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Lynette M. Petruska v. Gannon University the Board of Trustees of Gannon University William I. Alford, II Robert H. Allshouse Joseph F. Allison Michael P. Allison, Rev. James A. Baldauf L. Scott Barnard George J. Behringer Arnold E. Bergquist Lawrence E. Brandt, Rev. Msgr. Robert L. Brugger, Rev. Msgr. Donald M. Carlson Daniel C. Carneval, D.O. Stephanie Domitrovich, Hon. Thomas L. Doolin James J. Duratz Antoine M. Garibaldi Thomas C. Guelcher William M. Hilbert, Sr. Brian J. Jackman James W. Keim, Jr. Mary Rita Kuhn, Sr., Ssj Thomas J. Loftus Anne C. McCallion Joseph T. Messina Michael J. Nuttall John E. Paganie Denise Illig Robison James J. Rutkowski, Jr. James A. Schaffner Helen M. Schilling, M.D., D.D.S. John M. Schultz, Very Rev. Robert J. Smith, Rev. Msgr. Lawrence T. Speice, Rev. Msgr. William C. Springer James G. Toohey Donald W. Trautman, Bishop Anastasia Valimont, Sr. Ssj Ricarda Vincent, Sr. Ssj Melvin Witherspoon All Other Known and Unknown Members of the Board of Trustees of Gannon University Dur
Citations: 448 F.3d 615; 64 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 823; 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135; 87 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,369; 2006 WL 1410038Docket: 05-1222
Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; May 24, 2006; Federal Appellate Court
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed the application of the ministerial exception to Title VII employment discrimination suits involving religious organizations. This doctrine, rooted in the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, exempts religious institutions from such suits when the discrimination relates to religious beliefs, doctrines, or internal church regulations. The court articulated a nuanced approach to the ministerial exception, allowing for Title VII claims if the discrimination does not pertain to religious factors. In this case, Lynette Petruska alleges that Gannon University, a Catholic institution, demoted her for reasons unrelated to religion, specifically due to her gender and her opposition to sexual harassment by university officials. The court's ruling emphasizes that discrimination not linked to religious belief does not fall under the protection of the ministerial exception, thereby enabling potential Title VII claims in such contexts. The District Court dismissed Petruska's Title VII claims against Gannon, citing the ministerial exception under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). However, it was determined that such a motion should be assessed under Rule 12(b)(6), which requires accepting Petruska's allegations as true. Thus, it was assumed that Gannon had no religious justification for her demotion, leading to the reversal of the dismissal of her Title VII claims. Petruska also raised state law claims for breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent supervision and retention, and civil conspiracy, which the District Court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) on the grounds that the religion clauses removed jurisdiction. Upon review under Rule 12(b)(6), it was found that these claims did not necessitate examining religious matters, allowing them to proceed. Petruska, hired as Gannon University's Director of Social Concerns in 1997 and appointed as the first female chaplain in 1999, sought assurances from President David Rubino regarding her position's security against potential male successors due to concerns over gender discrimination and the influence of Bishop Donald Trautman. Rubino assured her that her tenure would be performance-based. In March 2000, Rubino took a leave of absence amidst allegations of sexual misconduct, which he admitted. Petruska played a key role in reporting further accusations against him, leading to his resignation in May, after which Gannon attempted to conceal his misconduct. Petruska was involved in revising the university's sexual harassment policy and successfully opposed limitations on grievance filing times. However, in July 2000, acting President Ostrowski was instructed by Trautman to place the Chaplain's Division under Rouch's control, which Ostrowski resisted. Ostrowski informed Petruska about Trautman's plan to place the Chaplain's Division under Rouch's leadership, acknowledging that this decision was based on her gender. Ostrowski indicated that Trautman and Rouch would not allow Petruska to remain as Chaplain due to her gender. In January 2001, Ostrowski learned Trautman planned to remove three high-ranking female officials, including Petruska, once a new President was appointed. Antoine Garibaldi became President in May 2001 and required Rouch's approval for Petruska's decisions. In August 2002, Garibaldi announced a restructuring that removed Petruska from the President's Staff and made Rouch her supervisor. Believing she was about to be fired, Petruska resigned in October 2002. Following her resignation, Rouch stated that a woman would not replace Petruska as chaplain. Petruska subsequently filed a lawsuit against Gannon University and various officials, asserting six claims including Title VII sex discrimination and retaliation. The District Court dismissed her complaint, ruling that the religion clauses barred her claims. The excerpt also addresses the ongoing conflict between state regulation and religious freedom, particularly in employment contexts, and discusses the ministerial exception that exempts religious institutions from Title VII discrimination suits involving employees with ministerial duties. This exception is recognized by several federal circuits, focusing on whether an employee's