United States v. Roshon E. Thomas, AKA Rollin Roy Phillips
Docket: 04-30541
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; May 18, 2006; Federal Appellate Court
The case involves Roshon E. Thomas, who is appealing a decision regarding the legality of a police search of a rental car he was driving, despite not being listed on the rental agreement. Officer Michael Bahr of the Spokane police, who was also part of a DEA task force, received a confidential tip suggesting that Thomas was involved in transporting crack cocaine from Long Beach, California, to Spokane, Washington. The informant, who had previously rented a vehicle at Thomas's direction, indicated that Thomas frequently used rented cars for drug transport and had made similar trips every six to eight weeks.
The informant provided details about a specific trip in November 2002, during which Thomas allegedly transported crack cocaine for an associate named Antonio Crawford, who had been arrested for drug distribution. The police corroborated the informant's claims by confirming that a known associate of Thomas, Jamie McGuffey, rented a vehicle from Budget Rental Company shortly before the police investigation began, which had accumulated significant mileage consistent with a round trip to Long Beach.
Further investigation revealed that Thomas had a past history of renting cars from Budget, and the informant continued to provide updates, including information about a planned trip to Long Beach over the Christmas holiday for drug transportation. On February 27, 2003, when Thomas and McGuffey attempted to rent a car, they were denied service due to outstanding late fees, prompting the Budget manager to alert local rental services about their attempts. The case raises legal questions regarding the standing of a non-listed driver to challenge the search of a vehicle associated with drug trafficking allegations.
On March 4, 2003, National Car Rental at Spokane Airport notified Officer Bahr of McGuffey's reservation for a white 2003 Dodge Intrepid, scheduled for pickup at noon on March 5. The rental manager permitted police to install a tracking device in the vehicle prior to McGuffey’s rental. McGuffey completed the rental agreement on March 5, which stated that only authorized drivers could operate the vehicle, but did not list Thomas as such. On March 8, the tracking device indicated that the rental car returned to Washington State. While Officer Bahr was unavailable, another DEA officer and Washington State Patrol troopers monitored the area until they spotted the rental car around 1:30 a.m. The DEA agent recognized Thomas, who was alone in the vehicle and presented a driver's license under the name 'Roland Phillips.' Officers confirmed his identity via tattoos and arrested him based on an outstanding warrant. A search of the rental car revealed nearly 600 grams of cocaine, $1,200, and 25.1 grams of heroin. Thomas's counsel filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the tracking device usage violated his right to privacy under Griswold v. Connecticut, but did not claim McGuffey authorized him to drive the rental car. The district court ruled against Thomas, finding insufficient evidence of permission from McGuffey and stating that unauthorized drivers lack a reasonable expectation of privacy, thus lacking standing to challenge the search. The court also cited probable cause, the legality of monitoring public movements, the appropriateness of the Terry stop, the automobile exception, and the inevitability of discovery as reasons for denying the motion. Following this, Thomas entered a conditional guilty plea for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance and was sentenced to 188 months in custody. He appealed, claiming standing to contest the search despite not being authorized to drive the rental car. The assessment of an unauthorized driver’s privacy interest is based on whether they have a legitimate expectation of privacy as recognized by society. Courts have established multiple criteria for determining such standing in cases involving unauthorized drivers of rental vehicles.
The Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits utilize a bright-line test, asserting that individuals not listed on a rental agreement lack standing to contest a search, as they do not hold a property or possessory interest in the vehicle, nor an expectation of privacy. This principle is supported by United States v. Haywood, which emphasizes that an unauthorized driver without a valid license cannot expect privacy since the rental company would not have permitted vehicle use.
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit modifies this approach, allowing standing for unauthorized drivers only if they can demonstrate permission from the authorized driver, as seen in United States v. Best and United States v. Muhammad. Here, standing is based on showing 'consensual possession' and parallels the treatment of unauthorized drivers of privately owned cars, referencing United States v. Sanchez.
The Sixth Circuit adopts a totality-of-the-circumstances approach, as articulated in United States v. Smith, where it rejects a strict bright-line rule in favor of assessing multiple factors to determine legitimate expectations of privacy. These factors include the driver's licensing status, the relationship with the lessee, possession of rental documents, permission to use the vehicle, and the driver's ties to the rental company.
The determination of standing for unauthorized drivers to challenge searches of rental vehicles remains unresolved in this Circuit, which has previously recognized that vehicle owners possess a legitimate expectation of privacy, while stressing that individuals lacking any possessory interest do not have such an expectation. The crux of the issue is whether unauthorized drivers possess any ownership or possessory interest in the rental vehicle.
