Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; May 17, 2006; Federal Appellate Court
Thomas Walker, an inmate at the United States Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, pleaded guilty to stabbing four correctional officers with sharpened metal rods. Shortly after his guilty pleas, he sought to withdraw them, claiming coercion due to the district court's denial of his motion to transfer the case to Indianapolis, fearing he could not receive a fair trial in Terre Haute. The district court denied his motion and sentenced him to 240 months in prison, which was 30 months above the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range.
On appeal, Walker argued that the district court should have allowed him to withdraw his pleas, that he was entitled to advance notice under Rule 32(h) for the upward departure from the Guidelines, and that his sentence was unreasonable. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, stating that Walker did not provide a fair and just reason for withdrawing his pleas and that merely changing his mind was insufficient. Additionally, the court noted that Rule 32(h)'s notice requirement was not applicable since the district court's sentence was based on the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), rather than a departure from the Guidelines. The court concluded that Walker's sentence was reasonable and well-explained.
The incident involved Walker stabbing Officer Joseph Sims and subsequently attacking Officers Gary Brummett, Terry Ray, and Lloyd McPherson, all of whom required medical attention. Following the assaults, Walker admitted to FBI Agent James Buckley that he attacked the officers to escape the penitentiary. Walker was indicted on four counts of assaulting federal officers with a deadly weapon under 18 U.S.C. 111(a) and (b). Prior to trial, he was transferred to a different facility while seeking a change of venue due to concerns about pretrial publicity and the likelihood of an impartial jury in Terre Haute.
On February 8, 2005, a district court hearing addressed Walker's motion to transfer his case, which the government opposed due to the inconvenience for local witnesses. The court denied the transfer, opting to summon additional jurors to assess potential prejudice instead. Walker's defense counsel requested his transfer to the Marion penitentiary for safety reasons, but the court decided against this. Instead, it asked the government to submit a security plan for Walker while he remained in Terre Haute. During the hearing, Walker unexpectedly expressed a desire to plead guilty, leading to a recess for him and his counsel to prepare a petition without a plea agreement.
Upon reconvening, the judge outlined the charges against Walker, who acknowledged his guilt for four counts of violations under 18 U.S.C. 111(a) and (b). The judge informed him of the potential maximum sentence of eighty years in prison and a $1,000,000 fine. Walker confirmed he understood these penalties and asserted that no promises or coercion influenced his decision to plead guilty. Although he initially cited concerns about receiving a fair trial, he ultimately affirmed his guilt. The government then provided a factual basis for the pleas, detailing Walker's confession of assaulting four officers with metal rods, which Walker confirmed. The court accepted his guilty pleas for all counts.
On February 22, Walker requested to withdraw his guilty plea for the assault on McPherson. On March 9, the day of his sentencing, his defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw all guilty pleas, arguing they were not voluntary due to Walker's distress over the court's denial of a motion to transfer the case. The court denied the motion, stating that Walker's change of heart was insufficient to justify withdrawal.
During sentencing, Walker was assigned an adjusted offense level of 30 and a criminal history category of VI, resulting in an advisory sentencing range of 168-210 months, which the parties agreed was correct due to Walker's career offender status. The court, deeming the advisory range inadequate given the severity of the assaults, imposed a 240-month sentence.
Regarding the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, a defendant may do so before sentencing if a "fair and just reason" is presented, with the burden on the defendant. Walker's claim of coercion due to the denial of his transfer motion was examined against the court's assurances of an impartial jury selection process. The court found no abuse of discretion or clear error, noting that Walker had previously admitted his guilt and that the plea hearing was thorough. Walker's argument that the spontaneous nature of his plea raised doubts about his earlier statements was dismissed, as he had sufficient time to reflect on his decision during a recess before the plea hearing.
A judge determines if a plea is knowingly and voluntarily made by observing the defendant's demeanor and responses during the plea colloquy, relying heavily on the defendant's sworn answers. A defendant attempting to withdraw a plea must provide reasons that do not contradict their previous statements made during a Rule 11 hearing, facing significant challenges in doing so. The record indicated that Walker's pleas were voluntary, as the judge made efforts to reassure him and ascertain his guilt regarding the charges. The district court's finding of the voluntariness of Walker's guilty pleas was upheld, and the denial of his plea withdrawal motion was deemed not an abuse of discretion.
Walker further contended that his sentence should be vacated due to the district court's failure to provide notice under Rule 32(h) prior to imposing an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines. However, he forfeited this claim by not raising an objection at the district court level, leading to a plain error review. Rule 32(h) requires reasonable notice before a court departs from the sentencing guidelines on grounds not previously identified. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, district courts were mandated to impose sentences within the guidelines unless specific circumstances justified a departure. The concept of "departure" under the guidelines allowed for limited discretion in sentencing outside the prescribed ranges under certain conditions.