primary functions serve the spiritual mission of the church. Courts have established the ministerial exception through constitutional analysis and the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, particularly in relation to Title VII. The Fourth Circuit affirmed that Title VII explicitly applies to ministerial employment but held that the religion clauses of the Constitution prevent employment lawsuits by ministers. Conversely, the McClure case used the constitutional avoidance approach, suggesting Title VII does not unambiguously pertain to ministerial hiring and firing. There are three primary rationales for the ministerial exception derived from various constitutional provisions. First, the "government scrutiny" rationale posits that the exception is necessary to prevent government interference in church affairs, rooted in the Establishment Clause. Second, the "selection of clergy" rationale emphasizes that religious institutions must independently choose their ministers without government involvement, aligning more closely with the Free Exercise Clause. Finally, the "inquiry into religious doctrine" rationale argues that courts should refrain from resolving religious issues, as doing so would exceed judicial authority, also framed in terms of both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. The Court has not formally adopted or rejected the ministerial exception in prior cases but has addressed claims from non-ministerial employees against religious organizations. In Little v. Wuerl, the court upheld a Catholic school's decision not to rehire a teacher based on her remarriage, determining that Title VII allows for exemptions based on non-conformance with religious standards. The ministerial exception was not applicable in the case of Little because the plaintiff was a non-ministerial employee who was terminated based on religious discrimination, allowing for statutory exemptions under Title VII. While the court acknowledged the ministerial exception, it emphasized that Title VII does not govern the relationship between ministers and their religious employers, even in cases of alleged discrimination based on race or sex. In the case of Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish School, a teacher, also a non-ministerial employee, claimed age discrimination after being fired, though the school argued her dismissal was due to personal circumstances. The court determined that the suit did not pose a significant risk to First Amendment rights. Petruska's claims were dismissed by the District Court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The court noted a division among jurisdictions regarding whether the ministerial exception is jurisdictional or a failure to state a claim. Ultimately, it found that the exception should be raised under Rule 12(b)(6) for this case, leading to a plenary review of Petruska's allegations. Petruska alleged she was demoted due to her gender, specifically stating that Gannon’s acting President indicated her demotion was "solely on the basis of her gender." The court examined whether the demotion stemmed from religious beliefs or sexism. It concluded that the allegations suggested sexism unconnected to religious doctrine, as Petruska had been hired as a chaplain and no Catholic doctrine prohibited women from such roles. The complaint highlighted a culture of sexism and harassment at Gannon, including admissions of misconduct by a former president and claims of systemic discrimination against women in leadership roles, indicating that the actions taken against Petruska were not justified by religious principles. The case addresses whether a ministerial employee can sue a religious institution under Title VII when the employment decision lacks a faith-based rationale. The analysis begins by emphasizing the need for a construction of Title VII that avoids infringing on the First Amendment. While previous rulings, such as McClure, suggested Title VII may not apply to ministerial employees, the Fourth Circuit clarified that Congress intended for Title VII to include ministers within its protections against sex discrimination and retaliation, as outlined in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a). Title VII provides a limited exemption for religious organizations to hire individuals of a particular religion but does not allow discrimination based on sex or retaliation for reporting such discrimination. The legislative history of Title VII indicates that while religious organizations can discriminate based on religion, they cannot do so based on sex, as evidenced by the evolution of the law since its inception in 1964 and reaffirmed in 1972. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the ministerial exception must originate from the Constitution rather than Title VII. It is noted that while a woman could sue for sex discrimination if denied priesthood, Title VII cannot constitutionally extend to matters of religious belief or doctrine, as such interference would violate the Free Exercise Clause and risk entangling courts in religious affairs, breaching the Establishment Clause. However, the case at hand involves an allegation of demotion based on gender animus unrelated to religious beliefs or doctrines. The ministerial exception does not shield Title VII claims from ministerial employees if the employment decision is not based on religious beliefs, doctrine, or church regulations. The court emphasizes that the Free Exercise Clause should not allow discrimination disconnected from religious principles. The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the ministerial exception, but lower circuits have linked it to church autonomy principles, which