A "possessory or ownership interest" is not strictly defined; a reasonable expectation of privacy can be established through property law principles or societal understandings. A defendant lacking ownership may still challenge a search if they demonstrate "joint control" or "common authority" over the searched property. For instance, a defendant had standing to contest a search of a friend's car due to possession with permission, while another lacked standing when no proprietary interest or joint control was shown. Common authority is based on mutual property use by individuals with joint access. In Jones v. United States, a defendant had standing to challenge a search of a friend's apartment because he had permission, a key, stored belongings, and the ability to exclude others. Conversely, a defendant without any property interest or control over a vehicle lacked standing. It is noted that a driver's unauthorized use of a rental car does not negate their privacy interest, as established in cases like United States v. Henderson, where a lessee retains a reasonable expectation of privacy even after the lease ends, as long as they maintain possession. Additionally, privacy rights may persist past rental periods or check-out times, indicating that violations of lease terms do not automatically extinguish privacy expectations.
The court rejects the government's argument that a defendant not listed on a lease lacks standing to challenge a search. Citing precedents such as Portillo, Jones, Dorais, and Henderson, it asserts that constitutional standing cannot solely rely on a rental agreement. An unauthorized driver with permission to use a rental car can challenge a search similarly to an authorized renter. The court supports this position with findings that ownership indicators, such as the ability to exclude others and possession with permission, grant standing. Consequently, Thomas, as an unauthorized driver, can only contest the search if he proves he had permission from the authorized renter, McGuffey. Thomas did not demonstrate such permission, leading to the conclusion that he lacks standing.
In addition, Thomas raises four sentencing errors. First, he claims the district court misapplied U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b) regarding the definition of 'Offense Statutory Maximum.' Second, he argues the court improperly considered offenses that were neither admitted nor proven to a jury. Third, he asserts the sentence was enhanced based on judge-found facts. Fourth, he contends he was not advised of his right to have a jury determine drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt.
Under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b), a career offender's offense level is based on the 'Offense Statutory Maximum' for the conviction. Thomas argues that Blakely v. Washington redefines 'statutory maximum' to mean the highest sentence a judge can impose based solely on jury findings or defendant admissions. However, the application note clarifies that 'Offense Statutory Maximum' refers to the maximum imprisonment term authorized for the offense of conviction, not the maximum penalty under unique circumstances. The career offender provision focuses on the potential punishment for the crime, which remains unaffected by Blakely.
Thomas pled guilty to a class B felony under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), facing a maximum sentence of 30 years. The district court properly applied sentencing under § 4B1.1. Thomas contested the use of prior convictions to enhance his sentence, arguing that Almendarez-Torres may no longer be valid post-Blakely, but this was rejected based on precedent from United States v. Weiland. He also claimed the court improperly relied on judge-found facts; however, the drug quantity was stipulated in his plea agreement, thus no error occurred. Thomas argued he was not informed of his right to have a jury determine drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt, but this claim was waived as it was not raised in his opening brief.
Regarding a potential remand under United States v. Ameline, the government contended that the district court's comments indicated it would impose the same sentence even if the Guidelines were advisory. Thomas needed to show a reasonable probability of a different sentence under advisory Guidelines, but the court's statements did not definitively confirm this. The district court imposed a minimum sentence of 188 months, choosing not to exceed the statutory minimum, leading to uncertainty about whether he would have received the same sentence if the Guidelines were advisory. Consequently, a limited Ameline remand was deemed necessary, while affirming part of the district court's decision.
The panel unanimously determined that this case could be decided without oral argument, contrary to Thomas's suggestion that the source was 'unidentified.' Officer Bahr obtained a warrant to install a tracking device, and the government did not attempt to justify the search on consent grounds, leading to the assumption that Thomas did not consent. Thomas's trial counsel's failure to call witnesses regarding standing was cited in his later motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He claimed the district court made contradictory factual conclusions about McGuffey's permission to use the rental car. The court noted a lack of evidence that McGuffey loaned the car to Thomas but also mentioned that McGuffey's decision to allow Thomas to drive it nullified the rental agreement. The panel disagreed with Thomas's interpretation, clarifying that the district court's acknowledgment of McGuffey’s allowance was part of an alternative finding regarding the inevitable discovery of drugs, not a contradiction of its conclusion that McGuffey did not give permission. Thomas failed to present evidence supporting his claim of permission during the suppression hearing, and thus the district court's conclusions were deemed not clearly erroneous. Thomas's motion to withdraw his plea, based on ineffective assistance of counsel, was denied, and he did not appeal this decision. The motion to suppress is reviewed de novo, with factual findings assessed for clear error. The panel referenced prior Fifth Circuit cases, noting that later decisions have established a bright-line rule regarding unauthorized drivers and the terms of rental agreements, making Kye Soo Lee inapplicable to this case, where the rental agreement only authorized McGuffey to drive.
Thomas lacked standing to contest the search, making it unnecessary to evaluate its validity under the automobile exception or the doctrine of inevitable discovery. Sentences under the Sentencing Reform Act, following the Booker decision, are subject to reasonableness review. The court conducts de novo reviews of the interpretation and application of sentencing guidelines, while factual findings during sentencing are assessed for clear error. Since Thomas did not object to his Guideline sentence, any potential error related to Booker is unpreserved and subject to plain error review. Additionally, the district court's comments indicating disagreement with the length of sentences and mandatory minimums suggest a violation of the defendant's substantial rights.
