Mary Patterson Brian Battiste Thomas Thibodeaux Alex Hartley Edna B. Taylor Edward Carter Helen Carter Demeturie Simmons Melvin Franklin Ronald Singleton Helen Ratcliff Willie Brown Charles K. Battiste Leonard Acklin Jawana Acklin Debra Ellzey-Herron v. Dean Morris, L.L.P., Dean Morris, L.L.P. Leader Mortgage Company, L.L.C. Long Beach Mortgage Company Mortgage Electronics Registration Systems, Inc. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. John C. Morris, III George B. Dean, Jr. Candice A. Courteau Charles H. Heck, Jr. Washington Mutual Bank Chase Home Finance, L.L.C. As Successor by Merger to Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation National City Bank, as Successor by Merger to the Provident Bank U.S. Bank, National Association, Robert Bauer Salome Lucineo Boyd Jim T. Bright Debra Bright Lionell J. Coleman Lynn L. Coleman Keenan Duckworth Karen Duckworth Mercedes Dutton Matthew David Dyer Terry Hardy, Sr. Terese La-Beaud Alton Pierce Willie Lee Rauls Rosalyn Veleary-Dodge v. Dean Morris, L.L.P. Banker's Trust of California
Docket: 06-30215
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; May 3, 2006; Federal Appellate Court
The case involves multiple plaintiffs, including Mary Patterson, Brian Battiste, and others, against several defendants primarily consisting of various mortgage companies and banks such as Dean Morris, L.L.P., Leader Mortgage Company, Long Beach Mortgage Company, and others. The plaintiffs, referred to as Plaintiffs-Appellees, claim against the defendants, known as Defendants-Appellants, for actions related to mortgage lending practices. The defendants include prominent financial institutions like Washington Mutual Bank, Chase Home Finance, and U.S. Bank, among others, many of which have been identified as successors by merger to previously established entities. The document outlines a series of lawsuits where the same group of plaintiffs is involved in multiple claims against the defendants concerning their financial dealings and alleged misconduct.
Defendants appeal a remand order to state court concerning class actions, asserting a lack of jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) and grounds for equitable remand in bankruptcy. The Fifth Circuit affirms the remand order related to CAFA but dismisses the remand order in the Bauer matter and the equitable remand order in the Patterson matter due to jurisdictional issues. The court notes that it can review remand orders for errors concerning CAFA applications. Defendants contend that the district court improperly placed the burden of proof on them regarding removal appropriateness; however, the court's reliance on undisputed documentation (fee schedules, fax confirmations, etc.) to establish the lawsuit's commencement date renders the burden of proof allocation irrelevant. CAFA grants federal jurisdiction for class actions initiated on or after February 18, 2005. Plaintiffs claim their actions began on February 17, 2005, when they fax-filed their complaints, while defendants argue that the actions did not commence until fees were fully paid on subsequent dates. Louisiana law permits fax filing if the applicable fees are sent within five days; otherwise, the transmission is without effect.
Plaintiffs received a fax confirmation on February 18 listing the filing fees for the Patterson and Bauer suits as $5,127.00 and $4,689.00, respectively. On February 22, they paid $3,039.00 for each case. A letter received on May 12 indicated an additional owed amount of $2,145.50, which plaintiffs paid on June 14. Defendants argue that this late payment indicates plaintiffs did not meet the five-day deadline mandated by LA. R.S. 13:850, thus delaying the commencement date of their suits. In contrast, plaintiffs assert they paid all required fees upon their arrival at court on February 22 and were unaware of any additional fees until notified on May 12 due to a clerk's error. They argue that all court payments are non-refundable and cannot be held on account, thus they fulfilled the statutory requirement by paying the applicable filing fee at the relevant time.