permit churches to govern their own laws without judicial interference. However, Title VII is a secular law, and since no religious justification was presented for the demotion in question, the church autonomy principles are deemed inapplicable. Relevant case law, such as Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich and Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, illustrates that courts cannot intervene in church decisions regarding internal regulations. These cases affirm a church's right to self-governance, but the application of federal statutes like Title VII introduces different considerations. Federal laws, including employment regulations, require adherence by religious institutions, as they are neutral and generally applicable, thereby not infringing on religious exercise. The courts must accept that such laws govern the employment practices of churches without entangling the government in religious matters. In Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, the Supreme Court ruled that a Georgia court improperly instructed a jury to resolve a church property dispute by considering religious doctrine, violating the First Amendment. The Court emphasized that civil courts must address church property disputes using neutral laws that do not involve inquiries into religious matters. This principle was reaffirmed in Maryland and Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, where the Court upheld a Maryland court's decision that relied solely on legal documents without engaging in religious doctrine. The Court reiterated that religious organizations must adhere to secular laws as long as those laws do not necessitate an exploration of religious beliefs or practices. Consequently, in the case concerning Petruska's complaint under Title VII, the application of these precedents would only preclude her suit if it required examination of religious doctrine. Since there is no indication that Petruska's demotion was tied to religious beliefs or internal regulations, the case does not necessitate such an inquiry at this stage. Further, the document discusses rationales for the ministerial exception, which some circuits argue is essential to prevent government interference in religious matters, citing Catholic Bishop as a key case. In contrast, a distinction was made in Geary, where it was ruled that a non-minister could pursue a Title VII claim against a religious employer, highlighting that employment discrimination laws involve less scrutiny of religious affairs compared to the oversight of religious schools. In such cases, courts only need to determine if a sincerely held religious belief motivated the employer's actions, thereby limiting the government's entanglement with religious institutions. The court must evaluate whether allowing Petruska's lawsuit against Gannon would result in excessive judicial scrutiny of the church, adhering to the principle that courts should not resolve issues of religious belief, doctrine, or internal regulations. At this stage, it is unclear if the case will require examination of these religious aspects. If Gannon does not provide a religious justification for Petruska's demotion, the central question will focus on whether the demotion was due to gender discrimination, independent of religious considerations. Conversely, if Gannon offers a religious rationale for the demotion, this assertion alone does not necessitate dismissal of Petruska's claims. Potential justifications could include claims of non-compliance with church doctrine, such as failure to attend mass, or a concession of gender discrimination rooted in religious principles. In the former situation, the court would assess whether the demotion was motivated by the claimed religious doctrine or by sex discrimination, without challenging the validity of the doctrine itself. For instance, if Gannon asserts that Petruska was demoted for not attending mass, she cannot dispute the doctrinal requirement but can argue that her demotion was not related to her attendance. She could present evidence suggesting that her demotion was solely based on gender and that male employees who did not attend mass faced no similar consequences. The evaluation of such evidence would not require the court to engage with religious questions. Gannon may acknowledge that Petruska was demoted based on gender but argue that this discrimination was driven by religious doctrine or internal church regulations. The factfinder would need to ascertain whether the discrimination stemmed from such religious principles, as this would invoke the ministerial exception, barring Petruska's claim. Petruska cannot contest the validity of the religious doctrine cited by Gannon; for instance, if Gannon claims that Catholicism prohibits female university chaplains, Petruska cannot dispute this. Merely presenting evidence of sex discrimination would be insufficient if that discrimination is deemed religiously motivated, as it would fall outside of judicial review. However, Petruska might provide evidence that her demotion was not based on any religious justification, such as statements from decision-makers indicating no religious rationale for the discrimination. In such cases, the factfinder would avoid making religious determinations. If Gannon provides a religious rationale for the demotion, the District Court may need to restrict discovery or exclude evidence questioning the validity of the religious doctrine. For example, if Gannon claims Petruska was demoted for not attending mass, she cannot challenge this by referencing church law or scripture. The D.C. Circuit's guidance on a minister's contract claim suggests that if a claim probes ecclesiastical