegality of the crime and claimed impartiality, yet the Court ruled that the prosecutor could still maintain concerns independent of her statements, as these could represent valid race-neutral reasons for the strike. Similarly, concerning Juror Z, the panel initially argued that his statement about considering the death penalty indicated an unreasonable justification for his exclusion. However, the trial judge was justified in considering Juror Z’s overall indecisiveness and inconsistent statements during voir dire as reasonable grounds for exclusion. The ruling affirmed that even if reasonable minds could differ on the credibility of jurors, such disagreements do not override the trial court’s determinations on juror qualifications, granting trial judges the same deference as juries in evaluating witness credibility. The superior court judge evaluated Juror Z's inconsistent statements to assess his capacity to serve faithfully as a juror under Washington law, having observed his testimony directly. The Washington Supreme Court's affirmation does not require an explicit finding of "substantially impaired" status for Juror Z. Although the appellate court did not use those exact words, both the trial and appellate courts supported the decision to excuse Juror Z based on the prosecutor’s claim that he could not uphold his juror oath regarding the death penalty law. The record allows for multiple interpretations, but the standard under AEDPA for relief requires a finding of "objectively unreasonable" decisions, which is not met here. The trial judge's actions during voir dire, including his assessment of Juror Z's responses and the prosecutor's rationale for dismissal, indicated that Juror Z was "substantially impaired." The absence of an objection from the defense further supported this implicit finding. The Washington Supreme Court must be afforded a presumption of correctness regarding the trial court's factual determinations about juror bias. The appellate court noted that Juror Z had indicated willingness to impose the death penalty under incorrect circumstances and misunderstood the burden of proof, thereby validating the trial court's discretion in excusing him for cause. The opinion suggests that the Washington Supreme Court implied Juror Z's substantial impairment in fulfilling juror duties, thus affirming his dismissal, while cautioning against undermining the trial court's necessary discretion in assessing juror bias in capital cases. Brown establishes that if the written record does not clearly indicate whether a dismissed juror could properly deliberate on the death penalty, the death sentence must be vacated if the juror was dismissed by a judge who observed their voir dire responses without any objection from the defense. However, this interpretation diverges from the Supreme Court's guidance on jury selection under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), even following the Gray decision. Prior to Collins, the Supreme Court held that a judge's decision to dismiss a juror does not require irrefutable proof of bias. While the court will not blindly uphold juror dismissals in death penalty cases, AEDPA necessitates greater deference to state courts than what has been applied in this instance. The lower standard of "reasonableness review" proposed in this opinion undermines a trial judge's ability to assess juror responses holistically, including non-verbal cues. AEDPA, as reinforced by the Supreme Court, demands respect for the practical decisions made by experienced state judges in capital cases. The author expresses dissent regarding the court's refusal to rehear the case en banc. In the context of Juror Z, the prosecutor challenged his ability to impose the death penalty, and despite his initial indication of being able to consider both sentencing options, Juror Z later misstated the applicable Washington law during questioning. The excerpt highlights a judicial exchange regarding the standard of proof required in a capital case. Juror Z expressed confusion about the phrase "beyond a shadow of a doubt" versus the legally required "beyond a reasonable doubt." The prosecutor clarified that the law does not require proof beyond all doubt, but Juror Z struggled to articulate his stance, indicating a need for evidence that a defendant would reoffend. Despite assertions that Juror Z could impose the death penalty, his responses displayed uncertainty and misunderstanding of the law, contradicting the panel's claims of his unequivocal stance. On October 25, 1993, the trial judge instructed the jury pool on the death penalty law, emphasizing the jury's role in determining whether to impose the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole, and the burden on the State to prove the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. This instruction was reiterated during individual questioning on November 3, 1993, further clarifying the implications of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or the death penalty.