The case of Hall v. Reber is cited, where the plaintiff's timely payment of $175.00 was deemed sufficient despite a later notice of an additional $125.00 required for processing, establishing that the suit commenced as of the filing date. The breakdown of fees indicated that the plaintiffs' February 22 payment covered the petition and transmission fees, aligning with Hall's precedent. The plaintiffs contend that their timely payment of $3,039.00 was adequate for the required fees, and their failure to pay for additional parties should not affect the suit's commencement date under Louisiana law. Defendants' cited cases involve insufficient funds for required fees and are not applicable here. Furthermore, the plaintiffs' underlying claim involves allegations of overcharging related to collection and foreclosure proceedings, with the Patterson and Bauer class actions later consolidated. The Patterson class includes those with bankruptcy filings that could support federal jurisdiction, while the Bauer class encompasses other Louisiana residents.
Defendants argue that even if the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) does not grant the district court jurisdiction, the court could still hear the case under the general bankruptcy removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1452. The court determined it lacked bankruptcy jurisdiction over Bauer, as there were no members in bankruptcy and only state law claims present. While bankruptcy jurisdiction for Patterson was acknowledged, the court opted to equitably remand the case based on precedent from Browning v. Navarro, allowing remand on any equitable grounds. Notably, orders remanding claims under this statute are not subject to appeal (28 U.S.C. § 1452(b)).
Despite the lack of appellate jurisdiction over equitable remand orders, the court examined whether CAFA could provide an independent basis for review and concluded it does not. CAFA limits removal of class actions strictly to cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1453, and although it allows for appeals from remand orders, this does not extend to non-reviewable remand decisions when CAFA is deemed inapplicable.
The court emphasized that equitable remands related to bankruptcy cases typically cannot be reviewed federally, as established in Arnold v. Garlock, Inc. CAFA only permits review of remand orders that meet its criteria, which is not the case here. The court noted that the plaintiffs' claims began just before CAFA's enactment on February 18, 2005, and thus CAFA cannot serve as a basis for appellate review of the remand, ensuring consistent treatment of bankrupt class actions prior to CAFA's introduction.
Defendants' request to apply the Yamaha Motor Corp. precedent, which discusses the scope of appellate jurisdiction, was dismissed since the district court's remand order does not fall under the CAFA framework. The district court's order to remand the actions to the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans was upheld, confirming that as jurisdiction under CAFA is lacking, the matter remains solely as an equitable remand under § 1452(b), which is non-reviewable.
In Brill, 427 F.3d at 451-52, the court examined a remand order related to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, noting that the district court had also denied removal under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The Brill court did not address the specific statutory language that limits appellate jurisdiction over remand orders, aside from the general provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1447(d), which CAFA specifically amended. Both Yamaha and Brill did not address the conflict between statutory provisions that seemingly grant and restrict jurisdiction over remand orders. The recommended approach to reconcile these conflicting statutes is to prioritize the text of 28 U.S.C. 1452(b), which suggests a lack of jurisdiction over the equitable remand order unless CAFA offers an independent jurisdictional basis.
The remand order concerning the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) is affirmed, while the appeals related to the remand order in Bauer and the equitable remand order in Patterson are dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction. The court mandates prompt issuance of this decision. CAFA's language does not support a shift in the burden of proof for removal, as established in Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., which emphasizes that the proponent of removal bears the persuasion burden. The document notes a $3,006.50 petition fee, clarified by a plaintiff's receipt detailing charges for class action lawsuits and additional fees. Defendants’ argument regarding the recommencement of actions through amended complaints is considered waived on appeal due to lack of evidence presented to the district court. The Bauer class initially included two named plaintiffs who sought bankruptcy protection but were dismissed without prejudice, leading to a remand as no federal questions remained. Defendants contended the claims were merely stayed pending arbitration, but jurisdictional remands based on events post-removal are non-reviewable. The court declined to adopt reasoning from Brill that would allow broader review of remand orders, reaffirming limitations on jurisdiction to CAFA contexts as per Williams. Lastly, the permissive language of 28 U.S.C. 1453(c)(1) allows appellate courts discretion in accepting appeals, which the court chooses not to exercise in this case to adhere to statutory text.