policy, the court may grant summary judgment to prevent excessive entanglement with religion. Nonetheless, if the church does not contest certain aspects of the claim or if neutral evidence is available, the case may proceed. The analysis of whether evidence challenges religious doctrines will be complex, but the district courts are deemed capable of managing these issues. The potential for future complications does not warrant dismissing Petruska's claims at this stage. The judicial approach must be careful to preserve constitutional rights without unnecessarily limiting valid claims, especially those intended to address historical injustices, as emphasized by Congress. Thus, there is no constitutional basis to dismiss Petruska's claims preemptively. The document articulates a legal rationale regarding the firing of ministerial employees by religious institutions. It acknowledges that while courts generally respect a church's autonomy to make employment decisions based on religious beliefs, this autonomy does not extend to decisions made on secular grounds, such as sexism. Specifically, if a male and female ministerial candidate are equally qualified and a church chooses the male candidate due to gender bias, such a decision is not protected under religious freedom, permitting the female candidate to file a Title VII discrimination lawsuit without infringing on the church's rights. The text further clarifies that religious institutions retain the right to terminate ministers for reasons aligned with their religious beliefs, such as misconduct or issues of faith. However, the newly adopted rule restricts these institutions from dismissing employees for secular reasons unrelated to their religious exercise. Additionally, the document notes that courts should not engage in inquiries regarding religious doctrine when evaluating ministerial employment cases. It emphasizes that the current claims, including a retaliation claim for opposing sexual harassment, do not present questions of religious doctrine that would entangle secular courts in church matters. Consequently, the dismissal of Petruska's discrimination claim is reversed, affirming her right to pursue legal action. The District Court's dismissal of Petruska's Title VII retaliation claim has been reversed. In addition to her Title VII claims, Petruska's complaint includes four state law claims: breach of contract, civil conspiracy, negligent supervision and retention, and fraudulent misrepresentation. The ministerial exception applies solely to Title VII, but similar doctrines limit state law claims linked to employment in religious organizations. Courts have determined that the First Amendment prohibits state law claims necessitating interpretation of religious beliefs or doctrines, while allowing claims that do not require such inquiries. In evaluating Petruska's state law claims based on this precedent, the court found the following: 1. **Breach of Contract**: Petruska's claim that her demotion breached her three-year chaplain contract does not inherently involve questions of religious doctrine. Therefore, the dismissal of this claim is reversed. 2. **Fraudulent Misrepresentation**: Petruska's claim, based on Gannon's assertions about equal opportunity and Rubino's promise regarding gender performance, does not necessarily require inquiry into religious matters. However, she failed to meet the pleading standards for fraud under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), leading to the affirmation of the dismissal of this claim. 3. **Negligent Supervision and Retention and Civil Conspiracy**: Both claims arise directly from her Title VII allegations. Civil conspiracy requires proof of unlawful acts, which in this case are the violations of Title VII. Similarly, the negligent supervision and retention claim stems from the alleged Title VII violations, asserting that Gannon inadequately supervised and retained the discriminatory employees. Overall, the court allows the breach of contract claim to proceed while affirming the dismissal of the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, with the other two claims linked to Title VII allegations remaining intact. Gannon has not provided a justification for the retention of specific employees based on faith, doctrine, or internal regulations. The court permits Petruska to advance her Title VII claims, stating that the First Amendment does not prevent her conspiracy and negligent supervision and retention claims from proceeding at this stage. Consequently, the court reverses the District Court's dismissal of these claims, except for the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, which lacked sufficient detail as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Petruska's claims currently do not violate the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause, allowing her causes of action to move forward. However, the court warns that constitutional issues may arise later in the case, which the District Court must carefully navigate. The document also notes that the District Court did not engage in fact-finding, and the matter is treated as a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. Additionally, it references prior cases and emphasizes that religious organizations are not exempt from legal scrutiny regarding employment decisions, although they are not required to provide religious rationale for such decisions. Church personnel and records are subject to legal processes such as subpoenas and discovery, which can infringe upon rights protected by the Religion Clauses. The inquiry process itself can violate these rights, as established in cases like NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago. Excessive