After the Supreme Court's decision in *Booker*, the concept of sentence departures has been deemed obsolete in terms of evaluating reasonableness rather than correctness against pre-*Booker* guidelines. Post-*Booker*, district courts have broader discretion to impose sentences outside the advisory Guidelines range, making departure analysis largely irrelevant. The question arises regarding the continuing applicability of Rule 32(h), which originated from *Burns v. United States*, requiring advance notice to defendants before upward departures from the Guidelines. However, since the Guidelines are now advisory, the concerns from *Burns*—primarily the unexpected nature of sua sponte upward departures—no longer exist. Courts now exercise discretion based on a comprehensive set of factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In the case at hand, the defendant, Walker, was aware of the facts used by the district court for its § 3553(a) analysis, and the court's decision to impose a sentence above the advisory range did not rely on previously unreported information. Therefore, Rule 32(h) was not applicable, and no advance notice was required prior to sentencing.
Walker contends that his above-Guidelines sentence of 240 months is unreasonable, but this assertion is rejected. Sentencing courts, following the Booker decision, must calculate an advisory Guidelines range and then determine a sentence based on the factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Sentences within the advisory range are presumed reasonable, while those outside require a more thorough justification. The district court correctly calculated Walker's advisory range and justified its 30-month upward variance by emphasizing the number of victims and the egregious nature of the violence. The court highlighted the psychological harm inflicted on prison guards, noting their daily responsibilities and the need for public protection, which align with the § 3553(a) factors regarding the seriousness of the offenses and the necessity for deterrence. The review standard for reasonableness is deferential, as the district court is better positioned to assess the appropriate sentence. The court's observations during hearings and testimony further supported its rationale, establishing that the 240-month sentence, which is a quarter of the 80-year maximum, was reasonable and adequately explained. The decision is affirmed.
The Eighth Circuit follows a three-step sentencing approach: (1) determine the appropriate Guidelines range, (2) assess the need for a "traditional departure" under U.S.S.G. 4A1.3 or 5K, and (3) evaluate factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) to decide if a sentence outside the advisory Guidelines range is warranted. The distinction between traditional "departures" and variances is crucial, particularly regarding Rule 32(h), where notice is not required for variances. A recent government letter indicated a withdrawal of the argument that Rule 32(h) is inapplicable to post-Booker sentences, suggesting that due process may necessitate notice and opportunity to contest a non-Guideline sentence. However, this new position does not alter the court's previous stance, and no due process argument was raised in this case. The court found that the nature of the stabbings committed by Walker did not reflect a genuine escape plan and concluded they were unprovoked acts of violence. Walker, classified as a career offender, had an adjusted offense level of 30, regardless of the number of victims. The court noted that the element of unfair surprise that justified the creation of Rule 32(h) is no longer applicable, as defendants are now aware that courts can consider a variety of sentencing factors under § 3553(a). Walker was fully informed of the facts relevant to the court’s analysis.
The district court appropriately exercised its discretion under the advisory Guidelines and the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when imposing a 240-month sentence on Walker, which is 30 months above the calculated advisory range. Rule 32(h) did not necessitate advance notice for this upward variance. Walker’s claims of unreasonableness are dismissed; sentences within the advisory range carry a presumption of reasonableness, while those outside require a more substantial explanation. The court expressed concerns about the number of victims and the senseless violence of the offenses, indicating that the advisory range did not adequately reflect these factors. The court also highlighted the psychological impact on prison guards, emphasizing the need for just punishment, deterrence, and public protection. Given the deference owed to the district court's sentencing decisions and its thorough consideration of the case, the 240-month sentence was deemed reasonable and well-justified. The ruling was affirmed.
Assaulting a federal officer performing official duties can result in a maximum penalty of twenty years in prison if a deadly or dangerous weapon is used, or if bodily injury is inflicted, as per 18 U.S.C. 111(b). During the plea colloquy, Walker denied causing bodily injury to Officer McPherson but acknowledged assaulting him with a dangerous weapon, which triggered enhanced penalties under the same statute. Walker was classified as a "Career Offender" under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(b)(C), setting his base offense level at 32 and his criminal history category at VI. This offense level was subsequently reduced by two levels for acceptance of responsibility (U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(a)).
Several circuits, including the Eighth, continue to require district courts to conduct traditional departure analyses post-Booker, which involves three steps: determining the appropriate Guidelines range, deciding if a traditional departure is warranted, and considering factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) for potential sentences outside the advisory range. The Eighth Circuit differentiates between traditional departures and variances regarding Rule 32(h) notice requirements, stating that notice is not needed for variances.
On May 4, 2006, the government filed a letter under Rule 28j, indicating a desire to withdraw its argument against the applicability of Rule 32(h) for out-of-Guidelines sentences post-Booker, citing that due process may necessitate notice and opportunity to be heard regarding departures or non-Guidelines sentences. Despite the government's shift in position, it acknowledged that any error in this case was harmless. The DOJ’s stance suggests that while Rule 32(h) does not technically apply, it should due to due process concerns, although no specific due process argument was made in this case.
Walker expressed a desire to escape from prison to an FBI agent, but the nature of his stabbings was deemed as pointless violence without any realistic escape plan, lacking motivation or animosity towards the victims. As a result of his career offender status and the adjustment for his guilty plea, Walker's adjusted offense level would be 30, maintaining a criminal history category of VI irrespective of the number of victims involved.