monitoring by public authorities can breach Establishment Clause principles, leading to entanglement with religious institutions. The selection of clergy is integral to a church's free exercise rights, and any government interference in this choice constitutes a burden. Secular evaluations of religious doctrine by authorities are prohibited by the First Amendment, as civil courts cannot resolve ecclesiastical matters without violating the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. Additionally, the document discusses procedural motions in court, specifically a 12(b)(1) motion regarding a court's power to hear a case versus a 12(b)(6) motion testing the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's claim. The ministerial exception, related to the church autonomy doctrine, can bar claims but does not impact a court's jurisdiction to adjudicate them. This exception, rooted in Title VII's provision on sex discrimination, reflects a limitation rather than a jurisdictional barrier. The ministerial exception limits a plaintiff's right of action under Title VII but does not affect a federal court's jurisdiction to review federal law claims. Federal courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions arising under U.S. laws, including Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination based on sex. Gannon's creation of a Vice President for Mission and Ministry position is seen as an internal regulatory decision, but Petruska's complaint alleges discrimination not from the position's creation but from Rouch being appointed to it, taking over duties previously held by Petruska. Title VII regulates the assignment of individuals to positions rather than the structure of the organization itself. Gannon has not provided a religious basis for appointing Rouch to the role formerly held by Petruska. The passage further references historical legislative context regarding Title VII and First Amendment protections, emphasizing that religious organizations should not have immunity for actions not based on religious beliefs, as this could lead to misconduct and deny employees recourse against mistreatment. The excerpt also distinguishes between relevant cases and clarifies that not all cases involving religious organizations pertain to First Amendment issues. A New York law intended to strengthen the North American branch of a church was invalidated by the Supreme Court because it favored one segment over another, violating the principle that the state cannot favor one religious group at the expense of another. The court acknowledged that secular courts lack the expertise to interpret church law and that they should not intervene in church decisions. It emphasized that individuals cannot be excused from valid laws based on their religious beliefs, and no compulsory deference to religious authority is required in church property disputes. The Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence supports limited inquiries into church matters, particularly when assessing whether actions were taken due to age or failure to perform religious duties, without questioning the validity of religious teachings. Furthermore, since the plaintiff, Petruska, seeks only monetary damages, her suit does not threaten church governance or appointment decisions. Her allegations involve opposition to sexual harassment policies and reporting misconduct, which the courts can address without violating the principle established in Milivojevich, which prohibits secular examination of church discipline and internal matters. The First Circuit dismissed a plaintiff's claim regarding wrongful discharge based on alleged violations of church procedures, referencing similar dismissals in Lewis v. Seventh Day Adventists and Hutchison v. Thomas, where state law claims were rejected due to the church's internal regulations. The Eighth Circuit allowed a minister's state law employment claims to proceed, emphasizing that evidence at trial might not necessitate an impermissible inquiry into religious bylaws. Churches can be held liable for torts and valid contracts, yet the religion clauses may prevent the use of internal church documents as evidence in breach of contract claims, particularly in the case of Petruska. The court ruled that the ministerial exception is not subject to waiver or estoppel, asserting that federal courts should avoid religious controversies. A dissenting opinion criticized the majority for treating ministers like lay employees and argued that decisions regarding spiritual roles are inherently religious. The dissent emphasized that the majority's approach contradicts established federal court precedent on the ministerial exception. Government interference in a church's decision-making infringes on its free exercise of religion, leading to judicial entanglement in religious matters. The ministerial exception should apply to any claims restricting a church's right to choose individuals for specific spiritual roles, regardless of any independent justification based on religious beliefs or doctrines. The court agrees that Gannon's motion to dismiss is valid under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and that Petruska's allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation lack the necessary detail under Rule 9(b). While the adjudication of Petruska's breach of contract claim does not violate the First Amendment, her claims related to Title VII, civil conspiracy, and negligent supervision are barred by the ministerial exception, given that her primary duties involved spiritual functions. The First Amendment protects both individual beliefs and the autonomy of religious institutions regarding church governance and internal matters. The Establishment Clause prohibits government actions that advance or inhibit religion or excessively entangle the state in religious doctrine. The case raises questions about the applicability of Title VII to Gannon's restructuring decisions and whether such adjudication would violate free exercise rights or cause unconstitutional entanglement. All relevant circuits have found that applying Title VII to minister-church relationships risks infringing on First Amendment rights, thus recognizing some form of the ministerial exception. Adjudication of Petruska's claims does not infringe upon the Free Exercise Clause unless Gannon provides a religious rationale for its restructuring decisions. The majority asserts that constitutional protections apply only to religious exercise. However, selecting a minister is fundamentally a religious exercise, as ministers embody the church's message and represent it publicly. The relationship between a church and its ministers is crucial, as the minister serves as a key instrument in fulfilling the church's purpose, thus making such matters of significant ecclesiastical concern. The Free Exercise Clause protects two interrelated rights: the right to express religious beliefs and the right of religious institutions to govern themselves. A church must have the freedom to select its representatives to communicate its beliefs. Petruska's complaint challenges this right, asserting that any restrictions on the church's ability to choose its spiritual voice violate its Free Exercise rights. The majority claims that Gannon's right to govern and organize internally is limited to interpreting its own regulations, stating that Gannon has not demonstrated the need for creating the Vice President for Mission and Ministry position. The dissent disagrees, arguing that both the Vice President for Mission and Ministry and the University Chaplain serve vital spiritual functions, including teaching and church governance. Thus, Gannon's decisions about these positions involve constitutionally protected spiritual functions, which are shielded from government interference by the Free Exercise Clause. Religious organizations are subject to neutral laws of general applicability that do not require examination of religious doctrine, as established in key Supreme Court cases. The majority opinion asserts that Title VII, a neutral law, applies to lay employment decisions made by religious institutions, despite an exception for hiring individuals of a particular religion for roles integral to the church's functions. The dissenting view emphasizes that a church's choice of minister is fundamental to its expression of faith and argues that applying Title VII in this context infringes on the Free Exercise Clause. It contends that while the Free Exercise Clause protects a church's governance and teachings, it does not extend to member practices that contravene neutral laws. The dissent criticizes the majority for equating the treatment of lay employees with ministers, rejecting the recognized ministerial exception from other appellate courts. Additionally, the dissent addresses the Establishment Clause, arguing against the majority's requirement for a religious justification to avoid unconstitutional entanglement, referencing the three-prong test from Lemon v. Kurtzman for determining Establishment Clause issues. The statute must fulfill three criteria: it must have a secular legislative purpose, its primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion, and it must not result in excessive government entanglement with religion. In the context of Title VII, only the excessive entanglement prong is relevant. This excessive entanglement occurs if the court's inquiry into Gannon's restructuring decision involves evaluating the validity of religious beliefs or practices. The church's choice regarding who performs its spiritual functions is a religious decision; thus, any inquiry into this decision excessively entangles the court. The majority's reliance on the Geary case is misplaced, as Geary distinguishes between clergy and lay employees. In Geary, a teacher was dismissed for violating church doctrine, but the court ruled that the inquiry into age discrimination did not violate the Establishment Clause because it did not question the validity of religious beliefs. However, the Geary Court explicitly noted that cases involving clergy carry a significant risk of entanglement due to the religious nature of employment decisions for spiritual roles. The ministerial exception should prevent any claims that limit a church's right to select individuals for spiritual functions. Petruska's First Amended Complaint includes six claims: two under Title VII for discrimination and retaliation, and four others (fraudulent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, breach of contract, and negligent supervision and retention). The resolution of the Title VII claims, along with the other claims, would impose unconstitutional limits on Gannon's First Amendment rights, thus they should be barred by the ministerial exception. Petruska claims that Gannon unlawfully demoted and constructively discharged her as University Chaplain due to her gender and in retaliation for opposing sexual harassment. She argues that Gannon's restructuring was a pretext for discrimination. However, it is determined that Gannon's restructuring involved decisions about spiritual roles, thereby invoking the First Amendment, which would render Petruska's Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims (Counts I and II) subject to dismissal. Additionally, Petruska's First Amended Complaint includes three state tort claims: civil conspiracy, negligent supervision and retention, and fraudulent misrepresentation. These claims hinge on proving Gannon's restructuring as an unlawful act, which Petruska ties to her Title VII allegations. Since Gannon's decision falls under the ministerial exception to Title VII, these tort claims should also be dismissed. Petruska also raises a breach of contract claim, asserting entitlement to serve on the President's Staff and lead the Chaplain's Division based on her contract with Gannon. The court finds that state contract law does not impose restrictions on Gannon’s rights to select ministers, distinguishing it from Title VII and state tort law. Contracts in this context are enforceable, and their enforcement does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The analysis of this claim does not require examination of religious functions but instead focuses on the existence of a contract and its breach. Therefore, this claim is remanded for further consideration, as it does not inherently entangle the court in religious matters. A church's decision on who performs its spiritual functions is fundamentally a religious matter. The majority's refusal to recognize a ministerial exception conflicts with the stance of all other federal appellate courts on this issue. The dissent argues that this ruling allows government interference in the church's constitutionally protected choices, violating the First Amendment. A series of cases is cited, illustrating that other circuits apply the ministerial exception based on the function of the position, where primary duties involve teaching, governance, or participation in religious practices. The dissent emphasizes that the First Amendment protects decisions made by religious institutions, regardless of the underlying motivations. Additionally, it asserts that the judiciary cannot assess the legitimacy of employment decisions regarding ministers without infringing on constitutional boundaries. Personnel decisions regarding clergy by church-affiliated institutions are classified as inherently religious matters, and civil courts lack the authority to review such decisions. This limitation arises because judicial review would necessitate the courts interpreting religious doctrine and canonical law, essentially imposing a secular framework on decisions made by religious authorities. This encroachment on religious autonomy is prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause. The excerpt references case law, including Bollard, which emphasizes deference to religious organizations' decisions without further inquiry, and Minker, which highlights the ministerial exception that allows courts to avoid delving into the ecclesiastical nature of employment decisions. The Eleventh Circuit, while recognizing the ministerial exception, appears not to clarify whether this exception applies irrespective of the motives behind employment actions. It is noted that the constitutional protection of religious freedom extends to churches' employment actions involving clergy, even if those actions are not explicitly tied to church doctrine. The role of ministers is underscored as critical to the spiritual life of church members, as they perform significant religious functions such as marriages, funerals, and spiritual counseling. The case of Petruska is examined, where her duties as University Chaplain included roles that were ministerial in nature, such as co-chairing the Catholic Identity Task Force and leading prayer services. Despite her claims about job title and requirements, the complaint reveals her responsibilities aligned closely with ministerial functions. Additionally, the Vice President of Mission and Ministry is mentioned as having oversight of spiritual roles, indicating that some of his responsibilities are also spiritual in nature. The excerpt concludes by acknowledging the complexities in determining whether a minister's Title VII claim pertains to a church's decision on who performs spiritual functions, referencing a case where a Presbyterian minister alleged harassment and retaliation. The Elvig Court affirmed that a church's clergy selection decisions are protected by the First Amendment, barring claims related to ministerial employment decisions. However, despite dissenting views, the Court ruled that claims of sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation (specifically verbal abuse and intimidation) did not involve protected employment decisions, leading to the reversal of the district court's dismissal of those claims. In Petruska's case, the retaliatory conduct in question pertains to the employment decision itself, which is recognized as protected under the Free Exercise Clause. As Petruska does not assert claims of sexual harassment or hostile work environment, and since her alleged retaliatory conduct involves a protected choice, the court refrains from addressing whether similar claims from Elvig fall under the ministerial exception to Title VII. The majority agrees that Petruska failed to adequately plead fraud under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), affirming the dismissal of Count III. Civil conspiracy under Pennsylvania law necessitates proof of two or more individuals collaborating to commit an unlawful act or to unlawfully perform a lawful act. Additionally, an employer may be liable for negligent supervision if they fail to prevent foreseeable intentional harm by an employee outside the scope of employment. While Petruska's amended complaint references broader issues of priest sexual abuse and alleged cover-ups by Bishop Trautman, the only intentional harm she claims to have personally experienced is discrimination and retaliation.